Vulnerabilities

29 via 286 paths

Dependencies

574

Source

GitHub

Commit

0e390d5f

Find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in your code.

Severity
  • 1
  • 12
  • 12
  • 4
Status
  • 29
  • 0
  • 0

critical severity

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

  • Vulnerable module: babel-traverse
  • Introduced through: babel-core@6.18.2, babel-cli@6.18.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-constructor-call@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2016@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-helper-bindify-decorators@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-3@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-generator-functions@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs when using plugins that rely on the path.evaluate() or path.evaluateTruthy() internal Babel methods.

Note:

This is only exploitable if the attacker uses known affected plugins such as @babel/plugin-transform-runtime, @babel/preset-env when using its useBuiltIns option, and any "polyfill provider" plugin that depends on @babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider. No other plugins under the @babel/ namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be.

Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.

Workaround

Users who are unable to upgrade the library can upgrade the affected plugins instead, to avoid triggering the vulnerable code path in affected @babel/traverse.

Remediation

There is no fixed version for babel-traverse.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: ajv
  • Introduced through: eslint@3.9.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 table@3.8.3 ajv@4.11.8
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.

Overview

ajv is an Another JSON Schema Validator

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. A carefully crafted JSON schema could be provided that allows execution of other code by prototype pollution. (While untrusted schemas are recommended against, the worst case of an untrusted schema should be a denial of service, not execution of code.)

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade ajv to version 6.12.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Arbitrary Code Execution

  • Vulnerable module: js-yaml
  • Introduced through: js-yaml@3.6.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 js-yaml@3.6.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to js-yaml@3.13.1.

Overview

js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution. When an object with an executable toString() property used as a map key, it will execute that function. This happens only for load(), which should not be used with untrusted data anyway. safeLoad() is not affected because it can't parse functions.

Remediation

Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: ansi-regex
  • Introduced through: chalk@1.1.3, eslint@3.9.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to chalk@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to chalk@2.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 inquirer@0.12.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@7.3.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 core-object@2.1.1 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to core-object@3.1.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ora@0.3.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 core-object@2.1.1 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to core-object@3.1.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ora@0.3.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 inquirer@0.12.0 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 inquirer@0.12.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 table@3.8.3 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@8.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ora@0.3.0 log-symbols@1.0.2 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 inquirer@0.12.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 table@3.8.3 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@8.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ora@0.3.0 log-symbols@1.0.2 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 inquirer@0.12.0 string-width@1.0.2 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 inline-source-map-comment@1.0.5 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 inline-source-map-comment@1.0.5 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 inline-source-map-comment@1.0.5 sum-up@1.0.3 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 inline-source-map-comment@1.0.5 sum-up@1.0.3 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-constructor-call@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-block-scoping@6.26.0 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-computed-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-systemjs@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-constructor-call@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-parameters@6.24.1 babel-helper-call-delegate@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-object-super@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-commonjs@6.26.2 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-umd@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-modules-amd@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-define-map@6.26.0 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2017@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-remap-async-to-generator@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-class-properties@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2016@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-exponentiation-operator@6.24.1 babel-helper-builder-binary-assignment-operator-visitor@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-assignable-expression@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-stage-0@6.16.0 babel-preset-stage-1@6.24.1 babel-preset-stage-2@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-decorators@6.24.1 babel-helper-explode-class@6.24.1 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 has-ansi@2.0.0 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-helpers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-function-name@6.24.1 babel-helper-function-name@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-preset-latest@6.16.0 babel-preset-es2015@6.24.1 babel-plugin-transform-es2015-classes@6.24.1 babel-helper-replace-supers@6.24.1 babel-template@6.26.0 babel-traverse@6.26.0 babel-code-frame@6.26.0 chalk@1.1.3 strip-ansi@3.0.1 ansi-regex@2.1.1
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Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the sub-patterns [[\\]()#;?]* and (?:;[-a-zA-Z\\d\\/#&.:=?%@~_]*)*.

PoC

import ansiRegex from 'ansi-regex';

for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
    var time = Date.now();
    var attack_str = "\u001B["+";".repeat(i*10000);
    ansiRegex().test(attack_str)
    var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
    console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
}

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade ansi-regex to version 3.0.1, 4.1.1, 5.0.1, 6.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: loader-utils
  • Introduced through: babel-loader@6.2.7, eslint-loader@1.6.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-loader@6.2.7 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint-loader@1.6.1 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint-loader@1.6.2.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 source-map-loader@0.1.5 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to source-map-loader@0.2.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution in parseQuery function via the name variable in parseQuery.js. This pollutes the prototype of the object returned by parseQuery and not the global Object prototype (which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution). Therefore, the actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.1, 2.0.3 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: unset-value
  • Introduced through: babel-cli@6.18.0 and webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 braces@2.3.2 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 nanomatch@1.2.13 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 readdirp@2.2.1 micromatch@3.1.10 extglob@2.0.4 expand-brackets@2.1.4 snapdragon@0.8.2 base@0.11.2 cache-base@1.0.1 unset-value@1.0.0

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the unset function in index.js, because it allows access to object prototype properties.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade unset-value to version 2.0.1 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: aws-sdk
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.814.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. If an attacker submits a malicious INI file to an application that parses it with loadSharedConfigFiles , they will pollute the prototype on the application. This can be exploited further depending on the context.

PoC by Eugene Lim:

payload.toml:

[__proto__]
polluted = "polluted"

poc.js:

var fs = require('fs')
var sharedIniFileLoader = require('@aws-sdk/shared-ini-file-loader')

async function main() {
var parsed = await sharedIniFileLoader.loadSharedConfigFiles({ filepath: './payload.toml' })
console.log(parsed)
console.log(parsed.__proto__)
console.log({}.__proto__)
console.log(polluted)
}

main()
> node poc.js
{
configFile: { default: { region: 'ap-southeast-1' } },
credentialsFile: {}
}
{ polluted: '"polluted"' }
{ polluted: '"polluted"' }
"polluted"

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade aws-sdk to version 2.814.0 or higher.

References

high severity

Insecure Randomness

  • Vulnerable module: crypto-browserify
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 crypto-browserify@1.0.9
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.178.0.

Overview

crypto-browserify is implementation of crypto for the browser.

Affected versions of the package are vulnerable to Insecure Randomness due to using the cryptographically insecure Math.random(). This function can produce predictable values and should not be used in security-sensitive context.

Details

Computers are deterministic machines, and as such are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed from which subsequent values are calculated.

There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful statistical properties, but their output is highly predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where security depends on generated values being unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this problem by generating output that is more difficult to predict. For a value to be cryptographically secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly random value. In general, if a PRNG algorithm is not advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.

You can read more about node's insecure Math.random() in Mike Malone's post.

Remediation

Upgrade crypto-browserify to version 2.1.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor payload.

PoC by Snyk

const mergeFn = require('lodash').defaultsDeep;
const payload = '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"a0": true}}}'

function check() {
    mergeFn({}, JSON.parse(payload));
    if (({})[`a0`] === true) {
        console.log(`Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via ${payload}`);
    }
  }

check();

For more information, check out our blog post

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.12 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setWith and set functions.

PoC by awarau

  • Create a JS file with this contents:
lod = require('lodash')
lod.setWith({}, "__proto__[test]", "123")
lod.set({}, "__proto__[test2]", "456")
console.log(Object.prototype)
  • Execute it with node
  • Observe that test and test2 is now in the Object.prototype.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.17 or higher.

References

high severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions merge, mergeWith, and defaultsDeep could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype. This is due to an incomplete fix to CVE-2018-3721.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

high severity

Command Injection

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection via template.

PoC

var _ = require('lodash');

_.template('', { variable: '){console.log(process.env)}; with(obj' })()

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

high severity

Improper Privilege Management

  • Vulnerable module: shelljs
  • Introduced through: eslint@3.9.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 shelljs@0.7.8
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.0.0.

Overview

shelljs is a wrapper for the Unix shell commands for Node.js.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management. When ShellJS is used to create shell scripts which may be running as root, users with low-level privileges on the system can leak sensitive information such as passwords (depending on implementation) from the standard output of the privileged process OR shutdown privileged ShellJS processes via the exec function when triggering EACCESS errors.

Note: Thi only impacts the synchronous version of shell.exec().

Remediation

Upgrade shelljs to version 0.8.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: json5
  • Introduced through: babel-core@6.18.2, babel-cli@6.18.0 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-loader@6.2.7 loader-utils@0.2.17 json5@0.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint-loader@1.6.1 loader-utils@0.2.17 json5@0.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint-loader@1.6.2.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 source-map-loader@0.1.5 loader-utils@0.2.17 json5@0.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to source-map-loader@0.2.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 loader-utils@0.2.17 json5@0.5.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-core@6.18.2 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 babel-core@6.26.3 babel-register@6.26.0 babel-core@6.26.3 json5@0.5.1

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the parse method , which does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object. This pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse and not the global Object prototype (which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution). Therefore, the actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys.

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade json5 to version 1.0.2, 2.2.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The utilities function allow modification of the Object prototype. If an attacker can control part of the structure passed to this function, they could add or modify an existing property.

PoC by Olivier Arteau (HoLyVieR)

var _= require('lodash');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
_.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.5 or higher.

References

medium severity

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

  • Vulnerable module: inflight
  • Introduced through: babel-cli@6.18.0, eslint@3.9.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 glob@5.0.15 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 quick-temp@0.1.8 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 shelljs@0.7.8 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-funnel@2.0.2 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 yam@0.0.22 fs-extra@0.30.0 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-funnel@2.0.2 broccoli-plugin@1.3.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 broccoli-persistent-filter@1.4.6 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1 file-entry-cache@2.0.0 flat-cache@1.3.4 rimraf@2.6.3 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 broccoli-persistent-filter@1.4.6 hash-for-dep@1.5.1 broccoli-kitchen-sink-helpers@0.3.1 glob@5.0.15 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 broccoli-persistent-filter@1.4.6 async-disk-cache@1.3.5 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-funnel@2.0.2 broccoli-plugin@1.3.1 quick-temp@0.1.8 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 broccoli-persistent-filter@1.4.6 broccoli-plugin@1.3.1 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 broccoli-persistent-filter@1.4.6 broccoli-plugin@1.3.1 quick-temp@0.1.8 rimraf@2.7.1 glob@7.2.3 inflight@1.0.6

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime via the makeres function due to improperly deleting keys from the reqs object after execution of callbacks. This behavior causes the keys to remain in the reqs object, which leads to resource exhaustion.

Exploiting this vulnerability results in crashing the node process or in the application crash.

Note: This library is not maintained, and currently, there is no fix for this issue. To overcome this vulnerability, several dependent packages have eliminated the use of this library.

To trigger the memory leak, an attacker would need to have the ability to execute or influence the asynchronous operations that use the inflight module within the application. This typically requires access to the internal workings of the server or application, which is not commonly exposed to remote users. Therefore, “Attack vector” is marked as “Local”.

PoC

const inflight = require('inflight');

function testInflight() {
  let i = 0;
  function scheduleNext() {
    let key = `key-${i++}`;
    const callback = () => {
    };
    for (let j = 0; j < 1000000; j++) {
      inflight(key, callback);
    }

    setImmediate(scheduleNext);
  }


  if (i % 100 === 0) {
    console.log(process.memoryUsage());
  }

  scheduleNext();
}

testInflight();

Remediation

There is no fixed version for inflight.

References

medium severity

Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Vulnerable module: js-yaml
  • Introduced through: js-yaml@3.6.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 js-yaml@3.6.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to js-yaml@3.13.0.

Overview

js-yaml is a human-friendly data serialization language.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The parsing of a specially crafted YAML file may exhaust the system resources.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade js-yaml to version 3.13.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The library could be tricked into adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a constructor or __proto__ payload.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--__proto__.injected0 value0'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected0 === 'value0'); // true

require('minimist')('--constructor.prototype.injected1 value1'.split(' '));
console.log(({}).injected1 === 'value1'); // true

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.1, 1.2.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: glob-parent
  • Introduced through: babel-cli@6.18.0 and webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 glob-parent@2.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 glob-parent@2.0.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@2.2.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 parse-glob@3.0.4 glob-base@0.3.0 glob-parent@2.0.0
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 parse-glob@3.0.4 glob-base@0.3.0 glob-parent@2.0.0

Overview

glob-parent is a package that helps extracting the non-magic parent path from a glob string.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The enclosure regex used to check for strings ending in enclosure containing path separator.

PoC by Yeting Li

var globParent = require("glob-parent")
function build_attack(n) {
var ret = "{"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += "/"
}

return ret;
}

globParent(build_attack(5000));

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade glob-parent to version 5.1.2 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: loader-utils
  • Introduced through: babel-loader@6.2.7, eslint-loader@1.6.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-loader@6.2.7 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint-loader@1.6.1 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint-loader@1.6.2.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 source-map-loader@0.1.5 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to source-map-loader@0.2.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the resourcePath variable in interpolateName.js.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.2, 2.0.4, 3.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: loader-utils
  • Introduced through: babel-loader@6.2.7, eslint-loader@1.6.1 and others

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-loader@6.2.7 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to babel-loader@7.0.0.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint-loader@1.6.1 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint-loader@1.6.2.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 source-map-loader@0.1.5 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to source-map-loader@0.2.4.
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 loader-utils@0.2.17
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in interpolateName function via the URL variable.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade loader-utils to version 1.4.2, 2.0.4, 3.2.1 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber, trim and trimEnd functions.

POC

var lo = require('lodash');

function build_blank (n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}

return ret + "1";
}

var s = build_blank(50000)
var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0)

var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s)
var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1)

var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s)
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2)

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.21 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: uglify-js
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 uglify-js@2.7.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@3.0.0.

Overview

uglify-js is a JavaScript parser, minifier, compressor and beautifier toolkit.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the string_template and the decode_template functions.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade uglify-js to version 3.14.3 or higher.

References

medium severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: xml2js
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xml2js@0.4.15
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.1354.0.

Overview

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to allowing an external attacker to edit or add new properties to an object. This is possible because the application does not properly validate incoming JSON keys, thus allowing the __proto__ property to be edited.

PoC

var parseString = require('xml2js').parseString;

let normal_user_request    = "<role>admin</role>";
let malicious_user_request = "<__proto__><role>admin</role></__proto__>";

const update_user = (userProp) => {
    // A user cannot alter his role. This way we prevent privilege escalations.
    parseString(userProp, function (err, user) {
        if(user.hasOwnProperty("role") && user?.role.toLowerCase() === "admin") {
            console.log("Unauthorized Action");
        } else {
            console.log(user?.role[0]);
        }
    });
}

update_user(normal_user_request);
update_user(malicious_user_request);

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade xml2js to version 0.5.0 or higher.

References

medium severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: lodash
  • Introduced through: aws-sdk@2.6.15

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 aws-sdk@2.6.15 xmlbuilder@2.6.2 lodash@3.5.0
    Remediation: Upgrade to aws-sdk@2.38.0.

Overview

lodash is a modern JavaScript utility library delivering modularity, performance, & extras.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It parses dates using regex strings, which may cause a slowdown of 2 seconds per 50k characters.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade lodash to version 4.17.11 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: braces
  • Introduced through: babel-cli@6.18.0 and webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 babel-cli@6.18.0 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 watchpack@0.2.9 chokidar@1.7.0 anymatch@1.3.2 micromatch@2.3.11 braces@1.8.5
    Remediation: Upgrade to webpack@2.2.0.

Overview

braces is a Bash-like brace expansion, implemented in JavaScript.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). It used a regular expression (^\{(,+(?:(\{,+\})*),*|,*(?:(\{,+\})*),+)\}) in order to detects empty braces. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 50K characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 16th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Feb 18th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Feb 19th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade braces to version 2.3.1 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: clean-css
  • Introduced through: ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 ember-cli-preprocess-registry@3.3.0 broccoli-clean-css@1.1.0 clean-css-promise@0.1.1 clean-css@3.4.28
    Remediation: Upgrade to ember-cli-preprocess-registry@5.0.0.

Overview

clean-css is a fast and efficient CSS optimizer for Node.js platform and any modern browser.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). attacks. This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 70k characters long.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Feb 15th, 2018 - Initial Disclosure to package owner
  • Feb 20th, 2018 - Initial Response from package owner
  • Mar 6th, 2018 - Fix issued
  • Mar 7th, 2018 - Vulnerability published

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade clean-css to version 4.1.11 or higher.

References

low severity

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

  • Vulnerable module: eslint
  • Introduced through: eslint@3.9.1

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 eslint@3.9.1
    Remediation: Upgrade to eslint@4.18.2.

Overview

eslint is a pluggable linting utility for JavaScript and JSX

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). This can cause an impact of about 10 seconds matching time for data 100k characters long.

Details

Denial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.

The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.

Let’s take the following regular expression as an example:

regex = /A(B|C+)+D/

This regular expression accomplishes the following:

  • A The string must start with the letter 'A'
  • (B|C+)+ The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the + matches one or more times). The + at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.
  • D Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'

The expression would match inputs such as ABBD, ABCCCCD, ABCBCCCD and ACCCCCD

It most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD")'
0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total

$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test("ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCX")'
1.79s user 0.02s system 99% cpu 1.812 total

The entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.

Most Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.

Let's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: "ACCCX". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:

  1. CCC
  2. CC+C
  3. C+CC
  4. C+C+C.

The engine has to try each of those combinations to see if any of them potentially match against the expression. When you combine that with the other steps the engine must take, we can use RegEx 101 debugger to see the engine has to take a total of 38 steps before it can determine the string doesn't match.

From there, the number of steps the engine must use to validate a string just continues to grow.

String Number of C's Number of steps
ACCCX 3 38
ACCCCX 4 71
ACCCCCX 5 136
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX 14 65,553

By the time the string includes 14 C's, the engine has to take over 65,000 steps just to see if the string is valid. These extreme situations can cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size, as shown above), allowing an attacker to exploit this and can cause the service to excessively consume CPU, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Remediation

Upgrade eslint to version 4.18.2 or higher.

References

low severity

Prototype Pollution

  • Vulnerable module: minimist
  • Introduced through: webpack@1.13.3

Detailed paths

  • Introduced through: atomable@atomable/atomable#0e390d5f17accdfe409e86ddf1efe6dbcfd81a36 webpack@1.13.3 optimist@0.6.1 minimist@0.0.10

Overview

minimist is a parse argument options module.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to a missing handler to Function.prototype.

Notes:

  • This vulnerability is a bypass to CVE-2020-7598

  • The reason for the different CVSS between CVE-2021-44906 to CVE-2020-7598, is that CVE-2020-7598 can pollute objects, while CVE-2021-44906 can pollute only function.

PoC by Snyk

require('minimist')('--_.constructor.constructor.prototype.foo bar'.split(' '));
console.log((function(){}).foo); // bar

Details

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as __proto__, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

There are two main ways in which the pollution of prototypes occurs:

  • Unsafe Object recursive merge

  • Property definition by path

Unsafe Object recursive merge

The logic of a vulnerable recursive merge function follows the following high-level model:

merge (target, source)

  foreach property of source

    if property exists and is an object on both the target and the source

      merge(target[property], source[property])

    else

      target[property] = source[property]

When the source object contains a property named __proto__ defined with Object.defineProperty() , the condition that checks if the property exists and is an object on both the target and the source passes and the merge recurses with the target, being the prototype of Object and the source of Object as defined by the attacker. Properties are then copied on the Object prototype.

Clone operations are a special sub-class of unsafe recursive merges, which occur when a recursive merge is conducted on an empty object: merge({},source).

lodash and Hoek are examples of libraries susceptible to recursive merge attacks.

Property definition by path

There are a few JavaScript libraries that use an API to define property values on an object based on a given path. The function that is generally affected contains this signature: theFunction(object, path, value)

If the attacker can control the value of “path”, they can set this value to __proto__.myValue. myValue is then assigned to the prototype of the class of the object.

Types of attacks

There are a few methods by which Prototype Pollution can be manipulated:

Type Origin Short description
Denial of service (DoS) Client This is the most likely attack.
DoS occurs when Object holds generic functions that are implicitly called for various operations (for example, toString and valueOf).
The attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr and alters its state to an unexpected value such as Int or Object. In this case, the code fails and is likely to cause a denial of service.
For example: if an attacker pollutes Object.prototype.toString by defining it as an integer, if the codebase at any point was reliant on someobject.toString() it would fail.
Remote Code Execution Client Remote code execution is generally only possible in cases where the codebase evaluates a specific attribute of an object, and then executes that evaluation.
For example: eval(someobject.someattr). In this case, if the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.someattr they are likely to be able to leverage this in order to execute code.
Property Injection Client The attacker pollutes properties that the codebase relies on for their informative value, including security properties such as cookies or tokens.
For example: if a codebase checks privileges for someuser.isAdmin, then when the attacker pollutes Object.prototype.isAdmin and sets it to equal true, they can then achieve admin privileges.

Affected environments

The following environments are susceptible to a Prototype Pollution attack:

  • Application server

  • Web server

  • Web browser

How to prevent

  1. Freeze the prototype— use Object.freeze (Object.prototype).

  2. Require schema validation of JSON input.

  3. Avoid using unsafe recursive merge functions.

  4. Consider using objects without prototypes (for example, Object.create(null)), breaking the prototype chain and preventing pollution.

  5. As a best practice use Map instead of Object.

For more information on this vulnerability type:

Arteau, Oliver. “JavaScript prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application.” GitHub, 26 May 2018

Remediation

Upgrade minimist to version 0.2.4, 1.2.6 or higher.

References