Vulnerabilities

9 via 9 paths

Dependencies

315

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critical severity
new

Origin Validation Error

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error via the cache-handler.js redirect-hop inspection logic when an originless Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors as compose(redirect(), cache()). Undici decides whether to store the final response under the original request key by inspecting only the final redirect hop, bypassing the earlier fix for CVE-2026-109829 that compared only the initial and final origins. A redirect that bounces through an untrusted intermediate origin and returns to the trusted origin is still cached under the trusted key, an intermediate hop's Vary header is dropped so a response that varies on Authorization or Cookie can be served to a different user, and an intermediate hop's no-cache or default-uncacheable status is ignored so a non-storable redirect is laundered into a cacheable entry. An attacker who controls the target of a redirect from a trusted URL can poison the cached entry for that URL or have a private, per-user response served to a later caller.

Note: This is only exploitable when an originless Agent, a shared cache store, and compose(redirect(), cache()) are all used together.

Workaround

Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()), use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Interpretation Conflict

  • Vulnerable module: nodemailer
  • Introduced through: nodemailer@10.1.4

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › nodemailer@10.1.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to nodemailer@10.4.1.

Overview

nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Interpretation Conflict in addressparser, which sendMail() uses to derive the SMTP envelope recipient. An attacker can make the application send mail to a recipient other than the one it validated by supplying an address whose domain has whitespace or an RFC 5322 comment directly before a dot, such as ceo@victim.example .allowed.example, because the parser ends the address at that point and sendMail() uses the truncated address. Exposure requires the application to restrict recipients by domain with a parser or suffix check other than the one in nodemailer, and to pass the raw address string to sendMail().

Remediation

Upgrade nodemailer to version 10.4.1 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key via the CacheHandler.onResponseStart function in the cache handler. With an originless Agent using a shared cache and compose(redirect(), cache()), when a credential-bearing request to a user-specific URL receives a same-origin redirect to a cacheable per-user resource, the response is stored under the original URL without varying on credentials. A later authenticated or unauthenticated caller requesting that URL receives the first user’s private response from the cache.

Notes

  • The shared cache must be a MemoryCacheStore or SqliteCacheStore; the advisory identifies these stores as the affected cache implementations.

Workarounds

  • Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()) to prevent redirected per-user responses from being cached under the original request URL.
  • Use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores to prevent a shared cache from serving one origin’s user-specific response to callers of another.
  • Disable shared caching for credential-bearing requests that can follow redirects to prevent private responses from being reused for other callers.
  • Set appropriate Vary headers on per-user responses, or mark them private or no-store, to prevent shared-cache reuse across users.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: flat
  • Introduced through: flat@6.0.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › flat@6.0.1

Overview

flat is a Take a nested Javascript object and flatten it, or unflatten an object with delimited keys

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via unflatten(), which creates huge sparse arrays when processing flattened objects whose keys contain unbounded numeric indices. An attacker can supply keys such as a.4294967294, causing the resulting sparse array to consume excessive memory, and subsequent iteration with forEach, spread, or JSON.stringify to block the Node.js event loop.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for flat.

References

high severity
new

Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value via the fetch() function's Subresource Integrity verification logic, which splits the integrity string on a single space rather than on all ASCII whitespace characters. An integrity value whose digest is preceded by a horizontal tab or other non-space ASCII whitespace (e.g. \tsha256-...) is parsed as a single unrecognized token and skipped. When no recognized algorithm remains, the integrity list is treated as empty and the response is accepted unconditionally, allowing a server that returns a body different from the pinned digest to pass the check. An attacker who controls the response body can deliver arbitrary bytes to an application that uses whitespace-surrounded SRI metadata, with no integrity error raised.

Workaround

Supply SRI integrity metadata without surrounding whitespace, using a single space to separate multiple digests.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File via the cleanRequestHeaders function in lib/handler/redirect-handler.js, when request headers are supplied as an array of [name, value] tuples (e.g. via Object.entries(headers)). The redirect interceptor is responsible for stripping sensitive headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and Host on cross-origin redirects, but it misreads tuple-format headers as a flat alternating [name, value, name, value, ...] list, causing header names to never match the strip list and leaving sensitive headers intact. When a header-normalizing interceptor such as cache() or deduplicate() is composed outside redirect(), it serializes the retained headers onto the cross-origin request, disclosing origin-bound credentials to the redirect destination. This is a representation-dependent bypass of the cross-origin header stripping introduced to address CVE-2024-30260.

Note: This is only exploitable when headers are supplied as an array of [name, value] tuples and a header-normalizing interceptor (cache() or deduplicate()) is composed outside the redirect() interceptor.

Workaround

Supply request headers as a plain object or a flat [name, value, name, value, ...] array rather than an array of [name, value] tuples, or compose the redirect() interceptor outside the normalizing interceptor (cache() or deduplicate()).

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Origin Validation Error

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Origin Validation Error via the cache interceptor in lib/interceptor/cache.js when an Agent composes the redirect and shared cache interceptors as compose(redirect(), cache()). The redirect handler strips origin-bound credential headers from a conditional revalidation request but does not strip the cache-generated If-None-Match or If-Modified-Since validators, so when the original origin redirects the revalidation request to a different origin, the redirect destination receives the original origin's validators. undici then treats a 304 Not Modified response from that different origin as successful revalidation of the stored representation, allowing a shared cache to serve the original origin's authenticated response - including one gated by Authorization - to a subsequent unauthenticated caller.

Note: This is only exploitable when a shared MemoryCacheStore or SqliteCacheStore and the composition compose(redirect(), cache()) are used, and an attacker can influence a cross-origin redirect on the revalidated request.

Workaround

Compose the interceptors as compose(cache(), redirect()), use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Uncaught Exception

  • Vulnerable module: undici
  • Introduced through: undici@8.12.2

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › undici@8.12.2
    Remediation: Upgrade to undici@8.12.4.

Overview

undici is an An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception via the cache interceptor in lib/interceptor/cache.js when it is composed with a downstream handler that throws during response processing. When a cached response is replayed through the cache interceptor's async store path, a throw raised asynchronously - for example from the built-in dump interceptor exceeding its maxSize, or the decompress interceptor rejecting more than five Content-Encoding values - escapes as an uncaught exception or unhandled promise rejection and terminates the Node.js process. A malicious or compromised HTTP server can trigger this crash by serving a cacheable response whose replayed body or headers cause the downstream handler to throw, including on a 304 revalidation of a stale cache entry.

Note: This is only exploitable when the cache interceptor is composed with a downstream response handler that throws during response processing (such as dump with a maxSize limit, or decompress with more than five Content-Encoding values).

Workaround

Avoid composing the cache interceptor with a response handler that throws during response processing (such as dump with a maxSize) until upgrading.

Remediation

Upgrade undici to version 7.30.2, 8.12.4 or higher.

References

medium severity
new

Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow

  • Vulnerable module: express-rate-limit
  • Introduced through: express-rate-limit@8.7.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › express-rate-limit@8.7.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to express-rate-limit@8.7.2.

Overview

express-rate-limit is a Basic IP rate-limiting middleware for Express. Use to limit repeated requests to public APIs and/or endpoints such as password reset.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow via MemoryStore.resetClient mutating the shared resetTime Date object in place when skipFailedRequests or skipSuccessfulRequests is enabled. MemoryStore.increment returns the stored Client object directly, so the middleware's resetTime reference and the store's client.resetTime point to the same Date. When a subsequent request triggers resetClient, it calls client.resetTime.setTime(now + windowMs), advancing that shared Date forward. An earlier request still in flight then finishes or disconnects after the window boundary, reads the now-updated reset time, passes the stale-window guard at rate-limit.ts:545-547, and decrements the new window's hit count. A client that keeps requests in flight across a window boundary can thereby obtain up to one additional configured limit worth of requests in the new window as a one-off burst.

Note: This is only exploitable when the default MemoryStore is used together with the skipFailedRequests or skipSuccessfulRequests option.

Remediation

Upgrade express-rate-limit to version 8.7.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

LGPL-3.0 license

  • Module: parse-docker-image-name
  • Introduced through: parse-docker-image-name@3.0.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: drydock-app@CodesWhat/drydock › parse-docker-image-name@3.0.0

LGPL-3.0 license