Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to an anomaly in the _truncateToN function. An attacker can cause legitimate transactions or communications to be incorrectly flagged as invalid by exploiting the signature verification process when the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes, and the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash.
In some situations, a private key exposure is possible. This can happen when an attacker knows a faulty and the corresponding correct signature for the same message.
Note:
The scope of this issue was limited to improper validation of messages with leading zeros and fixed in version 6.6.0.
The additional CVE-2025-14505 was issued to track the signature issue related to leading zeros during the computation of k.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.7
var hash = require('hash.js');
var BN = require('bn.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('p192');
var msg = '343236343739373234';
var sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b';
// Same public key just in different formats
var pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723';
var pkPem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEzTWgsY7rj82H/wGXgAEoKHRfBG54\nXeuigVDeG+bLQ3ZSMAa+/zD/CbQEkSXO0pcj\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n';
// Create hash
var hashArray = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
// Convert array to string (just for showcase of the leading zeros)
var hashStr = Array.from(hashArray, function(byte) {
return ('0' + (byte & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2);
}).join('');
var hMsg = new BN(hashArray, 'hex');
// Hashed message contains 4 leading zeros bytes
console.log('sha256 hash(str): ' + hashStr);
// Due to using BN bitLength lib it does not calculate the bit length correctly (should be 32 since it is a sha256 hash)
console.log('Byte len of sha256 hash: ' + hMsg.byteLength());
console.log('sha256 hash(BN): ' + hMsg.toString(16));
// Due to the shift of the message to be within the order of the curve the delta computation is invalid
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(toArray(pk, 'hex'));
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashStr, sig));
// You can check that this hash should validate by consolidating openssl
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFile('msg.bin', new BN(msg, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('sig.bin', new BN(sig, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('cert.pem', pkPem, (err) => {
if (err) throw err;
});
// To verify the correctness of the message signature and key one can run:
// openssl dgst -sha256 -verify cert.pem -signature sig.bin msg.bin
// Or run this python script
/*
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
msg = '343236343739373234'
sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b'
pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723'
p192 = ec.SECP192R1()
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(p192, bytes.fromhex(pk))
pk.verify(bytes.fromhex(sig), bytes.fromhex(msg), ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
*/
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.6.0 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to a missing signature length check in the EDDSA signature process. An attacker can manipulate the signature by appending or removing zero-valued bytes.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var eddsa = elliptic.eddsa;
var ed25519 = new eddsa('ed25519');
var key = ed25519.keyFromPublic('7d4d0e7f6153a69b6242b522abbee685fda4420f8834b108c3bdae369ef549fa', 'hex');
// [tcId 37] appending 0 byte to signature
var msg = '54657374';
var sig = '7c38e026f29e14aabd059a0f2db8b0cd783040609a8be684db12f82a27774ab07a9155711ecfaf7f99f277bad0c6ae7e39d4eef676573336a5c51eb6f946b30d00';
console.log(key.verify(msg, sig));
// [tcId 38] removing 0 byte from signature
msg = '546573743137';
sig = '93de3ca252426c95f735cb9edd92e83321ac62372d5aa5b379786bae111ab6b17251330e8f9a7c30d6993137c596007d7b001409287535ac4804e662bc58a3';
console.log(key.verify(msg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to the allowance of BER-encoded signatures. An attacker can manipulate the ECDSA signatures by exploiting the signature malleability.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var hash = require('hash.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('p521');
// [tcId 7] length of sequence [r, s] contains a leading 0
var msg = '313233343030';
var sig = '3082008602414e4223ee43e8cb89de3b1339ffc279e582f82c7ab0f71bbde43dbe374ac75ffbef29acdf8e70750b9a04f66fda48351de7bbfd515720b0ec5cd736f9b73bdf8645024128b5d0926a4172b349b0fd2e929487a5edb94b142df923a697e7446acdacdba0a029e43d69111174dba2fe747122709a69ce69d5285e174a01a93022fea8318ac1';
var pk = '04005c6457ec088d532f482093965ae53ccd07e556ed59e2af945cd8c7a95c1c644f8a56a8a8a3cd77392ddd861e8a924dac99c69069093bd52a52fa6c56004a074508007878d6d42e4b4dd1e9c0696cb3e19f63033c3db4e60d473259b3ebe079aaf0a986ee6177f8217a78c68b813f7e149a4e56fd9562c07fed3d895942d7d101cb83f6';
var hashMsg = hash.sha512().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(pk, 'hex');
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashMsg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to a missing check for whether the leading bit of r and s is zero. An attacker can manipulate the ECDSA signature by exploiting this oversight.
PoC
var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.6
var hash = require('hash.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;
var ec = new elliptic.ec('secp256k1');
// [tcId 6] Legacy: ASN encoding of r misses leading 0
var msg = '313233343030';
var sig = '30440220813ef79ccefa9a56f7ba805f0e478584fe5f0dd5f567bc09b5123ccbc983236502206ff18a52dcc0336f7af62400a6dd9b810732baf1ff758000d6f613a556eb31ba';
var pk = '04b838ff44e5bc177bf21189d0766082fc9d843226887fc9760371100b7ee20a6ff0c9d75bfba7b31a6bca1974496eeb56de357071955d83c4b1badaa0b21832e9';
var hashMsg = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(pk, 'hex');
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashMsg, sig));
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.7 or higher.
References
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due to the sign function which allows an attacker to extract the private key from an ECDSA signature by signing a malformed input. A single maliciously crafted signed message can enable full key extraction for any previously known message-signature pair.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.6.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to improper range validation of the S value in the verify function, allowing the usage of an invalid signature.
Note:
This vulnerability could have a security-relevant impact if an application relies on the uniqueness of a signature.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.6 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues. Elliptic allows ECDSA signature malleability via variations in encoding, leading \0 bytes, or integer overflows. This could conceivably have a security-relevant impact if an application relied on a single canonical signature.
PoC
var crypto = require('crypto')
var EC = require('elliptic').ec;
var ec = new EC('secp256k1');
var obj = require("./poc_ecdsa_secp256k1_sha256_test.json");
for (let testGroup of obj.testGroups) {
var key = ec.keyFromPublic(testGroup.key.uncompressed, 'hex');
for(let test of testGroup.tests) {
console.log("[*] Test " + test.tcId + " result: " + test.result)
msgHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(test.msg, 'hex')).digest();
try {
result = key.verify(msgHash, Buffer.from(test.sig, 'hex'));
if (result == true) {
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: PASS");
else
console.log("Result: FAIL")
}
if (result == false) {
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: FAIL");
else
console.log("Result: PASS")
}
} catch (e) {
console.log("ERROR - VERIFY: " + e)
if (test.result == "valid" || test.result == "acceptable")
console.log("Result: FAIL");
else
console.log("Result: PASS")
}
}
}
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.
PoC
lodash.zipobjectdeep:
const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
lodash:
const test = require("lodash");
let emptyObject = {};
console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined
test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function
console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.
PoC by Snyk
const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'
function check() {
mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
}
}
check();
For more information, check out our blog post
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.
PoC
lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: crypto-js
- Introduced through: web3@0.19.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › web3@0.19.1 › crypto-js@3.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to web3@1.2.0.
Overview
crypto-js is a library of crypto standards.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of Weak Hash due to inadequate security settings in the PBKDF2 configuration, which uses insecure SHA1 and has a low iteration count of 1. These insecure settings allow attackers to perform brute-force attacks when PBKDF2 is used with the default parameters.
No information is directly exposed when a hash is generated, regardless of whether the PBKDF2 function is in the vulnerable configuration or not. However, it may be possible to recover the original data, more or less easily depending on the configured parameters, using a brute force attack. This is a low impact on the confidentiality of the protected data, which are in a different scope than the vulnerable package.
The attacker similarly may be able to modify some data which is meant to be protected by the vulnerable package - most commonly when it is used for signature verification. This would require a subsequent exploitation, such as forcing a hash collision via length extension attack. The integrity of the data is therefore compromised, but the quantity and targeting of that data is not fully in the attacker's control, yielding a low integrity impact.
Notes
This vulnerability is related to https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CRYPTOES-6032390 in crypto-es.
According to the
crypto-jsmaintainer: "Active development of CryptoJS has been discontinued. This library is no longer maintained." It is recommended to use the Node.js nativecryptomodule.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be avoided by setting PBKDF2 to use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 and increasing the number of iterations to a sufficiently high value depending on the intended use.
See, for example, the OWASP PBKDF2 Cheat Sheet for recommendations.
Changelog:
2023-10-24 - Initial publication
2023-10-25 - Added fixed version, updated references, separated crypto-es, description changes, updated CVSS, added CVE ID
2023-11-07 - Re-assessed CVSS following a CVSS publication on NVD. No changes made to CVSS.
2024-01-11 - Revised CVSS and description after additional deeper investigation, to reflect the details of the severity assessment
Remediation
Upgrade crypto-js to version 4.2.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cryptographic Issues via the secp256k1 implementation in elliptic/ec/key.js. There is no check to confirm that the public key point passed into the derive function actually exists on the secp256k1 curve. This results in the potential for the private key used in this implementation to be revealed after a number of ECDH operations are performed.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7 and ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 › elliptic@6.6.1
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 › ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 › secp256k1@4.0.4 › elliptic@6.6.1
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation due to the incorrect computation of the byte-length of k value with leading zeros resulting in its truncation. An attacker can obtain the secret key by analyzing both a faulty signature generated by a vulnerable implementation and a correct signature for the same inputs.
Note:
There is a distinct but related issue CVE-2024-48948.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for elliptic.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: yamljs@0.2.10 and solc@0.4.26
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › yamljs@0.2.10 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › solc@0.4.26 › fs-extra@0.30.0 › rimraf@2.7.1 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: elliptic
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › elliptic@0.16.0Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Timing Attack. Practical recovery of the long-term private key generated by the library is possible under certain conditions. Leakage of bit-length of a scalar during scalar multiplication is possible on an elliptic curve which might allow practical recovery of the long-term private key.
Remediation
Upgrade elliptic to version 6.5.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: yargs-parser
- Introduced through: solc@0.4.26
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › solc@0.4.26 › yargs@4.8.1 › yargs-parser@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to solc@0.5.11.
Overview
yargs-parser is a mighty option parser used by yargs.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.
Our research team checked several attack vectors to verify this vulnerability:
- It could be used for privilege escalation.
- The library could be used to parse user input received from different sources:
- terminal emulators
- system calls from other code bases
- CLI RPC servers
PoC by Snyk
const parser = require("yargs-parser");
console.log(parser('--foo.__proto__.bar baz'));
console.log(({}).bar);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade yargs-parser to version 5.0.1, 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.
POC
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: bitcore@0.11.7
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › bitcore@0.11.7 › lodash@2.4.1Remediation: Upgrade to bitcore@1.0.0.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Module: ethereumjs-util
- Introduced through: ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: rlp
- Introduced through: ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 › rlp@2.2.7
MPL-2.0 license
medium severity
- Module: web3
- Introduced through: web3@0.19.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › web3@0.19.1
LGPL-3.0 license
low severity
- Vulnerable module: web3
- Introduced through: web3@0.19.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: coval-solidity@decentriccorp/coval-solidity#540ac5f61888fd1661a60c28521a4c7f32115f70 › web3@0.19.1
Overview
web3 is a JavaScript API which connects to the Generic JSON RPC spec.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Credential Storage. The current implementation of web3.js could result in wallet decryption under certain circumstances. When a wallet is saved and encrypted into local storage, a private key is needed to load the wallet. However, this private key is available via LocalStorage and is readable in plaintext on a webpage after a wallet is loaded.
This implementation could be abused by an attacker through client-side attacks such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and could result in theft of a user's wallet private key.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for web3.