Vulnerabilities |
18 via 54 paths |
|---|---|
Dependencies |
501 |
Source |
GitHub |
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critical severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: node-forge@1.4.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › node-forge@1.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-forge@1.4.3.
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation via pki.verifyCertificateChain() in lib/x509.js, which does not decode or enforce the X.509 nameConstraints extension (OID 2.5.29.30) during certificate path validation. A certificate authority whose nameConstraints extension is marked non-critical can issue a leaf certificate with a subjectAltName dNSName or subject commonName outside its permitted subtrees or inside its excluded subtrees, and the chain passes verification. This allows an attacker holding such a CA's private key, or able to obtain a certificate issued under it, to impersonate arbitrary names - including in TLS peer verification via forge.tls - defeating the namespace restriction the constraint was intended to enforce.
Note: This is only exploitable when a name-constrained CA with a non-critical nameConstraints extension chains to a root trusted by the application, and the attacker controls that CA's private key or can obtain an out-of-scope certificate from it. Chains without nameConstraints are unaffected, and chains with a critical nameConstraints extension were already rejected.
Workaround
Pass an options.verify callback to pki.verifyCertificateChain() (or verify to forge.tls.createConnection()) that returns an error when any CA certificate in the chain has an extension with id 2.5.29.30. This rejects all chains below a name-constrained CA, including valid ones. Trust anchors with the extension must be checked separately.
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or higher.
References
critical severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error via the cache-handler.js redirect-hop inspection logic when an originless Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors as compose(redirect(), cache()). Undici decides whether to store the final response under the original request key by inspecting only the final redirect hop, bypassing the earlier fix for CVE-2026-109829 that compared only the initial and final origins. A redirect that bounces through an untrusted intermediate origin and returns to the trusted origin is still cached under the trusted key, an intermediate hop's Vary header is dropped so a response that varies on Authorization or Cookie can be served to a different user, and an intermediate hop's no-cache or default-uncacheable status is ignored so a non-storable redirect is laundered into a cacheable entry. An attacker who controls the target of a redirect from a trusted URL can poison the cached entry for that URL or have a private, per-user response served to a later caller.
Note: This is only exploitable when an originless Agent, a shared cache store, and compose(redirect(), cache()) are all used together.
Workaround
Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()), use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: @fastify/multipart
- Introduced through: @fastify/multipart@10.1.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @fastify/multipart@10.1.7Remediation: Upgrade to @fastify/multipart@10.1.9.
Overview
@fastify/multipart is a Multipart plugin for Fastify
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via type confusion in saveRequestFiles() when the plugin is registered with the attachFieldsToBody option. An unauthenticated client can forge a file upload object by sending a plain JSON request or a JSON-typed multipart field carrying truthy file and _buf properties, which saveRequestFiles() previously accepted as a genuine uploaded file. This bypasses the onFile hook and the files and fileSize limits, writes attacker-chosen bytes to the temporary directory, and preserves the attacker-supplied filename verbatim rather than reducing it to its basename. Because the filename can contain parent directory traversal segments such as ../../../../package.json, any application that uses the returned filename as a write destination is exposed to an arbitrary relative-path file write from a single request.
Details
A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.
Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:
- Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.
st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.
If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.
curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa
Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).
- Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as
Zip-Slip.
One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
Remediation
Upgrade @fastify/multipart to version 10.1.9 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ioredis
- Introduced through: @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › ioredis@5.11.1
Overview
ioredis is a Redis client for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in the RESP protocol parser in lib/parser.js. An attacker can crash the Node.js client process by sending crafted RESP byte streams with repeated nested array headers. The parser recurses while handling nested arrays, exhausting the V8 call stack and triggering an uncaught RangeError. In affected deployments that consume data from a malicious or compromised Redis endpoint, this terminates the process and disrupts Redis client operations.
Remediation
Upgrade ioredis to version 6.0.0-beta.1 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: joi
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4 and @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › joi@18.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › joi@18.3.0
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › joi@18.3.0
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the email validation rule when its multiple option is enabled. An attacker can block the Node.js event loop by submitting a long run of whitespace with no separator to a field validated with Joi.string().email({ multiple: true }), because the value is split with a regex whose leading \s* is retried from each position inside a whitespace run and backtracks through the rest of it, costing n squared steps for n whitespace characters. This is reached only when the application validates untrusted input with the multiple email option and applies no length limit before the email rule runs.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be avoided by placing a .max() constraint before .email(), for example Joi.string().max(1000).email({ multiple: true }), and by not using abortEarly: false with that schema, since that option runs the email rule even after the max check has failed. A .trim() does not help, because it removes only leading and trailing whitespace, not an interior run.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade joi to version 17.13.9, 18.3.1 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: @zone-eu/wild-plugins@1.0.12, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/wild-plugins@1.0.12 › nodemailer@10.2.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › nodemailer@10.2.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › @zone-eu/wild-plugins@1.0.12 › nodemailer@10.2.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › smtp-server@3.21.1 › nodemailer@10.2.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › nodemailer@10.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › nodemailer@10.2.0
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › nodemailer@10.2.0
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › nodemailer@10.3.1Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@10.4.1.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › smtp-server@3.21.3 › nodemailer@10.3.1Remediation: Upgrade to smtp-server@3.21.4.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Interpretation Conflict in addressparser, which sendMail() uses to derive the SMTP envelope recipient. An attacker can make the application send mail to a recipient other than the one it validated by supplying an address whose domain has whitespace or an RFC 5322 comment directly before a dot, such as ceo@victim.example .allowed.example, because the parser ends the address at that point and sendMail() uses the truncated address. Exposure requires the application to restrict recipients by domain with a parser or suffix check other than the one in nodemailer, and to pass the raw address string to sendMail().
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 10.4.1 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key via the CacheHandler.onResponseStart function in the cache handler. With an originless Agent using a shared cache and compose(redirect(), cache()), when a credential-bearing request to a user-specific URL receives a same-origin redirect to a cacheable per-user resource, the response is stored under the original URL without varying on credentials. A later authenticated or unauthenticated caller requesting that URL receives the first user’s private response from the cache.
Notes
- The shared cache must be a
MemoryCacheStoreorSqliteCacheStore; the advisory identifies these stores as the affected cache implementations.
Workarounds
- Compose the interceptors as
compose(cache(), redirect())to prevent redirected per-user responses from being cached under the original request URL. - Use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores to prevent a shared cache from serving one origin’s user-specific response to callers of another.
- Disable shared caching for credential-bearing requests that can follow redirects to prevent private responses from being reused for other callers.
- Set appropriate
Varyheaders on per-user responses, or mark themprivateorno-store, to prevent shared-cache reuse across users.
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: node-forge@1.4.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › node-forge@1.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-forge@1.4.3.
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to NULL Pointer Dereference via tls.handleHandshake() in lib/tls.js, which attempts to update handshake digests via c.session.md5.update(bytes) when c.session is null. A client's session is set to null by c.reset() after a close_notify alert or a call to close(), and is also absent before handshake() is called. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can send a ServerHello record in any of these states, causing an uncaught TypeError to propagate out of connection.process() and terminate the Node.js process.
Note: Only forge.tls clients are affected; servers are not vulnerable because a server creates its session upon receiving a ClientHello.
PoC
var c = forge.tls.createConnection({server: false, ...});
c.handshake();
// warning close_notify alert, then an empty ServerHello, in separate
// process() calls
c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes('15030100020100'));
c.process(forge.util.hexToBytes('160301000402000000'));
// <= 1.4.2: TypeError: Cannot read properties of null (reading 'md5')
// 1.4.3: the record is ignored
The reporter's PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-j8rw-jp99-435v.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: node-forge@1.4.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › node-forge@1.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-forge@1.4.3.
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via _trimString() in lib/http.js, which removes trailing whitespace using the regular expression /\s*$/. On a string of n whitespace characters followed by a non-whitespace character, the engine attempts a match at each position and scans the remainder of the run each time, producing O(n^2) work. forge.http calls _trimString() on every response header value processed by response.readHeader() and on cookie names and values in response.getCookies(), with no limit on header size. A server or on-path attacker can send a large response header that blocks the client's event loop for minutes, denying service to everything else in the process.
Note: This is only exploitable by applications that use forge.http directly; forge.http is not loaded by require('node-forge') and requires a socket pool provided by the application.
Workaround
Limit the size of HTTP response headers before passing them to forge.http, for example in the socket pool's data handler.
PoC
var response = forge.http.createResponse();
var ws = new Array(40001).join('\t ');
response.readHeader(forge.util.createBuffer(
'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nX-A: a' + ws + 'X\r\n\r\n'));
// <= 1.4.2: about 4 seconds (quadratic in the whitespace length)
// 1.4.3: about 1 ms
Regression tests are in tests/security/ghsa-6cv4-p8m7-4r25.js.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: node-forge@1.4.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › node-forge@1.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-forge@1.4.3.
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception via tls.parseHelloMessage() in lib/tls.js, which stores the ServerHello's compression_method without validating it against the methods offered in the ClientHello. When the client subsequently handles ServerHelloDone, tls.createConnectionState() throws an uncaught Error('Unsupported compression algorithm.') for any compression method other than null (0) or deflate (1). Because the ServerHello is not yet authenticated at this point, a malicious server or an on-path attacker can set the compression byte to an unsupported value, causing connection.process() to throw and terminating the Node.js process in applications that do not catch the exception - including those using forge.tls.wrapSocket or forge.http.
Workaround
Catch exceptions thrown by connection.process() and close the socket.
PoC
A server (or on-path attacker) sends a ServerHello with `compression_method` 0xff, followed by a valid Certificate and ServerHelloDone:
client.handshake();
client.process(serverHello + certificate + serverHelloDone);
// <= 1.4.2: throws Error: Unsupported compression algorithm.
// 1.4.3: error callback with "Unsupported compression method."
The reporter's PoC (a CA-issued server certificate and the default verify callback) is in tests/pocs/ghsa-w4xr-hqv8-ch44.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value via the fetch() function's Subresource Integrity verification logic, which splits the integrity string on a single space rather than on all ASCII whitespace characters. An integrity value whose digest is preceded by a horizontal tab or other non-space ASCII whitespace (e.g. \tsha256-...) is parsed as a single unrecognized token and skipped. When no recognized algorithm remains, the integrity list is treated as empty and the response is accepted unconditionally, allowing a server that returns a body different from the pinned digest to pass the check. An attacker who controls the response body can deliver arbitrary bytes to an application that uses whitespace-surrounded SRI metadata, with no integrity error raised.
Workaround
Supply SRI integrity metadata without surrounding whitespace, using a single space to separate multiple digests.
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
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Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
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Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
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Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File via the cleanRequestHeaders function in lib/handler/redirect-handler.js, when request headers are supplied as an array of [name, value] tuples (e.g. via Object.entries(headers)). The redirect interceptor is responsible for stripping sensitive headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and Host on cross-origin redirects, but it misreads tuple-format headers as a flat alternating [name, value, name, value, ...] list, causing header names to never match the strip list and leaving sensitive headers intact. When a header-normalizing interceptor such as cache() or deduplicate() is composed outside redirect(), it serializes the retained headers onto the cross-origin request, disclosing origin-bound credentials to the redirect destination. This is a representation-dependent bypass of the cross-origin header stripping introduced to address CVE-2024-30260.
Note: This is only exploitable when headers are supplied as an array of [name, value] tuples and a header-normalizing interceptor (cache() or deduplicate()) is composed outside the redirect() interceptor.
Workaround
Supply request headers as a plain object or a flat [name, value, name, value, ...] array rather than an array of [name, value] tuples, or compose the redirect() interceptor outside the normalizing interceptor (cache() or deduplicate()).
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
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Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error via the cache interceptor in lib/interceptor/cache.js when an Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors as compose(redirect(), cache()). The redirect handler strips origin-bound credential headers from a conditional revalidation request but does not strip the cache-generated If-None-Match or If-Modified-Since validators, so when the original origin redirects the revalidation request to a different origin, the redirect destination receives the original origin's validators. undici then treats a 304 Not Modified response from that different origin as successful revalidation of the stored representation, allowing a shared cache to serve the original origin's authenticated response - including one gated by Authorization - to a subsequent unauthenticated caller.
Note: This is only exploitable when a shared MemoryCacheStore or SqliteCacheStore and the composition compose(redirect(), cache()) are used, and an attacker can influence a cross-origin redirect on the revalidated request.
Workaround
Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()), use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: undici
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4, @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › undici@7.30.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › undici@8.12.3Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › undici@8.12.3
Overview
undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception via the cache interceptor in lib/interceptor/cache.js when it is composed with a downstream handler that throws during response processing. When a cached response is replayed through the cache interceptor's async store path, a throw raised asynchronously - for example from the built-in dump interceptor exceeding its maxSize, or the decompress interceptor rejecting more than five Content-Encoding values - escapes as an uncaught exception or unhandled promise rejection and terminates the Node.js process. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can trigger this crash by serving a cacheable response whose replayed body or headers cause the downstream handler to throw, including on a 304 revalidation of a stale cache entry.
Note: This is only exploitable when the cache interceptor is composed with a downstream response handler that throws during response processing (such as dump with a maxSize limit, or decompress with more than five Content-Encoding values).
Workaround
Avoid composing the cache interceptor with a response handler that throws during response processing (such as dump with a maxSize) until upgrading.
Remediation
Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: @fastify/static@10.1.8
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @fastify/static@10.1.8 › glob@13.0.7 › minimatch@10.2.6Remediation: Upgrade to @fastify/static@10.1.9.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification) in the firstPhasePreProcess method, where the **/.. transform clones a globParts entry and pushes the clone back onto the same array inside a do...while (didSomething) fixpoint loop. An attacker can exhaust CPU and memory by supplying a glob pattern whose **/.. sequences regenerate entries during preprocessing, which secondPhasePreProcess then compares in an O(n^2) pairwise partsMatch pass over the expanded set. Exploitation requires the pattern to be parsed with optimizationLevel set to 2 or higher.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch to version 11.0.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: fast-xml-parser
- Introduced through: mailauth@8.0.4 and @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mailauth@8.0.4 › fast-xml-parser@5.11.2Remediation: Upgrade to mailauth@8.0.5.
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mailauth@8.0.4 › fast-xml-parser@5.11.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @zone-eu/zone-mta@3.11.5 › mx-connect@2.0.3 › mailauth@8.0.4 › fast-xml-parser@5.11.2
Overview
fast-xml-parser is a Validate XML, Parse XML, Build XML without C/C++ based libraries
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in the readStopNodeData() function in OrderedObjParser.js. An attacker can block the event loop by supplying XML in which a stop node body contains many <a fragments and no closing >, which makes the function rescan the entire remaining input from every <. This affects only applications that set the non-default stopNodes option to match an element in the parsed document.
Remediation
Upgrade fast-xml-parser to version 5.12.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: node-forge@1.4.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › node-forge@1.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to node-forge@1.4.3.
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature via ed25519.verify() in lib/ed25519.js, which does not reject public keys of small order. crypto_sign_open() decodes the public key A with unpackneg(), which only checks that the point is on the curve, and never validates that the key is not a small-order point (the identity point or the other 7 points of order 2, 4, or 8, including non-canonical encodings with y >= p). An attacker who can supply the public key can present a small-order key together with a signature where S = 0 and a small-order R, causing the verification equation R == [k](-A) to hold for many or all messages without knowledge of any private key. For the identity key specifically, the fixed signature R = identity, S = 0 verifies for every message.
PoC
Identity public key `A = 01 00 … 00` (32 bytes) and signature `R = 01 00 … 00`, `S = 00 … 00` (64 bytes):
forge.ed25519.verify({message: 'admin=true', encoding: 'utf8',
signature: SIG, publicKey: IDENTITY});
// <= 1.4.2: true for any message; node:crypto.verify(): false
// 1.4.3: false
Other small-order public keys (orders 2, 4 and 8, and non-canonical encodings) give forgeries for many messages with `S = 0` and a small-order `R`.
Regression tests are in tests/unit/ed25519.js, and the reporter's PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-6889-vf6x-f3g5.js.
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: mongodb
- Introduced through: mongodb@7.8.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › mongodb@7.8.0Remediation: Upgrade to mongodb@7.9.0.
Overview
mongodb is an official MongoDB driver for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints via OIDC ENVIRONMENT and callback confusion in MongoCredentials validation, where specifying both an ENVIRONMENT value and an OIDC_CALLBACK or OIDC_HUMAN_CALLBACK bypasses the ALLOWED_HOSTS restriction. A bearer token produced by the application's own login callback can therefore be transmitted to a host outside the configured set of permitted hosts, resulting in unintended disclosure of that credential.
Remediation
Upgrade mongodb to version 7.9.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Module: @root/acme
- Introduced through: @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/asn1
- Introduced through: @root/csr@0.8.1 and @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/csr
- Introduced through: @root/csr@0.8.1 and @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/encoding
- Introduced through: @root/acme@3.1.0 and @root/csr@0.8.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/x509@0.7.2 › @root/asn1@1.0.2 › @root/encoding@1.0.1
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/keypairs
- Introduced through: @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/pem
- Introduced through: @root/csr@0.8.1 and @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/pem@1.0.4
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/pem@1.0.4
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/pem@1.0.4
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/pem@1.0.4
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: @root/x509
- Introduced through: @root/csr@0.8.1 and @root/acme@3.1.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/x509@0.7.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/csr@0.8.1 › @root/x509@0.7.2
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › @root/acme@3.1.0 › @root/keypairs@0.10.3 › @root/x509@0.7.2
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: openpgp
- Introduced through: openpgp@6.1.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › openpgp@6.1.1
LGPL-3.0 license
medium severity
- Module: pem-jwk
- Introduced through: pem-jwk@2.0.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @zone-eu/wildduck@nodemailer/wildduck › pem-jwk@2.0.0
MPL-2.0 license