Vulnerabilities |
5 via 5 paths |
|---|---|
Dependencies |
262 |
Source |
GitHub |
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critical severity
new
- Vulnerable module: @angular/common
- Introduced through: @angular/common@19.2.25
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @ngx-formly/common@formly-js/ng-formly › @angular/common@19.2.25Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/common@20.3.25.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Use of Weak Hash due to the use of a weak 32-bit hash in the HttpTransferCache. When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState cache.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be mitigated by configuring HTTP requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints or by disabling the HTTP transfer cache globally in the application bootstrap configuration.
Remediation
Upgrade @angular/common to version 20.3.25, 21.2.17, 22.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: @angular/core
- Introduced through: @angular/core@19.2.25
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @ngx-formly/common@formly-js/ng-formly › @angular/core@19.2.25Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/core@20.3.25.
Overview
@angular/core is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data via document.getElementById('ng-state'), during client-side SSR hydration, which enables DOM clobbering. An attacker can inject malicious JSON payloads into the application's TransferState cache by introducing a DOM element with a predictable identifier before the legitimate state script is parsed, causing forged API responses to be served to users and leading to the execution of arbitrary scripts, privilege escalation, or UI manipulation.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be mitigated by sanitizing or prefixing dynamic IDs to prevent user-controlled values from being used directly, or by configuring a unique, non-predictable application ID to change the state element's identifier.
Remediation
Upgrade @angular/core to version 20.3.25, 21.2.17, 22.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
new
- Vulnerable module: @angular/common
- Introduced through: @angular/common@19.2.25
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @ngx-formly/common@formly-js/ng-formly › @angular/common@19.2.25Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/common@20.3.25.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the formatDate function when processing an excessively long or attacker-controlled date format string. An attacker can cause high CPU and memory consumption, leading to application unavailability or browser unresponsiveness by supplying a maliciously crafted format string.
Note: This is only exploitable if the application formats dates using the vulnerable utility or pipe and the format string is customizable or controlled by untrusted user input.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
AThe string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+matches one or more times). The+at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.DFinally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
| String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
|---|---|---|
| ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
| ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
| ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
| ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade @angular/common to version 20.3.25, 21.2.17, 22.0.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: inflight
- Introduced through: @nativescript/core@8.9.9
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @ngx-formly/common@formly-js/ng-formly › @nativescript/core@8.9.9 › @nativescript/hook@2.0.0 › glob@7.2.3 › inflight@1.0.6
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.
Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.
Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.
To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.
PoC
const inflight = require('inflight');
function testInflight() {
let i = 0;
function scheduleNext() {
let key = `key-${i++}`;
const callback = () => {
};
for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
inflight(key, callback);
}
setImmediate(scheduleNext);
}
if (i % 100 === 0) {
console.log(process.memoryUsage());
}
scheduleNext();
}
testInflight();
Remediation
There is no fixed version for inflight.
References
low severity
new
- Vulnerable module: @babel/core
- Introduced through: @angular/localize@19.2.25
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: @ngx-formly/common@formly-js/ng-formly › @angular/localize@19.2.25 › @babel/core@7.26.9Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/localize@20.3.26.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via the inputSourceMap function. An attacker can access arbitrary files by crafting malicious input source code containing a #sourceMappingURL comment that references a specific source map file path.
Note:
This is only exploitable if all these conditions are met: the attacker controls the input source code, can read the output source code, and knows the path of the source map file they want to read.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be mitigated by setting inputSourceMap: false in the Babel options or by manually extracting and validating the #sourceMappingURL comment before processing.
Details
A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.
Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:
- Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.
st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.
If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.
curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa
Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).
- Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as
Zip-Slip.
One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
Remediation
Upgrade @babel/core to version 7.29.6, 8.0.0-rc.6 or higher.