Vulnerabilities

111 via 239 paths

Dependencies

989

Source

GitHub

Commit

efda7998

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Issue type
  • 111
  • 1
Severity
  • 5
  • 48
  • 49
  • 10
Status
  • 112
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: pouchdb
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.0.5.

critical severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.2.0.

Overview

socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. when parsing attachments containing untrusted user input. Attackers can overwrite the _placeholder object to place references to functions in query objects.

PoC

const decoder = new Decoder();

decoder.on("decoded", (packet) => {
  console.log(packet.data); // prints [ 'hello', [Function: splice] ]
})

decoder.add('51-["hello",{"_placeholder":true,"num":"splice"}]');
decoder.add(Buffer.from("world"));

Remediation

Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.3, 3.4.2, 4.0.5, 4.2.1 or higher.

References

critical severity

Predictable Value Range from Previous Values

  • Vulnerable module: form-data
  • Introduced through: request@2.88.2, mosca@1.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 form-data@0.1.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Predictable Value Range from Previous Values via the boundary value, which uses Math.random(). An attacker can manipulate HTTP request boundaries by exploiting predictable values, potentially leading to HTTP parameter pollution.

Remediation

Upgrade form-data to version 2.5.4, 3.0.4, 4.0.4 or higher.

References

critical severity

Authentication Bypass

  • Vulnerable module: hawk
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0

Overview

hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass. The incoming (client supplied) hash of the payload is trusted by the server and not verified before the signature is calculated.

A malicious actor in the middle can alter the payload and the server side will not identify the modification occurred because it simply uses the client provided value instead of verify the hash provided against the modified payload.

According to the maintainers this issue is to be considered out of scope as "payload hash validation is optional and up to developer to implement".

Remediation

There is no fixed version for hawk.

References

critical severity

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: multer
  • Introduced through: multer@0.1.6 and swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to multer@2.0.1.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 multer@1.4.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception in makeMiddleware, when processing a file upload request. An attacker can cause the application to crash by sending a request with a field name containing an empty string.

Remediation

Upgrade multer to version 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: simple-get
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 simple-get@1.4.3

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure. When getting Location response header after fetching a remote url with Cookie, it will follow that url and fetch it with the provided cookie which will be then leaked to the attacker .

Remediation

Upgrade simple-get to version 2.8.2, 3.1.1, 4.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: multer
  • Introduced through: multer@0.1.6 and swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to multer@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 multer@1.4.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime due to improper handling of error events in HTTP request streams, which fails to close the internal busboy stream. An attacker can cause a denial of service by repeatedly triggering errors in file upload streams, leading to resource exhaustion and memory leaks.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the server is handling file uploads.

Remediation

Upgrade multer to version 2.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: multer
  • Introduced through: multer@0.1.6 and swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to multer@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 multer@1.4.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception due to an error event thrown by busboy. An attacker can cause a full nodejs application to crash by sending a specially crafted multi-part upload request.

PoC

const express = require('express')
const multer  = require('multer')
const http  = require('http')
const upload = multer({ dest: 'uploads/' })
const port = 8888

const app = express()

app.post('/upload', upload.single('file'), function (req, res) {
  res.send({})
})

app.listen(port, () => {
  console.log(`Listening on port ${port}`)

  const boundary = 'AaB03x'
  const body = [
    '--' + boundary,
    'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.txt"',
    'Content-Type: text/plain',
    '',
    'test without end boundary'
  ].join('\r\n')
  const options = {
    hostname: 'localhost',
    port,
    path: '/upload',
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'content-type': 'multipart/form-data; boundary=' + boundary,
      'content-length': body.length,
    }
  }
  const req = http.request(options, (res) => {
    console.log(res.statusCode)
  })
  req.on('error', (err) => {
    console.error(err)
  })
  req.write(body)
  req.end()
})

Remediation

Upgrade multer to version 2.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: multer
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 multer@1.4.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception due to improper handling of multipart requests. An attacker can cause the application to crash by sending a specially crafted malformed multi-part upload request that triggers an unhandled exception.

Remediation

Upgrade multer to version 2.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 z-schema@3.25.1 validator@10.11.0

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements in the isLength() function that does not take into account Unicode variation selectors (\uFE0F, \uFE0E) appearing in a sequence which lead to improper string length calculation. This can lead to an application using isLength for input validation accepting strings significantly longer than intended, resulting in issues like data truncation in databases, buffer overflows in other system components, or denial-of-service.

PoC

Input;

const validator = require('validator');

console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 3? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 3 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 4 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F" (String.length: ${'test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F', { max: 4 })}`);

Output:

Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 3? false
Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 4? true
Is "test️️️️" (String.length: 8) length less than or equal to 4? true

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.22 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: protobufjs
  • Introduced through: tingyun@3.1.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingyun@3.1.1 protobufjs@6.10.3

Overview

protobufjs is a protocol buffer for JavaScript (& TypeScript).

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A user-controlled protobuf message can be used by an attacker to pollute the prototype of Object.prototype by adding and overwriting its data and functions. Exploitation can involve:

  1. using the function parse to parse protobuf messages on the fly,

  2. loading .proto files by using load/loadSync functions, or

  3. providing untrusted input to the functions ReflectionObject.setParsedOption and util.setProperty

Note:

  1. This is a different issue from CVE-2022-25878

  2. Users who use this package from npm can rest assured that version 7.2.4 includes the fixed code.

Developers using this package from a different CDN should consider 7.2.5 as the fixed version.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade protobufjs to version 6.11.4, 7.2.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators. However, \ is a valid filename character on posix systems.

By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location. This can lead to extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.7, 5.0.8, 4.4.16 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain two directories and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 "short path" counterparts. A specially crafted tar archive can include directories with two forms of the path that resolve to the same file system entity, followed by a symbolic link with a name in the first form, lastly followed by a file using the second form. This leads to bypassing node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and extracting arbitrary files into that location.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Write

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.

This logic is insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contain a path that is not an absolute path, but specify a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) resolves against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.

Additionally, a .. portion of the path can occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and is not properly sanitized by the logic that checks for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.

Note: This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.9, 5.0.10, 4.4.18 or higher.

References

high severity

DLL Injection

  • Vulnerable module: kerberos
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 kerberos@0.0.24

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to DLL Injection. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by creating a file with the same name in a folder that precedes the intended file in the DLL path search.

Remediation

Upgrade kerberos to version 1.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

  • Vulnerable module: body-parser
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 body-parser@1.18.2

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification) via the extendedparser and urlencoded functions when the URL encoding process is enabled. An attacker can flood the server with a large number of specially crafted requests.

Remediation

Upgrade body-parser to version 1.20.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Overwrite

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient symlink protection. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.

This logic is insufficient when extracting tar files that contain both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations results in the directory being created and added to the node-tar directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped. However, this is also where node-tar checks for symlinks occur. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it is possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7, 6.1.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary File Overwrite

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite. This is due to insufficient absolute path sanitization.

node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example, the path /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.

This logic is insufficient when file paths contain repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar only strips a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) still resolves to an absolute path.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 3.2.2, 4.4.14, 5.0.6, 6.1.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Internal Property Tampering

  • Vulnerable module: bson
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mongodb@2.2.36 mongodb-core@2.1.20 bson@1.0.9

Overview

bson is a BSON Parser for node and browser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Internal Property Tampering. The package will ignore an unknown value for an object's _bsotype, leading to cases where an object is serialized as a document rather than the intended BSON type.

NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2019-2391

Remediation

Upgrade bson to version 1.1.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Internal Property Tampering

  • Vulnerable module: bson
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mongodb@2.2.36 mongodb-core@2.1.20 bson@1.0.9

Overview

bson is a BSON Parser for node and browser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Internal Property Tampering. The package will ignore an unknown value for an object's _bsotype, leading to cases where an object is serialized as a document rather than the intended BSON type.

NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2020-7610

Remediation

Upgrade bson to version 1.1.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmlhttprequest
  • Introduced through: tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 xmlhttprequest@1.4.2

Overview

xmlhttprequest is a wrapper for the built-in http client to emulate the browser XMLHttpRequest object.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection. Provided requests are sent synchronously (async=False on xhr.open), malicious user input flowing into xhr.send could result in arbitrary code being injected and run.

POC

const { XMLHttpRequest } = require("xmlhttprequest")

const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
xhr.open("POST", "http://localhost.invalid/", false /* use synchronize request */)
xhr.send("\\');require(\"fs\").writeFileSync(\"/tmp/aaaaa.txt\", \"poc-20210306\");req.end();//")

Remediation

Upgrade xmlhttprequest to version 1.7.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uninitialized Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: bl
  • Introduced through: coap@0.17.0, mosca@1.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b coap@0.17.0 bl@1.0.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to coap@0.19.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 st@1.1.0 bl@1.0.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.6.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 levelup@0.18.6 bl@0.8.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.3.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 level-sublevel@6.6.5 levelup@0.19.1 bl@0.8.2

Overview

bl is a library that allows you to collect buffers and access with a standard readable buffer interface.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure. If user input ends up in consume() argument and can become negative, BufferList state can be corrupted, tricking it into exposing uninitialized memory via regular .slice() calls.

PoC by chalker

const { BufferList } = require('bl')
const secret = require('crypto').randomBytes(256)
for (let i = 0; i < 1e6; i++) {
  const clone = Buffer.from(secret)
  const bl = new BufferList()
  bl.append(Buffer.from('a'))
  bl.consume(-1024)
  const buf = bl.slice(1)
  if (buf.indexOf(clone) !== -1) {
    console.error(`Match (at ${i})`, buf)
  }
}

Remediation

Upgrade bl to version 2.2.1, 3.0.1, 4.0.3, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: dicer
  • Introduced through: multer@0.1.6 and swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6 busboy@0.2.14 dicer@0.2.5
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 multer@1.4.4 busboy@0.2.14 dicer@0.2.5

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious attacker can send a modified form to server, and crash the nodejs service. An attacker could sent the payload again and again so that the service continuously crashes.

PoC

await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000', { method: 'POST', headers: { ['content-type']: 'multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro', ['content-length']: '145', connection: 'keep-alive', }, body: '------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro\r\n Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bildbeschreibung"\r\n\r\n\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro--' });

Remediation

There is no fixed version for dicer.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: engine.io
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.5.0.

Overview

engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a POST request to the long polling transport.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: engine.io
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.5.0.

Overview

engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious client could send a specially crafted HTTP request, triggering an uncaught exception and killing the Node.js process.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.1, 6.2.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: fresh
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 fresh@0.2.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.15.5.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 send@0.2.0 fresh@0.2.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.15.5.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 fresh@0.2.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1 send@0.1.4 fresh@0.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.15.5.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 send@0.1.4 fresh@0.2.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 fresh@0.2.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 send@0.1.4 fresh@0.2.0

Overview

fresh is HTTP response freshness testing.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. A Regular Expression (/ *, */) was used for parsing HTTP headers and take about 2 seconds matching time for 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade fresh to version 0.5.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: gun
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.2019.416.

Overview

gun is an ecosystem of tools that let you build community run and encrypted applications.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal. Using curl --path-as-is allowed reads on any parent directory or files.

PoC

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:8080/gun/../../.env'

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade gun to version 0.2019.416 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.

PoC

lodash.zipobjectdeep:

const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

lodash:

const test = require("lodash");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: moment
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 moment@2.8.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.5.1.

Overview

moment is a lightweight JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal when a user provides a locale string which is directly used to switch moment locale.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade moment to version 2.29.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mongodb
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mongodb@2.2.36
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 mongodb@2.1.21

Overview

mongodb is an official MongoDB driver for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package fails to properly catch an exception when a collection name is invalid and the DB does not exist, crashing the application.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade mongodb to version 3.1.13 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: negotiator
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 accepts@1.0.0 negotiator@0.3.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.14.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 negotiator@0.3.0
    Remediation: Open PR to patch negotiator@0.3.0.

Overview

negotiator is an HTTP content negotiator for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when parsing Accept-Language http header.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade negotiator to version 0.6.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: parsejson
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 engine.io-client@1.8.6 parsejson@0.0.3

Overview

parsejson is a method that parses a JSON string and returns a JSON object.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. An attacker may pass a specially crafted JSON data, causing the server to hang.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for parsejson.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, pouchdb@3.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.8.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 qs@0.6.5
    Remediation: Open PR to patch qs@0.6.5.

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). During parsing, the qs module may create a sparse area (an array where no elements are filled), and grow that array to the necessary size based on the indices used on it. An attacker can specify a high index value in a query string, thus making the server allocate a respectively big array. Truly large values can cause the server to run out of memory and cause it to crash - thus enabling a Denial-of-Service attack.

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 1.0.0 or higher.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

References

high severity

Prototype Override Protection Bypass

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, pouchdb@3.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.15.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6 qs@1.2.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to multer@1.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 qs@0.6.5

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Override Protection Bypass. By default qs protects against attacks that attempt to overwrite an object's existing prototype properties, such as toString(), hasOwnProperty(),etc.

From qs documentation:

By default parameters that would overwrite properties on the object prototype are ignored, if you wish to keep the data from those fields either use plainObjects as mentioned above, or set allowPrototypes to true which will allow user input to overwrite those properties. WARNING It is generally a bad idea to enable this option as it can cause problems when attempting to use the properties that have been overwritten. Always be careful with this option.

Overwriting these properties can impact application logic, potentially allowing attackers to work around security controls, modify data, make the application unstable and more.

In versions of the package affected by this vulnerability, it is possible to circumvent this protection and overwrite prototype properties and functions by prefixing the name of the parameter with [ or ]. e.g. qs.parse("]=toString") will return {toString = true}, as a result, calling toString() on the object will throw an exception.

Example:

qs.parse('toString=foo', { allowPrototypes: false })
// {}

qs.parse("]=toString", { allowPrototypes: false })
// {toString = true} <== prototype overwritten

For more information, you can check out our blog.

Disclosure Timeline

  • February 13th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
  • February 13th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
  • February 16th, 2017 - Partial fix released in versions 6.0.3, 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.3.1.
  • March 6th, 2017 - Final fix released in versions 6.4.0,6.3.2, 6.2.3, 6.1.2 and 6.0.4

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 6.0.4, 6.1.2, 6.2.3, 6.3.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Poisoning

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, pouchdb@3.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.17.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b multer@0.1.6 qs@1.2.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to multer@1.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 body-parser@1.18.2 qs@6.5.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 qs@0.6.5

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning which allows attackers to cause a Node process to hang, processing an Array object whose prototype has been replaced by one with an excessive length value.

Note: In many typical Express use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 6.2.4, 6.3.3, 6.4.1, 6.5.3, 6.6.1, 6.7.3, 6.8.3, 6.9.7, 6.10.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: semver
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0 and pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 level-sublevel@6.6.5 levelup@0.19.1 semver@5.1.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 semver@5.3.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 levelup@0.18.6 semver@2.3.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.3.0.

Overview

semver is a semantic version parser used by npm.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

PoC


const semver = require('semver')
const lengths_2 = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]

console.log("n[+] Valid range - Test payloads")
for (let i = 0; i =1.2.3' + ' '.repeat(lengths_2[i]) + '<1.3.0';
const start = Date.now()
semver.validRange(value)
// semver.minVersion(value)
// semver.maxSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// semver.minSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// new semver.Range(value, {})

const end = Date.now();
console.log('length=%d, time=%d ms', value.length, end - start);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade semver to version 5.7.2, 6.3.1, 7.5.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.2.0.

Overview

socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a large packet because a concatenation approach is used.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.2, 3.4.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 tough-cookie@0.9.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). An attacker can provide a cookie, which nearly matches the pattern being matched. This will cause the regular expression matching to take a long time, all the while occupying the event loop and preventing it from processing other requests and making the server unavailable (a Denial of Service attack).

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 2.3.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 ws@2.2.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.9.999.

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) when the number of received headers exceed the server.maxHeadersCount or request.maxHeadersCount threshold.

Workaround

This issue can be mitigating by following these steps:

  1. Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.

  2. Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

PoC


const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');

const server = http.createServer();

const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ server });

server.listen(function () {
  const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');
  const headers = {};
  let count = 0;

  for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {
    if (count === 2000) break;

    for (let j = 0; j < chars.length; j++) {
      const key = chars[i] + chars[j];
      headers[key] = 'x';

      if (++count === 2000) break;
    }
  }

  headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';
  headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';
  headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';
  headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';

  const request = http.request({
    headers: headers,
    host: '127.0.0.1',
    port: server.address().port
  });

  request.end();
});

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade ws to version 5.2.4, 6.2.3, 7.5.10, 8.17.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 websocket-stream@2.0.2 ws@0.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@1.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 ws@0.4.32

Overview

ws is a WebSocket client and server implementation.

Affected versions of this package did not limit the size of an incoming payload before it was processed by default. As a result, a very large payload (over 256MB in size) could lead to a failed allocation and crash the node process - enabling a Denial of Service attack.

While 256MB may seem excessive, note that the attack is likely to be sent from another server, not an end-user computer, using data-center connection speeds. In those speeds, a payload of this size can be transmitted in seconds.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Update to version 1.1.1 or greater, which sets a default maxPayload of 100MB. If you cannot upgrade, apply a Snyk patch, or provide ws with options setting the maxPayload to an appropriate size that is smaller than 256MB.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0, mosca@1.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 ws@2.2.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.9.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 websocket-stream@2.0.2 ws@0.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@1.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 ws@0.4.32

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. A specially crafted value of the Sec-WebSocket-Extensions header that used Object.prototype property names as extension or parameter names could be used to make a ws server crash.

PoC:

const WebSocket = require('ws');
const net = require('net');

const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 3000 }, function () {
  const payload = 'constructor';  // or ',;constructor'

  const request = [
    'GET / HTTP/1.1',
    'Connection: Upgrade',
    'Sec-WebSocket-Key: test',
    'Sec-WebSocket-Version: 8',
    `Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: ${payload}`,
    'Upgrade: websocket',
    '\r\n'
  ].join('\r\n');

  const socket = net.connect(3000, function () {
    socket.resume();
    socket.write(request);
  });
});

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade ws to version 1.1.5, 3.3.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: hawk
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in header parsing where each added character in the attacker's input increases the computation time exponentially.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade hawk to version 9.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: aws-sdk
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. If an attacker submits a malicious INI file to an application that parses it with loadSharedConfigFiles , they will pollute the prototype on the application. This can be exploited further depending on the context.

PoC by Eugene Lim:

payload.toml:

[__proto__]
polluted = "polluted"

poc.js:

var fs = require('fs')
var sharedIniFileLoader = require('@aws-sdk/shared-ini-file-loader')

async function main() {
var parsed = await sharedIniFileLoader.loadSharedConfigFiles({ filepath: './payload.toml' })
console.log(parsed)
console.log(parsed.__proto__)
console.log({}.__proto__)
console.log(polluted)
}

main()
> node poc.js
{
configFile: { default: { region: 'ap-southeast-1' } },
credentialsFile: {}
}
{ polluted: '"polluted"' }
{ polluted: '"polluted"' }
"polluted"

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade aws-sdk to version 2.814.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Insecure Randomness

  • Vulnerable module: crypto-browserify
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 crypto-browserify@1.0.9
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.

Overview

crypto-browserify is implementation of crypto for the browser.

Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Insecure Randomness due to using the cryptographically insecure Math.random(). This function can produce predictable values and should not be used in security-sensitive context.

Details

Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated.

There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value. In general, if a PRNG algorithm is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.

You can read more about node's insecure Math.random() in Mike Malone's post.

Remediation

Upgrade crypto-browserify to version 2.1.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: extend
  • Introduced through: tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 pty.js@0.3.1 extend@1.2.1

Overview

extend is a port of the classic extend() method from jQuery.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. Utilities function can be tricked into modifying the prototype of "Object" when the attacker control part of the structure passed to these function. This can let an attacker add or modify existing property that will exist on all object.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade extend to version 2.0.2, 3.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.

PoC by Snyk

const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'

function check() {
    mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
    if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
        console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
    }
  }

check();

For more information, check out our blog post

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.

PoC

lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mosca
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.8.2.

Overview

mosca is a MQTT broker as a module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A crafted regular expression can cause the broker to crash. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to deny access to the target system.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade mosca to version 2.8.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: properties-reader
  • Introduced through: tingyun@3.1.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingyun@3.1.1 properties-reader@0.3.1

Overview

properties-reader is a Properties file reader for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution.

PoC by Eugene Lim:

payload.properties

[__proto__]
polluted = polluted

poc.js:

var propertiesReader = require('properties-reader');

propertiesReader('./payload.properties');
console.log({}.__proto__)
console.log(polluted)
> node poc.js
{ polluted: 'polluted' }
polluted

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade properties-reader to version 2.2.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

high severity

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: localtunnel@2.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b localtunnel@2.0.2 axios@0.21.4

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) due to inserting the X-XSRF-TOKEN header using the secret XSRF-TOKEN cookie value in all requests to any server when the XSRF-TOKEN0 cookie is available, and the withCredentials setting is turned on. If a malicious user manages to obtain this value, it can potentially lead to the XSRF defence mechanism bypass.

Workaround

Users should change the default XSRF-TOKEN cookie name in the Axios configuration and manually include the corresponding header only in the specific places where it's necessary.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.28.0, 1.6.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Privilege Management

  • Vulnerable module: shelljs
  • Introduced through: shelljs@0.7.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b shelljs@0.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to shelljs@0.8.5.

Overview

shelljs is a wrapper for the Unix shell commands for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management. When ShellJS is used to create shell scripts which may be running as root, users with low-level privileges on the system can leak sensitive information such as passwords (depending on implementation) from the standard output of the privileged process OR shutdown privileged ShellJS processes via the exec function when triggering EACCESS errors.

Note: Thi only impacts the synchronous version of shell.exec().

Remediation

Upgrade shelljs to version 0.8.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: localtunnel@2.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b localtunnel@2.0.2 axios@0.21.4

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via the data: URL handler. An attacker can trigger a denial of service by crafting a data: URL with an excessive payload, causing allocation of memory for content decoding before verifying content size limits.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 1.12.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: path-to-regexp
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 path-to-regexp@0.1.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 path-to-regexp@2.4.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when including multiple regular expression parameters in a single segment, which will produce the regular expression /^\/([^\/]+?)-([^\/]+?)\/?$/, if two parameters within a single segment are separated by a character other than a / or .. Poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS.

Note: While the 8.0.0 release has completely eliminated the vulnerable functionality, prior versions that have received the patch to mitigate backtracking may still be vulnerable if custom regular expressions are used. So it is strongly recommended for regular expression input to be controlled to avoid malicious performance degradation in those versions. This behavior is enforced as of version 7.1.0 via the strict option, which returns an error if a dangerous regular expression is detected.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be avoided by using a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a segment, which excludes - and /.

PoC

/a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade path-to-regexp to version 0.1.10, 1.9.0, 3.3.0, 6.3.0, 8.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: path-to-regexp
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 path-to-regexp@0.1.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.2.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when including multiple regular expression parameters in a single segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS.

Note:

This issue is caused due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-45296.

Workarounds

This can be mitigated by avoiding using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Alternatively, the regex used for both parameters can be defined to ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking.

PoC

/a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade path-to-regexp to version 0.1.12 or higher.

References

medium severity

Timing Attack

  • Vulnerable module: http-signature
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 http-signature@0.10.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

http-signature is a reference implementation of Joyent's HTTP Signature scheme.

Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Timing Attacks due to time-variable comparison of signatures.

The library implemented a character to character comparison, similar to the built-in string comparison mechanism, ===, and not a time constant string comparison. As a result, the comparison will fail faster when the first characters in the signature are incorrect. An attacker can use this difference to perform a timing attack, essentially allowing them to guess the signature one character at a time.

You can read more about timing attacks in Node.js on the Snyk blog.

Remediation

Upgrade http-signature to version 1.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, pouchdb@3.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.8.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 qs@0.6.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 qs@0.6.5
    Remediation: Open PR to patch qs@0.6.5.

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). When parsing a string representing a deeply nested object, qs will block the event loop for long periods of time. Such a delay may hold up the server's resources, keeping it from processing other requests in the meantime, thus enabling a Denial-of-Service attack.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 1.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: request@2.88.2, mosca@1.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion') due to the lack of folders count validation during the folder creation process. An attacker who generates a large number of sub-folders can consume memory on the system running the software and even crash the client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: request@2.88.2, mosca@1.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 tough-cookie@0.9.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Remote Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 websocket-stream@2.0.2 ws@0.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@1.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 ws@0.4.32
    Remediation: Open PR to patch ws@0.4.32.

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.

A client side memory disclosure vulnerability exists in ping functionality of the ws service. When a client sends a ping request and provides an integer value as ping data, it will result in leaking an uninitialized memory buffer.

This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.

ws's ping function uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code.

Proof of Concept:

var ws = require('ws')

var server = new ws.Server({ port: 9000 })
var client = new ws('ws://localhost:9000')

client.on('open', function () {
  console.log('open')
  client.ping(50) // this makes the client allocate an uninitialized buffer of 50 bytes and send it to the server

  client.on('pong', function (data) {
    console.log('got pong')
    console.log(data)
  })
})

Details

The Buffer class on Node.js is a mutable array of binary data, and can be initialized with a string, array or number.

const buf1 = new Buffer([1,2,3]);
// creates a buffer containing [01, 02, 03]
const buf2 = new Buffer('test');
// creates a buffer containing ASCII bytes [74, 65, 73, 74]
const buf3 = new Buffer(10);
// creates a buffer of length 10

The first two variants simply create a binary representation of the value it received. The last one, however, pre-allocates a buffer of the specified size, making it a useful buffer, especially when reading data from a stream. When using the number constructor of Buffer, it will allocate the memory, but will not fill it with zeros. Instead, the allocated buffer will hold whatever was in memory at the time. If the buffer is not zeroed by using buf.fill(0), it may leak sensitive information like keys, source code, and system info.

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.

References

medium severity

  • Vulnerable module: cookie
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, tty.js@0.2.15 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 cookie@0.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.1.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 cookie@0.1.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 cookie@0.1.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5 cookie@0.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@4.8.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name, path, or domain, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.

Workaround

Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade cookie to version 0.7.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Non-Constant Time String Comparison

  • Vulnerable module: cookie-signature
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 cookie-signature@1.0.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.4.5.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 cookie-signature@1.0.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 cookie-signature@1.0.1

Overview

'cookie-signature' is a library for signing cookies.

Versions before 1.0.4 of the library use the built-in string comparison mechanism, ===, and not a time constant string comparison. As a result, the comparison will fail faster when the first characters in the token are incorrect. An attacker can use this difference to perform a timing attack, essentially allowing them to guess the secret one character at a time.

You can read more about timing attacks in Node.js on the Snyk blog: https://snyk.io/blog/node-js-timing-attack-ccc-ctf/

Remediation

Upgrade to 1.0.4 or greater.

References

medium severity

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

  • Vulnerable module: express
  • Introduced through: tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4

Overview

express is a minimalist web framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') through the response.links function. An attacker can inject arbitrary resources into the Link header by using unsanitized input that includes special characters such as commas, semicolons, and angle brackets.

PoC

var express = require('express')
var app = express()

app.get('/', function (req, res) {
  res.links({"preload": req.query.resource});
  if(req.query.resource){
    console.log(res.getHeaders().link)
  }
  res.send('ok');
});
  
app.listen(3000);

// note how the query param uses < > to load arbitrary resource
const maliciousQueryParam = '?resource=http://api.example.com/users?resource=>; rel="preload", <http://api.malicious.com/1.js>; rel="preload"; as="script", <http:/api.example.com';

const url = `http://localhost:3000/${maliciousQueryParam}`;
  
fetch(url);

Remediation

Upgrade express to version 4.0.0-rc1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: hoek
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0 hoek@0.9.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0 boom@0.4.2 hoek@0.9.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0 sntp@0.2.4 hoek@0.9.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0 cryptiles@0.2.2 boom@0.4.2 hoek@0.9.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

hoek is an Utility methods for the hapi ecosystem.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade hoek to version 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: localtunnel@2.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b localtunnel@2.0.2 axios@0.21.4

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to the allowAbsoluteUrls attribute being ignored in the call to the buildFullPath function from the HTTP adapter. An attacker could launch SSRF attacks or exfiltrate sensitive data by tricking applications into sending requests to malicious endpoints.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');
const client = axios.create({baseURL: 'http://example.com/', allowAbsoluteUrls: false});
client.get('http://evil.com');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: localtunnel@2.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b localtunnel@2.0.2 axios@0.21.4

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to not setting allowAbsoluteUrls to false by default when processing a requested URL in buildFullPath(). It may not be obvious that this value is being used with the less safe default, and URLs that are expected to be blocked may be accepted. This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2025-27152.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: shelljs@0.7.1, mqtt@1.14.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b shelljs@0.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 bunyan@1.8.15 mv@2.1.1 rimraf@2.4.5 glob@6.0.4 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2 fstream@1.0.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: express
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.19.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4

Overview

express is a minimalist web framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to the implementation of URL encoding using encodeurl before passing it to the location header. This can lead to unexpected evaluations of malformed URLs by common redirect allow list implementations in applications, allowing an attacker to bypass a properly implemented allow list and redirect users to malicious sites.

Remediation

Upgrade express to version 4.19.2, 5.0.0-beta.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: moment
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 moment@2.8.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.5.1.

Overview

moment is a lightweight JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates.

Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks for any locale that has separate format and standalone options and format input can be controlled by the user.

An attacker can provide a specially crafted input to the format function, which nearly matches the pattern being matched. This will cause the regular expression matching to take a long time, all the while occupying the event loop and preventing it from processing other requests and making the server unavailable (a Denial of Service attack).

Disclosure Timeline

  • October 19th, 2016 - Reported the issue to package owner.
  • October 19th, 2016 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
  • October 24th, 2016 - Issue fixed and version 2.15.2 released.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 tough-cookie@0.9.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

tough-cookie is RFC6265 Cookies and Cookie Jar for node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. An attacker may pass a specially crafted cookie, causing the server to hang.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade to version 2.3.3 or newer.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: optimist@0.6.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true

require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: log4js
  • Introduced through: log4js@1.1.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b log4js@1.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to log4js@6.4.0.

Overview

log4js is a Port of Log4js to work with node.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure via the default file permissions for log files that are created by the file, fileSync and dateFile appenders which are world-readable (in unix). This could cause problems if log files contain sensitive information. This would affect any users that have not supplied their own permissions for the files via the mode parameter in the config.

Remediation

Upgrade log4js to version 6.4.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: express
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.5.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4

Overview

express is a minimalist web framework.

Affected versions of this package do not enforce the user's browser to set a specific charset in the content-type header while displaying 400 level response messages. This could be used by remote attackers to perform a cross-site scripting attack, by using non-standard encodings like UTF-7.

Details

<>

Recommendations

Update express to 3.11.0, 4.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: localtunnel@2.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b localtunnel@2.0.2 axios@0.21.4

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). An attacker can deplete system resources by providing a manipulated string as input to the format method, causing the regular expression to exhibit a time complexity of O(n^2). This makes the server to become unable to provide normal service due to the excessive cost and time wasted in processing vulnerable regular expressions.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

console.time('t1');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(10000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t1');

console.time('t2');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(100000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t2');


/* stdout
t1: 60.826ms
t2: 5.826s
*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.29.0, 1.6.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: glob-parent
  • Introduced through: mqtt@1.14.1 and mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob-parent@3.1.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob-parent@3.1.0
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mqtt@1.14.1 help-me@1.1.0 glob-stream@6.1.0 glob-parent@3.1.0

Overview

glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.

PoC by Yeting Li

var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}

return ret;
}

globParent(build_attack(5000));

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade glob-parent to version 5.1.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: gun
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.2019.416.

Overview

gun is an ecosystem of tools that let you build community run and encrypted applications.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure. Using curl --path-as-is allowed reads on any parent directory or files.

Remediation

Upgrade gun to version 0.2019.416 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.

POC

var lo = require('lodash');

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)

var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)

var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: moment
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 moment@2.8.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@1.2.0.

Overview

moment is a lightweight JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates.

An attacker can provide a long value to the duration function, which nearly matches the pattern being matched. This will cause the regular expression matching to take a long time, all the while occupying the event loop and preventing it from processing other requests and making the server unavailable (a Denial of Service attack).

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade moment to version 2.11.2 or greater.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: redis
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 redis@2.8.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.0.0.

Overview

redis is an A high performance Redis client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). When a client is in monitoring mode, monitor_regex, which is used to detected monitor messages` could cause exponential backtracking on some strings, leading to denial of service.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade redis to version 3.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: semver
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 levelup@0.18.6 semver@2.3.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

semver is a semantic version parser used by npm.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The semver module uses regular expressions when parsing a version string. For a carefully crafted input, the time it takes to process these regular expressions is not linear to the length of the input. Since the semver module did not enforce a limit on the version string length, an attacker could provide a long string that would take up a large amount of resources, potentially taking a server down. This issue therefore enables a potential Denial of Service attack.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade semver to version 4.3.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Root Path Disclosure

  • Vulnerable module: send
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 send@0.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.11.1.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1 send@0.1.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.11.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 send@0.1.4
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 send@0.1.4

Overview

Send is a library for streaming files from the file system as an http response. It supports partial responses (Ranges), conditional-GET negotiation, high test coverage, and granular events which may be leveraged to take appropriate actions in your application or framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to a Root Path Disclosure.

Remediation

Upgrade send to version 0.11.1 or higher. If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard to patch this vulnerability.

References

medium severity

Insecure Defaults

  • Vulnerable module: socket.io
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.4.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16

Overview

socket.io is a node.js realtime framework server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Defaults due to CORS Misconfiguration. All domains are whitelisted by default.

Remediation

Upgrade socket.io to version 2.4.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 uglify-js@1.2.5

Overview

uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 uglify-js@1.2.5

Overview

The parse() function in the uglify-js package prior to version 2.6.0 is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks when long inputs of certain patterns are processed.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade to version 2.6.0 or greater. If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard to patch this vulnerability.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 z-schema@3.25.1 validator@10.11.0

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input in the isURL() function which does not take into account : as the delimiter in browsers. An attackers can bypass protocol and domain validation by crafting URLs that exploit the discrepancy in protocol parsing that can lead to Cross-Site Scripting and Open Redirect attacks.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.20 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 z-schema@3.25.1 validator@10.11.0

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isSlug function

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "111"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "a"
    }

    return ret+"_";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isSlug(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 z-schema@3.25.1 validator@10.11.0

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isHSL function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "hsla(0"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += " "
    }

    return ret+"◎";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isHSL(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: swagger-tools@0.10.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b swagger-tools@0.10.4 z-schema@3.25.1 validator@10.11.0

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isEmail function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = ""
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "<"
    }

    return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        validator.isEmail(attack_str,{ allow_display_name: true })
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Insecure Randomness

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 websocket-stream@2.0.2 ws@0.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@1.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 ws@0.4.32
    Remediation: Open PR to patch ws@0.4.32.

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.

Affected versions of the package use the cryptographically insecure Math.random() which can produce predictable values and should not be used in security-sensitive context.

Details

Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated.

There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value. In general, if a PRNG algorithm is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.

You can read more about node's insecure Math.random() in Mike Malone's post.

Remediation

Upgrade ws to version 1.1.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0, mqtt@1.14.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 ws@2.2.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.9.999.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mqtt@1.14.1 websocket-stream@3.3.3 ws@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to mqtt@2.8.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5 ws@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.3.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 mqtt@1.14.1 websocket-stream@3.3.3 ws@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 engine.io-client@1.8.6 ws@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.4.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 ascoltatori@2.0.1 mqtt@1.14.1 websocket-stream@3.3.3 ws@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 websocket-stream@2.0.2 ws@0.8.1
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 socket.io@0.9.16 socket.io-client@0.9.16 ws@0.4.32

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

##PoC

for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();

  value.trim().split(/ *, */);

  const end = process.hrtime.bigint();

  console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ws to version 7.4.6, 6.2.2, 5.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xml2js
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xml2js@0.4.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to allowing an external attacker to edit or add new properties to an object. This is possible because the application does not properly validate incoming JSON keys, thus allowing the __proto__ property to be edited.

PoC

var parseString = require('xml2js').parseString;

let normal_user_request    = "<role>admin</role>";
let malicious_user_request = "<__proto__><role>admin</role></__proto__>";

const update_user = (userProp) => {
    // A user cannot alter his role. This way we prevent privilege escalations.
    parseString(userProp, function (err, user) {
        if(user.hasOwnProperty("role") && user?.role.toLowerCase() === "admin") {
            console.log("Unauthorized Action");
        } else {
            console.log(user?.role[0]);
        }
    });
}

update_user(normal_user_request);
update_user(malicious_user_request);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade xml2js to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Uninitialized Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: bl
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0 and mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 levelup@0.18.6 bl@0.8.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.3.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 level-sublevel@6.6.5 levelup@0.19.1 bl@0.8.2

Overview

bl is a storage object for collections of Node Buffers.

A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number is provided to the append() method and results in concatenation of uninitialized memory to the buffer collection.

This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.

Details

Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.

In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":

// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');

bl's append function uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL.

const BufferList = require('bl')

var bl = new BufferList()
bl.append(new Buffer('abcd'))
bl.append(new Buffer('efg'))
bl.append('100')
// appends a Buffer holding 100 bytes of uninitialized memory
bl.append(100)                     
bl.append(new Buffer('j'))

You can read more about the insecure Buffer behavior on our blog.

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.

Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting

  • Vulnerable module: express
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4

Overview

express is a minimalist web framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper handling of user input in the response.redirect method. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by passing malicious input to this method.

Note

To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions are required:

  1. The attacker should be able to control the input to response.redirect()

  2. express must not redirect before the template appears

  3. the browser must not complete redirection before:

  4. the user must click on the link in the template

Remediation

Upgrade express to version 4.20.0, 5.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Remote Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Memory Exposure. A potential remote memory exposure vulnerability exists in request. If a request uses a multipart attachment and the body type option is number with value X, then X bytes of uninitialized memory will be sent in the body of the request.

Note that while the impact of this vulnerability is high (memory exposure), exploiting it is likely difficult, as the attacker needs to somehow control the body type of the request. One potential exploit scenario is when a request is composed based on JSON input, including the body type, allowing a malicious JSON to trigger the memory leak.

Details

Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with non zero-ed out memory. Example:

var x = new Buffer(100); // uninitialized Buffer of length 100
// vs
var x = new Buffer('100'); // initialized Buffer with value of '100'

Initializing a multipart body in such manner will cause uninitialized memory to be sent in the body of the request.

Proof of concept

var http = require('http')
var request = require('request')

http.createServer(function (req, res) {
  var data = ''
  req.setEncoding('utf8')
  req.on('data', function (chunk) {
    console.log('data')
    data += chunk
  })
  req.on('end', function () {
    // this will print uninitialized memory from the client
    console.log('Client sent:\n', data)
  })
  res.end()
}).listen(8000)

request({
  method: 'POST',
  uri: 'http://localhost:8000',
  multipart: [{ body: 1000 }]
},
function (err, res, body) {
  if (err) return console.error('upload failed:', err)
  console.log('sent')
})

Remediation

Upgrade request to version 2.68.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Uninitialized Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: tunnel-agent
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 tunnel-agent@0.3.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

tunnel-agent is HTTP proxy tunneling agent. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.

A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number is used to set the proxy.auth option of a request request and results in a possible uninitialized memory exposures in the request body.

This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.

Details

Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.

In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":

// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');

tunnel-agent's request construction uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL.

Proof of concept by ChALkeR

require('request')({
  method: 'GET',
  uri: 'http://www.example.com',
  tunnel: true,
  proxy:{
      protocol: 'http:',
      host:"127.0.0.1",
      port:8080,
      auth:80
  }
});

You can read more about the insecure Buffer behavior on our blog.

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.

Remediation

Upgrade tunnel-agent to version 0.6.0 or higher. Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: gun@0.7.0 and tingodb@0.3.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b gun@0.7.0 aws-sdk@2.15.0 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to gun@0.7.3.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tingodb@0.3.5 lodash@2.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to tingodb@0.6.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

medium severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: send
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 send@0.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.8.8.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1 send@0.1.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.8.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 send@0.1.4
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 send@0.1.4

Overview

send is a library for streaming files from the file system.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory-Traversal attacks due to insecure comparison. When relying on the root option to restrict file access a malicious user may escape out of the restricted directory and access files in a similarly named directory. For example, a path like /my-secret is consedered fine for the root /my.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade to a version greater than or equal to 0.8.4.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: st
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 st@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.6.0.

Overview

st is a module for serving static files.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect. A malicious user could send a specially crafted request, which would automatically redirect the request to another domain, controlled by the attacker.

Note: st will only redirect if requests are served from the root(/) and not from a subdirectory

References

medium severity

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: node-ninja
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2

MPL-2.0 license

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: debug
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 debug@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5 debug@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 debug@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 debug@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 engine.io-client@1.8.6 debug@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0
    Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.2.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.

Overview

debug is a small debugging utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument. The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.

Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.

PoC

Use the following regex in the %o formatter.

/\s*\n\s*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: hawk
  • Introduced through: pouchdb@3.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 hawk@1.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@4.0.2.

Overview

hawk is an HTTP authentication scheme using a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm to provide partial HTTP request cryptographic verification.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

You can read more about Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) on our blog.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mime
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0, pouchdb@3.1.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 accepts@1.0.0 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Open PR to patch mime@1.2.11.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 send@0.2.0 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.16.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 type-is@1.0.0 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.4.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.3.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1 send@0.1.4 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.16.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 send@0.1.4 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Open PR to patch mime@1.2.11.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b pouchdb@3.1.0 request@2.28.0 form-data@0.1.4 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Upgrade to pouchdb@6.3.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 send@0.1.4 mime@1.2.11
    Remediation: Open PR to patch mime@1.2.11.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 st@1.1.0 mime@1.3.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.6.0.

Overview

mime is a comprehensive, compact MIME type module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It uses regex the following regex /.*[\.\/\\]/ in its lookup, which can cause a slowdown of 2 seconds for 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade mime to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.

References

low severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: optimist@0.6.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.

Notes:

  • This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598

  • The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: moment
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 moment@2.8.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to mosca@2.5.1.

Overview

moment is a lightweight JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (/[0-9]*['a-z\u00A0-\u05FF\u0700-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF]+|[\u0600-\u06FF\/]+(\s*?[\u0600-\u06FF]+){1,2}/i) in order to parse dates specified as strings. This can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds matching time for data 50k characters long.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade moment to version 2.19.3 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ms
  • Introduced through: socket.io@1.7.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 debug@2.3.3 ms@0.7.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 engine.io@1.8.5 debug@2.3.3 ms@0.7.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 debug@2.3.3 ms@0.7.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 debug@2.3.3 ms@0.7.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.2.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 engine.io-client@1.8.6 debug@2.3.3 ms@0.7.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0 ms@0.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0 ms@0.7.1
    Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.1.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b socket.io@1.7.4 socket.io-client@1.7.4 socket.io-parser@2.3.1 debug@2.2.0 ms@0.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to socket.io@2.0.0.

Overview

ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.

Proof of concept

ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s

Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.

For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
  • Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
  • April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
  • May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
  • May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version 2.0.0 released.
  • May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions >=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: mosca@1.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-gyp@3.8.0 tar@2.2.2
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b mosca@1.1.0 leveldown@1.4.6 prebuild@4.5.0 node-ninja@1.0.2 tar@2.2.2

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). When stripping the trailing slash from files arguments, the f.replace(/\/+$/, '') performance of this function can exponentially degrade when f contains many / characters resulting in ReDoS.

This vulnerability is not likely to be exploitable as it requires that the untrusted input is being passed into the tar.extract() or tar.list() array of entries to parse/extract, which would be unusual.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.1.4, 5.0.8, 4.4.16 or higher.

References

low severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: serve-static
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.9.0.

Overview

When using serve-static middleware version < 1.7.2 and it's configured to mount at the root, it creates an open redirect on the site.

Source: Node Security Project

Details

For example:

If a user visits http://example.com//www.google.com/%2e%2e they will be redirected to //www.google.com/%2e%2e, which some browsers interpret as http://www.google.com/%2e%2e.

Remediation

  • Update to version 1.7.2 or greater (or 1.6.5 if sticking to the 1.6.x line).
  • Disable redirects if not using the feature with 'redirect: false' option and cannot upgrade.

References

low severity

Cross-site Scripting

  • Vulnerable module: send
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0 and tty.js@0.2.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 send@0.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1 send@0.1.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.0.
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 send@0.1.4
  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b tty.js@0.2.15 express@3.4.4 connect@2.11.0 send@0.1.4

Overview

send is a Better streaming static file server with Range and conditional-GET support

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper user input sanitization passed to the SendStream.redirect() function, which executes untrusted code. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by manipulating the input parameters to this method.

Note:

Exploiting this vulnerability requires the following:

  1. The attacker needs to control the input to response.redirect()

  2. Express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears

  3. The browser MUST NOT complete redirection before

  4. The user MUST click on the link in the template

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade send to version 0.19.0, 1.1.0 or higher.

References

low severity

Cross-site Scripting

  • Vulnerable module: serve-static
  • Introduced through: express@4.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Arduinojs@openfpgaduino/arduinojs#efda79987c105b749b2dc5f220ac9ac183bd266b express@4.0.0 serve-static@1.0.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.

Overview

serve-static is a server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper sanitization of user input in the redirect function. An attacker can manipulate the redirection process by injecting malicious code into the input.

Note

To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions are required:

  1. The attacker should be able to control the input to response.redirect()

  2. express must not redirect before the template appears

  3. the browser must not complete redirection before:

  4. the user must click on the link in the template

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade serve-static to version 1.16.0, 2.1.0 or higher.

References