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high severity
- Vulnerable module: protobufjs
- Introduced through: log4bro@3.18.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter@toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter#be416fc30949445f4ff762c55d1ed542c3af6663 › log4bro@3.18.0 › @google-cloud/logging-bunyan@3.3.1 › @google-cloud/logging@9.9.0 › google-gax@2.30.5 › protobufjs@6.11.3
Overview
protobufjs is a protocol buffer for JavaScript (& TypeScript).
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A user-controlled protobuf message can be used by an attacker to pollute the prototype of Object.prototype
by adding and overwriting its data and functions. Exploitation can involve:
using the function parse to parse protobuf messages on the fly,
loading
.proto
files by usingload/loadSync
functions, orproviding untrusted input to the functions
ReflectionObject.setParsedOption
andutil.setProperty
Note:
This is a different issue from CVE-2022-25878
Users who use this package from npm can rest assured that version 7.2.4 includes the fixed code.
Developers using this package from a different CDN should consider 7.2.5 as the fixed version.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade protobufjs
to version 6.11.4, 7.2.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: @grpc/grpc-js
- Introduced through: log4bro@3.18.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter@toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter#be416fc30949445f4ff762c55d1ed542c3af6663 › log4bro@3.18.0 › @google-cloud/logging-bunyan@3.3.1 › @google-cloud/logging@9.9.0 › google-gax@2.30.5 › @grpc/grpc-js@1.6.12
Overview
@grpc/grpc-js is a gRPC Library for Node
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption via the grpc.max_receive_message_length
channel option. An attacker can cause a denial of service by sending messages that exceed the configured limits, which are then buffered or decompressed into memory.
Remediation
Upgrade @grpc/grpc-js
to version 1.8.22, 1.9.15, 1.10.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: log4bro@3.18.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter@toolisticon/ssl-hostinfo-prometheus-exporter#be416fc30949445f4ff762c55d1ed542c3af6663 › log4bro@3.18.0 › bunyan@1.8.15 › mv@2.1.1 › rimraf@2.4.5 › glob@6.0.4 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres
function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs
object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs
object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node
process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight
.