Vulnerabilities

14 via 20 paths

Dependencies

433

Source

GitHub

Commit

df01bc37

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Severity
  • 1
  • 4
  • 6
  • 3
Status
  • 14
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 plist@3.0.2 xmldom@0.5.0

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to parsing XML that is not well-formed, and contains multiple top-level elements. All the root nodes are being added to the childNodes collection of the Document, without reporting or throwing any error.

Workarounds

One of the following approaches might help, depending on your use case:

  1. Instead of searching for elements in the whole DOM, only search in the documentElement.

  2. Reject a document with a document that has more than 1 childNode.

PoC

var DOMParser = require('xmldom').DOMParser;
var xmlData = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="large">\n' +
'    <leaf color="green" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="twig">\n' +
'    <leaf color="gold" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n';
var xmlDOM = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xmlData);
console.log(xmlDOM.toString());

This will result with the following output:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><root>
  <branch girth="large">
    <leaf color="green"/>
  </branch>
</root>
<root>
  <branch girth="twig">
    <leaf color="gold"/>
  </branch>
</root>

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 plist@3.0.2 xmldom@0.5.0

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the copy() function in dom.js. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible via the p variable.

DISPUTED This vulnerability has been disputed by the maintainers of the package. Currently the only viable exploit that has been demonstrated is to pollute the target object (rather then the global object which is generally the case for Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities) and it is yet unclear if this limited attack vector exposes any vulnerability in the context of this package.

See the linked GitHub Issue for full details on the discussion around the legitimacy and potential revocation of this vulnerability.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • Vulnerable module: jsrsasign
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 jsrsasign@9.1.9

Overview

jsrsasign is a free pure JavaScript cryptographic library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature when JWS or JWT signature with non Base64URL encoding special characters or number escaped characters may be validated as valid by mistake.

Workaround:

Validate JWS or JWT signature if it has Base64URL and dot safe string before executing JWS.verify() or JWS.verifyJWT() method.

PoC:

var KJUR = require('jsrsasign');
var rsu = require('jsrsasign-util');

// jsrsasign@10.5.24

//// creating valid hs256 jwt - code used to get valid hs256 jwt.
// var oHeader = {alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT'};
// // Payload
// var oPayload = {};
// var tNow = KJUR.jws.IntDate.get('now');
// var tEnd = KJUR.jws.IntDate.get('now + 1year');
// oPayload.iss = "https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__foo.com&d=DwIGAg&c=wwDYKmuffy0jxUGHACmjfA&r=3J3pjDmBp7lIUZbkdHkHLg&m=CP36zULZ4
oa9S7i8rFsa5Rei7n32BgBaGjoG8lCiqO-pm9ZIzxG9adHdbUE4qski&s=eMfp9lSTyBb95UqdO_sO3ukTKlGihPESsUm5F4yotGk&e= ";
// oPayload.sub = "mailto:mike@foo.com";
// oPayload.nbf = tNow;
// oPayload.iat = tNow;
// oPayload.exp = tEnd;
// oPayload.jti = "id123456";
// oPayload.aud = "https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__foo.com_employee&d=DwIGAg&c=wwDYKmuffy0jxUGHACmjfA&r=3J3pjDmBp7lIUZbkdHkHLg&m=C
P36zULZ4oa9S7i8rFsa5Rei7n32BgBaGjoG8lCiqO-pm9ZIzxG9adHdbUE4qski&s=bxlm95BhVv7dbGuy_vRD4JBci6ODNdgOU7Q7bNPkv48&e= ";
// // Sign JWT, password=616161
// var sHeader = JSON.stringify(oHeader);
// var sPayload = JSON.stringify(oPayload);
// var sJWT = KJUR.jws.JWS.sign("HS256", sHeader, sPayload, "616161");


//verifying valid and invalid hs256 jwt
//validjwt
var validJwt = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwOi8vZm9vLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6Im1haWx0bzp
taWtlQGZvby5jb20iLCJuYmYiOjE2NTUyMjk3MjksImlhdCI6MTY1NTIyOTcyOSwiZXhwIjoxNjg2NzY1NzI5LC
JqdGkiOiJpZDEyMzQ1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHA6Ly9mb28uY29tL2VtcGxveWVlIn0.eqrgPFuchnot7HgslW8S
1xQUkTDBW-_cyhrPgOOFRzI";
//invalid jwt with special signs
var invalidJwt1 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwOi8vZm9vLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6Im1haWx0bzp
taWtlQGZvby5jb20iLCJuYmYiOjE2NTUyMjk3MjksImlhdCI6MTY1NTIyOTcyOSwiZXhwIjoxNjg2NzY1NzI5LC
JqdGkiOiJpZDEyMzQ1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHA6Ly9mb28uY29tL2VtcGxveWVlIn0.eqrgPFuchno!@#$%^&*
()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()t7HgslW8S1xQUkTDBW-_cyhrPgOOFRzI";
//invalid jwt with additional numbers and signs
var invalidJwt2 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwOi8vZm9vLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6Im1haWx0bzp
taWtlQGZvby5jb20iLCJuYmYiOjE2NTUyMjk3MjksImlhdCI6MTY1NTIyOTcyOSwiZXhwIjoxNjg2NzY1NzI5LC
JqdGkiOiJpZDEyMzQ1NiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHA6Ly9mb28uY29tL2VtcGxveWVlIn0.eqrgPFuchno\1\1\2\3\4
\2\2\3\2\1\2\222\3\1\1\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\2\222\23\2\2\2\2t7HgslW8S1xQUkTDBW-_cyhrPgOOFRzI";


var isValid = KJUR.jws.JWS.verifyJWT(validJwt, "616161", {alg: ['HS256']});
console.log("valid hs256 Jwt: " + isValid); //valid Jwt: true

//verifying invalid  1 hs256 jwt
var isValid = KJUR.jws.JWS.verifyJWT(invalidJwt1, "616161", {alg: ['HS256']});
console.log("invalid hs256  Jwt by special signs: " + isValid); //invalid Jwt  by special signs: true

//verifying invalid 2 hs256 jwt
var isValid = KJUR.jws.JWS.verifyJWT(invalidJwt2, "616161", {alg: ['HS256']});
console.log("invalid hs256  Jwt by additional numbers and slashes: " + isValid); //invalid Jwt by additional numbers and slashes: true

Remediation

Upgrade jsrsasign to version 10.5.25 or higher.

References

high severity

Observable Discrepancy

  • Vulnerable module: jsrsasign
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 jsrsasign@9.1.9

Overview

jsrsasign is a free pure JavaScript cryptographic library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Observable Discrepancy via the RSA PKCS#1.5 or RSAOAEP decryption process. An attacker can decrypt ciphertexts by exploiting the Marvin security flaw. Exploiting this vulnerability requires the attacker to have access to a large number of ciphertexts encrypted with the same key.

Workaround

The vulnerability can be mitigated by finding and replacing RSA and RSAOAEP decryption with another crypto library.

Remediation

Upgrade jsrsasign to version 11.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: plist
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 plist@3.0.2

Overview

plist is a Mac OS X Plist parser/builder for Node.js and browsers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the .parse(), exploiting this vulnerability may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) and Remote Code Execution.

PoC:

var plist = require('plist');
var xmlPollution = `
<plist version="1.0">
  <dict>
    <key>__proto__</key>
    <dict>
      <key>length</key>
      <string>polluted</string>
    </dict>
  </dict>
</plist>`;
console.log(plist.parse(xmlPollution).length); // polluted

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade plist to version 3.0.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: zone-mta@3.9.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 request@2.88.2

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: zone-mta@3.9.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 plist@3.0.2 xmldom@0.5.0

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. It does not correctly escape special characters when serializing elements are removed from their ancestor. This may lead to unexpected syntactic changes during XML processing in some downstream applications.

Note: Customers who use "xmldom" package, should use "@xmldom/xmldom" instead, as "xmldom" is no longer maintained.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: wild-config@1.7.1 and zone-mta@3.9.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 wild-config@1.7.1 glob@8.0.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 wild-config@1.7.1 glob@8.0.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Cryptographic Weakness

  • Vulnerable module: jsrsasign
  • Introduced through: mobileconfig@2.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mobileconfig@2.4.0 jsrsasign@9.1.9

Overview

jsrsasign is a free pure JavaScript cryptographic library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Weakness. Invalid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are mistakenly recognized to be valid.

Remediation

Upgrade jsrsasign to version 10.1.13 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: nodemailer
  • Introduced through: zone-mta@3.9.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 mx-connect@1.5.3 mailauth@4.6.0 nodemailer@6.9.7

Overview

nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the attachDataUrls parameter or when parsing attachments with an embedded file. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted email that triggers inefficient regular expression evaluation, leading to excessive consumption of CPU resources.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade nodemailer to version 6.9.9 or higher.

References

low severity
new

Improper Authorization

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: mailauth@4.6.5, undici@5.28.3 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mailauth@4.6.5 undici@5.28.2
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 undici@5.28.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@5.28.4.
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 mx-connect@1.5.3 mailauth@4.6.0 undici@5.27.0

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Authorization due to improper handling of Proxy-Authorization headers during cross-origin redirects in certain methods. An attacker can exploit this behavior by inducing a victim to make a request that triggers a cross-origin redirect, potentially leaking sensitive information contained in the Proxy-Authorization header.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 5.28.4, 6.11.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: mailauth@4.6.5 and zone-mta@3.9.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mailauth@4.6.5 undici@5.28.2
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 mx-connect@1.5.3 mailauth@4.6.0 undici@5.27.0

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains due to not clearing Proxy-Authentication headers on cross-origin redirects. An attacker can intercept the improperly cleared headers.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 5.28.3, 6.6.1 or higher.

References

low severity
new

Improper Access Control

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: mailauth@4.6.5, undici@5.28.3 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 mailauth@4.6.5 undici@5.28.2
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 undici@5.28.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@5.28.4.
  • Introduced through: wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck#df01bc379e76caeeb02b43df1e939facac885786 zone-mta@3.9.5 mx-connect@1.5.3 mailauth@4.6.0 undici@5.27.0

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Access Control due to the integrity option passed to fetch(). An attacker can alter this option, allowing fetch() to accept requests as valid even if they have been tampered with.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 5.28.4, 6.11.1 or higher.

References