Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
Overview
socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation.
when parsing attachments containing untrusted user input. Attackers can overwrite the _placeholder object to place references to functions in query objects.
PoC
const decoder = new Decoder();
decoder.on("decoded", (packet) => {
console.log(packet.data); // prints [ 'hello', [Function: splice] ]
})
decoder.add('51-["hello",{"_placeholder":true,"num":"splice"}]');
decoder.add(Buffer.from("world"));
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.3, 3.4.2, 4.0.5, 4.2.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: parse
- Introduced through: parse@1.11.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › parse@1.11.1Remediation: Upgrade to parse@7.0.1.
Overview
parse is a library that gives you access to the powerful Parse Server backend from your JavaScript app.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the initializeState() function. An attacker can cause a denial of service by injecting malicious properties into Object.prototype by specifying a className value of 'proto'.
Note: The vulnerability was fixed in 7.0.0; however, the maintainer recommends skipping this release as it contains a bug that introduces a breaking change in the format of Parse Server 5xx responses.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade parse to version 7.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
Overview
socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in the Decoder class, which accepts an unlimited number of binary attachments. An attacker can exploit this to exhaust server memory.
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.5, 3.4.4, 4.2.6 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.
Notes:
Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.
This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: parse
- Introduced through: parse@1.11.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › parse@1.11.1Remediation: Upgrade to parse@7.0.0.
Overview
parse is a library that gives you access to the powerful Parse Server backend from your JavaScript app.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely by injecting a malicious payload into affected APIs, including: ParseObject.fromJSON, ParseObject.pin, ParseObject.registerSubclass, ObjectStateMutations, and encode/decode.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade parse to version 7.0.0-alpha.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: engine.io
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5
Overview
engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a POST request to the long polling transport.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: engine.io
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5
Overview
engine.io is a realtime engine behind Socket.IO. It provides the foundation of a bidirectional connection between client and server
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious client could send a specially crafted HTTP request, triggering an uncaught exception and killing the Node.js process.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade engine.io to version 3.6.1, 6.2.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.
PoC
lodash.zipobjectdeep:
const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
lodash:
const test = require("lodash");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: markdown-it
- Introduced through: markdown-it@6.1.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › markdown-it@6.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to markdown-it@13.0.2.
Overview
markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Infinite loop in linkify inline rule when using malformed input.
Remediation
Upgrade markdown-it to version 13.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: parsejson
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › engine.io-client@1.8.6 › parsejson@0.0.3
Overview
parsejson is a method that parses a JSON string and returns a JSON object.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. An attacker may pass a specially crafted JSON data, causing the server to hang.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for parsejson.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io-parser
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1
Overview
socket.io-parser is a socket.io protocol parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via a large packet because a concatenation approach is used.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io-parser to version 3.3.2, 3.4.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: parse@1.11.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › parse@1.11.1 › ws@3.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to parse@5.2.0.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) when the number of received headers exceed the server.maxHeadersCount or request.maxHeadersCount threshold.
Workaround
This issue can be mitigating by following these steps:
Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the
--max-http-header-size=sizeand/or themaxHeaderSizeoptions so that no more headers than theserver.maxHeadersCountlimit can be sent.Set
server.maxHeadersCountto 0 so that no limit is applied.
PoC
const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const server = http.createServer();
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ server });
server.listen(function () {
const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');
const headers = {};
let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {
if (count === 2000) break;
for (let j = 0; j < chars.length; j++) {
const key = chars[i] + chars[j];
headers[key] = 'x';
if (++count === 2000) break;
}
}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';
headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';
headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';
headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({
headers: headers,
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: server.address().port
});
request.end();
});
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade ws to version 5.2.4, 6.2.3, 7.5.10, 8.17.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: webpack-dev-middleware
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › webpack-dev-middleware@1.12.2
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Path Traversal due to insufficient validation of the supplied URL address before returning the local file. This issue allows accessing any file on the developer's machine. The middleware can operate with either the physical filesystem or a virtualized in-memory memfs filesystem. When the writeToDisk configuration option is set to true, the physical filesystem is utilized. The getFilenameFromUrl method parses the URL and constructs the local file path by stripping the public path prefix from the URL and appending the unescaped path suffix to the outputPath. Since the URL is not unescaped and normalized automatically before calling the middleware, it is possible to use %2e and %2f sequences to perform a path traversal attack.
Notes:
This vulnerability is exploitable without any specific configurations, allowing an attacker to access and exfiltrate content from any file on the developer's machine.
If the development server is exposed on a public IP address or
0.0.0.0, an attacker on the local network can access the files without victim interaction.If the server permits access from third-party domains, a malicious link could lead to local file exfiltration when visited by the victim.
PoC
A blank project can be created containing the following configuration file webpack.config.js:
module.exports = { devServer: { devMiddleware: { writeToDisk: true } } };
When started, it is possible to access any local file, e.g. /etc/passwd:
$ curl localhost:8080/public/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
Remediation
Upgrade webpack-dev-middleware to version 5.3.4, 6.1.2, 7.1.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.
PoC by Snyk
const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'
function check() {
mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
}
}
check();
For more information, check out our blog post
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.
PoC
lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection due the improper validation of options.variable key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-fetch
- Introduced through: react@15.7.0, react-dom@15.7.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › react@15.7.0 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react@16.5.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › react-dom@15.7.0 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-dom@16.5.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › recompose@0.20.2 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3
Overview
node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure when fetching a remote url with Cookie, if it get a Location response header, it will follow that url and try to fetch that url with provided cookie. This can lead to forwarding secure headers to 3th party.
Remediation
Upgrade node-fetch to version 2.6.7, 3.1.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: cookie
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5 › cookie@0.3.1
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name, path, or domain, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.
Workaround
Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade cookie to version 0.7.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › istanbul@0.4.5 › glob@5.0.15 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-fetch
- Introduced through: react@15.7.0, react-dom@15.7.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › react@15.7.0 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react@16.5.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › react-dom@15.7.0 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-dom@16.5.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › recompose@0.20.2 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3
Overview
node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Node Fetch did not honor the size option after following a redirect, which means that when a content size was over the limit, a FetchError would never get thrown and the process would end without failure.
Remediation
Upgrade node-fetch to version 2.6.1, 3.0.0-beta.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.
POC
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: markdown-it
- Introduced through: markdown-it@6.1.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › markdown-it@6.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to markdown-it@10.0.0.
Overview
markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity.
Parsing *_*_*_… takes quadratic time, this could be a denial of service vulnerability in an application that parses user input.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade markdown-it to version 10.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: markdown-it
- Introduced through: markdown-it@6.1.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › markdown-it@6.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to markdown-it@12.3.2.
Overview
markdown-it is a modern pluggable markdown parser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the /s+$/ in line 23 of lib/rules_inline/newline.js. This expression is used to remove trailing whitespaces from a string, however, it also matches non-trailing whitespaces.
In the worst-case scenario, the matching process would take computation time proportional to the square of the length of the non-trailing whitespaces. It is possible that a string containing more than tens of thousands characters, as markdown-it handles Markdown, would be passed over the network, resulting in significant computational time.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade markdown-it to version 12.3.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: socket.io
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4
Overview
socket.io is a node.js realtime framework server.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Defaults due to CORS Misconfiguration. All domains are whitelisted by default.
Remediation
Upgrade socket.io to version 2.4.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: parse@1.11.1 and test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › parse@1.11.1 › ws@3.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to parse@3.3.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5 › ws@1.1.5
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › engine.io-client@1.8.6 › ws@1.1.5
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.
##PoC
for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ws to version 7.4.6, 6.2.2, 5.2.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: parse
- Introduced through: parse@1.11.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › parse@1.11.1Remediation: Upgrade to parse@2.10.0.
Overview
parse is a library that gives you access to the powerful Parse Server backend from your JavaScript app.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials. The setPassword method (http://parseplatform.org/Parse-SDK-JS/api/2.9.1/Parse.User.html#setPassword) stores the user's password in localStorage as raw text making it vulnerable to anyone with access to your localStorage. We believe this is the only time that password is stored at all. In the documentation under Users > Signing Up, it clearly states, "We never store passwords in plaintext, nor will we ever transmit passwords back to the client in plaintext."
PoC by Diamond Lewis and Colin Ulin
async () => {
const user = Parse.User.current()
if (user) {
user.setPassword('newpass')
await user.save()
}
}
After running the above code, the new password will be stored in localStorage as a property named "password".
Remediation
Upgrade parse to version 2.10.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bmson@3.1.0, bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bmson@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-indexer@3.1.0 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-indexer@4.0.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bemuse-notechart@1.1.1 › bmson@3.1.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to bemuse-notechart@2.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: bson-objectid
- Introduced through: bson-objectid@1.3.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › bson-objectid@1.3.1
Overview
bson-objectid is a library that allows you to construct ObjectIDs without the mongodb driver or bson module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insufficient Input Validation. The ObjectID() function allows an attacker to generate a malformed objectid by inserting an additional property to the user-input, because bson-objectid will return early if it detects _bsontype==ObjectID in the user-input object. As a result, objects in arbitrary forms can bypass formatting if they have a valid bsontype.
PoC by Feng Xiao (xiaofen9)
var ObjectID = require("bson-objectid");
var json = {
"mal_formkey": {
"payload": "xxxx"
},
"_bsontype" : "ObjectID"
};
console.log(ObjectID(json));
console.log(ObjectID.isValid(ObjectID(json)));
Remediation
There is no fixed version for bson-objectid.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › debug@2.3.3Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.3.3.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5 › debug@2.3.3Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.3.3.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › debug@2.3.3Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.3.3.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › debug@2.3.3Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.3.3.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › engine.io-client@1.8.6 › debug@2.3.3Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.3.3.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.2.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.2.0.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Open PR to patch debug@2.2.0.
Overview
debug is a small debugging utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument.
The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.
Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.
PoC
Use the following regex in the %o formatter.
/\s*\n\s*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: ms
- Introduced through: test-bed@0.5.3
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › debug@2.3.3 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.2.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › engine.io@1.8.5 › debug@2.3.3 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.2.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › debug@2.3.3 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.2.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › debug@2.3.3 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.2.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › engine.io-client@1.8.6 › debug@2.3.3 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.2.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.1.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-adapter@0.5.0 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.1.
-
Introduced through: bemuse@emilva/bemuse#HEAD › test-bed@0.5.3 › socket.io@1.7.4 › socket.io-client@1.7.4 › socket.io-parser@2.3.1 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Open PR to patch ms@0.7.1.
Overview
ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.
Proof of concept
ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s
Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.
For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
- May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
- May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version
2.0.0released. - May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions
>=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.