Vulnerabilities |
5 via 5 paths |
|---|---|
Dependencies |
59 |
Source |
GitHub |
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high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: uri-js
- Introduced through: ajv@6.12.6
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: adviser@jam3/adviser › ajv@6.12.6 › uri-js@4.4.1
Overview
uri-js is a RFC 3986/3987 compliant, scheme extendable URI/IRI parsing/validating/resolving library for JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Infinite loop via the removeDotSegments function, which loops infinitely when a path segment begins with Unicode line separators (U+2028) or paragraph separators (U+2029). An attacker can trigger this by passing such a path to removeDotSegments directly, or through the normalize or resolve functions with IRI handling enabled, blocking the Node.js event loop indefinitely until heap exhaustion.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for uri-js.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ajv
- Introduced through: ajv@6.12.6
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: adviser@jam3/adviser › ajv@6.12.6Remediation: Upgrade to ajv@6.14.0.
Overview
ajv is an Another JSON Schema Validator
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper validation of the pattern keyword when combined with $data references. An attacker can cause the application to become unresponsive and exhaust CPU resources by submitting a specially crafted regular expression payload.
Note:
This is only exploitable if the $data option is enabled.
PoC
const Ajv = require('ajv');
// Vulnerable configuration — $data enables runtime pattern injection
const ajv = new Ajv({ $data: true });
const schema = {
type: 'object',
properties: {
pattern: { type: 'string' },
value: {
type: 'string',
pattern: { $data: '1/pattern' } // Pattern comes from the data itself
}
}
};
const validate = ajv.compile(schema);
// Malicious payload — both the pattern and the triggering input
const maliciousPayload = {
pattern: '^(a|a)*$', // Catastrophic backtracking pattern
value: 'a'.repeat(30) + 'X' // 30 'a's followed by 'X' to force full backtracking
};
console.time('attack');
validate(maliciousPayload); // Blocks the entire Node.js process for ~44 seconds
console.timeEnd('attack');
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ajv to version 6.14.0, 8.18.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: uri-js
- Introduced through: ajv@6.12.6
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: adviser@jam3/adviser › ajv@6.12.6 › uri-js@4.4.1
Overview
uri-js is a RFC 3986/3987 compliant, scheme extendable URI/IRI parsing/validating/resolving library for JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output via pctDecChars(), which decodes invalid and overlong percent-encoded sequences into ASCII metacharacters. An attacker can craft percent-encoded payloads to bypass platform decoder validation and inject path traversal or CRLF sequences that downstream consumers process without filtering.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for uri-js.
References
medium severity
new
- Vulnerable module: uri-js
- Introduced through: ajv@6.12.6
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: adviser@jam3/adviser › ajv@6.12.6 › uri-js@4.4.1
Overview
uri-js is a RFC 3986/3987 compliant, scheme extendable URI/IRI parsing/validating/resolving library for JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception in the parse() function of src/schemes/mailto.ts, whose to branch calls hfield[1].split(",") directly, while the subject, body, and default branches all route through unescapeComponent(), which short-circuits on a missing value. An attacker can crash the process by supplying a mailto URI whose query carries a bare to token with no =value, such as mailto:?to, so splitting on = yields a one element array and the undefined second element is dereferenced. This requires the application to pass an attacker-influenced string to URI.parse(), URI.resolve(), URI.normalize(), or URI.equal(), none of which wrap the scheme handler in a try/catch, and whether the throw terminates the process or only fails the one request depends on the host's own error handling.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for uri-js.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: debug@4.1.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: adviser@jam3/adviser › debug@4.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to debug@4.3.1.
Overview
debug is a small debugging utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument.
The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.
Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.
PoC
Use the following regex in the %o formatter.
/\s*\n\s*/
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.