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* Check if node version supports asymmetricKeyDetails

* Validate algorithms for ec key type

* Rename variable

* Rename function

* Add early return for symmetric keys

* Validate algorithm for RSA key type

* Validate algorithm for RSA-PSS key type

* Check key types for EdDSA algorithm

* Rename function

* Move validateKey function to module

* Convert arrow to function notation

* Validate key in verify function

* Simplify if

* Convert if to switch..case

* Guard against empty key in validation

* Remove empty line

* Add lib to check modulus length

* Add modulus length checks

* Validate mgf1HashAlgorithm and saltLength

* Check node version before using key details API

* Use built-in modulus length getter

* Fix Node version validations

* Remove duplicate validateKey

* Add periods to error messages

* Fix validation in verify function

* Make asymmetric key validation the latest validation step

* Change key curve validation

* Remove support for ES256K

* Fix old test that was using wrong key types to sign tokens

* Enable RSA-PSS for old Node versions

* Add specific RSA-PSS validations on Node 16 LTS+

* Improve error message

* Simplify key validation code

* Fix typo

* Improve error message

* Change var to const in test

* Change const to let to avoid reassigning problem

* Improve error message

* Test incorrect private key type

* Rename invalid to unsupported

* Test verifying of jwt token with unsupported key

* Test invalid private key type

* Change order of object parameters

* Move validation test to separate file

* Move all validation tests to separate file

* Add prime256v1 ec key

* Remove modulus length check

* WIP: Add EC key validation tests

* Fix node version checks

* Fix error message check on test

* Add successful tests for EC curve check

* Remove only from describe

* Remove `only`

* Remove duplicate block of code

* Move variable to a different scope and make it const

* Convert allowed curves to object for faster lookup

* Rename variable

* Change variable assignment order

* Remove unused object properties

* Test RSA-PSS happy path and wrong length

* Add missing tests

* Pass validation if no algorithm has been provided

* Test validation of invalid salt length

* Test error when signing token with invalid key

* Change var to const/let in verify tests

* Test verifying token with invalid key

* Improve test error messages

* Add parameter to skip private key validation

* Replace DSA key with a 4096 bit long key

* Test allowInvalidPrivateKeys in key signing

* Improve test message

* Rename variable

* Add key validation flag tests

* Fix variable name in Readme

* Change private to public dsa key in verify

* Rename flag

* Run EC validation tests conditionally

* Fix tests in old node versions

* Ignore block of code from test coverage

* Separate EC validations tests into two different ones

* Add comment

* Wrap switch in if instead of having an early return

* Remove unsupported algorithms from asymmetric key validation

* Rename option to allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes and improve Readme

* 9.0.0

* adding migration notes to readme

* adding changelog for version 9.0.0

Co-authored-by: julienwoll <julien.wollscheid@auth0.com>
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edgarchirivella-okta and julienwoll committed Dec 21, 2022
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18 changes: 18 additions & 0 deletions CHANGELOG.md
Expand Up @@ -4,6 +4,24 @@
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file starting from version **v4.0.0**.
This project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](http://semver.org/).

## 9.0.0 - 2022-12-21

**Breaking changes: See [Migration from v8 to v9](https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/wiki/Migration-Notes:-v8-to-v9)**

### Breaking changes

- Removed support for Node versions 11 and below.
- The verify() function no longer accepts unsigned tokens by default. ([834503079514b72264fd13023a3b8d648afd6a16]https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/commit/834503079514b72264fd13023a3b8d648afd6a16)
- RSA key size must be 2048 bits or greater. ([ecdf6cc6073ea13a7e71df5fad043550f08d0fa6]https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/commit/ecdf6cc6073ea13a7e71df5fad043550f08d0fa6)
- Key types must be valid for the signing / verification algorithm

### Security fixes

- security: fixes `Arbitrary File Write via verify function` - CVE-2022-23529
- security: fixes `Insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify() could lead to signature validation bypass` - CVE-2022-23540
- security: fixes `Insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC` - CVE-2022-23541
- security: fixes `Unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage` - CVE-2022-23539

## 8.5.1 - 2019-03-18

### Bug fix
Expand Down
4 changes: 3 additions & 1 deletion README.md
Expand Up @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ $ npm install jsonwebtoken

# Migration notes

* [From v8 to v9](https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/wiki/Migration-Notes:-v8-to-v9)
* [From v7 to v8](https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/wiki/Migration-Notes:-v7-to-v8)

# Usage
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ When signing with RSA algorithms the minimum modulus length is 2048 except when
* `keyid`
* `mutatePayload`: if true, the sign function will modify the payload object directly. This is useful if you need a raw reference to the payload after claims have been applied to it but before it has been encoded into a token.
* `allowInsecureKeySizes`: if true allows private keys with a modulus below 2048 to be used for RSA
* `allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes`: if true, allows asymmetric keys which do not match the specified algorithm. This option is intended only for backwards compatability and should be avoided.



Expand Down Expand Up @@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ As mentioned in [this comment](https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/issues
> Eg: `1000`, `"2 days"`, `"10h"`, `"7d"`. A numeric value is interpreted as a seconds count. If you use a string be sure you provide the time units (days, hours, etc), otherwise milliseconds unit is used by default (`"120"` is equal to `"120ms"`).
* `clockTimestamp`: the time in seconds that should be used as the current time for all necessary comparisons.
* `nonce`: if you want to check `nonce` claim, provide a string value here. It is used on Open ID for the ID Tokens. ([Open ID implementation notes](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#NonceNotes))

* `allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes`: if true, allows asymmetric keys which do not match the specified algorithm. This option is intended only for backwards compatability and should be avoided.

```js
// verify a token symmetric - synchronous
Expand Down
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions lib/asymmetricKeyDetailsSupported.js
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
const semver = require('semver');

module.exports = semver.satisfies(process.version, '>=15.7.0');
3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions lib/rsaPssKeyDetailsSupported.js
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
const semver = require('semver');

module.exports = semver.satisfies(process.version, '>=16.9.0');
66 changes: 66 additions & 0 deletions lib/validateAsymmetricKey.js
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
const ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DETAILS_SUPPORTED = require('./asymmetricKeyDetailsSupported');
const RSA_PSS_KEY_DETAILS_SUPPORTED = require('./rsaPssKeyDetailsSupported');

const allowedAlgorithmsForKeys = {
'ec': ['ES256', 'ES384', 'ES512'],
'rsa': ['RS256', 'PS256', 'RS384', 'PS384', 'RS512', 'PS512'],
'rsa-pss': ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512']
};

const allowedCurves = {
ES256: 'prime256v1',
ES384: 'secp384r1',
ES512: 'secp521r1',
};

module.exports = function(algorithm, key) {
if (!algorithm || !key) return;

const keyType = key.asymmetricKeyType;
if (!keyType) return;

const allowedAlgorithms = allowedAlgorithmsForKeys[keyType];

if (!allowedAlgorithms) {
throw new Error(`Unknown key type "${keyType}".`);
}

if (!allowedAlgorithms.includes(algorithm)) {
throw new Error(`"alg" parameter for "${keyType}" key type must be one of: ${allowedAlgorithms.join(', ')}.`)
}

/*
* Ignore the next block from test coverage because it gets executed
* conditionally depending on the Node version. Not ignoring it would
* prevent us from reaching the target % of coverage for versions of
* Node under 15.7.0.
*/
/* istanbul ignore next */
if (ASYMMETRIC_KEY_DETAILS_SUPPORTED) {
switch (keyType) {
case 'ec':
const keyCurve = key.asymmetricKeyDetails.namedCurve;
const allowedCurve = allowedCurves[algorithm];

if (keyCurve !== allowedCurve) {
throw new Error(`"alg" parameter "${algorithm}" requires curve "${allowedCurve}".`);
}
break;

case 'rsa-pss':
if (RSA_PSS_KEY_DETAILS_SUPPORTED) {
const length = parseInt(algorithm.slice(-3), 10);
const { hashAlgorithm, mgf1HashAlgorithm, saltLength } = key.asymmetricKeyDetails;

if (hashAlgorithm !== `sha${length}` || mgf1HashAlgorithm !== hashAlgorithm) {
throw new Error(`Invalid key for this operation, its RSA-PSS parameters do not meet the requirements of "alg" ${algorithm}.`);
}

if (saltLength !== undefined && saltLength > length >> 3) {
throw new Error(`Invalid key for this operation, its RSA-PSS parameter saltLength does not meet the requirements of "alg" ${algorithm}.`)
}
}
break;
}
}
}
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "jsonwebtoken",
"version": "8.5.1",
"version": "9.0.0",
"description": "JSON Web Token implementation (symmetric and asymmetric)",
"main": "index.js",
"nyc": {
Expand Down
12 changes: 11 additions & 1 deletion sign.js
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
const timespan = require('./lib/timespan');
const PS_SUPPORTED = require('./lib/psSupported');
const validateAsymmetricKey = require('./lib/validateAsymmetricKey');
const jws = require('jws');
const {includes, isBoolean, isInteger, isNumber, isPlainObject, isString, once} = require('lodash')
const { KeyObject, createSecretKey, createPrivateKey } = require('crypto')
Expand All @@ -22,7 +23,8 @@ const sign_options_schema = {
noTimestamp: { isValid: isBoolean, message: '"noTimestamp" must be a boolean' },
keyid: { isValid: isString, message: '"keyid" must be a string' },
mutatePayload: { isValid: isBoolean, message: '"mutatePayload" must be a boolean' },
allowInsecureKeySizes: { isValid: isBoolean, message: '"allowInsecureKeySizes" must be a boolean'}
allowInsecureKeySizes: { isValid: isBoolean, message: '"allowInsecureKeySizes" must be a boolean'},
allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes: { isValid: isBoolean, message: '"allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes" must be a boolean'}
};

const registered_claims_schema = {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -166,6 +168,14 @@ module.exports = function (payload, secretOrPrivateKey, options, callback) {
return failure(error);
}

if (!options.allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes) {
try {
validateAsymmetricKey(header.alg, secretOrPrivateKey);
} catch (error) {
return failure(error);
}
}

const timestamp = payload.iat || Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);

if (options.noTimestamp) {
Expand Down
36 changes: 36 additions & 0 deletions test/dsa-private.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIGWAIBAAKCAgEArzbPbt//BQpsYsnoZR4R9nXgcuvcXoH8WZjRsb4ZPfVJGchG
7CfRMlG0HR34vcUpehNj5pAavErhfNnk1CEal0TyDsOkBY/+JG239zXgRzMYjSE6
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VN66AIpxSF0MG1OEmgD+noHMI7moclw/nw+ZUPaIFxvPstlD4EsPDkdE0I6x3k3b
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emFIhVphNHqQt20Tq6WVRBx+p4+YNWiThvmLtmLh0QghdnUrJZxyXx7/p8K5SE9/
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hmw0HnOrgbWt4lRkxOra281hL74xcgtgMZQ32PTOy8wTEVTk03mmqlIq/dV4jgBc
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e1YOro6e0mUqAiEAx4K3cPG3dxH91uU3L+sS2vzqXEVn2BmSMmkGczSOgn4=
-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
36 changes: 36 additions & 0 deletions test/dsa-public.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIGSDCCBDoGByqGSM44BAEwggQtAoICAQCvNs9u3/8FCmxiyehlHhH2deBy69xe
gfxZmNGxvhk99UkZyEbsJ9EyUbQdHfi9xSl6E2PmkBq8SuF82eTUIRqXRPIOw6QF
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y0elWU3mxe6Rn6R7WHM8or7sX3tWDq6OntJlKg==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

11 comments on commit e1fa9dc

@nickhobbs94
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NIST has given the CVE for this at 9.8 severity. NIST CVE-2022-23540
Based on the comments here that seems way too high.

Is it correct that a secretOrPublicKey must not be specified for the algorithm to be set to none? Could the advisory be updated to note this? Right now it says everybody is vulnerable if they don't specify the algorithm.

@julienwoll tagging you since you published the advisory.

@julienwoll
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Thanks @nickhobbs94, that was a great feedback, we updated the advisory: GHSA-qwph-4952-7xr6

@leumasme
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@leumasme leumasme commented on e1fa9dc Jan 9, 2023

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Is it just me or is CVE-2022-23529 / GHSA-27h2-hvpr-p74q complete nonsense?

The entire "vulnerability" is based on an object with a malicious toString function being passed - but the very existance of a malicious toString function should not happen in a sane situation.
If any deserializer allows creation of arbitrary functions, it's the deserializer that has a vulnerability - not a library that calls toString on the deserialized object (especially when the library explicitly states that
the argument should be of type String or Buffer, as this library does).

By this definition of a "vulnerability", even JSON.parse, which should obviously be safe for untrusted input, would be vulnerable

let x = {
    toString: () => console.error("PWNED !!11")
};
JSON.parse(x); // Logs "PWNED !!11"

Also taking the nonsensical "PoC" code into account (running code by creating a process exit event handler, then exiting the process instead of just running the code),
and the fact that this seems to have been submitted as "Arbitrary File Write via verify function" when it would just be a full RCE if it were real,
makes it seem like this was submitted by a complete beginner.

At the same time, the GHSA is marked as "GitHub Reviewed" so it somehow passed some sort of manual check?
Someone please enlighten me if this is nonsense or i'm just going insane.

@LaurenceJJones
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By this definition of a "vulnerability", even JSON.parse, which should obviously be safe for untrusted input, would be vulnerable

> let obj = { toString: ()=> {console.log("PWNED!!!");process.on('exit', () => {require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/owned.txt', 'Arb write on nodejs!!');});process.exit(0)}}
undefined
> JSON.parse(obj)
PWNED!!!
$ cat /tmp/owned.txt
───────┬─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
       │ File: owned.txt
───────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   1   │ Arb write on nodejs!!

existance of a malicious toString function should not happen in a sane situation.

Exactly unless there some sort of prototype pollution but in that case it would be a vulnerable application than the package but if we want to make sure then let the package take the reigns

@eoftedal
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This would even make console.log in node.js vulnerable:

let obj = { toString: ()=> {console.log("PWNED!!!");process.on('exit', () => {require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/owned.txt', 'Arb write on nodejs!!');});process.exit(0)}}
console.log("Look at this: " + obj)

The CVSS score of 7.6 from Github and 9.8 is NVD is completely overblown. If you can exploit this you already have RCE, because you can already supply code.

@leumasme
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This would even make console.log in node.js vulnerable:

Actually, in your example the string concatenation "x" + obj causes this, not console.log

@MichaelErmer
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@leumasme yes, its completely made up github/advisory-database#1595

@stypr
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@stypr stypr commented on e1fa9dc Jan 11, 2023

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Nice bug, I wish there was Legit Impact on Impact Metrics for CVSS..

@eoftedal
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@leumasme You are right, and that actually makes it worse 😄

@ilyash-b
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Is it just me or is CVE-2022-23529 / GHSA-27h2-hvpr-p74q complete nonsense?

I suspect it was ChatGPT generated

@Uzlopak
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const malicious = {
    toString: () => console.error("PWNED !!11")
};

'' + malicious

So there is a sec. Vuln. in nodejs?
Lol.

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