fliptask/fliptask-api

Vulnerabilities

45 via 282 paths

Dependencies

749

Source

GitHub

Commit

acda3fdd

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Issue type
  • 45
  • 4
Severity
  • 4
  • 15
  • 29
  • 1
Status
  • 49
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.3.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 mysql2@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.7.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due to improper sanitization of the timezone parameter in the readCodeFor function by calling a native MySQL Server date/time function.

PoC

const mysql = require('mysql2');
const connection = mysql.createConnection({
  host: '127.0.0.1',
  user: 'root',
  database: 'test',
  password: '123456',
});

let query_data = {
  sql: `SELECT CURDATE();`,
  timezone:
    "');''.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('open /System/Applications/Calculator.app');console.log('",
};

connection.query(query_data, (err, results) => {
  if (err) throw err;
  console.log(results);
});

connection.end();

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.7 or higher.

References

critical severity

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.3.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 mysql2@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.4.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via the readCodeFor function due to improper validation of the supportBigNumbers and bigNumberStrings values.

PoC

 {sql:`SELECT INDEX_LENGTH FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1`, supportBigNumbers:"console.log(1337)"}

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.4 or higher.

References

critical severity

SQL Injection

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@5.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 sequelize@5.22.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.19.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to SQL Injection via the replacements statement. It allowed a malicious actor to pass dangerous values such as OR true; DROP TABLE users through replacements which would result in arbitrary SQL execution.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.19.1 or higher.

References

critical severity

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

  • Vulnerable module: babel-traverse
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs when using plugins that rely on the path.evaluate() or path.evaluateTruthy() internal Babel methods.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the attacker uses known affected plugins such as @babel/plugin-transform-runtime, @babel/preset-env when using its useBuiltIns option, and any "polyfill provider" plugin that depends on @babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider. No other plugins under the @babel/ namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be.

Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.

Workaround

Users who are unable to upgrade the library can upgrade the affected plugins instead, to avoid triggering the vulnerable code path in affected @babel/traverse.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for babel-traverse.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 update-notifier@2.5.0 boxen@1.3.0 term-size@1.2.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpx@10.2.4 update-notifier@2.5.0 boxen@1.3.0 term-size@1.2.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

PoC

const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
  str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";

console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")

// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js` 
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.

References

high severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.21.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5

…and 18 more

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the isPublic function, by failing to identify hex-encoded 0x7f.1 as equivalent to the private addess 127.0.0.1. An attacker can expose sensitive information, interact with internal services, or exploit other vulnerabilities within the network by exploiting this vulnerability.

PoC

var ip = require('ip');

console.log(ip.isPublic("0x7f.1"));
//This returns true. It should be false because 0x7f.1 == 127.0.0.1 == 0177.1

Remediation

Upgrade ip to version 1.1.9, 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Filtering of Special Elements

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@5.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 sequelize@5.22.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.29.0.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Filtering of Special Elements due to attributes not being escaped if they included ( and ), or were equal to * and were split if they included the character ..

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.29.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.3.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 mysql2@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.8.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper user input sanitization passed to fields and tables when using nestTables.

PoC


const mysql = require('mysql2');
const connection = mysql.createConnection({
host: '127.0.0.1',
user: 'root',
database: 'test',
password: 'root',
});

let query_data = {
sql: `SELECT CAST('{"admin":true}' AS JSON)_proto__;`,
nestTables: "_",
};

connection.query(query_data, (err, results) => {

if (err) throw err;
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(results[0]));
console.log(results[0].admin);
});

connection.end();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.8 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ansi-regex
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18, bcrypt@4.0.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 cli-columns@3.1.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.21.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 columnify@1.5.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.21.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.20.1.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.20.1.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1 node-pre-gyp@0.14.0 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1 node-pre-gyp@0.14.0 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1

…and 15 more

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the sub-patterns [[\\]()#;?]* and (?:;[-a-zA-Z\\d\\/#&.:=?%@~_]*)*.

PoC

import ansiRegex from 'ansi-regex';

for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    var time = Date.now();
    var attack_str = "\u001B["+";".repeat(i*10000);
    ansiRegex().test(attack_str)
    var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
    console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ansi-regex to version 3.0.1, 4.1.1, 5.0.1, 6.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Insecure Encryption

  • Vulnerable module: bcrypt
  • Introduced through: bcrypt@4.0.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to bcrypt@5.0.0.

Overview

bcrypt is an A library to help you hash passwords.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Encryption. Data is truncated wrong when its length is greater than 255 bytes.

Remediation

Upgrade bcrypt to version 5.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: dicer
  • Introduced through: multer@1.4.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 multer@1.4.4 busboy@0.2.14 dicer@0.2.5

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious attacker can send a modified form to server, and crash the nodejs service. An attacker could sent the payload again and again so that the service continuously crashes.

PoC

await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000', { method: 'POST', headers: { ['content-type']: 'multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro', ['content-length']: '145', connection: 'keep-alive', }, body: '------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro\r\n Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bildbeschreibung"\r\n\r\n\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro--' });

Remediation

There is no fixed version for dicer.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.

PoC

lodash.zipobjectdeep:

const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

lodash:

const test = require("lodash");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: nth-check
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 cheerio@1.0.0-rc.2 css-select@1.2.0 nth-check@1.0.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 ice-cap@0.0.4 cheerio@0.20.0 css-select@1.2.0 nth-check@1.0.2

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when parsing crafted invalid CSS nth-checks, due to the sub-pattern \s*(?:([+-]?)\s*(\d+))? in RE_NTH_ELEMENT with quantified overlapping adjacency.

PoC

var nthCheck = require("nth-check")
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    var time = Date.now();
    var attack_str = '2n' + ' '.repeat(i*10000)+"!";
    try {
        nthCheck.parse(attack_str) 
    }
    catch(err) {
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
    }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade nth-check to version 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Internal Property Tampering

  • Vulnerable module: taffydb
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 taffydb@2.7.3

Overview

taffydb is an open source JavaScript library that provides in-memory database capabilities

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Internal Property Tampering. taffy sets an internal index for each data item in its DB. However, it is found that the internal index can be forged by adding additional properties into user-input. If an index is found in the query, taffyDB will ignore other query conditions and directly return the indexed data item. Moreover, the internal index is in an easily-guessable format (e.g. T000002R000001). As such, attackers can use this vulnerability to access any data items in the DB and exploit an SQL Injection.

Note: The taffy package has been deprecated by the author. Its successor package, taffydb, is also found to be vulnerable and is not actively maintained.

PoC

var TAFFY = require('taffy');
var friends = TAFFY([
        {"id":1,"gender":"M","username":"Smith","password":"aaa","status":"Active"},
        {"id":2,"gender":"F","username":"Ruth","password":"bbb","status":"Active"},
        {"id":3,"gender":"M","username":"Stevenson","password":"ccc","status":"Active"},
        {"id":4,"gender":"F","username":"Gill","password":"ddd","status":"Active"}
]);

var json = {username:"Smith", "password":"123", "___id":"T000002R000002", "___s":true};
var item1 = friends(json);
console.log(item1.first());

Remediation

There is no fixed version for taffydb.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.

PoC by Snyk

const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'

function check() {
    mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
    if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
        console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
    }
  }

check();

For more information, check out our blog post

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.

PoC

lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

high severity

SQL Injection

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@5.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 sequelize@5.22.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.21.2.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to SQL Injection due to an improper escaping for multiple appearances of $ in a string.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.21.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@8.5.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm such that the library can be misconfigured to use legacy, insecure key types for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.

Exploitability

Users are affected when using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below:

EC: ES256, ES384, ES512

RSA: RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512

RSA-PSS: PS256, PS384, PS512

And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:

ES256: prime256v1

ES384: secp384r1

ES512: secp521r1

Workaround

Users who are unable to upgrade to the fixed version can use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 socks-proxy-agent@4.0.2 socks@2.3.3 ip@1.1.5

…and 18 more

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the isPublic function, which identifies some private IP addresses as public addresses due to improper parsing of the input. An attacker can manipulate a system that uses isLoopback(), isPrivate() and isPublic functions to guard outgoing network requests to treat certain IP addresses as globally routable by supplying specially crafted IP addresses.

Note

This vulnerability derived from an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-42282

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ip.

References

medium severity

Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@8.5.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment via the secretOrPublicKey argument due to misconfigurations of the key retrieval function jwt.verify(). Exploiting this vulnerability might result in incorrect verification of forged tokens when tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm.

Note: This vulnerability affects your application if it supports the usage of both symmetric and asymmetric keys in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Poisoning

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.3.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 mysql2@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.4.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning due to insecure results object creation and improper user input sanitization passed through parserFn in text_parser.js and binary_parser.js.

PoC

SELECT CAST('{"toString": {"toString":true}, "tags": {"a": 1, "b": null}}' as JSON) AS __proto__;
Object.getPrototypeOf(results[0])
> { tags: { a: 1, b: null }, toString: { toString: true } }

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.3.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 mysql2@2.3.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.3.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information through the keyFromFields function, resulting in cache poisoning. An attacker can inject a colon (:) character within a value of the attacker-crafted key.

PoC

  connection.query(
    'SELECT information_schema.tables.TABLE_NAME,`tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables`.TABLE_ROWS FROM information_schema.tables INNER JOIN information_schema.tables AS `tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables` ON `tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables`.TABLE_ROWS!=information_schema.tables.TABLE_ROWS LIMIT 1;',
    function(err, results, fields) {
    }
  );
  // Send another request and spwan new connection
  connection1.query(
    `SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_ROWS, DATA_LENGTH FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1;`,
    function(err, results, fields) {
      console.log(results);
      console.log(fields);
    }
  );

Results

[ { TABLE_NAME: 'ADMINISTRABLE_ROLE_AUTHORIZATIONS', TABLE_ROWS: 0 } ]
[
  `TABLE_NAME` VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  `TABLE_ROWS` BIGINT(21) UNSIGNED,
  `DATA_LENGTH` BIGINT(21) UNSIGNED
]

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18 and nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 ice-cap@0.0.4 cheerio@0.20.0 jsdom@7.2.2 request@2.88.2

…and 4 more

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion')

  • Vulnerable module: tar
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18 and bcrypt@4.0.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 tar@4.4.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1 node-pre-gyp@0.14.0 tar@4.4.19
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 tar@4.4.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 tar@4.4.19
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 tar@4.4.19
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 tar@4.4.19
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 tar@4.4.19
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 tar@4.4.19
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 tar@4.4.19

…and 6 more

Overview

tar is a full-featured Tar for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion') due to the lack of folders count validation during the folder creation process. An attacker who generates a large number of sub-folders can consume memory on the system running the software and even crash the client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside.

Remediation

Upgrade tar to version 6.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18 and nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 ice-cap@0.0.4 cheerio@0.20.0 jsdom@7.2.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 ice-cap@0.0.4 cheerio@0.20.0 jsdom@7.2.2 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0

…and 5 more

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Authentication

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@8.5.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 jsonwebtoken@8.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Authentication such that the lack of algorithm definition in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.

Exploitability

Users are affected only if all of the following conditions are true for the jwt.verify() function:

  1. A token with no signature is received.

  2. No algorithms are specified.

  3. A falsy (e.g., null, false, undefined) secret or key is passed.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1
    Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@3.10.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@5.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 sequelize@5.22.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.28.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion') due to improper user-input sanitization, due to unsafe fall-through in GET WHERE conditions.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.28.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18 and bcrypt@4.0.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 init-package-json@1.10.3 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1 node-pre-gyp@0.14.0 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 fs-vacuum@1.2.10 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 node-gyp@5.1.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpx@10.2.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 init-package-json@1.10.3 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 read-installed@4.0.3 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 read-package-tree@5.3.1 read-package-json@2.1.2 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 lock-verify@2.2.2 @iarna/cli@2.2.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 gentle-fs@2.3.1 fs-vacuum@1.2.10 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 lock-verify@2.2.2 @iarna/cli@2.2.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 lock-verify@2.2.2 @iarna/cli@2.2.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1 fs-vacuum@1.2.10 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5 node-gyp@5.1.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1 fs-vacuum@1.2.10 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1 fs-vacuum@1.2.10 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 cacache@12.0.4 move-concurrently@1.0.1 copy-concurrently@1.0.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

…and 134 more

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Cryptographic Issues

  • Vulnerable module: bcrypt
  • Introduced through: bcrypt@4.0.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 bcrypt@4.0.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to bcrypt@5.0.0.

Overview

bcrypt is an A library to help you hash passwords.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues. When hashing a password containing an ASCII NUL character, that character acts as the string terminator. Any following characters are ignored.

Remediation

Upgrade bcrypt to version 5.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 marked@0.3.19

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The em regex within src/rules.js file have multiple unused capture groups which could lead to a denial of service attack if user input is reachable.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 1.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 minimist@1.2.0

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true

require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: got
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 update-notifier@2.5.0 latest-version@3.1.0 package-json@4.0.1 got@6.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpx@10.2.4 update-notifier@2.5.0 latest-version@3.1.0 package-json@4.0.1 got@6.7.1

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to missing verification of requested URLs. It allowed a victim to be redirected to a UNIX socket.

Remediation

Upgrade got to version 11.8.5, 12.1.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: http-cache-semantics
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.21.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to npm@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 pacote@9.5.12 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmaccess@3.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmhook@5.0.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmorg@1.0.1 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmpublish@1.1.3 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmsearch@2.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 libnpmteam@1.0.2 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-profile@4.0.4 npm-registry-fetch@4.0.7 make-fetch-happen@5.0.2 http-cache-semantics@3.8.1

…and 18 more

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The issue can be exploited via malicious request header values sent to a server, when that server reads the cache policy from the request using this library.

PoC

Run the following script in Node.js after installing the http-cache-semantics NPM package:

const CachePolicy = require("http-cache-semantics");

for (let i = 0; i <= 5; i++) {

const attack = "a" + " ".repeat(i * 7000) +
"z";

const start = performance.now();
new CachePolicy({
headers: {},
}, {
headers: {
"cache-control": attack,
},


});
console.log(`${attack.length}: ${performance.now() - start}ms`);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade http-cache-semantics to version 4.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.

POC

var lo = require('lodash');

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)

var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)

var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 marked@0.3.19

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The inline.text regex may take quadratic time to scan for potential email addresses starting at every point.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 0.6.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 marked@0.3.19

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when passing unsanitized user input to inline.reflinkSearch, if it is not being parsed by a time-limited worker thread.

PoC

import * as marked from 'marked';

console.log(marked.parse(`[x]: x

\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](`));

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 4.0.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 marked@0.3.19

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when unsanitized user input is passed to block.def.

PoC

import * as marked from "marked";
marked.parse(`[x]:${' '.repeat(1500)}x ${' '.repeat(1500)} x`);

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 4.0.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: marked
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 marked@0.3.19

Overview

marked is a low-level compiler for parsing markdown without caching or blocking for long periods of time.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A Denial of Service condition could be triggered through exploitation of the heading regex.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade marked to version 0.4.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: sequelize
  • Introduced through: sequelize@5.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 sequelize@5.22.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to sequelize@6.28.1.

Overview

sequelize is a promise-based Node.js ORM for Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, SQLite and Microsoft SQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due to improper user-input, by allowing an attacker to create malicious queries leading to SQL errors.

Remediation

Upgrade sequelize to version 6.28.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Session Fixation

  • Vulnerable module: passport
  • Introduced through: passport@0.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 passport@0.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to passport@0.6.0.

Overview

passport is a Simple, unobtrusive authentication for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Session Fixation. When a user logs in or logs out, the session is regenerated instead of being closed.

Remediation

Upgrade passport to version 0.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 lodash@3.10.1

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: bin-links
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 bin-links@1.1.8
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 bin-links@1.1.8
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 bin-links@1.1.8

Artistic-2.0 license

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: gentle-fs
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 gentle-fs@2.3.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 bin-links@1.1.8 gentle-fs@2.3.1

…and 1 more

Artistic-2.0 license

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: npm
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18

Artistic-2.0 license

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: npm-lifecycle
  • Introduced through: npm@6.14.18

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libcipm@4.0.8 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5
  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 npm@6.14.18 libnpm@3.0.1 npm-lifecycle@3.1.5

Artistic-2.0 license

low severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: fliptask@fliptask/fliptask-api#acda3fdda284d8f3a36ec0285834ee0fea158555 nodemailer-sendgrid-transport@0.2.0 sendgrid@1.9.2 smtpapi@1.4.7 esdoc@1.1.0 minimist@1.2.0

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.

Notes:

  • This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598

  • The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.

References