Vulnerabilities

37 via 50 paths

Dependencies

500

Source

GitHub

Commit

e291675f

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Severity
  • 3
  • 10
  • 21
  • 3
Status
  • 37
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: passport-twitter@1.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport-twitter@1.0.4 xtraverse@0.1.0 xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to parsing XML that is not well-formed, and contains multiple top-level elements. All the root nodes are being added to the childNodes collection of the Document, without reporting or throwing any error.

Workarounds

One of the following approaches might help, depending on your use case:

  1. Instead of searching for elements in the whole DOM, only search in the documentElement.

  2. Reject a document with a document that has more than 1 childNode.

PoC

var DOMParser = require('xmldom').DOMParser;
var xmlData = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="large">\n' +
'    <leaf color="green" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n' +
'<root>\n' +
'  <branch girth="twig">\n' +
'    <leaf color="gold" />\n' +
'  </branch>\n' +
'</root>\n';
var xmlDOM = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xmlData);
console.log(xmlDOM.toString());

This will result with the following output:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><root>
  <branch girth="large">
    <leaf color="green"/>
  </branch>
</root>
<root>
  <branch girth="twig">
    <leaf color="gold"/>
  </branch>
</root>

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

critical severity

Predictable Value Range from Previous Values

  • Vulnerable module: form-data
  • Introduced through: fb@1.1.1 and less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 fb@1.1.1 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 form-data@2.1.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Predictable Value Range from Previous Values via the boundary value, which uses Math.random(). An attacker can manipulate HTTP request boundaries by exploiting predictable values, potentially leading to HTTP parameter pollution.

Remediation

Upgrade form-data to version 2.5.4, 3.0.4, 4.0.4 or higher.

References

critical severity

Authentication Bypass

  • Vulnerable module: hawk
  • Introduced through: less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3

Overview

hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass. The incoming (client supplied) hash of the payload is trusted by the server and not verified before the signature is calculated.

A malicious actor in the middle can alter the payload and the server side will not identify the modification occurred because it simply uses the client provided value instead of verify the hash provided against the modified payload.

According to the maintainers this issue is to be considered out of scope as "payload hash validation is optional and up to developer to implement".

Remediation

There is no fixed version for hawk.

References

high severity

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: qs
  • Introduced through: fb@1.1.1 and less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 fb@1.1.1 request@2.88.2 qs@6.5.5
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 qs@6.4.3

Overview

qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via improper enforcement of the arrayLimit option in bracket notation parsing. An attacker can exhaust server memory and cause application unavailability by submitting a large number of bracket notation parameters - like a[]=1&a[]=2 - in a single HTTP request.

PoC


const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)

Remediation

Upgrade qs to version 6.14.1 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash.template
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 gulp-util@3.0.8 lodash.template@3.6.2

Overview

lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

Notes:

  1. Version 4.18.0 was intended to fix this vulnerability but it got deprecated due to introducing a breaking functionality issue.

  2. This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash.template to version 4.18.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: passport-twitter@1.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport-twitter@1.0.4 xtraverse@0.1.0 xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the copy() function in dom.js. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible via the p variable.

DISPUTED This vulnerability has been disputed by the maintainers of the package. Currently the only viable exploit that has been demonstrated is to pollute the target object (rather then the global object which is generally the case for Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities) and it is yet unclear if this limited attack vector exposes any vulnerability in the context of this package.

See the linked GitHub Issue for full details on the discussion around the legitimacy and potential revocation of this vulnerability.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ajv
  • Introduced through: less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 har-validator@4.2.1 ajv@4.11.8
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.

Overview

ajv is an Another JSON Schema Validator

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper validation of the pattern keyword when combined with $data references. An attacker can cause the application to become unresponsive and exhaust CPU resources by submitting a specially crafted regular expression payload.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the $data option is enabled.

PoC

const Ajv = require('ajv');

// Vulnerable configuration — $data enables runtime pattern injection
const ajv = new Ajv({ $data: true });

const schema = {
  type: 'object',
  properties: {
    pattern: { type: 'string' },
    value: {
      type: 'string',
      pattern: { $data: '1/pattern' }  // Pattern comes from the data itself
    }
  }
};

const validate = ajv.compile(schema);

// Malicious payload — both the pattern and the triggering input
const maliciousPayload = {
  pattern: '^(a|a)*$',           // Catastrophic backtracking pattern
  value: 'a'.repeat(30) + 'X'    // 30 'a's followed by 'X' to force full backtracking
};

console.time('attack');
validate(maliciousPayload);       // Blocks the entire Node.js process for ~44 seconds
console.timeEnd('attack');

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ajv to version 6.14.0, 8.18.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: underscore
  • Introduced through: mongoose-json-schema@0.0.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 mongoose-json-schema@0.0.7 underscore@1.7.0

Overview

underscore is a JavaScript's functional programming helper library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion through the _.flatten() or _.isEqual() functions that are used without a depth limit. An attacker can cause the application to crash or become unresponsive by supplying deeply nested data structures as input, leading to stack exhaustion.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by enforcing a depth limit on data structures created from untrusted input (e.g., limiting nesting to 1000 levels or fewer), or by passing a finite depth limit as the second argument to the _.flatten() function.

Remediation

Upgrade underscore to version 1.13.8 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: ajv
  • Introduced through: less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 har-validator@4.2.1 ajv@4.11.8
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.

Overview

ajv is an Another JSON Schema Validator

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A carefully crafted JSON schema could be provided that allows execution of other code by prototype pollution. (While untrusted schemas are recommended against, the worst case of an untrusted schema should be a denial of service, not execution of code.)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade ajv to version 6.12.3 or higher.

References

high severity
new

XML Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: passport-twitter@1.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport-twitter@1.0.4 xtraverse@0.1.0 xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML Injection via the XMLSerializer() function. An attacker can manipulate the structure and integrity of generated XML documents by injecting attacker-controlled markup containing the CDATA terminator ]]> through CDATA section content, which is not properly validated or sanitized during serialization. This can result in unauthorized XML elements or attributes being inserted, potentially leading to business logic manipulation or privilege escalation in downstream consumers.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

high severity

Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop

  • Vulnerable module: braces
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5

Overview

braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop due improper limitation of the number of characters it can handle, through the parse function. An attacker can cause the application to allocate excessive memory and potentially crash by sending imbalanced braces as input.

PoC

const { braces } = require('micromatch');

console.log("Executing payloads...");

const maxRepeats = 10;

for (let repeats = 1; repeats <= maxRepeats; repeats += 1) {
  const payload = '{'.repeat(repeats*90000);

  console.log(`Testing with ${repeats} repeats...`);
  const startTime = Date.now();
  braces(payload);
  const endTime = Date.now();
  const executionTime = endTime - startTime;
  console.log(`Regex executed in ${executionTime / 1000}s.\n`);
} 

Remediation

Upgrade braces to version 3.0.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: hawk
  • Introduced through: less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.

Overview

hawk is a library for the HTTP Hawk Authentication Scheme.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in header parsing where each added character in the attacker's input increases the computation time exponentially.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade hawk to version 9.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash.template
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 gulp-util@3.0.8 lodash.template@3.6.2

Overview

lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Code Injection due the improper validation of options.variable key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

There is no fixed version for lodash.template.

References

medium severity

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@5.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 jsonwebtoken@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm such that the library can be misconfigured to use legacy, insecure key types for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.

Exploitability

Users are affected when using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below:

EC: ES256, ES384, ES512

RSA: RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512

RSA-PSS: PS256, PS384, PS512

And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:

ES256: prime256v1

ES384: secp384r1

ES512: secp521r1

Workaround

Users who are unable to upgrade to the fixed version can use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@5.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 jsonwebtoken@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment via the secretOrPublicKey argument due to misconfigurations of the key retrieval function jwt.verify(). Exploiting this vulnerability might result in incorrect verification of forged tokens when tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm.

Note: This vulnerability affects your application if it supports the usage of both symmetric and asymmetric keys in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: fb@1.1.1 and less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 fb@1.1.1 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: fb@1.1.1 and less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 fb@1.1.1 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 tough-cookie@2.3.4

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Input Validation

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: passport-twitter@1.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport-twitter@1.0.4 xtraverse@0.1.0 xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. It does not correctly escape special characters when serializing elements are removed from their ancestor. This may lead to unexpected syntactic changes during XML processing in some downstream applications.

Note: Customers who use "xmldom" package, should use "@xmldom/xmldom" instead, as "xmldom" is no longer maintained.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for xmldom.

References

medium severity

Improper Authentication

  • Vulnerable module: jsonwebtoken
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@5.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 jsonwebtoken@5.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@9.0.0.

Overview

jsonwebtoken is a JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Authentication such that the lack of algorithm definition in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.

Exploitability

Users are affected only if all of the following conditions are true for the jwt.verify() function:

  1. A token with no signature is received.

  2. No algorithms are specified.

  3. A falsy (e.g., null, false, undefined) secret or key is passed.

Remediation

Upgrade jsonwebtoken to version 9.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

  • Vulnerable module: cookie
  • Introduced through: csurf@1.11.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 csurf@1.11.0 cookie@0.4.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name, path, or domain, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.

Workaround

Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade cookie to version 0.7.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip)

  • Vulnerable module: decompress
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to download@5.0.0.

Overview

decompress is a package that can be used for extracting archives.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip). It is possible to bypass the security measures provided by decompress and conduct ZIP path traversal through symlinks.

PoC

const decompress = require('decompress');

decompress('slip.tar.gz', 'dist').then(files => {
    console.log('done!');
});

Details

It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:


+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt

+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

Upgrade decompress to version 4.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip)

  • Vulnerable module: decompress-tar
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 decompress-tar@3.1.0

Overview

decompress-tar is a tar plugin for decompress.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip). It is possible to bypass the security measures provided by decompress and conduct ZIP path traversal through symlinks.

PoC

const decompress = require('decompress');

decompress('slip.tar.gz', 'dist').then(files => {
    console.log('done!');
});

Details

It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:


+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt

+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Remediation

There is no fixed version for decompress-tar.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: hoek
  • Introduced through: less-middleware@2.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3 hoek@2.16.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3 boom@2.10.1 hoek@2.16.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3 sntp@1.0.9 hoek@2.16.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 less-middleware@2.2.1 less@2.7.3 request@2.81.0 hawk@3.1.3 cryptiles@2.0.5 boom@2.10.1 hoek@2.16.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to less-middleware@3.0.0.

Overview

hoek is an Utility methods for the hapi ecosystem.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade hoek to version 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: mv@2.1.1 and download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 mv@2.1.1 rimraf@2.4.5 glob@6.0.4 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 glob@5.0.15 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 glob@5.0.15 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: swig@1.4.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 swig@1.4.2 optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true

require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: underscore
  • Introduced through: mongoose-json-schema@0.0.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 mongoose-json-schema@0.0.7 underscore@1.7.0

Overview

underscore is a JavaScript's functional programming helper library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the template function, particularly when the variable option is taken from _.templateSettings as it is not sanitized.

PoC

const _ = require('underscore');
_.templateSettings.variable = "a = this.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch HELLO')";
const t = _.template("")();

Remediation

Upgrade underscore to version 1.13.0-2, 1.12.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: got
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 got@5.7.1

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to missing verification of requested URLs. It allowed a victim to be redirected to a UNIX socket.

Remediation

Upgrade got to version 11.8.5, 12.1.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

  • Vulnerable module: xmldom
  • Introduced through: passport-twitter@1.0.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport-twitter@1.0.4 xtraverse@0.1.0 xmldom@0.1.31

Overview

xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) Injection. Does not correctly preserve system identifiers, FPIs or namespaces when repeatedly parsing and serializing maliciously crafted documents.

Details

XXE Injection is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input. XML is a markup language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable. By default, many XML processors allow specification of an external entity, a URI that is dereferenced and evaluated during XML processing. When an XML document is being parsed, the parser can make a request and include the content at the specified URI inside of the XML document.

Attacks can include disclosing local files, which may contain sensitive data such as passwords or private user data, using file: schemes or relative paths in the system identifier.

For example, below is a sample XML document, containing an XML element- username.

<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
   <username>John</username>
</xml>

An external XML entity - xxe, is defined using a system identifier and present within a DOCTYPE header. These entities can access local or remote content. For example the below code contains an external XML entity that would fetch the content of /etc/passwd and display it to the user rendered by username.

<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
   <username>&xxe;</username>
</xml>

Other XXE Injection attacks can access local resources that may not stop returning data, possibly impacting application availability and leading to Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade xmldom to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: glob-parent
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 glob-parent@3.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to download@5.0.0.
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 glob-parent@3.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to download@5.0.0.

Overview

glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.

PoC by Yeting Li

var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}

return ret;
}

globParent(build_attack(5000));

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade glob-parent to version 5.1.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

  • Vulnerable module: micromatch
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity due to the use of unsafe pattern configurations that allow greedy matching through the micromatch.braces() function. An attacker can cause the application to hang or slow down by passing a malicious payload that triggers extensive backtracking in regular expression processing.

Remediation

Upgrade micromatch to version 4.0.8 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: swig@1.4.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 swig@1.4.2 uglify-js@2.4.24

Overview

uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: swig@1.4.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 swig@1.4.2 uglify-js@2.4.24
    Remediation: Open PR to patch uglify-js@2.4.24.

Overview

The parse() function in the uglify-js package prior to version 2.6.0 is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks when long inputs of certain patterns are processed.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade to version 2.6.0 or greater. If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard to patch this vulnerability.

References

medium severity

Uninitialized Memory Exposure

  • Vulnerable module: tunnel-agent
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 caw@1.2.0 tunnel-agent@0.4.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to download@5.0.1.

Overview

tunnel-agent is HTTP proxy tunneling agent. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.

A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number is used to set the proxy.auth option of a request request and results in a possible uninitialized memory exposures in the request body.

This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.

Details

Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.

In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":

// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');

tunnel-agent's request construction uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL.

Proof of concept by ChALkeR

require('request')({
  method: 'GET',
  uri: 'http://www.example.com',
  tunnel: true,
  proxy:{
      protocol: 'http:',
      host:"127.0.0.1",
      port:8080,
      auth:80
  }
});

You can read more about the insecure Buffer behavior on our blog.

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.

Remediation

Upgrade tunnel-agent to version 0.6.0 or higher. Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4

References

medium severity

Session Fixation

  • Vulnerable module: passport
  • Introduced through: passport@0.3.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 passport@0.3.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to passport@0.6.0.

Overview

passport is a Simple, unobtrusive authentication for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Session Fixation. When a user logs in or logs out, the session is regenerated instead of being closed.

Remediation

Upgrade passport to version 0.6.0 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: braces
  • Introduced through: download@4.4.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 download@4.4.3 gulp-decompress@1.2.0 decompress@3.0.0 vinyl-fs@2.4.4 glob-stream@5.3.5 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5

Overview

braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\{(,+(?:(\{,+\})*),*|,*(?:(\{,+\})*),+)\}) in order to detects empty braces. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 50K characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Feb 19th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade braces to version 2.3.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: swig@1.4.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 swig@1.4.2 optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.

Notes:

  • This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598

  • The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ms
  • Introduced through: jsonwebtoken@5.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: maglev@seeden/maglev#e291675fed963ccf5d50bab24ec9d9bf745ad5a3 jsonwebtoken@5.7.0 ms@0.7.3
    Remediation: Upgrade to jsonwebtoken@7.4.1.

Overview

ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.

Proof of concept

ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s

Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.

For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
  • Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
  • April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
  • May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
  • May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version 2.0.0 released.
  • May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions >=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.

References