Last tested: 20 Feb, 2018

jade vulnerabilities

A clean, whitespace-sensitive template language for writing HTML

View on npm

jade (latest)

Published 06 Feb, 2018

Known vulnerabilities2
Vulnerable paths2
Dependencies47

Regular Expression Denial of Service (DoS)

medium severity

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: jade@1.11.0 > transformers@2.1.0 > uglify-js@2.2.5

Overview

The parse() function in the uglify-js package prior to version 2.6.0 is vulnerable to regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks when long inputs of certain patterns are processed.

Details

"The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a Denial of Service attack, that exploits the fact that most Regular Expression implementations may reach extreme situations that cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size). An attacker can then cause a program using a Regular Expression to enter these extreme situations and then hang for a very long time." 1

Remediation

Upgrade to version 2.6.0 or greater. If a direct dependency update is not possible, use snyk wizard to patch this vulnerability.

References

Improper minification of non-boolean comparisons

high severity

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: jade@1.11.0 > transformers@2.1.0 > uglify-js@2.2.5

Overview

uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.

Tom MacWright discovered that UglifyJS versions 2.4.23 and earlier are affected by a vulnerability which allows a specially crafted Javascript file to have altered functionality after minification. This bug was demonstrated by Yan to allow potentially malicious code to be hidden within secure code, activated by minification.

Details

In Boolean algebra, DeMorgan's laws describe the relationships between conjunctions (&&), disjunctions (||) and negations (!). In Javascript form, they state that:

 !(a && b) === (!a) || (!b)
 !(a || b) === (!a) && (!b)

The law does not hold true when one of the values is not a boolean however.

Vulnerable versions of UglifyJS do not account for this restriction, and erroneously apply the laws to a statement if it can be reduced in length by it.

Consider this authentication function:

function isTokenValid(user) {
    var timeLeft =
        !!config && // config object exists
        !!user.token && // user object has a token
        !user.token.invalidated && // token is not explicitly invalidated
        !config.uninitialized && // config is initialized
        !config.ignoreTimestamps && // don't ignore timestamps
        getTimeLeft(user.token.expiry); // > 0 if expiration is in the future

    // The token must not be expired
    return timeLeft > 0;
}

function getTimeLeft(expiry) {
  return expiry - getSystemTime();
}

When minified with a vulnerable version of UglifyJS, it will produce the following insecure output, where a token will never expire:

( Formatted for readability )

function isTokenValid(user) {
    var timeLeft = !(                       // negation
        !config                             // config object does not exist
        || !user.token                      // user object does not have a token
        || user.token.invalidated           // token is explicitly invalidated
        || config.uninitialized             // config isn't initialized
        || config.ignoreTimestamps          // ignore timestamps
        || !getTimeLeft(user.token.expiry)  // > 0 if expiration is in the future
    );
    return timeLeft > 0
}

function getTimeLeft(expiry) {
    return expiry - getSystemTime()
}

Remediation

Upgrade UglifyJS to version 2.4.24 or higher.

References

Vulnerable versions of jade

Fixed in 1.9.2

Prototype Pollution

low severity

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: nodemon@1.9.1 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: browser-sync@1.9.1 > localtunnel@1.8.3 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: browser-sync@1.9.1 > localtunnel@1.8.3 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: browser-sync@1.9.1 > localtunnel@1.8.3 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: browser-sync@1.9.1 > localtunnel@1.8.3 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.9.1 > watchpack@0.2.9 > chokidar@1.7.0 > fsevents@1.1.3 > node-pre-gyp@0.6.39 > request@2.81.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > boom@0.4.2 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > cryptiles@0.2.2 > boom@0.4.2 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > iron@0.3.3 > cryptiles@0.2.2 > boom@0.4.2 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > iron@0.3.3 > boom@0.4.2 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > joi@0.4.0 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > catbox@1.0.0 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > iron@0.3.3 > hoek@0.9.1
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > hawk@1.1.2 > hoek@1.5.2
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > hawk@1.1.2 > boom@1.2.1 > hoek@1.5.2
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > hawk@1.1.2 > cryptiles@1.0.1 > boom@1.2.1 > hoek@1.5.2
  • Introduced through: hapi@1.9.1 > hawk@1.1.2 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > cryptiles@2.0.5 > boom@2.10.1 > hoek@2.16.3
  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > hawk@3.1.3 > sntp@1.0.9 > hoek@2.16.3

Overview

hoek is a Utility methods for the hapi ecosystem.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Remediation

Upgrade hoek to versions 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or higher.

References

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

low severity

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > har-validator@2.0.6 > is-my-json-valid@2.17.2

Overview

is-my-json-valid is a universal validation plugin.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. It used a regular expression (/^\S+@\S+$/) in order to validate emails. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 90K characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 13th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 14th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Feb 14th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade is-my-json-valid to version 2.17.2, 1.4.1 or higher.

References

Uninitialized Memory Exposure

medium severity

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: jade@1.9.1 > coveralls@2.13.3 > request@2.79.0 > tunnel-agent@0.4.3

Overview

tunnel-agent is HTTP proxy tunneling agent. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.

A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number is used to set the proxy.auth option of a request request and results in a possible uninitialized memory exposures in the request body.

This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.

Details

Constructing a Buffer class with integer N creates a Buffer of length N with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.

In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":

// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');

tunnel-agent's request construction uses the default Buffer constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL.

Proof of concept by ChALkeR

require('request')({
  method: 'GET',
  uri: 'http://www.example.com',
  tunnel: true,
  proxy:{
      protocol: 'http:',
      host:"127.0.0.1",
      port:8080,
      auth:80
  }
});

You can read more about the insecure Buffer behavior on our blog.

Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.

Remediation

Upgrade tunnel-agent to version 0.6.0 or higher.

References