Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
critical severity
- Vulnerable module: constantinople
- Introduced through: jade@1.1.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › constantinople@1.0.2
Overview
constantinople is a Determine whether a JavaScript expression evaluates to a constant (using acorn)
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Sandbox Bypass which can lead to arbitrary code execution.
Remediation
Upgrade constantinople
to version 3.1.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: jade@1.1.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › transformers@2.1.0 › uglify-js@2.2.5Remediation: Open PR to patch uglify-js@2.2.5.
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › with@2.0.0 › uglify-js@2.4.0Remediation: Upgrade to jade@1.3.0.
Overview
uglify-js
is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.
Tom MacWright discovered that UglifyJS versions 2.4.23 and earlier are affected by a vulnerability which allows a specially crafted Javascript file to have altered functionality after minification. This bug was demonstrated by Yan to allow potentially malicious code to be hidden within secure code, activated by minification.
Details
In Boolean algebra, DeMorgan's laws describe the relationships between conjunctions (&&
), disjunctions (||
) and negations (!
).
In Javascript form, they state that:
!(a && b) === (!a) || (!b)
!(a || b) === (!a) && (!b)
The law does not hold true when one of the values is not a boolean however.
Vulnerable versions of UglifyJS do not account for this restriction, and erroneously apply the laws to a statement if it can be reduced in length by it.
Consider this authentication function:
function isTokenValid(user) {
var timeLeft =
!!config && // config object exists
!!user.token && // user object has a token
!user.token.invalidated && // token is not explicitly invalidated
!config.uninitialized && // config is initialized
!config.ignoreTimestamps && // don't ignore timestamps
getTimeLeft(user.token.expiry); // > 0 if expiration is in the future
// The token must not be expired
return timeLeft > 0;
}
function getTimeLeft(expiry) {
return expiry - getSystemTime();
}
When minified with a vulnerable version of UglifyJS, it will produce the following insecure output, where a token will never expire:
( Formatted for readability )
function isTokenValid(user) {
var timeLeft = !( // negation
!config // config object does not exist
|| !user.token // user object does not have a token
|| user.token.invalidated // token is explicitly invalidated
|| config.uninitialized // config isn't initialized
|| config.ignoreTimestamps // ignore timestamps
|| !getTimeLeft(user.token.expiry) // > 0 if expiration is in the future
);
return timeLeft > 0
}
function getTimeLeft(expiry) {
return expiry - getSystemTime()
}
Remediation
Upgrade UglifyJS to version 2.4.24
or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: multimatch@0.3.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › multimatch@0.3.0 › minimatch@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to multimatch@2.1.0.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via complicated and illegal regexes.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch
to version 3.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: multimatch@0.3.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › multimatch@0.3.0 › minimatch@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to multimatch@2.1.0.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS).
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch
to version 3.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: trim-newlines
- Introduced through: gulp-util@2.2.20
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › gulp-util@2.2.20 › dateformat@1.0.12 › meow@3.7.0 › trim-newlines@1.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to gulp-util@3.0.8.
Overview
trim-newlines is a Trim newlines from the start and/or end of a string
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via the end()
method.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
ws
package
Remediation
Upgrade trim-newlines
to version 3.0.1, 4.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash.template
- Introduced through: gulp-util@2.2.20
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › gulp-util@2.2.20 › lodash.template@2.4.1
Overview
lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection via template
.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
There is no fixed version for lodash.template
.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: underscore
- Introduced through: underscore@1.5.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › underscore@1.5.2Remediation: Upgrade to underscore@1.12.1.
Overview
underscore is a JavaScript's functional programming helper library.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the template
function, particularly when the variable
option is taken from _.templateSettings
as it is not sanitized.
PoC
const _ = require('underscore');
_.templateSettings.variable = "a = this.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch HELLO')";
const t = _.template("")();
Remediation
Upgrade underscore
to version 1.13.0-2, 1.12.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: multimatch@0.3.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › multimatch@0.3.0 › minimatch@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to multimatch@2.1.0.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the braceExpand
function in minimatch.js
.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch
to version 3.0.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: jade@1.1.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › constantinople@1.0.2 › uglify-js@2.4.24
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › transformers@2.1.0 › uglify-js@2.2.5
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › with@2.0.0 › uglify-js@2.4.0Remediation: Upgrade to jade@1.8.0.
Overview
uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template
and the decode_template
functions.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade uglify-js
to version 3.14.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: jade@1.1.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › constantinople@1.0.2 › uglify-js@2.4.24Remediation: Open PR to patch uglify-js@2.4.24.
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › transformers@2.1.0 › uglify-js@2.2.5Remediation: Open PR to patch uglify-js@2.2.5.
-
Introduced through: gulp-coverage@dylanb/gulp-coverage#2d76c425cd9984aabcb476bc35bae87445dda527 › jade@1.1.5 › with@2.0.0 › uglify-js@2.4.0Remediation: Upgrade to jade@1.8.0.
Overview
The parse()
function in the uglify-js
package prior to version 2.6.0 is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks when long inputs of certain patterns are processed.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade to version 2.6.0
or greater.
If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard
to patch this vulnerability.