Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: sharp
- Introduced through: sharp@0.30.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › sharp@0.30.7Remediation: Upgrade to sharp@0.32.6.
Overview
sharp is a High performance Node.js image processing, the fastest module to resize JPEG, PNG, WebP, GIF, AVIF and TIFF images
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow when the ReadHuffmanCodes()
function is used. An attacker can craft a special WebP
lossless file that triggers the ReadHuffmanCodes()
function to allocate the HuffmanCode buffer with a size that comes from an array of precomputed sizes: kTableSize
. The color_cache_bits
value defines which size to use. The kTableSize
array only takes into account sizes for 8-bit first-level table lookups but not second-level table lookups. libwebp allows codes that are up to 15-bit (MAX_ALLOWED_CODE_LENGTH
). When BuildHuffmanTable() attempts to fill the second-level tables it may write data out-of-bounds. The OOB write to the undersized array happens in ReplicateValue.
Notes:
This is only exploitable if the color_cache_bits
value defines which size to use.
This vulnerability was also published on libwebp CVE-2023-5129
Changelog:
2023-09-12: Initial advisory publication
2023-09-27: Advisory details updated, including CVSS, references
2023-09-27: CVE-2023-5129 rejected as a duplicate of CVE-2023-4863
2023-09-28: Research and addition of additional affected libraries
2024-01-28: Additional fix information
Remediation
Upgrade sharp
to version 0.32.6 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to a missing signature length check in the EDDSA
signature process. An attacker can manipulate the signature by appending or removing zero-valued bytes.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var eddsa = elliptic.eddsa;
var ed25519 = new eddsa('ed25519');
var key = ed25519.keyFromPublic('7d4d0e7f6153a69b6242b522abbee685fda4420f8834b108c3bdae369ef549fa', 'hex');
// [tcId 37] appending 0 byte to signature
var msg = '54657374';
var sig = '7c38e026f29e14aabd059a0f2db8b0cd783040609a8be684db12f82a27774ab07a9155711ecfaf7f99f277bad0c6ae7e39d4eef676573336a5c51eb6f946b30d00';
console.log(key.verify(msg, sig));
// [tcId 38] removing 0 byte from signature
msg = '546573743137';
sig = '93de3ca252426c95f735cb9edd92e83321ac62372d5aa5b379786bae111ab6b17251330e8f9a7c30d6993137c596007d7b001409287535ac4804e662bc58a3';
console.log(key.verify(msg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to the allowance of BER-encoded signatures. An attacker can manipulate the ECDSA signatures by exploiting the signature malleability.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var hash = require('hash.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('p521');
// [tcId 7] length of sequence [r, s] contains a leading 0
var msg = '313233343030';
var sig = '3082008602414e4223ee43e8cb89de3b1339ffc279e582f82c7ab0f71bbde43dbe374ac75ffbef29acdf8e70750b9a04f66fda48351de7bbfd515720b0ec5cd736f9b73bdf8645024128b5d0926a4172b349b0fd2e929487a5edb94b142df923a697e7446acdacdba0a029e43d69111174dba2fe747122709a69ce69d5285e174a01a93022fea8318ac1';
var pk = '04005c6457ec088d532f482093965ae53ccd07e556ed59e2af945cd8c7a95c1c644f8a56a8a8a3cd77392ddd861e8a924dac99c69069093bd52a52fa6c56004a074508007878d6d42e4b4dd1e9c0696cb3e19f63033c3db4e60d473259b3ebe079aaf0a986ee6177f8217a78c68b813f7e149a4e56fd9562c07fed3d895942d7d101cb83f6';
var hashMsg = hash.sha512().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(pk, 'hex');
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashMsg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to a missing check for whether the leading bit of r
and s
is zero. An attacker can manipulate the ECDSA signature by exploiting this oversight.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var hash = require('hash.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('secp256k1');
// [tcId 6] Legacy: ASN encoding of r misses leading 0
var msg = '313233343030';
var sig = '30440220813ef79ccefa9a56f7ba805f0e478584fe5f0dd5f567bc09b5123ccbc983236502206ff18a52dcc0336f7af62400a6dd9b810732baf1ff758000d6f613a556eb31ba';
var pk = '04b838ff44e5bc177bf21189d0766082fc9d843226887fc9760371100b7ee20a6ff0c9d75bfba7b31a6bca1974496eeb56de357071955d83c4b1badaa0b21832e9';
var hashMsg = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(pk, 'hex');
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashMsg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and buffered-spawn@3.3.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › patch-package@6.5.1 › cross-spawn@6.0.5
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › buffered-spawn@3.3.2 › cross-spawn@4.0.2
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.
PoC
const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";
console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")
// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js`
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade cross-spawn
to version 7.0.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to an anomaly in the _truncateToN
function. An attacker can cause legitimate transactions or communications to be incorrectly flagged as invalid by exploiting the signature verification process when the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes and the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.7
var hash = require('hash.js');
var BN = require('bn.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('p192');
var msg = '343236343739373234';
var sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b';
// Same public key just in different formats
var pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723';
var pkPem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEzTWgsY7rj82H/wGXgAEoKHRfBG54\nXeuigVDeG+bLQ3ZSMAa+/zD/CbQEkSXO0pcj\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n';
// Create hash
var hashArray = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
// Convert array to string (just for showcase of the leading zeros)
var hashStr = Array.from(hashArray, function(byte) {
return ('0' + (byte & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2);
}).join('');
var hMsg = new BN(hashArray, 'hex');
// Hashed message contains 4 leading zeros bytes
console.log('sha256 hash(str): ' + hashStr);
// Due to using BN bitLength lib it does not calculate the bit length correctly (should be 32 since it is a sha256 hash)
console.log('Byte len of sha256 hash: ' + hMsg.byteLength());
console.log('sha256 hash(BN): ' + hMsg.toString(16));
// Due to the shift of the message to be within the order of the curve the delta computation is invalid
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(toArray(pk, 'hex'));
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashStr, sig));
// You can check that this hash should validate by consolidating openssl
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFile('msg.bin', new BN(msg, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('sig.bin', new BN(sig, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('cert.pem', pkPem, (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
// To verify the correctness of the message signature and key one can run:
// openssl dgst -sha256 -verify cert.pem -signature sig.bin msg.bin
// Or run this python script
/*
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
msg = '343236343739373234'
sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b'
pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723'
p192 = ec.SECP192R1()
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(p192, bytes.fromhex(pk))
pk.verify(bytes.fromhex(sig), bytes.fromhex(msg), ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
*/
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.6.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: knex
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19
Overview
knex is a query builder for PostgreSQL, MySQL and SQLite3
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to SQL Injection due to missing escape of field objects, which allows ignoring the WHERE
clause of a SQL
query.
Note:
Exploiting this vulnerability is possible when using MySQL
DB.
PoC
const knex = require('knex')({
client: 'mysql2',
connection: {
host: '127.0.0.1',
user: 'root',
password: 'supersecurepassword',
database: 'poc',
charset: 'utf8'
}
})
knex.schema.hasTable('users').then((exists) => {
if (!exists) {
knex.schema.createTable('users', (table) => {
table.increments('id').primary()
table.string('name').notNullable()
table.string('secret').notNullable()
}).then()
knex('users').insert({
name: "admin",
secret: "you should not be able to return this!"
}).then()
knex('users').insert({
name: "guest",
secret: "hello world"
}).then()
}
})
attackerControlled = {
"name": "admin"
}
knex('users')
.select()
.where({secret: attackerControlled})
.then((userSecret) => console.log(userSecret))
Remediation
Upgrade knex
to version 2.4.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to improper range validation of the S
value in the verify
function, allowing the usage of an invalid signature.
Note:
This vulnerability could have a security-relevant impact if an application relies on the uniqueness of a signature.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.6 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 and @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@4.17.11.
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@4.17.11.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function zipObjectDeep
can be tricked into adding or modifying properties of the Object prototype. These properties will be present on all objects.
PoC
const _ = require('lodash');
_.zipObjectDeep(['__proto__.z'],[123]);
console.log(z); // 123
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.20 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues. Elliptic allows ECDSA signature malleability via variations in encoding, leading \0
bytes, or integer overflows. This could conceivably have a security-relevant impact if an application relied on a single canonical signature.
PoC
var crypto = require('crypto')
var EC = require('elliptic').ec;
var ec = new EC('secp256k1');
var obj = require("./poc_ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_test.json");
for (let testGroup of obj.testGroups) {
var key = ec.keyFromPublic(testGroup.key.uncompressed, 'hex');
for(let test of testGroup.tests) {
console.log("[*] Test " + test.tcId + " result: " + test.result)
msgHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(test.msg, 'hex')).digest();
try {
result = key.verify(msgHash, Buffer.from(test.sig, 'hex'));
if (result == true) {
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: PASS");
else
console.log("Result: FAIL")
}
if (result == false) {
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: FAIL");
else
console.log("Result: PASS")
}
} catch (e) {
console.log("ERROR - VERIFY: " + e)
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: FAIL");
else
console.log("Result: PASS")
}
}
}
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: braces
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
Overview
braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled resource consumption due improper limitation of the number of characters it can handle, through the parse
function. An attacker can cause the application to allocate excessive memory and potentially crash by sending imbalanced braces as input.
PoC
const { braces } = require('micromatch');
console.log("Executing payloads...");
const maxRepeats = 10;
for (let repeats = 1; repeats <= maxRepeats; repeats += 1) {
const payload = '{'.repeat(repeats*90000);
console.log(`Testing with ${repeats} repeats...`);
const startTime = Date.now();
braces(payload);
const endTime = Date.now();
const executionTime = endTime - startTime;
console.log(`Regex executed in ${executionTime / 1000}s.\n`);
}
Remediation
Upgrade braces
to version 3.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep
function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject
function.
PoC
lodash.zipobjectdeep:
const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
lodash:
const test = require("lodash");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: micromatch
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity due to the use of unsafe pattern configurations that allow greedy matching through the micromatch.braces()
function. An attacker can cause the application to hang or slow down by passing a malicious payload that triggers extensive backtracking in regular expression processing.
Remediation
Upgrade micromatch
to version 4.0.8 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: unset-value
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › knex@0.21.19 › liftoff@3.1.0 › findup-sync@3.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the unset
function in index.js
, because it allows access to object prototype properties.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade unset-value
to version 2.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@4.17.11.
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@4.17.11.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep
could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype
using a constructor
payload.
PoC by Snyk
const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'
function check() {
mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
}
}
check();
For more information, check out our blog post
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set
and setwith
functions due to improper user input sanitization.
PoC
lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge
, mergeWith
, and defaultsDeep
could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype
. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721
.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: crypto-js
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › crypto-js@3.3.0
Overview
crypto-js is a library of crypto standards.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of Weak Hash due to inadequate security settings in the PBKDF2
configuration, which uses insecure SHA1 and has a low iteration count of 1. These insecure settings allow attackers to perform brute-force attacks when PBKDF2
is used with the default parameters.
No information is directly exposed when a hash is generated, regardless of whether the PBKDF2 function is in the vulnerable configuration or not. However, it may be possible to recover the original data, more or less easily depending on the configured parameters, using a brute force attack. This is a low impact on the confidentiality of the protected data, which are in a different scope than the vulnerable package.
The attacker similarly may be able to modify some data which is meant to be protected by the vulnerable package - most commonly when it is used for signature verification. This would require a subsequent exploitation, such as forcing a hash collision via length extension attack. The integrity of the data is therefore compromised, but the quantity and targeting of that data is not fully in the attacker's control, yielding a low integrity impact.
Notes
This vulnerability is related to https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CRYPTOES-6032390 in crypto-es.
According to the
crypto-js
maintainer: "Active development of CryptoJS has been discontinued. This library is no longer maintained." It is recommended to use the Node.js nativecrypto
module.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be avoided by setting PBKDF2
to use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 and increasing the number of iterations to a sufficiently high value depending on the intended use.
See, for example, the OWASP PBKDF2 Cheat Sheet for recommendations.
Changelog:
2023-10-24 - Initial publication
2023-10-25 - Added fixed version, updated references, separated crypto-es, description changes, updated CVSS, added CVE ID
2023-11-07 - Re-assessed CVSS following a CVSS publication on NVD. No changes made to CVSS.
2024-01-11 - Revised CVSS and description after additional deeper investigation, to reflect the details of the severity assessment
Remediation
Upgrade crypto-js
to version 4.2.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template
.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
high severity
- Module: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
GPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues via the secp256k1
implementation in elliptic/ec/key.js
. There is no check to confirm that the public key point passed into the derive function actually exists on the secp256k1
curve. This results in the potential for the private key used in this implementation to be revealed after a number of ECDH operations are performed.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
Overview
jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm such that the library can be misconfigured to use legacy, insecure key types for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.
Exploitability
Users are affected when using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below:
EC: ES256, ES384, ES512
RSA: RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512
RSA-PSS: PS256, PS384, PS512
And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:
ES256: prime256v1
ES384: secp384r1
ES512: secp521r1
Workaround
Users who are unable to upgrade to the fixed version can use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes
option to true
in the sign()
and verify()
functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.
Remediation
Upgrade jsonwebtoken
to version 9.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
Overview
jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment via the secretOrPublicKey
argument due to misconfigurations of the key retrieval function jwt.verify()
. Exploiting this vulnerability might result in incorrect verification of forged tokens when tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm.
Note:
This vulnerability affects your application if it supports the usage of both symmetric and asymmetric keys in jwt.verify()
implementation with the same key retrieval function.
Remediation
Upgrade jsonwebtoken
to version 9.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: request
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › request@2.88.2
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › web-request@1.0.7 › request@2.88.2
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › web-request@1.0.7 › request@2.88.2
Overview
request is a simplified http request client.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js
file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: request
package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.
Remediation
A fix was pushed into the master
branch but not yet published.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › request-promise@4.2.6 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › web-request@1.0.7 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › web-request@1.0.7 › request@2.88.2 › tough-cookie@2.5.0
Overview
tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false
mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.
PoC
// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
"Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
"https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
"Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
"https://google.com/"
);
//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade tough-cookie
to version 4.1.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
Overview
jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Authentication such that the lack of algorithm definition in the jwt.verify()
function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none
algorithm for signature verification.
Exploitability
Users are affected only if all of the following conditions are true for the jwt.verify()
function:
A token with no signature is received.
No algorithms are specified.
A falsy (e.g.,
null
,false
,undefined
) secret or key is passed.
Remediation
Upgrade jsonwebtoken
to version 9.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: cookie
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › socket.io@2.5.1 › engine.io@3.6.2 › cookie@0.4.2
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name
, path
, or domain
, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.
Workaround
Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.
Details
A cross-site scripting attack occurs when the attacker tricks a legitimate web-based application or site to accept a request as originating from a trusted source.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, <
can be coded as <
; and >
can be coded as >
; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses <
and >
as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Description |
---|---|---|
Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?
,&
,/
,<
,>
and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade cookie
to version 0.7.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@3.10.1.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object
prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13, del@5.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › del@5.1.0 › globby@10.0.2 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › del@5.1.0 › rimraf@3.0.2 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › del@3.0.0 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › fstream@1.0.12 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › node-unzip-2@0.2.8 › fstream@1.0.12 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › del@3.0.0 › globby@6.1.0 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › patch-package@6.5.1 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres
function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs
object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs
object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node
process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight
.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › elliptic@3.0.3
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › elliptic@6.4.0
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Timing Attack. Practical recovery of the long-term private key generated by the library is possible under certain conditions. Leakage of bit-length of a scalar during scalar multiplication is possible on an elliptic curve which might allow practical recovery of the long-term private key.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic
to version 6.5.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 and particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › particl-bitcore-lib@0.16.0 › lodash@4.17.11
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber
, trim
and trimEnd
functions.
POC
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › @zasmilingidiot/omp-lib@0.2.0 › particl-bitcore-lib@https://github.com/kewde/particl-bitcore-lib.git › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: phin
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › jimp@0.16.13 › @jimp/custom@0.16.13 › @jimp/core@0.16.13 › phin@2.9.3
Overview
phin is a The ultra-lightweight Node.js HTTP client
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor due to the handling of HTTP headers during redirects when followRedirects
is enabled. An attacker can potentially intercept sensitive information by exploiting how headers are included in outgoing requests after a redirect.
Remediation
Upgrade phin
to version 3.7.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Module: jschardet
- Introduced through: autodetect-decoder-stream@1.0.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › autodetect-decoder-stream@1.0.3 › jschardet@1.6.0
LGPL-2.1 license
low severity
- Vulnerable module: class-validator
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › class-validator@0.13.2
Overview
class-validator is a decorator-based property validation for classes.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation via bypassing the input validation in validate()
, as certain internal attributes can be overwritten via a conflicting name.
NOTE:
There is an optional forbidUnknownValues
parameter that can be used to reduce the risk of this bypass.
Details
A cross-site scripting attack occurs when the attacker tricks a legitimate web-based application or site to accept a request as originating from a trusted source.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, <
can be coded as <
; and >
can be coded as >
; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses <
and >
as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Description |
---|---|---|
Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?
,&
,/
,<
,>
and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade class-validator
to version 0.14.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › socket.io@2.5.1 › debug@4.1.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › socket.io@2.5.1 › engine.io@3.6.2 › debug@4.1.1
-
Introduced through: particl-desktop-testing@particl/particl-desktop#671fda81590363bf260c7ee858afb43c7a2bc0de › @zasmilingidiot/particl-marketplace@0.3.13 › socket.io@2.5.1 › socket.io-parser@3.4.3 › debug@4.1.1
Overview
debug is a small debugging utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors
via manipulation of the str
argument.
The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.
Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.
PoC
Use the following regex in the %o
formatter.
/\s*\n\s*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug
to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.