How to use the pip._vendor.six.moves.urllib.parse.urlparse function in pip

content_type = _get_content_type(url, session=session)
                if content_type.lower().startswith('text/html'):
                    break
                else:
                    logger.debug(
                        'Skipping page %s because of Content-Type: %s',
                        link,
                        content_type,
                    )
                    return

        logger.debug('Getting page %s', url)

        # Tack index.html onto file:// URLs that point to directories
        (scheme, netloc, path, params, query, fragment) = \
            urllib_parse.urlparse(url)
        if (scheme == 'file' and
                os.path.isdir(urllib_request.url2pathname(path))):
            # add trailing slash if not present so urljoin doesn't trim
            # final segment
            if not url.endswith('/'):
                url += '/'
            url = urllib_parse.urljoin(url, 'index.html')
            logger.debug(' file: URL is directory, getting %s', url)

        resp = session.get(
            url,
            headers={
                "Accept": "text/html",
                # We don't want to blindly returned cached data for
                # /simple/, because authors generally expecting that
                # twine upload && pip install will function, but if

def _validate_secure_origin(self, logger, location):
        # Determine if this url used a secure transport mechanism
        parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(str(location))
        origin = (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port)

        # The protocol to use to see if the protocol matches.
        # Don't count the repository type as part of the protocol: in
        # cases such as "git+ssh", only use "ssh". (I.e., Only verify against
        # the last scheme.)
        protocol = origin[0].rsplit('+', 1)[-1]

        # Determine if our origin is a secure origin by looking through our
        # hardcoded list of secure origins, as well as any additional ones
        # configured on this PackageFinder instance.
        for secure_origin in (SECURE_ORIGINS + self.secure_origins):
            if protocol != secure_origin[0] and secure_origin[0] != "*":
                continue

            try:

def _validate_secure_origin(self, logger, location):
        # Determine if this url used a secure transport mechanism
        parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(str(location))
        origin = (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port)

        # The protocol to use to see if the protocol matches.
        # Don't count the repository type as part of the protocol: in
        # cases such as "git+ssh", only use "ssh". (I.e., Only verify against
        # the last scheme.)
        protocol = origin[0].rsplit('+', 1)[-1]

        # Determine if our origin is a secure origin by looking through our
        # hardcoded list of secure origins, as well as any additional ones
        # configured on this PackageFinder instance.
        for secure_origin in (SECURE_ORIGINS + self.secure_origins):
            if protocol != secure_origin[0] and secure_origin[0] != "*":
                continue

            try:

def _validate_secure_origin(self, logger, location):
        # Determine if this url used a secure transport mechanism
        parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(str(location))
        origin = (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port)

        # The protocol to use to see if the protocol matches.
        # Don't count the repository type as part of the protocol: in
        # cases such as "git+ssh", only use "ssh". (I.e., Only verify against
        # the last scheme.)
        protocol = origin[0].rsplit('+', 1)[-1]

        # Determine if our origin is a secure origin by looking through our
        # hardcoded list of secure origins, as well as any additional ones
        # configured on this PackageFinder instance.
        for secure_origin in (SECURE_ORIGINS + self.secure_origins):
            if protocol != secure_origin[0] and secure_origin[0] != "*":
                continue

            try:

def _validate_secure_origin(self, logger, location):
        # Determine if this url used a secure transport mechanism
        parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(str(location))
        origin = (parsed.scheme, parsed.hostname, parsed.port)

        # The protocol to use to see if the protocol matches.
        # Don't count the repository type as part of the protocol: in
        # cases such as "git+ssh", only use "ssh". (I.e., Only verify against
        # the last scheme.)
        protocol = origin[0].rsplit('+', 1)[-1]

        # Determine if our origin is a secure origin by looking through our
        # hardcoded list of secure origins, as well as any additional ones
        # configured on this PackageFinder instance.
        for secure_origin in (SECURE_ORIGINS + self.secure_origins):
            if protocol != secure_origin[0] and secure_origin[0] != "*":
                continue

            try:

def _remove_md5_fragment(location):
    if not location:
        return ''
    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(location)
    if parsed[-1].startswith('md5='):
        return urllib.parse.urlunparse(parsed[:-1] + ('',))
    return location

def _clean_link(url):
    # type: (str) -> str
    """Makes sure a link is fully encoded.  That is, if a ' ' shows up in
    the link, it will be rewritten to %20 (while not over-quoting
    % or other characters)."""
    # Split the URL into parts according to the general structure
    # `scheme://netloc/path;parameters?query#fragment`. Note that the
    # `netloc` can be empty and the URI will then refer to a local
    # filesystem path.
    result = urllib_parse.urlparse(url)
    # In both cases below we unquote prior to quoting to make sure
    # nothing is double quoted.
    if result.netloc == "":
        # On Windows the path part might contain a drive letter which
        # should not be quoted. On Linux where drive letters do not
        # exist, the colon should be quoted. We rely on urllib.request
        # to do the right thing here.
        path = urllib_request.pathname2url(
            urllib_request.url2pathname(result.path))
    else:
        # In addition to the `/` character we protect `@` so that
        # revision strings in VCS URLs are properly parsed.
        path = urllib_parse.quote(urllib_parse.unquote(result.path), safe="/@")
    return urllib_parse.urlunparse(result._replace(path=path))

def handle_401(self, resp, **kwargs):
        # We only care about 401 responses, anything else we want to just
        #   pass through the actual response
        if resp.status_code != 401:
            return resp

        # We are not able to prompt the user so simple return the response
        if not self.prompting:
            return resp

        parsed = urllib_parse.urlparse(resp.url)

        # Prompt the user for a new username and password
        username = six.moves.input("User for %s: " % parsed.netloc)
        password = getpass.getpass("Password: ")

        # Store the new username and password to use for future requests
        if username or password:
            self.passwords[parsed.netloc] = (username, password)

        # Consume content and release the original connection to allow our new
        #   request to reuse the same one.
        resp.content
        resp.raw.release_conn()

        # Add our new username and password to the request
        req = HTTPBasicAuth(username or "", password or "")(resp.request)

def _clean_link(url):
    # type: (str) -> str
    """Makes sure a link is fully encoded.  That is, if a ' ' shows up in
    the link, it will be rewritten to %20 (while not over-quoting
    % or other characters)."""
    # Split the URL into parts according to the general structure
    # `scheme://netloc/path;parameters?query#fragment`. Note that the
    # `netloc` can be empty and the URI will then refer to a local
    # filesystem path.
    result = urllib_parse.urlparse(url)
    # In both cases below we unquote prior to quoting to make sure
    # nothing is double quoted.
    if result.netloc == "":
        # On Windows the path part might contain a drive letter which
        # should not be quoted. On Linux where drive letters do not
        # exist, the colon should be quoted. We rely on urllib.request
        # to do the right thing here.
        path = urllib_request.pathname2url(
            urllib_request.url2pathname(result.path))
    else:
        # In addition to the `/` character we protect `@` so that
        # revision strings in VCS URLs are properly parsed.
        path = urllib_parse.quote(urllib_parse.unquote(result.path), safe="/@")
    return urllib_parse.urlunparse(result._replace(path=path))

return
                # This is a dirty hack to prevent installing Binary Wheels from
                # PyPI unless it is a Windows or Mac Binary Wheel. This is
                # paired with a change to PyPI disabling uploads for the
                # same. Once we have a mechanism for enabling support for
                # binary wheels on linux that deals with the inherent problems
                # of binary distribution this can be removed.
                comes_from = getattr(link, "comes_from", None)
                if (
                        (
                            not platform.startswith('win') and not
                            platform.startswith('macosx') and not
                            platform == 'cli'
                        ) and
                        comes_from is not None and
                        urllib_parse.urlparse(
                            comes_from.url
                        ).netloc.endswith(PyPI.netloc)):
                    if not wheel.supported(tags=supported_tags_noarch):
                        self._log_skipped_link(
                            link,
                            "it is a pypi-hosted binary "
                            "Wheel on an unsupported platform",
                        )
                        return
                version = wheel.version

        # This should be up by the search.ok_binary check, but see issue 2700.
        if "source" not in search.formats and ext != wheel_ext:
            self._log_skipped_link(
                link, 'No sources permitted for %s' % search.supplied)
            return