briangann/grafana-datatable-panel
Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
high severity
- Vulnerable module: uplot
- Introduced through: @grafana/data@10.3.12, @grafana/ui@10.3.12 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/data@11.2.3.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/ui@11.2.3.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/ui@11.2.3.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/runtime@11.2.3.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/runtime@11.2.3.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › uplot@1.6.28Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/runtime@11.2.3.
…and 3 more
Overview
uplot is an A small, fast chart for time series, lines, areas, ohlc & bars
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the uplot.assign
function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype.
PoC
var uplot = require("uplot")
BAD_JSON = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"polluted":true}}');
console.log('before prototype pollution: polluted:', {}.polluted)
uplot.assign({}, BAD_JSON)
console.log('After prototype pollution: polluted:', {}.polluted)
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
Unsafe
Object
recursive mergeProperty definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named __proto__
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
Application server
Web server
Web browser
How to prevent
Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
.Require schema validation of JSON input.
Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade uplot
to version 1.6.31 or higher.
References
low severity
new
- Vulnerable module: prismjs
- Introduced through: @grafana/ui@10.3.12 and @grafana/runtime@10.3.12
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › prismjs@1.29.0
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › prismjs@1.29.0
Overview
prismjs is a lightweight, robust, elegant syntax highlighting library.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the document.currentScript
lookup process. An attacker can manipulate the web page content and execute unintended actions by injecting HTML elements that overshadow legitimate DOM elements.
Note:
This is only exploitable if the application accepts untrusted input containing HTML but not direct JavaScript.
Remediation
Upgrade prismjs
to version 1.30.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: dompurify
- Introduced through: @grafana/data@10.3.12, @grafana/ui@10.3.12 and others
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › dompurify@2.5.8Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/data@10.4.0.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › dompurify@2.5.8Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/ui@10.4.0.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › dompurify@2.5.8Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/runtime@10.4.0.
-
Introduced through: briangann-datatable-panel@briangann/grafana-datatable-panel#0fc80846ceb46d0e7f995e3ec264a6cb9ee81691 › @grafana/runtime@10.3.12 › @grafana/ui@10.3.12 › @grafana/data@10.3.12 › dompurify@2.5.8Remediation: Upgrade to @grafana/runtime@10.4.0.
…and 1 more
Overview
dompurify is a DOM-only XSS sanitizer for HTML, MathML and SVG.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to incorrect handling of template literals in regular expressions. An attacker can manipulate the output of the script by injecting malicious payloads that bypass the dompurify
sanitization.
PoC
DOMPurify.sanitize(
`<math><foo-test><mi><li><table><foo-test><li></li></foo-test><a>
<style>
<! \${
</style>
}
<foo-b id="><img src onerror='alert(1)'>">hmm...</foo-b>
</a></table></li></mi></foo-test></math>
`,
{
SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: {
tagNameCheck: /^foo-/,
},
}
);
Details
A cross-site scripting attack occurs when the attacker tricks a legitimate web-based application or site to accept a request as originating from a trusted source.
This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.
Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.
Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, <
can be coded as <
; and >
can be coded as >
; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses <
and >
as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.
The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Description |
---|---|---|
Stored | Server | The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link. |
Reflected | Server | The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. |
DOM-based | Client | The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data. |
Mutated | The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:
- Web servers
- Application servers
- Web application environments
How to prevent
This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:
- Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
- Convert special characters such as
?
,&
,/
,<
,>
and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents. - Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
- Redirect invalid requests.
- Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
- Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
- Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.
Remediation
Upgrade dompurify
to version 3.2.4 or higher.