Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
high severity
- Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › update-notifier@2.5.0 › boxen@1.3.0 › term-size@1.2.0 › execa@0.7.0 › cross-spawn@5.1.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemon@2.0.3.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.
PoC
const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";
console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")
// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js`
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: minimatch
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4, express-handlebars@3.1.0 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › minimatch@3.1.2Remediation: Upgrade to nodemon@3.1.12.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express-handlebars@3.1.0 › glob@7.2.3 › minimatch@3.1.2Remediation: Upgrade to express-handlebars@8.0.0.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer-express-handlebars@2.0.0 › express-handlebars@3.1.0 › glob@7.2.3 › minimatch@3.1.2Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer-express-handlebars@6.1.0.
Overview
minimatch is a minimal matching utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the AST class, caused by catastrophic backtracking when an input string contains many * characters in a row, followed by an unmatched character.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade minimatch to version 10.2.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mongoose
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@6.13.5.
Overview
mongoose is a Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic due to the improper handling of $where in match queries. An attacker can manipulate search queries to inject malicious code.
Remediation
Upgrade mongoose to version 6.13.5, 7.8.3, 8.8.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mongoose
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@6.13.6.
Overview
mongoose is a Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic due to the improper use of a $where filter in conjunction with the populate() match. An attacker can manipulate search queries to retrieve or alter information without proper authorization by injecting malicious input into the query.
Note: This vulnerability derives from an incomplete fix of CVE-2024-53900
Remediation
Upgrade mongoose to version 6.13.6, 7.8.4, 8.9.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: qs
- Introduced through: body-parser@1.17.2 and express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › body-parser@1.17.2 › qs@6.4.0Remediation: Upgrade to body-parser@1.20.4.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › qs@6.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.22.0.
Overview
qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via improper enforcement of the arrayLimit option in bracket notation parsing. An attacker can exhaust server memory and cause application unavailability by submitting a large number of bracket notation parameters - like a[]=1&a[]=2 - in a single HTTP request.
PoC
const qs = require('qs');
const attack = 'a[]=' + Array(10000).fill('x').join('&a[]=');
const result = qs.parse(attack, { arrayLimit: 100 });
console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 10000 (should be max 100)
Remediation
Upgrade qs to version 6.14.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: nodemailer@4.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer@4.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@6.4.16.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection. Use of crafted recipient email addresses may result in arbitrary command flag injection in sendmail transport for sending mails.
PoC
-bi@example.com (-bi Initialize the alias database.)
-d0.1a@example.com (The option -d0.1 prints the version of sendmail and the options it was compiled with.)
-Dfilename@example.com (Debug output ffile)
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 6.4.16 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: body-parser
- Introduced through: body-parser@1.17.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › body-parser@1.17.2Remediation: Upgrade to body-parser@1.20.3.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification) via the extendedparser and urlencoded functions when the URL encoding process is enabled. An attacker can flood the server with a large number of specially crafted requests.
Remediation
Upgrade body-parser to version 1.20.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: nodemailer@4.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer@4.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@7.0.11.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in the addressparser function. An attacker can cause the process to terminate immediately by sending an email address header containing deeply nested groups, separated by many :s.
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 7.0.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: bson
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › bson@1.0.9Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.3.9.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mongodb@2.2.34 › mongodb-core@2.1.18 › bson@1.0.9Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.2.9.
Overview
bson is a BSON Parser for node and browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Internal Property Tampering. The package will ignore an unknown value for an object's _bsotype, leading to cases where an object is serialized as a document rather than the intended BSON type.
NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2019-2391
Remediation
Upgrade bson to version 1.1.4 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: bson
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › bson@1.0.9Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.3.9.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mongodb@2.2.34 › mongodb-core@2.1.18 › bson@1.0.9Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.2.9.
Overview
bson is a BSON Parser for node and browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Internal Property Tampering. The package will ignore an unknown value for an object's _bsotype, leading to cases where an object is serialized as a document rather than the intended BSON type.
NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2020-7610
Remediation
Upgrade bson to version 1.1.4 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mongoose
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.13.20.
Overview
mongoose is a Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in document.js, via update functions such as findByIdAndUpdate(). This allows attackers to achieve remote code execution.
Note: Only applications using Express and EJS are vulnerable.
PoC
import { connect, model, Schema } from 'mongoose';
await connect('mongodb://127.0.0.1:27017/exploit');
const Example = model('Example', new Schema({ hello: String }));
const example = await new Example({ hello: 'world!' }).save();
await Example.findByIdAndUpdate(example._id, {
$rename: {
hello: '__proto__.polluted'
}
});
// this is what causes the pollution
await Example.find();
const test = {};
console.log(test.polluted); // world!
console.log(Object.prototype); // [Object: null prototype] { polluted: 'world!' }
process.exit();
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mongoose to version 5.13.20, 6.11.3, 7.3.4 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: pug
- Introduced through: pug@2.0.0-beta.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › pug@2.0.0-beta.12Remediation: Upgrade to pug@3.0.1.
Overview
pug is an A clean, whitespace-sensitive template language for writing HTML
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE). If a remote attacker was able to control the pretty option of the pug compiler, e.g. if you spread a user provided object such as the query parameters of a request into the pug template inputs, it was possible for them to achieve remote code execution on the node.js backend.
Remediation
Upgrade pug to version 3.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: pug-code-gen
- Introduced through: pug@2.0.0-beta.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › pug@2.0.0-beta.12 › pug-code-gen@1.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to pug@2.0.0.
Overview
pug-code-gen is a Default code-generator for pug. It generates HTML via a JavaScript template function.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE). If a remote attacker was able to control the pretty option of the pug compiler, e.g. if you spread a user provided object such as the query parameters of a request into the pug template inputs, it was possible for them to achieve remote code execution on the node.js backend.
Remediation
Upgrade pug-code-gen to version 2.0.3, 3.0.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: async
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › async@2.6.0Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.7.3.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mapValues() method, due to improper check in createObjectIterator function.
PoC
//when objects are parsed, all properties are created as own (the objects can come from outside sources (http requests/ file))
const hasOwn = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
//does not have the property, because it's inside object's own "__proto__"
console.log(hasOwn.isAdmin);
async.mapValues(hasOwn, (val, key, cb) => cb(null, val), (error, result) => {
// after the method executes, hasOwn.__proto__ value (isAdmin: true) replaces the prototype of the newly created object, leading to potential exploits.
console.log(result.isAdmin);
});
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade async to version 2.6.4, 3.2.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: braces
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › braces@2.3.2Remediation: Upgrade to nodemon@2.0.0.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2
Overview
braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Excessive Platform Resource Consumption within a Loop due improper limitation of the number of characters it can handle, through the parse function. An attacker can cause the application to allocate excessive memory and potentially crash by sending imbalanced braces as input.
PoC
const { braces } = require('micromatch');
console.log("Executing payloads...");
const maxRepeats = 10;
for (let repeats = 1; repeats <= maxRepeats; repeats += 1) {
const payload = '{'.repeat(repeats*90000);
console.log(`Testing with ${repeats} repeats...`);
const startTime = Date.now();
braces(payload);
const endTime = Date.now();
const executionTime = endTime - startTime;
console.log(`Regex executed in ${executionTime / 1000}s.\n`);
}
Remediation
Upgrade braces to version 3.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mongodb
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mongodb@2.2.34Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.4.10.
Overview
mongodb is an official MongoDB driver for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package fails to properly catch an exception when a collection name is invalid and the DB does not exist, crashing the application.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mongodb to version 3.1.13 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mquery
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mquery@2.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.12.3.
Overview
mquery is an Expressive query building for MongoDB
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mergeClone() function.
PoC by zhou, peng
mquery = require('mquery');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"polluted":"HACKED"}}';
console.log('Before:', {}.polluted); // undefined
mquery.utils.mergeClone({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log('After:', {}.polluted); // HACKED
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mquery to version 3.2.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: pug-code-gen
- Introduced through: pug@2.0.0-beta.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › pug@2.0.0-beta.12 › pug-code-gen@1.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to pug@3.0.0.
Overview
pug-code-gen is a Default code-generator for pug. It generates HTML via a JavaScript template function.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') via the name option of the compileClient, compileFileClient, or compileClientWithDependenciesTracked functions. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code by providing untrusted input.
Note:
These functions are for compiling Pug templates into JavaScript, and there would typically be no reason to allow untrusted callers.
PoC
const express = require("express")
const pug = require("pug")
const runtimeWrap = require('pug-runtime/wrap');
const PORT = 3000
const app = express()
app.get("/", (req, res) => {
const out = runtimeWrap(pug.compileClient('string of pug', req.query))
res.send(out())
})
app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${PORT}`)
})
Remediation
Upgrade pug-code-gen to version 3.0.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: qs
- Introduced through: body-parser@1.17.2 and express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › body-parser@1.17.2 › qs@6.4.0Remediation: Upgrade to body-parser@1.19.2.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › qs@6.5.0Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.17.3.
Overview
qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning which allows attackers to cause a Node process to hang, processing an Array object whose prototype has been replaced by one with an excessive length value.
Note: In many typical Express use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
wspackage
Remediation
Upgrade qs to version 6.2.4, 6.3.3, 6.4.1, 6.5.3, 6.6.1, 6.7.3, 6.8.3, 6.9.7, 6.10.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: unset-value
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › braces@2.3.2 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › nanomatch@1.2.13 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10 › extglob@2.0.4 › expand-brackets@2.1.4 › snapdragon@0.8.2 › base@0.11.2 › cache-base@1.0.1 › unset-value@1.0.0
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the unset function in index.js, because it allows access to object prototype properties.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade unset-value to version 2.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mquery
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mquery@2.3.3Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.11.7.
Overview
mquery is an Expressive query building for MongoDB
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the merge function within lib/utils.js. Depending on if user input is provided, an attacker can overwrite and pollute the object prototype of a program.
PoC
require('./env').getCollection(function(err, collection) {
assert.ifError(err);
col = collection;
done();
});
var payload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"polluted": "vulnerable"}}');
var m = mquery(payload);
console.log({}.polluted);
// The empty object {} will have a property called polluted which will print vulnerable
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mquery to version 3.2.3 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: mongoose
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.13.15.
Overview
mongoose is a Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in the Schema.path() function.
Note: CVE-2022-24304 is a duplicate of CVE-2022-2564.
PoC:
const mongoose = require('mongoose');
const schema = new mongoose.Schema();
malicious_payload = '__proto__.toString'
schema.path(malicious_payload, [String])
x = {}
console.log(x.toString())
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mongoose to version 5.13.15, 6.4.6 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: nodemailer@4.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer@4.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@7.0.7.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Interpretation Conflict due to improper handling of quoted local-parts containing @. An attacker can cause emails to be sent to unintended external recipients or bypass domain-based access controls by crafting specially formatted email addresses with quoted local-parts containing the @ character.
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 7.0.7 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: path-to-regexp
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › path-to-regexp@0.1.7Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when including multiple regular expression parameters in a single segment, which will produce the regular expression /^\/([^\/]+?)-([^\/]+?)\/?$/, if two parameters within a single segment are separated by a character other than a / or .. Poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS.
Note:
While the 8.0.0 release has completely eliminated the vulnerable functionality, prior versions that have received the patch to mitigate backtracking may still be vulnerable if custom regular expressions are used. So it is strongly recommended for regular expression input to be controlled to avoid malicious performance degradation in those versions. This behavior is enforced as of version 7.1.0 via the strict option, which returns an error if a dangerous regular expression is detected.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be avoided by using a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a segment, which excludes - and /.
PoC
/a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade path-to-regexp to version 0.1.10, 1.9.0, 3.3.0, 6.3.0, 8.0.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: path-to-regexp
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › path-to-regexp@0.1.7Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.2.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when including multiple regular expression parameters in a single segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Poor performance will block the event loop and can lead to a DoS.
Note:
This issue is caused due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-45296.
Workarounds
This can be mitigated by avoiding using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Alternatively, the regex used for both parameters can be defined to ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking.
PoC
/a${'-a'.repeat(8_000)}/a
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade path-to-regexp to version 0.1.12 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: cookie
- Introduced through: cookie-parser@1.3.5 and express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › cookie-parser@1.3.5 › cookie@0.1.3Remediation: Upgrade to cookie-parser@1.4.7.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › cookie@0.3.1Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.1.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via the cookie name, path, or domain, which can be used to set unexpected values to other cookie fields.
Workaround
Users who are not able to upgrade to the fixed version should avoid passing untrusted or arbitrary values for the cookie fields and ensure they are set by the application instead of user input.
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade cookie to version 0.7.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: nodemailer@4.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer@4.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@6.6.1.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection if unsanitized user input that may contain newlines and carriage returns is passed into an address object.
PoC:
const userEmail = 'foo@bar.comrnSubject: foobar'; // imagine this comes from e.g. HTTP request params or is otherwise user-controllable
await transporter.sendMail({
from: '...',
to: '...',
replyTo: {
name: 'Customer',
address: userEmail,
},
subject: 'My Subject',
text: message,
});
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 6.6.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: express-handlebars@3.1.0 and nodemailer-express-handlebars@2.0.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express-handlebars@3.1.0 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer-express-handlebars@2.0.0 › express-handlebars@3.1.0 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: express
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.19.2.
Overview
express is a minimalist web framework.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to the implementation of URL encoding using encodeurl before passing it to the location header. This can lead to unexpected evaluations of malformed URLs by common redirect allow list implementations in applications, allowing an attacker to bypass a properly implemented allow list and redirect users to malicious sites.
Remediation
Upgrade express to version 4.19.2, 5.0.0-beta.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: mongoose
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.12.2.
Overview
mongoose is a Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The mongoose.Schema() function is subject to prototype pollution due to the recursively calling of Schema.prototype.add() function to add new items into the schema object. This vulnerability allows modification of the Object prototype.
PoC
mongoose = require('mongoose');
mongoose.version; //'5.12.0'
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"polluted":"HACKED"}}';
console.log('Before:', {}.polluted); // undefined
mongoose.Schema(JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log('After:', {}.polluted); // HACKED
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mongoose to version 5.12.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: mpath
- Introduced through: mongoose@4.13.21
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › mongoose@4.13.21 › mpath@0.5.1Remediation: Upgrade to mongoose@5.13.9.
Overview
mpath is a package that gets/sets javascript object values using MongoDB-like path notation.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A type confusion vulnerability can lead to a bypass of CVE-2018-16490. In particular, the condition ignoreProperties.indexOf(parts[i]) !== -1 returns -1 if parts[i] is ['__proto__']. This is because the method that has been called if the input is an array is Array.prototype.indexOf() and not String.prototype.indexOf(). They behave differently depending on the type of the input.
PoC
const mpath = require('mpath');
// mpath.set(['__proto__', 'polluted'], 'yes', {});
// console.log(polluted); // ReferenceError: polluted is not defined
mpath.set([['__proto__'], 'polluted'], 'yes', {});
console.log(polluted); // yes
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Objectrecursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).
lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Short description |
|---|---|---|
| Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
| Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
| Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype).Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Mapinstead ofObject.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Olivier. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade mpath to version 0.8.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: got
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › update-notifier@2.5.0 › latest-version@3.1.0 › package-json@4.0.1 › got@6.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to nodemon@2.0.17.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Open Redirect due to missing verification of requested URLs. It allowed a victim to be redirected to a UNIX socket.
Remediation
Upgrade got to version 11.8.5, 12.1.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: glob-parent
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › glob-parent@3.1.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemon@2.0.0.
Overview
glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.
PoC by Yeting Li
var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}
return ret;
}
globParent(build_attack(5000));
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade glob-parent to version 5.1.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: micromatch
- Introduced through: nodemon@1.19.4
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › anymatch@2.0.0 › micromatch@3.1.10
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemon@1.19.4 › chokidar@2.1.8 › readdirp@2.2.1 › micromatch@3.1.10
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity due to the use of unsafe pattern configurations that allow greedy matching through the micromatch.braces() function. An attacker can cause the application to hang or slow down by passing a malicious payload that triggers extensive backtracking in regular expression processing.
Remediation
Upgrade micromatch to version 4.0.8 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: nodemailer
- Introduced through: nodemailer@4.7.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › nodemailer@4.7.0Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@6.9.9.
Overview
nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the attachDataUrls parameter or when parsing attachments with an embedded file. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted email that triggers inefficient regular expression evaluation, leading to excessive consumption of CPU resources.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade nodemailer to version 6.9.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: pug@2.0.0-beta.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › pug@2.0.0-beta.12 › pug-filters@2.1.5 › uglify-js@2.8.29Remediation: Upgrade to pug@3.0.0.
Overview
uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: express
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
Overview
express is a minimalist web framework.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper handling of user input in the response.redirect method. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by passing malicious input to this method.
Note
To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions are required:
The attacker should be able to control the input to
response.redirect()express must not redirect before the template appears
the browser must not complete redirection before:
the user must click on the link in the template
Remediation
Upgrade express to version 4.20.0, 5.0.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: clean-css
- Introduced through: pug@2.0.0-beta.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › pug@2.0.0-beta.12 › pug-filters@2.1.5 › clean-css@3.4.28Remediation: Upgrade to pug@2.0.0.
Overview
clean-css is a fast and efficient CSS optimizer for Node.js platform and any modern browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). attacks. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 70k characters long.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
- Feb 20th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
- Mar 6th, 2018 - Fix issued
- Mar 7th, 2018 - Vulnerability published
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade clean-css to version 4.1.11 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: body-parser@1.17.2 and debug@2.2.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › body-parser@1.17.2 › debug@2.6.7Remediation: Upgrade to body-parser@1.18.2.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to debug@2.6.9.
Overview
debug is a small debugging utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument.
The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.
Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.
PoC
Use the following regex in the %o formatter.
/\s*\n\s*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: mime
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › send@0.15.6 › mime@1.3.4Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.16.0.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › serve-static@1.12.6 › send@0.15.6 › mime@1.3.4Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.16.0.
Overview
mime is a comprehensive, compact MIME type module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It uses regex the following regex /.*[\.\/\\]/ in its lookup, which can cause a slowdown of 2 seconds for 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mime to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: ms
- Introduced through: debug@2.2.0
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to debug@2.6.7.
Overview
ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.
Proof of concept
ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s
Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.
For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
- May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
- May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version
2.0.0released. - May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions
>=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: send
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › send@0.15.6Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › serve-static@1.12.6 › send@0.15.6Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.21.0.
Overview
send is a Better streaming static file server with Range and conditional-GET support
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper user input sanitization passed to the SendStream.redirect() function, which executes untrusted code. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by manipulating the input parameters to this method.
Note:
Exploiting this vulnerability requires the following:
The attacker needs to control the input to
response.redirect()Express MUST NOT redirect before the template appears
The browser MUST NOT complete redirection before
The user MUST click on the link in the template
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade send to version 0.19.0, 1.1.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: serve-static
- Introduced through: express@4.15.5
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: rallly@nprail/rallly#8b28e66ea0e9926f705367810a1a83a0ba5b2e63 › express@4.15.5 › serve-static@1.12.6Remediation: Upgrade to express@4.20.0.
Overview
serve-static is a server.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting due to improper sanitization of user input in the redirect function. An attacker can manipulate the redirection process by injecting malicious code into the input.
Note
To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions are required:
The attacker should be able to control the input to
response.redirect()express must not redirect before the template appears
the browser must not complete redirection before:
the user must click on the link in the template
Details
Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as < and > can be coded as > in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
| Type | Origin | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
| Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
| DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
| Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?,&,/,<,>and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade serve-static to version 1.16.0, 2.1.0 or higher.