rtpro/js-ipfs

Vulnerabilities

28 via 317 paths

Dependencies

654

Source

GitHub

Commit

ec7a5899

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Issue type
  • 28
  • 7
Severity
  • 2
  • 13
  • 19
  • 1
Status
  • 35
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • Vulnerable module: elliptic
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, libp2p-floodsub@0.11.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-floodsub@0.11.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 ethereum-cryptography@0.1.3 secp256k1@4.0.4 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 libp2p-crypto-secp256k1@0.2.3 secp256k1@3.8.1 elliptic@6.6.1

…and 70 more

Overview

elliptic is a fast elliptic-curve cryptography implementation in plain javascript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to an anomaly in the _truncateToN function. An attacker can cause legitimate transactions or communications to be incorrectly flagged as invalid by exploiting the signature verification process when the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes, and the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash. In some situations, a private key exposure is possible. This can happen when an attacker knows a faulty and the corresponding correct signature for the same message.

PoC

var elliptic = require('elliptic'); // tested with version 6.5.7
var hash = require('hash.js');
var BN = require('bn.js');
var toArray = elliptic.utils.toArray;

var ec = new elliptic.ec('p192');
var msg = '343236343739373234';
var sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b';
// Same public key just in different formats
var pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723';
var pkPem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEzTWgsY7rj82H/wGXgAEoKHRfBG54\nXeuigVDeG+bLQ3ZSMAa+/zD/CbQEkSXO0pcj\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n';

// Create hash
var hashArray = hash.sha256().update(toArray(msg, 'hex')).digest();
// Convert array to string (just for showcase of the leading zeros)
var hashStr = Array.from(hashArray, function(byte) {
  return ('0' + (byte & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2);
}).join('');
var hMsg = new BN(hashArray, 'hex');
// Hashed message contains 4 leading zeros bytes
console.log('sha256 hash(str): ' + hashStr);
// Due to using BN bitLength lib it does not calculate the bit length correctly (should be 32 since it is a sha256 hash)
console.log('Byte len of sha256 hash: ' + hMsg.byteLength());
console.log('sha256 hash(BN): ' + hMsg.toString(16));

// Due to the shift of the message to be within the order of the curve the delta computation is invalid
var pubKey = ec.keyFromPublic(toArray(pk, 'hex'));
console.log('Valid signature: ' + pubKey.verify(hashStr, sig));

// You can check that this hash should validate by consolidating openssl
const fs = require('fs');
fs.writeFile('msg.bin', new BN(msg, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
  if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('sig.bin', new BN(sig, 16).toBuffer(), (err) => {
  if (err) throw err;
});
fs.writeFile('cert.pem', pkPem, (err) => {
  if (err) throw err;
});

// To verify the correctness of the message signature and key one can run:
// openssl dgst -sha256 -verify cert.pem -signature sig.bin msg.bin
// Or run this python script
/*
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec


msg = '343236343739373234'
sig = '303502186f20676c0d04fc40ea55d5702f798355787363a91e97a7e50219009d1c8c171b2b02e7d791c204c17cea4cf556a2034288885b'
pk = '04cd35a0b18eeb8fcd87ff019780012828745f046e785deba28150de1be6cb4376523006beff30ff09b4049125ced29723'

p192 = ec.SECP192R1()
pk = ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey.from_encoded_point(p192, bytes.fromhex(pk))
pk.verify(bytes.fromhex(sig), bytes.fromhex(msg), ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
*/

Remediation

There is no fixed version for elliptic.

References

critical severity

Identity Spoofing

  • Vulnerable module: libp2p-secio
  • Introduced through: libp2p-secio@0.8.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-secio@0.9.0.

Overview

[libp2p-secio] provides a SECIO implementation in JavaScript.

Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Identity Spoofing. It did not correctly vaidate the that the DstPeer PeerId matched the PeerId that the peer learns through the Crypto Handshake

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
  • Introduced through: yargs@8.0.2 and update-notifier@2.5.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 os-locale@2.1.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@11.1.1.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 update-notifier@2.5.0 boxen@1.3.0 term-size@1.2.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to update-notifier@4.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

PoC

const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
  str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";

console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")

// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js` 
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ammo
  • Introduced through: hapi@16.8.4 and libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 hapi@16.8.4 ammo@2.1.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 hapi@16.8.4 ammo@2.1.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 inert@4.2.1 ammo@2.1.2

Overview

ammo is a HTTP Range processing utilities. Note This package is deprecated and is now maintained as @hapi/ammo.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The Range HTTP header parser has a vulnerability which will cause the function to throw a system error if the header is set to an invalid value. Because hapi is not expecting the function to ever throw, the error is thrown all the way up the stack. If no unhandled exception handler is available, the application will exist, allowing an attacker to shut down services.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ammo.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ansi-regex
  • Introduced through: yargs@8.0.2, ipfs-repo@0.17.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 cliui@3.2.0 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@10.1.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 cliui@3.2.0 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@10.1.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 cliui@3.2.0 wrap-ansi@2.1.0 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@13.2.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 cliui@3.2.0 wrap-ansi@2.1.0 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@13.2.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.22.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.22.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.26.5.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.26.5.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 leveldown@1.9.0 prebuild-install@2.5.3 npmlog@4.1.2 gauge@2.7.4 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1

…and 19 more

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the sub-patterns [[\\]()#;?]* and (?:;[-a-zA-Z\\d\\/#&.:=?%@~_]*)*.

PoC

import ansiRegex from 'ansi-regex';

for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    var time = Date.now();
    var attack_str = "\u001B["+";".repeat(i*10000);
    ansiRegex().test(attack_str)
    var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
    console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ansi-regex to version 3.0.1, 4.1.1, 5.0.1, 6.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: dicer
  • Introduced through: ipfs-multipart@0.1.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-multipart@0.1.1 dicer@0.3.1

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious attacker can send a modified form to server, and crash the nodejs service. An attacker could sent the payload again and again so that the service continuously crashes.

PoC

await fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000', { method: 'POST', headers: { ['content-type']: 'multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro', ['content-length']: '145', connection: 'keep-alive', }, body: '------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro\r\n Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bildbeschreibung"\r\n\r\n\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryoo6vortfDzBsDiro--' });

Remediation

There is no fixed version for dicer.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: hapi
  • Introduced through: hapi@16.8.4 and libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 hapi@16.8.4
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 hapi@16.8.4

Overview

hapi is a HTTP Server framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The CORS request handler has a vulnerability which will cause the function to throw a system error if the header contains some invalid values. If no unhandled exception handler is available, the application will exist, allowing an attacker to shut down services.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for hapi.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: libp2p
  • Introduced through: libp2p@0.12.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.38.0.

Overview

libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of libp2p, a modular peer to peer network stack

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) in that an attacker can cause the allocation of large amounts of memory, ultimately leading to the process getting killed by the host’s operating system.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade libp2p to version 0.38.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: semver
  • Introduced through: ipfs-repo@0.17.0, ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-repo@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 levelup@1.3.9 semver@5.4.1

…and 7 more

Overview

semver is a semantic version parser used by npm.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

PoC


const semver = require('semver')
const lengths_2 = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]

console.log("n[+] Valid range - Test payloads")
for (let i = 0; i =1.2.3' + ' '.repeat(lengths_2[i]) + '<1.3.0';
const start = Date.now()
semver.validRange(value)
// semver.minVersion(value)
// semver.maxSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// semver.minSatisfying(["1.2.3"], value)
// new semver.Range(value, {})

const end = Date.now();
console.log('length=%d, time=%d ms', value.length, end - start);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade semver to version 5.7.2, 6.3.1, 7.5.2 or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: subtext
  • Introduced through: hapi@16.8.4 and libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3

Overview

subtext is a HTTP payload parsing library. Deprecated. Note: This package is deprecated and is now maintained as @hapi/subtext

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package fails to enforce the maxBytes configuration for payloads with chunked encoding that are written to the file system. This allows attackers to send requests with arbitrary payload sizes, which may exhaust system resources.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

There is no fixed version for subtext.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: subtext
  • Introduced through: hapi@16.8.4 and libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3

Overview

subtext is a HTTP payload parsing library. Deprecated. Note: This package is deprecated and is now maintained as @hapi/subtext

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The Content-Encoding HTTP header parser has a vulnerability which will cause the function to throw a system error if the header contains some invalid values. Because hapi rethrows system errors (as opposed to catching expected application errors), the error is thrown all the way up the stack. If no unhandled exception handler is available, the application will exist, allowing an attacker to shut down services.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for subtext.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash.set
  • Introduced through: ipfs-repo@0.17.0, ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 lodash.set@4.3.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 lodash.set@4.3.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 lodash.set@4.3.2

Overview

lodash.set is a lodash method _.set exported as a Node.js module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the set and setwith functions due to improper user input sanitization.

Note

lodash.set is not maintained for a long time. It is recommended to use lodash library, which contains the fix since version 4.17.17.

PoC

lod = require('lodash')
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

There is no fixed version for lodash.set.

References

high severity

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.16.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.35.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.25.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to RSA's PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code which does not check for tailing garbage bytes after decoding a DigestInfo ASN.1 structure. This can allow padding bytes to be removed and garbage data added to forge a signature when a low public exponent is being used.

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 1.3.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.12.2.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-info@0.15.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-api@26.0.3.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-book@0.9.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.24.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.14.3.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.12.1.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-secio@0.10.1.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.15.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.20.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-book@0.9.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.24.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.14.2.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.12.2.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.15.7.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.24.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.24.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the util.setPath function.

Note: version 0.10.0 is a breaking change removing the vulnerable functions.

POC:

const nodeforge = require('node-forge');
var obj = {};
nodeforge.util.setPath(obj, ['__proto__', 'polluted'], true);
console.log(polluted);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 0.10.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: subtext
  • Introduced through: hapi@16.8.4 and libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 hapi@16.8.4 subtext@5.1.3

Overview

subtext is a HTTP payload parsing library. Deprecated. Note: This package is deprecated and is now maintained as @hapi/subtext

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A multipart payload can be constructed in a way that one of the parts’ content can be set as the entire payload object’s prototype. If this prototype contains data, it may bypass other validation rules which enforce access and privacy. If this prototype evaluates to null, it can cause unhandled exceptions when the request payload is accessed.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for subtext.

References

medium severity

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: ip
  • Introduced through: multiaddr@3.1.0, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 mafmt@3.0.2 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-tcp@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 multiaddr@2.3.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 mafmt@3.0.2 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-tcp@0.11.6 mafmt@4.0.0 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 mafmt@4.0.0 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-websockets@0.10.5 mafmt@4.0.0 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 libp2p-tcp@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 multiaddr@2.3.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 multicast-dns@6.2.3 dns-packet@1.3.4 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 libp2p-tcp@0.11.6 mafmt@4.0.0 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 multiaddr@2.3.0 ip@1.1.9
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 multiaddr@3.1.0 ip@1.1.9

…and 28 more

Overview

ip is a Node library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the isPublic function, which identifies some private IP addresses as public addresses due to improper parsing of the input. An attacker can manipulate a system that uses isLoopback(), isPrivate() and isPublic functions to guard outgoing network requests to treat certain IP addresses as globally routable by supplying specially crafted IP addresses.

Note

This vulnerability derived from an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-42282

Remediation

There is no fixed version for ip.

References

medium severity

  • Vulnerable module: cookie
  • Introduced through: libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 socket.io@2.5.1 engine.io@3.6.2 cookie@0.4.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.22.4.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name, path, or domain, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.

Workaround

Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.

Details

A cross-site scripting attack occurs when the attacker tricks a legitimate web-based application or site to accept a request as originating from a trusted source.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade cookie to version 0.7.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.16.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.35.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.25.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the forge.debug API if called with untrusted input.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 1.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: glob@7.2.3, ipfs-api@14.3.7 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 temp@0.8.4 rimraf@2.6.3 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ipfs-bitswap
  • Introduced through: ipfs-bitswap@0.17.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-bitswap@0.17.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to ipfs-bitswap@0.24.1.

Overview

ipfs-bitswap is a JavaScript implementation of Bitswap 'data exchange' protocol used by IPFS.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package was found to put blocks in the blockstore during invocation of multiple functions resulting in Denial of Service (DoS) conditions under certain circumstances.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ipfs-bitswap to version 0.24.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.16.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.35.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.25.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to RSA's PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code which does not properly check DigestInfo for a proper ASN.1 structure. This can lead to successful verification with signatures that contain invalid structures but a valid digest.

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 1.3.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.16.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.35.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.25.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to RSAs PKCS#1` v1.5 signature verification code which is lenient in checking the digest algorithm structure. This can allow a crafted structure that steals padding bytes and uses unchecked portion of the PKCS#1 encoded message to forge a signature when a low public exponent is being used.

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 1.3.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: yargs-parser
  • Introduced through: yargs@8.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 yargs-parser@7.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@13.1.0.

Overview

yargs-parser is a mighty option parser used by yargs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a __proto__ payload.

Our research team checked several attack vectors to verify this vulnerability:

  1. It could be used for privilege escalation.
  2. The library could be used to parse user input received from different sources:
    • terminal emulators
    • system calls from other code bases
    • CLI RPC servers

PoC by Snyk

const parser = require("yargs-parser");
console.log(parser('--foo.__proto__.bar baz'));
console.log(({}).bar);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade yargs-parser to version 5.0.1, 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: got
  • Introduced through: update-notifier@2.5.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 update-notifier@2.5.0 latest-version@3.1.0 package-json@4.0.1 got@6.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to update-notifier@6.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to missing verification of requested URLs. It allowed a victim to be redirected to a UNIX socket.

Remediation

Upgrade got to version 11.8.5, 12.1.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Open Redirect

  • Vulnerable module: node-forge
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, peer-info@0.11.6 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to peer-id@0.16.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p@0.35.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.27.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-mdns@0.18.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.25.0.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-kad-dht@0.10.6.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 node-forge@0.7.6

…and 22 more

Overview

node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect via parseUrl function when it mishandles certain uses of backslash such as https:/\/\/\ and interprets the URI as a relative path.

PoC:


// poc.js
var forge = require("node-forge");
var url = forge.util.parseUrl("https:/\/\/\www.github.com/foo/bar");
console.log(url);

// Output of node poc.js:

{
  full: 'https://',
  scheme: 'https',
  host: '',
  port: 443,
  path: '/www.github.com/foo/bar',                        <<<---- path  should be "/foo/bar"
  fullHost: ''
}

Remediation

Upgrade node-forge to version 1.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ws
  • Introduced through: libp2p-websockets@0.10.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-websockets@0.10.5 pull-ws@3.3.2 ws@1.1.5

Overview

ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

##PoC

for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();

  value.trim().split(/ *, */);

  const end = process.hrtime.bigint();

  console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ws to version 7.4.6, 6.2.2, 5.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mem
  • Introduced through: yargs@8.0.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 yargs@8.0.2 os-locale@2.1.0 mem@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to yargs@11.1.1.

Overview

mem is an optimization used to speed up consecutive function calls by caching the result of calls with identical input.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Old results were deleted from the cache and could cause a memory leak.

details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade mem to version 4.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: ethereumjs-account
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: ethereumjs-block
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: ethereumjs-tx
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7

…and 1 more

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: ethereumjs-util
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1

…and 9 more

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: merkle-patricia-tree
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2

…and 1 more

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: pem-jwk
  • Introduced through: peer-id@0.10.7, libp2p-floodsub@0.11.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-floodsub@0.11.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-secio@0.8.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-ping@0.6.1 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-api@14.3.7 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-mdns@0.9.2 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-railing@0.7.1 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-kad-dht@0.5.1 libp2p-record@0.5.1 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 peer-book@0.5.4 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p@0.12.4 libp2p-swarm@0.32.4 libp2p-identify@0.6.3 peer-info@0.11.6 peer-id@0.10.7 libp2p-crypto@0.12.1 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-fs@0.3.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipfs-repo@0.17.0 datastore-level@0.6.0 datastore-core@0.3.0 interface-datastore@0.3.1 libp2p-crypto@0.10.4 pem-jwk@1.5.1

…and 46 more

MPL-2.0 license

medium severity
new

MPL-2.0 license

  • Module: rlp
  • Introduced through: ipld-resolver@0.13.4 and ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-account@2.0.5 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 ethereumjs-tx@1.3.7 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 ipfs-unixfs-engine@0.22.5 ipld-resolver@0.13.4 ipld-ethereum@1.4.4 ethereumjs-block@1.7.1 merkle-patricia-tree@2.3.2 ethereumjs-util@5.2.1 rlp@2.2.7

…and 17 more

MPL-2.0 license

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: debug
  • Introduced through: libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 socket.io@2.5.1 debug@4.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.20.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 socket.io@2.5.1 engine.io@3.6.2 debug@4.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.20.4.
  • Introduced through: ipfs@rtpro/js-ipfs#ec7a58991ee404bdf2dad7c22a1fa501a48a1ce0 libp2p-webrtc-star@0.13.4 socket.io@2.5.1 socket.io-parser@3.4.3 debug@4.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to libp2p-webrtc-star@0.20.4.

Overview

debug is a small debugging utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument. The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.

Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.

PoC

Use the following regex in the %o formatter.

/\s*\n\s*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.

References