Vulnerabilities

6 via 11 paths

Dependencies

993

Source

GitHub

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Severity
  • 1
  • 5
Status
  • 6
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity
new

Embedded Malicious Code

  • Vulnerable module: size-sensor
  • Introduced through: echarts-for-react@3.0.6

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry echarts-for-react@3.0.6 size-sensor@1.0.4

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Embedded Malicious Code that conceals a credential-stealing payload and worm propagation logic. A malicious actor associated with the "TeamPCP" or "Mini Shai-Hulud" campaign compromised a maintainer's access token; this allowed the attacker to publish over 600 tampered package versions to npm, primarily targeting the @antv ecosystem, along with other widely used packages like echarts-for-react, size-sensor, and jest-canvas-mock.

Attack Details

This supply chain attack is notable for successfully forging valid Sigstore provenance badges, meaning the malicious packages appear legitimate to standard provenance-verification tools. The attackers introduced the malware using a "phantom commit dropper," injecting an anomalous @antv/setup optional dependency that points directly to a malicious GitHub commit.

Malware Behavior

The heavily obfuscated payload is designed to execute during the package installation phase. It scans developer workstations and CI/CD pipelines to harvest high-value secrets, including AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, npm tokens, Vault tokens, and Kubernetes service-account material. The stolen data is compressed, encrypted, and exfiltrated to an external server. If the primary exfiltration route fails, the malware falls back on abusing stolen GitHub tokens to create Dune-themed repositories under the victim's account to stash the stolen data. The payload also contains worm capabilities, using stolen npm tokens to modify and republish further packages.

Remediation

Avoid using all malicious instances of the size-sensor package.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: @babel/runtime
  • Introduced through: react-mentions@4.4.10

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry react-mentions@4.4.10 @babel/runtime@7.4.5

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the replace() method in wrapRegExp.js. An attacker can cause degradation in performance by supplying input strings that exploit the quadratic complexity of the replacement algorithm.

This is only exploitable when all of the following conditions are met:

  1. The code passes untrusted strings in the second argument to .replace().

  2. The compiled regular expressions being applied contain named capture groups.

In the case of @babel/preset-env, if the targets option is in use the application will be vulnerable under either of the following conditions:

  1. A browser older than Chrome 64, Opera 71, Edge 79, Firefox 78, Safari 11.1, or Node.js 10 is used when processing named capture groups.

  2. A browser older than Chrome/Edge 126, Opera 112, Firefox 129, Safari 17.4, or Node.js 23 is used when processing duplicated named capture groups.

Note: The project maintainers advise that "just updating your Babel dependencies is not enough: you will also need to re-compile your code."

Workaround

This vulnerability can be avoided by filtering out input containing a $< that is not followed by a >.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade @babel/runtime to version 7.26.10, 8.0.0-alpha.17 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: postcss-selector-parser
  • Introduced through: css-loader@7.1.4 and rehype-expressive-code@0.41.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry css-loader@7.1.4 postcss-modules-local-by-default@4.2.0 postcss-selector-parser@7.1.1
  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry css-loader@7.1.4 postcss-modules-scope@3.2.1 postcss-selector-parser@7.1.1
  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry rehype-expressive-code@0.41.7 expressive-code@0.41.7 @expressive-code/core@0.41.7 postcss-nested@6.2.0 postcss-selector-parser@6.1.2
  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry rehype-expressive-code@0.41.7 expressive-code@0.41.7 @expressive-code/plugin-frames@0.41.7 @expressive-code/core@0.41.7 postcss-nested@6.2.0 postcss-selector-parser@6.1.2
  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry rehype-expressive-code@0.41.7 expressive-code@0.41.7 @expressive-code/plugin-shiki@0.41.7 @expressive-code/core@0.41.7 postcss-nested@6.2.0 postcss-selector-parser@6.1.2
  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry rehype-expressive-code@0.41.7 expressive-code@0.41.7 @expressive-code/plugin-text-markers@0.41.7 @expressive-code/core@0.41.7 postcss-nested@6.2.0 postcss-selector-parser@6.1.2

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via the toString function in the AST Serialization. An attacker can cause uncontrolled recursion by providing specially crafted input, potentially resulting in resource exhaustion and application unavailability.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for postcss-selector-parser.

References

medium severity

Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input

  • Vulnerable module: uuid
  • Introduced through: @sentry/webpack-plugin@4.6.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry @sentry/webpack-plugin@4.6.1 uuid@9.0.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to @sentry/webpack-plugin@5.2.0.

Overview

uuid is a RFC4122 (v1, v4, and v5) compliant UUID library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input due to accepting external output buffers but not rejecting out-of-range writes (small buf or large offset). This inconsistency allows silent partial writes into caller-provided buffers.

PoC

cd /home/StrawHat/uuid
npm ci
npm run build

node --input-type=module -e "
import {v4,v5,v6} from './dist-node/index.js';
const ns='6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8';
for (const [name,fn] of [
  ['v4',()=>v4({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v5',()=>v5('x',ns,new Uint8Array(8),4)],
  ['v6',()=>v6({},new Uint8Array(8),4)],
]) {
  try { fn(); console.log(name,'NO_THROW'); }
  catch(e){ console.log(name,'THREW',e.name); }
}"

Remediation

Upgrade uuid to version 11.1.1, 14.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: zxcvbn
  • Introduced through: zxcvbn@4.4.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry zxcvbn@4.4.2

Overview

zxcvbn is a realistic password strength estimation

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the repeat_match functionality, due to the usage of an insecure regex in lazy_anchored variable.

PoC

const zxcvbn = require("zxcvbn");
attackStr = '\x00\x00' + ('\x00'.repeat(54773)) + '\n'
zxcvbn(attackStr)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for zxcvbn.

References

medium severity
new

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: echarts
  • Introduced through: echarts@6.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: sentry@getsentry/sentry echarts@6.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to echarts@6.1.0.

Overview

echarts is an Apache ECharts is a powerful, interactive charting and data visualization library for browser

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in the tooltip rendering when both Lines series and tooltip are used without a user-specified tooltip.formatter, and series.data[i].name is provided. An attacker can execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the user's browser by supplying crafted HTML content in series.data[i].name.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade echarts to version 6.1.0 or higher.

References